

International Relations

Approaches and Studies

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Edited by:
Constantin HLIHOR
Mihai RETEGAN

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International Relations: Approaches and Studies

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FOREWARD

During the last decades, mankind experienced a process of globalization described by the growing accentuation of the political, economic, social and cultural interdependences, no matter where the actors of the international politics were situated. In such circumstances, generated, on one hand, by the evolutions in the practices of the international relations (major economic crisis; the political and diplomatic uncertainty of some regions found in endemic crisis situations – the Balkans, the extended region of the Black Sea, the northern part of Africa etc;) and, on the other hand, by the decrease of the scientific credibility of some theories belonging to the field of international relations' scientific research, the failure or at least the reduced application of several methodologies, the inexistence of general accepted theories or a meta-theory, we welcome the publishing of a volume of studies that presents a theoretical as well as a historical approach to some “sequences” belonging to the theory and history of international relations.

Therefore, the topicality of the subjects presented in this volume is determined by the necessity to introduce some aspects regarding the theory as well as the history and practices of international relations to those interested.

As far as its theoretical dimension is concerned, the volume contains three studies that refer to the understanding of some complex phenomena of the international politics, such as the appearance of a new type of bipolarity produced by the contradiction

between the Christian and Islamic worlds, or the security issue¹. The distinguished professor and politician Tasin Gemil tackles a difficult issue found in the international relations after the Cold War period, that of the relations between the Christian and Muslim worlds. The author starts from the observation that nowadays the gap between the Christian and Islamic worlds gradually increases in a manner that is dangerous for the entire humankind, which is caused particularly by certain alarmists, hot-headed persons, bigots and fanatic activists that exist on both sides. The author tries to find the springs that could lead to diminishing the damage. To this purpose, he appeals to history arguing the fact that during the almost 14 centuries of existence of the Islam, the periods of understanding between Muslims and Christians prevailed in comparison to the ones of warfare. Moreover, bringing forward concrete examples from the current times, he presents the possibility of dialogue and intercultural cooperation as the only means for avoiding severe interreligious conflict. The security studies experienced the most accelerated trend of the theoretical researches because the international politics, following the end of the Cold War, in the complex context of the reconfiguration of the world order pattern and the change of the international system's structure, underwent profound geostrategic transformations, determined by the increase and diversification of the actors, both states and non-states, the resizing of the international security architecture in the context of conventional and unconventional risks and threats' amplification. Understanding these processes and phenomena could be accomplished more easily if the theory of rare events is applied in research and analysis. Many of the most significant events that are related to the security aspect in international politics are considered rare events, for example: wars, coups d'état, international revolutions, profound economic crisis, a shock caused by the increase in the energetic resources' consumption, etc.

¹ Tasin Gemil, *“War and peace” between the christian and muslim worlds*, p. 13; Ecaterina Hlihor, *Security from classic to postmodern in international relations*, p. 23; Gabriel Chirca, *Rare events events in the new global security equation – a challenge to both, the academic and intelligence communities in providing decision-making support*, p. 38.

They rarely occur and must be considered of high importance in the ulterior study of the evolutions in the international politics.

The international relations' historical dimension is represented in four studies that analyze the power rapports in both political and economic contexts, emphasizing the impact they have on the international relations of two eras, important when we discuss the configuration and reconfiguration of the power balance on the European continent: the 18th and 20th centuries².

According to Professor Victor Țvirunc the life of Swedish King Charles XII was abundant with dramatic events. Many of them drastically affected not only the fate of monarch personally, but also the fate of Sweden, neighboring countries and Europe as a whole. The clash between the Turkish-Tatar units and Swedish troops under the Swedish king at the village Varnitsa, February 1, 1713, which went down in history under the name of *Kalabalyk*, belonged to these events. This issue presents a new perspective on this tragic page of biography of the Swedish King Charles XII, based on the new documents, researched by the author in the Russian archives. The Second World War was, without doubt, one of the events that marked profoundly the evolution of the international relations in the second half of the last century, having both geostrategic and political and diplomatic consequences. The direct confrontation in the military theatres of operations played a crucial role in gaining the victory; however, the secret services' confrontation displayed in the "shadowed" battlefield is no less important, according to the opinion of Mr. Mihai Șerban. In order to strengthen these working hypotheses, 11 inedited documents from the archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service are presented in this volume. Professor Gavriil Preda brings to the public's attention some essential aspects

² Victor Țvirunc, *Kalabalyk. the failure of the swedish king*, p. 50; Gavriil Preda, *Soviet troops in Romania (1944-1958). Status and consequences*, p. 94; Mihai Șerban, *Political decisions in Romania during World War II taken on the basis of special intelligence service efforts*, p. 66; Ion Alexandrescu, *Romanian financial and economic crisis of the IXth decade of the twentiethy century: only a crisis of the system?*, p.135.

regarding the Red Army's status in Romania and, most important, the impact of this foreign presence on the Romanian territory had on the country's political evolution. The political, social and economic evolutions inside Moscow's sphere of influence demonstrated that the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of European states in central and south-eastern Europe has been the main tool used to install communist regimes in those countries. Stationing of Soviet troops in Romania in the period 1944–1958 was part of Soviet power strategy concerned with bringing to power and consolidation of a communist regime in Bucharest. The economic rapports between Romania and the financial international organisms – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – are presented in Professor's Ion Alexandrescu's study *The economic development of Romania in the 80's* was largely conditioned by the need to improve the current account balance to meet the external debt obligations, including interest, estimated at about two billion dollars annually, and to finance imports of capital equipment necessary to the restructuring of the economy. The significant improvements of the obvious trade balance and payment in the early years of the ninth decade were achieved mainly by reducing the administrative imports, coupled with a decline in consumption and investment. In 1989, after she had paid about \$ 23 billion for the liquidation of loans which amounted in 1981 to nearly \$ 11 billion, Romania was a country isolated from the international financial gear, low compared to other European countries, consistent with the economic and financial existing order, little obvious attempts reformed after the beginning of the ninth decade, later abandoned. But without external debts.

The volume presents the international relations' evolutions in the extended area of the Black Sea and the Balkan region³ in three studies focusing on the processes occurring in this part of the world after the Cold War. The identity issue and, more important, the role

³ Constantin Hlihor, *The geopolitics of national identity in Central and South East Europe: Continuity and discontinuity during the post Cold War era*, p. 172; Mihail Dobre, *Romania and the issue of international cooperation in the Black Sea area in the aftermath of the Cold War*, p. 195.

that the national identity played in the reconfiguration of the borders' architecture and the Balkans' security during the 19th and 20th centuries were central themes not only for historians but for the international relations' analysts as well. The intervention of external factors in this area that aimed to stabilize and secure it has not lead to the achievement of this proposed purpose as long as it had not been taken into consideration the national aspirations of peoples in the Balkan region. The Balkans' stability and security lasted as long as the Great Powers has the interest and capacity to maintain them. Each major crisis that occurred in the geostrategic balance of power generated a row of conflicts and crisis, difficult to control in this region of the world. While analyzing, on one hand, the policy of the states situated in the Black Sea region and, on the other hand, the geostrategic rapports between the different centres of power that were interested in the evolutions of the Black Sea's extended area, ambassador Mihail Dobre concludes that the security and stability of this region could be achieved and maintained through bi and multilateral cooperation. This cooperation could be beneficial if it is accomplished in two dimensions. The *first dimension* is related to the fact that a first initiative with a view to organizing an institutionalized cooperation between the Black Sea riparian states emerged soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. That initiative is presently known as the *Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation*. The *second dimension* brings to light the fact that the importance Romania attached to its participation in the sub-regional organizations, and in this context to the Black Sea initiative, was based on a concept that the authorities in Bucharest publicly defined in 1991.

The reading of this volume offers both new information and approaches regarding an exciting subject, that of the international relations, but also provides the opportunity to reflect on the messages that can have an impact on the thinking and practices of the contemporary international policy.

Constantin Hlihor, Mihai Retegan

București, septembrie 2013

“WAR AND PEACE” BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM WORLDS

Tasin GEMIL

For a long time, a part of western academic world and of the European public got used to conceive the relations between East and West, better said between the Muslim East and the Christian West, as antagonistic, conflicting relations naturally leading to long wars, uninterrupted until our days. Moreover, quite a few western authors affirm that such wars will also continue in the next intervals. It is not the place here to analyze causes and purposes of such catastrophic visions. In any case, they overcome the narrow frame of doctrinal contradictions and rivalries between the Christian and the Islamic religions, having a lot more pragmatic rivalries, of a political and especially economic nature.

A lot was written and still a lot is written about the so-called clash between the Islamic civilization and the Judeo-Christian one. Getting over the extremely well-known and inciting work of Samuel Huntington (in fact the idea belongs to Bernard Lewis), I confine myself here to giving two suggestive examples of relatively recent issue, within prestigious publishing houses, under the signature of two French writers, from two different generations, with most suggestive titles:

1. Thierry Camous, *Orienturi/Occidenturi 25 de secole de razboiae (Orients/Occidents 25 centuries of wars)*, Editura Cartier, Bucharest, 2009, 512 pp. (the original book appeared at Presses Universitaires de France in 2007).

2. Jean-Paul Roux, *Un choc de religions. La longue guerre de l'islam et la chrétienté 622-2007* (*A Shock of Religions, The Long War between Islam and Christianity 622-2007*), Fayard, Paris, 2007, 459 pp. (this book was also quickly translated and published into Romanian).

If the first author, Thierry Camous, is relatively young (born in 1971) and less known, instead the second, Jean-Paul Roux (1925-2009), is an undeniable celebrity, being renowned by his works concerning the history and civilization of old Turks from Central Asia, as well as of the Turkic-Muslim world as a whole.

T. Camous states at the beginning of his book that “*the story concerning relations between the western and eastern civilizations, surely does not only depend on carnages; it is also related with arts, sciences and thought. However – he says – **without the benefit of a doubt** (underlined by T.G.), the meetings between these two poles of civilization, intermingled and complementary, were more frequent on the battlefield than anywhere else, until they made up a sort of modus vivendi between Occidents and Orient: opposition, disagreement, conflict and, eventually, carnage*” (p. 11).

Jean-Paul Roux limits to 1375 years the war between East and West, accounting only for the war, considered as permanent, between the Islamic and the Christian worlds. According to the author’s opinion, this endless war “*started in 632 and which, for decades until the present day... there was not a year, a month, pr even a week without blood being shed by Christians or Muslims... This war is a reality. It had never really stopped*” (4th cover).

Both authors are trying to demonstrate the fact that the East and the West were and still are involved in a permanent war, a war whose end would still not be predictable. The judgment is dark and, in my opinion, faulty and harmful. It is a pity that it has been formulated by a scholar of the level of Jean-Paul Roux, who dedicated all his life to researching the eastern world and especially the Turkic peoples, including the Islamic period. This book of Jean-Paul Roux was openly written from the position of western Christian

circles alarmed by Islam’s propensity in western countries. “*In a few decades – concluded Jean-Paul Roux – in Europe there will be more believers in mosques than in temples and churches*” (p. 373).

Like others (for example, Jean-Pierre Valognes: “*l’Islam n’a cessé d’être en guerre contre le monde chrétien*”/ “*The islam never stopped being in a war against the Christian world*”), Jean-Paul Roux openly accuses the Islamic world of a ceaseless aggression against the Christian world. The only explanation of this unexpected attitude from Jean-Paul Roux, an attitude which recalls the crusader and islamophobic ones, would be the fact that, towards the end of his life, this great scholar became very religious. In fact, this last book of his is even dedicated to God (“*Je dédie ce livre à Dieu*”/ “*I dedicate this book to God*”, he wrote on the book’s dashboard).

Unfortunately, fears and islamophobic feelings led to extremes are shared by broad western circles, including intellectual circles. Some far right politicians have rushed in to take profit on such a state of spirit in order to win adherents, not only in their own country but also worldwide. For instance, Geert Wilders, president of the freedom Party and Member of the Dutch Parliament, in a discourse pronounced in New York, in the autumn of 2009, in front of international political decision-makers, launched serious attacks and insults against Islam and Muslims, called upon the US to do “*all that is possible in order to stop this Islamic stupidity*”. There are many people who link these calls for fight against Islam and the criminal, abominable actions undertaken lately (for example: the massacre against youth in Norway; public burning of the Koran in the USA, a fact generating violent reactions in Muslim countries etc.) by some Europeans and Americans in the name of defending Judeo-Christian values. Unfortunately, Internet pages are full of such ostracism and islamophobic incitement.

But it is no less true the fact that neither the other part is passive. There are many Muslim intellectuals that are not only sharing the conviction that the crusader assault of the Christian world, better said of the West, against the Islamic world has never

stopped, that current wars from Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Mali a. o. are nothing more than modern Crusades. It is also reminded that, in the past, Islamic states were a lot more tolerant with Christians and Jews than the Christian states were towards Muslims and Jews. Repeated attacks and massacres committed by crusaders for two centuries within the very Islamic countries, compulsions and crimes committed by Christian authorities against Muslim and Jewish communities from Spain, the systematic and tough oppression organized by western colonialists during the modern era against Muslim populations from North Africa, the Middle and Near East, as well as against those of South East Asia are arguments often invoked by Muslim militants in this current dispute which, unfortunately, is increasingly growing. These accusing voices against the Christian world are joined now by Muslim peoples and populations from the former Soviet space, oppressed for hundreds of years by the Christian power of Russian tsars and Bolsheviks.

During the 15th Eurasian Economic Summit of 10-12 April 2012, taking place in Istanbul under the theme “*Intercultural Dialogue: Culture of Peace – Avenue of Multiculturalism*”, the Secretary General of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, said as heavy as possible: “*I believe that it would not be an exaggeration on my part to state that the present day world is passing through a period of grave danger and uncertainty. The rise of right wing extremists in recent days in many societies is a cause of great alarm. They pursue an agenda of intolerance of cultural diversity and religious beliefs. These extremists groups and individuals comprise right wing politicians, fanatic and bigoted religious leaders, authors and civil society activists. While these elements may constitute a minority section in society but their capability to destabilize cannot be undermined*”. As one that has known Professor E. Ihsanoğlu for a long time, I can say that he is a very moderate Muslim leader, permanently open to dialogue and understanding.

As in the case of Christian accusations against Muslims, the latter’s accusations against Christians are neither ideological-religious but they are politically and economically motivated. Ultimately, the whole current Christian-Muslim conflict (I would rather call it **game**, but a **very dangerous** one, with a higher stake than the one from the 19th – 20th century) can be reduced to the essential relation between the energy demand and offer from the present and future world. The natural gas and oil reserves lie in a 70% proportion on the territory of Islamic counties, while the “hungry” energy market is made up for the most part of Christian countries (China and India are new players in this confrontation and their role is not yet clearly defined. In this context, the effect of recent hydrocarbon fields discoveries in Israel will be very interesting, of course if they are real and significant).

No doubt, both islamophobic Christians and christianophobic Muslims have many arguments both from the past and from today in order to demonstrate the validity of their points of view, even if they are completely opposite. But the fundamental problem that is raised today concerns the refusal of dialogue between the two worlds and the persistence of opposition by means of conflict, including war, be it asymmetric, or finding common elements, closeness factors in order to create connection and confidence bridges, able to prevent the violent clash between the two worlds, a clash that could this time have catastrophic consequences for the whole humanity?!

Simplifying at the maximum this highly topical historical dilemma, I think that it can be reduced to the well-known parable of the half full or half empty glass. Of course, the full half represents confidence and peace and the empty half means despair and devastating war. I want to believe that on both sides there are more of those who see the full half of the glass than those that by always raising alarm signals have the impression that they defend their own values, Christian or Islamic, without taking into account the huge risks induced by the constant state of alert and fear.

I want to believe that on both sides there are much more those who see the possibility of dialogue and understanding than those inciting to distrust and conflict. As a Muslim raised and educated as historian, politician and diplomat in a Christian environment, I am fully convinced of the fact that the two worlds and civilizations have coexisted during history, not only in conflicting relations, but also in understanding, at least for an equal amount of time. If, for example, Muslim assaults on the Christian Constantinople of the 8th and, then, 15th century (700 years after) and the Ottoman-Muslim attacks against Vienna, of 1529 and 1683 (thus, after an interval more than 150 years) are absolutized and a link is made between these historical events and nowadays' terrorist actions of New York, Madrid, London a. o., a conviction can be very easily induced in the conscience of the uninformed Christian that Muslims always aimed at hitting upon basic centres of the Christian world. As well as, absolutizing the 11th – 16th centuries Crusades and the colonial offensive of major Christian states against Muslim countries during the 19th – 20th centuries and linking them to current wars and tensions from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, North Africa etc. can create the feeling that the Christian world always wanted to occupy Islamic territory and subdue Muslims. Viewed with enough detachment, universal history offers, though, a different reality than the one the fearful, exalted and especially interested religious, political and economic circles from both sides are trying to depict today.

A simple calculation shows us that out of almost 14 centuries of coexistence between the Christian Western world and the Islamic Eastern one, intervals of conflict and war made up less than half. We are considering here the three centuries of crusades, followed by as many centuries of Turkish-Muslim expansion in Europe. But even during these six centuries of confrontations, wars were not permanent phenomena. For most of the time during this period, relations between aggressors and aggressed were peaceful, even marked by economic cooperation. Otherwise, it would have soon

come up not only to economic exhaustion but also the physical exhaustion of both sides. Also, it is worth remembering that not all the Christian world and not all the Muslim world led an armed fight one against the other, but only politico-military elites from certain countries leading their armies. There were big countries, such as the “over-Christian king” of France or the Safavid shah of Muslim Iran who, for economic or politico-strategic reasons, have for long period of time sided with the other camp. Even during the culmination of the Middle Age, it was not the religious ideologies that always led relations among states, but first of all economic and politico-strategic interests. Starting with the 16th century, when the West started to assiduously promote mercantilism and then capitalism, western businessmen practically started the assault on eastern markets, a complex phenomenon in which European chancelleries were also involved, which not seldom used violent means in order to achieve their economic purposes.

Instead, wars within the two ideologically antagonistic worlds were much more violent and destructive than those between them. For example, I think it is enough to enumerate, in the case of the Christian western world, the wars of: a Hundred years, Thirty years, Seven years, Northern Wars, American Independence Wars, Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars a. o. Most of these wars involved several European states, on one side or the other, being essentially continental or even world wars. We are not taking into account here the numerous civil wars that repeatedly devastated the main European countries. For the most part of it, the Islamic world remained uninvolved in these wars, including the two World Wars.

But Muslim states were neither spared of conflicts and wars, both internal and among them. As in the case of the western Christian world, intra-Islamic conflicts were stronger and lasted longer periods than those between Muslim and Christian states. Until towards the half of the 18th century, when Imperial Russia entered with a great force in the game, so for almost 400 years, the Ottoman Empire, as representative power of the Islamic world, was preoccupied more of

its rivalry and wars with the Muslim Persia, than of its European offensive, which took place only when pauses occurred in its eastern wars against Muslim enemies. Also, Mongol-Tartar campaigns of the 13th-15th centuries were broader in the east rather than in the west, for the simple reason that the Orient offered then a lot more riches than the West. And the famous Timur Lenk exclusively hit upon Islamic states, as he aimed at becoming the uncontested leader of the Muslim world. In spite of propagandistic declarations, the Ottoman-Russian wars of the 18th19th centuries did not have at all a religious character, as Muslim Ottomans were effectively supported by great powers of the western Christian world.

With the exception of the long crusader aggression in the East, on one hand, and the prolonged Turkish-Ottoman expansion in Europe, on the other hand, the western Christian and eastern Muslim worlds practically avoided not only direct confrontations, but also intense relations, especially at cultural level. Better said, until the modern era, between the two worlds there were not systematic bilateral exchanges, neither economic nor, least of all, cultural and inter-human. In fact, even in the modern era, economic-political and cultural-human relations between the two worlds were, until close to our days, unidirectional; more precisely, from the West to the East. This phenomenon was encouraged of course also by religious intolerance practiced for a long time in western countries against Muslims and Jews. Until the contemporary era, Muslims could not safely settle in western countries and even less practice freely their religious beliefs. Instead, within all Islamic countries, Christians, as well as Jews, enjoyed from the beginning a special status of autonomy and protection, as persons and as communities. This attitude was imposed by express provisions of Koran, which demanded to the Islamic state to protect non-Muslims which recognized its authority.

At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that the multi-lateral forceful rise of the West during the last three-four centuries and the increasing lagging behind of the Muslim Orient led to the accumulation of discontents and frustrations, which exploded during

the last four-five decades, also under the form of violent actions of terrorism and mass revolts. However, such phenomena are not characteristic to the whole Islamic world, but, usually, the western mass media presents all Muslims as potential terrorists, which causes as a reaction the accusation of all the Christian West of crusader thinking and anti-Islamic attitude. This serious error of judgment, of which are guilty in the first place the mass media channels, but also some western political and intellectual circles, should be revised with priority, if world peace and intercultural and religious cooperation are truly desired.

Turkic world Islam, which already reached a total population of almost 160 million, is different from that in the Arab and Iranian worlds, as well as from the one in the South East Asian world, both by ideological origin and especially through attitude and position towards the other religions. Turkic world adopted Islam starting with the 10th century, not very easily, with the condition of adapting it to the Central Asian ancestral tradition of tolerance and flexibility. To this end, a single example seems self-evident: within Ottoman law, besides the Islamic legislation called *Sher'iat*, there was also Turkish customary legislation of Central Asian origins called *Örf*, which was able to complete or even correct religious legislation. Turkic Islam is more permissive, more flexible than the one practiced in the rest of the Islamic world. Turks or Turkic powers did not impose Islam anywhere, as did the conquering Arab Muslims. The two important Turkic-Islamic states in history, the Golden Horde (1240-1502) and the Ottoman Empire (1301-1923) practiced an extended religious tolerance, which in fact meant protection and guarantee of ethnic and religious individuality concerning subjected non-Muslim peoples and communities.

It is thus explainable the new reforming movement of *Euro-Islam*, started in the Turkic world, especially among Tartar intellectual elite circles of Kazan. In fact this current is a renewal adapted to present conditions of a large Tartar movement to reform Islam, started in Kazan at the end of the 18th century and amplified in

Crimea at the end of the 19th century, called *Jadidism* (Renewal), and which spread across the whole Turkic-Muslim territory of the Tsarist Empire. Today, Euro-Islam is an innovating opinion current, meant to adapt principles of Islam to the requirements of the contemporary world. The purpose is to promote a non-dogmatic, pragmatic and modern Islam, compatible with the values of western civilization.

Beyond its aim for a structural reform, the Euro-Islam movement demonstrates the wish and capability of eastern Muslim world, at least of its Turkic segment, to achieve not only dialogue but also a close cooperation with the West, in view of integrating common moral and cultural values, but without losing its own spiritual identity. To this end, one can invoke the recent remarkable endeavours of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which annually organized, starting with 2008, great international forums in order to identify optimum paths for inter-cultural dialogue and achieving harmony in multiculturalism. Also called the “Baku Process”, these world level reunions are meant to join together people of different origins, with diverse educational backgrounds, from heterogeneous cultures, in order to bring them closer by means of projects and programmes in the field of culture and dialogue. It is expected for the “Baku Process” to have a significant role in consolidating cooperation, coexistence, peace, understanding, tolerance and intercultural relations between individuals and peoples.

SECURITY FROM CLASSIC TO POSTMODERN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ecaterina HLIHOR

The approach of security issues is no longer possible these days if considering only the state and its territory of sovereignty. The acceleration of the globalization process, the increase of the economic inter-dependence lead to the transfer of prosperity from a region to another, but also of diseases, unemployment, terrorism. These issues are no longer solved in the realistic way, by increasing the armies as in the past. Subsequently, the security policies can no longer be centered only on the security of the space of the state sovereignty, but also on the fundamental needs of the population.

Security as assumed policy by an actor within the interior of society, as well as strategy which is to define the compartment on the level of international relations tends to close up on the constructive vision of most states of liberal democracy.

The changes, sometimes dramatic, occurring in the international environment and implicitly in the *security objective reality/being*, have entailed to the theoreticians and analytical politicians the revision of paradigms they were operating within the research of security issues present in the contemporary world. More and more specialists asked themselves if it were not possible to build a model of analysis through the technique of hybridization of paradigms which should correspond to the mutations produced in the internal and international society.

One of the adepts of such solutions is without any doubt Francis Fukuyama as well. He has risen in the spotlight of the public

opinion during the last years, not only by the ideas promoted but also by the fact that he has reconsidered his theoretical model in time. He noticed that the ideas of non-conservationism came into an obvious contradiction with the reality of the contemporary international environment. Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that lately, a “conciliation” between the paradigms of non-conservationism and neo-liberalism is attempted. The result would be the emergence of a new trend he defines *Realistic Wilsonism*¹. The basic ideas do not surprise by novelty. Right from the beginning of the ninth decade of the past century Richard Rosecrance sustained that the international system cannot be understood only with the analytical tools of realism or liberalism, but it is necessary to use them both. We assist in fact in this case as well, to a reconsideration and indirect acknowledgment of the fact that the neo-liberal model is more adequate for the analysis of the contemporary international environment.

Fukuyama sustains that the adepts of neo-realism should “borrow” from the neo-liberals the vision about the state and its role in the international relations. Achieving the regional or global security is not possible if “*what goes on inside the states is not seriously tackled*”³. Consequently, from reasons of security another more powerful state must intervene in a weaker state to change the form of state and management of power. The legitimacy of this act is obtained by applying another principle which Fukuyama already sees as a reality of the present world, i.e. the increase of the degree “*of institutionalization between nations*”³. But this issue places under a question mark the legitimacy of the state as a result of “the social contract” validated not only by theory but also by democratic practice. The arbitrary and the policy of force could thus obtain an academic legitimacy and prestige. Who guarantees that selfish

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads – Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, translation by Andreea and Nicolae Năstase, Publishing House Antet, Bucharest, 2006, p. 9.

² Ibidem, p. 17.

³ Ibidem.

interests specific for the large powers shall not materialize in the behavior which proposes itself to supply security in the international environment by changing a political regime which he perceives as contrary to his interests and not to the ideological principles which he promotes? These assertions from the paradigm launched by F. Fukuyama are rather “tailored” to justify the intervention policy of the USA in the contemporary international environment. This vision and paradigm is brought to discussion by several theoreticians in Europe and not only.

The limits and impossibility to find pertinent answers to the issues connected to security have determined David Held also to attempt the technique of “hybridization” of paradigms. But apart from Fukuyama, he thinks that a closing up and a mixing of the basic ideas which neo-marxism relies upon with those belonging to the liberal democracy would solve the problems of security in the contemporary international environment.⁴ It is, we believe, very difficult to reconcile the paradigms which are based on fundamentally different beliefs, but Held warns us that if we fail to do so we risk not having adequate solutions for the challenges launched against security from the part of the forces and processes which accompany the phenomenon of globalization⁵. Until not long ago a clear distinction existed between external security and internal safety because, in security issues, the internal policy was traditionally separated from the external policy. The end of the Cold War and especially the globalization process diminish until vanishing, this separation.

The information technology has reduced the limits imposed in the past by space (distance) and time (duration) to the movement of capitals, labor force, services, ideas, which created a transnational process which no longer takes frontiers into account⁶. At the same

⁴ Martin Griffiths, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

⁵ David Held, *Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System in Economy and Society*, no. 20, 1991, p. 150.

⁶ See also Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Revolutionary Wealth*, Bucharest, Publishing House Antet, pp. 18-26.

time, the local factors, such as labor force, infrastructure, laws enable the local communities to attract capitals and investments. Thus, a network of economic, political and social relations emerges within which no difference can be made any longer between internal and international. From this point of view Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello believe that in spite of the efforts to study and understand the impact revolution has on the knowledge of security, “*the challenge launched by the revolution of information for security remains still unexplored, in terms of policies, as well as in issues of substance.*”⁷

More still, one already talks of “*internal policy at a global scale*”. The states are even stronger restrained in the so-called international regimes, as a result of the agreements concluded to regulate the issues which they cannot solve alone. The international law has introduced more and more norms and rules which limit to an even greater extent the sphere of classic sovereignty and of territorial law. Contemplated from here, says Held, aspects of the internal political life acquire global significances. The states can no longer solve alone a series of transnational problems if they do not cooperate. Thus, one reaches a single security agenda with a global character⁸. This is how the concept global security emerged. The principle *rex est imperator in regno suo* seems not to have any relevance today any more. The national elite whose main responsibility was to defend security seems to have been replaced by an internationalist one. From this perspective, the threats at the address of security shall no longer be launched from the part of the states as actors and shall no longer have the characteristic of „territoriality”, as in the past. Many of these shall originate from the economic, financial field, from the natural and social environment, from the

⁷ Johan Eriksson, Giampiero Giacomello, *The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations: (IR) relevant Theory?* in *International Political Science Review*, vol. 27, 2006, on line <http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/27/3/221>.

⁸ David Held, *op. cit.*, in *loc. cit.*, p. 151.

demographic growth and the diminishing of the food, water and energy resources⁹.

We witness in fact a period of transition, not necessarily towards a globalization of security, but rather towards an acceptance of such a generally accepted definition about the theoretical development, but also about the practical one of the security policies. Only that the attitude and behavior in matters of security are not always regulated by theoretical and methodological principles of any of the consecrated theories of security, but by the needs to find quickly solutions to the acute problems of the international environment and which cannot wait for the respective theoretic clarifications. The need of theoretic clarifications with an integrator character and alignment of the studies and researches on security to the concepts and theories with significances in the field of international relations comes from the necessity to argument and justify the political actions of the states that have different behaviors when confronted with threats and dangers of any kind¹⁰.

This need was felt even stronger at the beginning of the '90s. It was a period when major changes in the international European and worldwide practice occurred which brought about a wave of optimism in the political-strategic evaluation process. This fact determined the appearance of some new perspectives of the theoretical and practical approach of the *security* domain. After a very short time a series of problems appeared for all states under transition, in the interior, but mostly in the relations between them, showing that peace and security are fragile and cannot be thought of and pre-determined in the logics of classical paradigms¹¹.

The prognosis and critical evaluation of the perspectives on the level of security experienced a passage towards a new approach

⁹ Michael Klare, *Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms*, in **Current History**, November 1996, online, <http://www.currenthistory.com/archivenov96/klare.html>

¹⁰ Donald M. Snow, *quoted works*, p. 13.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

by ideas, from the preponderent military concept, designed and promoted for centuries, to a complex one from the aspect of concept and practice. It includes along with the military and diplomatic component also the financial, technological, informational, economic, cultural one, etc. which have their own finalities and act as elements of interference and are complementary to the generation and maintaining of the state of security.

From this approach, *security* is more and more understood¹² as *a relation between the capacity of an actor to carry out actions for the elimination of threats and removal of one`s own vulnerabilities and the possibility of maintaining its physical/functional integrity and defending one`s own values*. It is a possible definition, subject to improvement and which opens a new perspective of understanding of a field where the consensus in the approach is far from being achieved. Not even from a semantic point of view can the consensus with regard to the definition of the notion of security be obtained¹³.

Referring to the evolution of the security studies in Europe, Ole Waever considers that the changes of paradigm have occurred around three major research centers: Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris¹⁴. The Aberystwyth Group (Critical Security Studies) is concentrated on the studies regarding individual security and less on the national or regional one. The researches carried out here are based on the paradigm introduced decades ago in the European social-political thinking by the well-known School of Frankfurt. The Group of Copenhagen (known in our country too due to the

¹² Michael Klare, *op. cit.*, in *loc. cit.*

¹³ Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict*, in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, New York: St. Martin`s Press, 1994, pp. 298-299.

¹⁴ Apud, Rens Van Munster, *Review Essay: Security on a Shoestring: A Hitchhiker`s Guide to Critical Schools of Security in Europe*, in **Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association**, vol. 42(2), 2007, p. 235–243, on line <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/42/2/235>.

translation of the works of B. Buzan by the sociologist and specialist in security studies Ionel Nicu Sava from the University of Bucharest) has focused the research on the dimensions and components of the security process but has also approached issues which pertain to the sentiment of fear and insecurity¹⁵. The Paris School is centered on the research of security policies and on the identification of the factors which de-secure a society. It is a sociological approach of the security phenomenon and starts from the premise that security must be understood as „*an exceptional speech act*”¹⁶. The Paris researchers try to decipher how a well built and functional bureaucracy could supply society with the security it needs.

Constructivism, despite of all contestations and criticism it suffers¹⁷, offers a methodological and practical frame for the understanding of the security phenomenon, but mainly of the manner in which people act to procure security. In our opinion, this school seems to bring in the theory of international relations a way of conciliation between the paradigms but also a more adequate perspective of understanding the problems of security of the contemporary world¹⁸. The stake of the researches of this school is the switching of the gravity center from the cause analysis of the security issues (why do wars appear; what determines the building of the political-military alliances and how can they function; why does the weapon race appear, etc.) in which the explanation is given by the understanding

¹⁵ Ibidem

¹⁶ Ibidem

¹⁷ Samuel J. Barkin, *Realist Constructivism*, in **International Studies Review** no.5/2003, p. 332.

¹⁸ Keith Krause, *Approche critique et constructiviste des études de sécurité*, in **AFRI**, volume IV, on line http://www.afri-ct.org/article.php3?id_article=539; other works signed by the same author can also be consulted: Keith Krause, *A Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Program of Critical Security Studies*, **Cooperation and Conflict**, vol. 33, no 3, septembre 1998, p. 299-334; Keith Krause/Michael C. Williams, *A Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods*, **Mershon International Studies Review**, vol. 40, no 2, octobre 1996, pp. 229-254

of the relation between the states/other actors of the interests they promote at a certain moment and of the power relationships, on an analysis of the social-political context in which this type of problems occur. The culture, the values people believe in at a certain moment, the image they have about the binom peace-war and about its part played in the definition of the behavior of the states in the international environment are very important in the perception and understanding of security¹⁹. According to Samuel J. Barkin, “*what actors undertake in the international relations, the interests they promote and the political or security structures which they prefer to act in are defined rather by ideas and social norms than by objective material conditions*”²⁰.

From this perspective, the constructivists consider that in order to have an adequate image on security the *manner in which states perceive each other* and how they model their interests depending on the changes occurring in the internal context of a society but nevertheless in the international one is very important²¹. The adepts of the classical theories regarding security believe that instability, crisis, and war appear as a result of the contradictions of interests and the changes taking place in the power equation at a regional or global level. Karl W. Deutsch, referring to this aspect, appreciated that the large wars or the so-called limited conflicts were generated “*to a larger proportion than 50% of the cases*”, by errors of perception

¹⁹ See, Richard K. Ashley, *The Poverty of Neorealism*, in vol. Robert O. Keohane (dir.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986; Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1989, p. 327.

²⁰ Samuel J. Barkin, *op., cit., in loc., cit.*, p. 338

²¹ Roxanne Doty, *Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines*, **International Studies Quarterly**, vol. 37, no 3, septembre 1993, pp. 297- 320; Martin Hollis/Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, passim; Steve Smith, *Reflectivist and constructivist approaches to international theory* in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds, *op., cit.*, pp. 225-227.

“with regard to the relevant intentions and capacities of other nations”²². In fact, John J. Mearsheimer, one of the important representatives of offensive neorealism tried recently to contradict such a point of view, stating that, in fact, the perception errors are unavoidable in the international relations, since a state shall never have sufficient information to make a decision connected to peace or war.²³ Considering this, the researches of Jef Huymans’ can be useful in understanding the role language plays in society the manner in which security issues may be perceived but also the possibility to eliminate the perception errors²⁴. We perceive threats, risks, we observe that society is vulnerable, but could we know all these without knowing and accepting the significance of certain definitions? And how could we do it without using an adequate vocabulary?

The question still prevailing today, although more than two decades have passed since the observations of Deutsch, is whether the frequency of the perception errors is connected to the nature of the political regime, “to the weaknesses” of the analysis and expertise techniques and methods analysts use in counseling the decision factors in the external policy of the states, mainly in situations of crisis or of the use of an inadequate conceptual device? We believe that partly, the answer lies in the ideological grid of interpreting the contemporary conflictual phenomenon but also in knowledge. People feel the need of a “*cognitive consonance*”²⁵, with regard to what they know, but also to what they wish. They wish that the world they live in should have a meaning and should be a part of a whole in a significant and controllable manner. *The construction of this*

²² Karl W. Deutsch, *Analiza relațiilor internaționale*, Publishing House Tehnica-Info, Chișinău, 2006, pp. 51-52.

²³ John Mearsheimer, *op., cit.*, pp. 31-32.

²⁴ Jef Huymans, *The Politics of Insecurity, Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London, Routledge, 2006; Idem, *Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security*, în **Alternatives**, Special Issue, Vol. 27, 2002, pp. 41-62.

²⁵ Karl W. Deutsch, p. 51.

meaning is done by *communication*, acquisitions of information and comparison with one's own image on the international environment. If the acquired information do not match the own image there is a high probability that it should be rejected and cause sentiments of frustration, rejection, suspicion. Deutsch is right when stating that "we all bear in mind simplifying and more or less realistic images on the world we live in. Most often these images are partially realistic and imaginary, but in any situation they confer us through their solidity and good order a sentiment of safety. We usually admit these images so apriorically, that we are not even conscious of them. We are very convinced of our own realism, but we are frightened by the ideological «blinding» of other persons – or of other nations – which do not share our points of view."²⁶

The force with which this acceptance/attachment mechanism to a series of embedded images referring to the own country/community and to other countries acts and the negation/rejection of information which does not overlap with the preconceived ideas accepted provide us with some answers connected to the behavior of states on the level of secure activity. For the defense of the state and nation they belonged to, in the 19th century and in the first half of the next one, not only political people, but also simple citizens preferred even to pay with their lives than to renounce the beliefs and sentiment of national consciousness. This is also valid for other "sets" of "force-images": democracy, liberty, justice, etc. These force-images are acquired by education and by a social and political adapted language, at the level of society, as well as of the international environment²⁷. They are influenced in a positive or negative sense by stereotypes existing at a certain moment in society, by historical psycho-fixations or political idiosyncrasies, but also by propaganda and patriotic discourse. They are practiced by political

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Robert H. Jackson, *The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations*, in vol. Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 111-138.

dissidents but also by the public opinion and have an important role in the act of elaboration of security policies as well as in the security actions, if a state/group is feeling threatened.

Man is not born with the sentiment of duty towards his country/community he belongs to and neither with moral, religious, political, or ideological convictions. This is why we believe that a good knowledge of the cultural context of the mentalities in which security problems emerge and mainly of the manner how people belonging to some different cultures and civilizations position themselves towards these issues is not without importance. Before reacting in order to remove a threat at the own security, the way and factors which led to a certain *culture of security or strategic culture* in the society/the collective mental of the one who produced that threat have to be known. Neorealists affirm that the security interests of the states are a priori defined²⁸. We appreciate that, in fact, the states make a *rational choice* on the manner security policies are built, as well as on the means by which they are applied in the social practice.

To treat globally a problem of security has also advantages but also many disadvantages. People have been used to threats which aimed at the state and its territory of sovereignty. Therefore they prepared themselves and accepted to act, participating to wars of defense of the mother country, without sparing their lives in order to secure the society they belonged to. But the problems which individuals taken separately perceived as threats were “forgotten“. For many people the sentiment of insecurity springs from the incapacity to protect themselves against diseases, to keep their employment or to generate enough resources to ensure themselves a decent life.²⁹ This is why, the concerns of some actors – the

²⁸ Ted Hopf, *The promise of constructivism in international relations theory*, in *International Security*, Summer 1998, vol. 23, no. 1, p. 171.

²⁹ R. Thakur, *From National to Human Security*, in vol. S. Harris, A. Mack (eds), *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp. 53-54.

European Union, USA, Japan etc., for the quality of life and natural environment, the protection of man against threats coming from “everyday life“ have become lately major concerns.

When people live the anguish of the loss of their working place, when they are dominated by the fear to get out on the street, when the sentiment of incapacity to protect their religious, moral values they were educated in, they become less tolerant and can turn to threats against other people.³⁰ Which are the answers for this type of threats? To what extent their reaction in a classical paradigm, notwithstanding which current of thought it belongs to, may be the adequate one? We consider that those who say that to secure society means, before anything, to find the means and methods by which the citizens should be “*free in the relationship with fear and free to obtain whatever they want*” are right³¹.

In order for the people to find themselves in this situation it is necessary that the security policies should no longer be centered only on securing the space of sovereignty of the state, but also on the fundamental needs of the population. This thing is more obvious today than in the past times. The increase of the economic interdependencies and the acceleration of the globalizing process make possible not only the transfer of prosperity from a region to another, but also of diseases, unemployment, terrorism, and other negative aspects. These problems cannot be solved by far through the increase of armies and the perfecting of arms, as in the past. From this perspective, the security policies can no longer be configured and no strategies can be built only with the help of a single paradigm or type of modeling, offered by a single current of thought/political ideology, notwithstanding even how attractively. The solution of hybrid models seems to be more and more embraced by analysts. It remains that this technique should also convince the political dissidents in the field of security.

³⁰ *Redefining Security: The Human Dimension*, in *Current History*, May 1995, p. 230.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 231.

Security, as policy assumed by an actor inside the society, as well as strategy to define his behavior on the level of international relations, tends to draw even nearer to the constructive vision in most states with a liberal democracy³². This thing does not suppose the elimination of the state from the equation of security, neither internally, and nevertheless on the level of international relations. The large economic corporations or those of another nature do not have the military force necessary to impose the rule of the “market game”³³ there where this one is not taken into account. There exist, on the other hand, enough situations, mostly in Africa, but not only, when, in the thrive for profit, the large companies encourage the civil disorder and interethnic conflicts in order to easily control the energy sources, thus associating themselves to the threats from those societies. With reference to this subject, Edward A. Kolodziej underlined: “*Multinational corporations, allied with Western countries, as accomplice mainly the United States, are identified as maim oppressors of the poor of this world. They lead through international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. They use the huge resources available while this mesalliance between the state power and the corporate one modelates the public opinion at their mercy, by concentrating mass-media and by massive advertizing campaigns and imposes the rules which serve its interests over an impotent population*”³⁴.

The fact that the resources necessary for the economic activity, such as the energy and water are not equally distributed worldwide and thus the access of people to them is different, will have a major impact on security. The increase of the consumption of resources

³² Dario Battistella, *L'apport de Karl Deutsch a la theorie des relations internationales* in *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, Volume 10, no. 4, 2003, pp. 543-565.

³³ See şi John J. Mearsheimer, *op., cit.*, pp. 260-261; Michael T. Klare, *The New Challenges of Gobar Security*, in *Current History*, April 1993, p. 157.

³⁴ Edward A. Kolodziej, *op., cit.*, p. 29.

and of the population, the migration of the population from poor and underdeveloped areas towards developed areas will dramatically influence the theoretical and modeling frame of the security policies elaborated by the classic and neoclassic actors – mainly those with a universal vocation, such as UNO or NATO. From this point of view, the “raw material“ for the building of policies and public discourse in the field of security shall no longer be found in the classical problems – mass destruction arms, terrorism, rogues states, democratic regimes, etc.³⁵

In the years to follow the strategies of economic security shall be at least in the Western world more important than the military ones. In the present context, war is by far no longer an instrument of promoting policy in the international environment. It is not totally impossible, but today a classical war between any of the stages of the Euro-Atlantic space is totally unimaginable. In exchange one may notice that in this area the so-called economic “wars“ have grown, whose study is displayed already by a vast part of specialized literature³⁶. An elementary logic tells us that if we deal with such a type of war a security strategy should also exist to prevent the damages in this sector of society.

As a consequence, the dispute for the control of resources, mainly for energy and water, which will become even scarcer as compared to the needs of an explosively growing population, shall

³⁵ See also the opinion of a reputed specialist on this issue: Joseph S.Nye Jr., *Deciphering International Conflicts. Theory and History*, Bucharest, Antet, 2005, p. 235.

³⁶ See pe larg, D. Lucas, A. Tiffereau, *Guerre économique et information*, Paris, Ellipse 2001; R. Kauffer, *L'arme de la désinformation: Les multinationales américaines en guerre contre l'Europe*, Grasset, Paris, 1999; C. Harbulot, *La machine de guerre économique*, Paris, Economica, 1992; B. Esamert, *La guerre économique mondiale*, Paris, Olivier Orban, 1991; B. Alexander, *The future of warfare*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1995; J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, *The emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy*, Rand Corporation Editions, 1999 etc.

dominate the security agenda. From this agenda the defense of the capital and of the means by which it will circulate shall not be lacking. It is not about its physical defense such as was the case in the XXth century, because in the future the manner of collecting, storing, or transferring from a "pocket" to another shall change fundamentally. As a result, there shall exist not only new strategies which we probably only sense today, but also new actors. But we believe that from this last equation the state together with its military forces shall not be absent, in spite of the globalist discourse. The strategy actions shall be modernized and it is possible that the importance of strategies based on physical violence should decrease and the "soldiers" in civilian clothes should increase.

NON-DETERMINED EVENTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL SECURITY EQUATION – A CHALLENGE TO BOTH, THE ACADEMIC AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES IN PROVIDING DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT

Gabriel CHIRCA

Motto:

(...) only military people deal with randomness with genuine, introspective intellectual honesty because military collected more genuine intellects and risk thinkers than most if not all other professions.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Vision and illusion

One of the basic features of the current security environment is non-linearity, which frequently brings about a new threat pattern, generally unconventional, dynamic, and recurrently random/arbitrary, without restrictions or rules, in other words asymmetrical and characterized by high likeliness of non-determined events occurrence¹. The outcome is a permanently dynamic environment, whose physiognomy and physiology can only be decoded by the interrelation of two structural analysis approaches:

¹ Ionel Nițu, „Dificultățile prognozei de intelligence într-o eră a incertitudinii” (*Difficulties in Intelligence Prognosis in an Uncertain Era*), *Intelligence Review*, no.17/2010.

The approach of imbalance / instability which emphasizes its main causes – **conflicts** (including cultural), **regional instability**, **economic frictions** (determined by lack of resources and limitation of access to markets), **ecological instability**, **classic/ typical threats** (terrorism, proliferation, organized crime) and also **new/recent threats** (growing strength of failed states, of renegades, of criminals to create unrest, personal and collective insecurity, political instability), and hybrid threats (generated by the capacity and ability of a potential adversary to simultaneously engage conventional and unconventional components), **access to technologies** etc. – this approach is endorsed, especially by the academic community;

The approach of interconnectivity, which emphasizes the fact that the main causes and components of instability have a dispersed confines / margins and catalyzed evolutions, frequently oriented to areas of emergence particular for great deviations /variations – this approach is endorsed, especially by the intelligence community.

The corroboration of these two approaches brings about a major confusion, between the cause of an event and the catalyser that speeds up its dynamic and effects (to those it adds up a misapprehension – the illusion of control, and a misjudgement – the preconception of action, in fact another illusion, through which it is presumed that action is always better than not taking action².

All the above considerations lead to the belief / idea that from the intelligence activity perspective, the main sources of uncertainty are associated to the cognitive and mental constraints of the intelligence providers, to the adversary action / non-action and, not the least, to the non-determined events³. Further on, the paper focuses on these type of events, relatively recently approached by the intelligence analysis. To note that the affix *non* is not an actual

² Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Mark Blyth, “The Black Swan of Cairo – How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 3, May/June, 2011.

³ Ionel Nițu, *quoted article*.

negative denominator, but a warning that directs to events which are different from the known ones, the determined ones⁴.

Rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno (*a rare bird in the lands, very much like a black swan*)

This type of events, acknowledged by the academic community and intelligence community under the title of “*black swan*”, includes those events which were not anticipated, nor have they been registered by recent history, or they have been but *post-factum*.

Rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno (a rare bird and very like a black swan) is an expression that comprises in its content 2500 universal human experience, according to which all swans are white. This was an unquestionable truth until 1788, when the first explorers of Australia came across a black swan. Therefore, a simple perception cancelled an apparently absolute truth since it was confirmed through continuous observation, transmitted from a generation to another, for millenniums.

Less than 150 years after, in 1912, John Smith the captain of *Titanic*, was announcing, before the safest ever built ship departed in its sole and last sail: “*I have never been in any accident of any sort worth speaking about...I never saw a wreck and never been wrecked, nor have I been in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort....*” No one, in that moment anticipated one of the most dreadful maritime tragedies in all times, although, afterwards, hundreds of subsequent analyses identified numerous causes and circumstances that generated the event and catalysed its effects⁵.

In 1990, the Royal Science Academy in Sweden granted Harry Markowitz, Miller Merton and William Sharpe, the Nobel Prize for

⁴ Details on the use of denominator *non*: www.meriam.webster.dictionay and www.dictionay.reference.com

⁵ Nassim Nicolas Taleb, *Lebăda neagră. Impactul foarte puțin probabilului*, (Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable), Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 – according to *The Times* one of the most influential 12 books published after the Second World War.

“their work in developing the diverse portfolio theory and the financial actives evaluation patterns”. (The Nobel committee recognized Harry Markowitz for developing portfolio theory, Miller for the theory of corporate finance, and Sharpe for the Capital Asset (stock market) Pricing Model also known as CAPM).

The patterns developed by the three experts, who underestimated risks, but were accredited by the Nobel Committee, “blinded” the analysts, who provided the decision-makers with predictive analysis packages that did not anticipated the 2008 emerged economic-financial crisis⁶.

11 September 2001 (9/11) is significant for any line of reasoning referring to or associated with the non-typical events, and its standing does not allow too many comments. Certainly, the attacks were not anticipated (as well as it is certain that the astonishment/shock of their occurrence increased their impact, including in the line of symbolism), although the subsequent analysis of the causes that enabled these attacks pulled them out from the non-typical area, unfortunately too late.

The kind of events presented above, so diverse in origin, evolution and closing belong to the non-typical or non-linear class of events. They are more frequently referred to, by the representatives of academic and intelligence communities, under the heading of *black swans*.

The theory and metaphor *black swan*, approached by Taleb in his paper *The Black Swan*. In the paper *Impact of the Highly Improbable*, and in numerous articles published afterwards “*real examples of going against common sense*”⁷ he approaches this type of unforeseen events, which have not been anticipated, nor have they been registered by recent history, or they have been but *post-factum*.

⁶ Nassim Nicholas Taleb declared in 2010 that the investors who lost money during the financial crisis should take legal action against the Central Bank of Sweden for granting the Nobel Prize to economists, whose theories have brought global economy to collapse (www.contributors.ro)

⁷ Benjamin Pauker, *Foreign Policy*, Nov-Dec 2012, page 15.

In his view, the non-typical events can not be anticipated because one of their features is retrospective predictability, in other words, they occur and happen unexpectedly, similar to the first black swan. According to the theory build up by Taleb, the descriptive pattern of this type of event relates to three identity parameters:

- *Rarity*, which places the non-typical event beyond the habitual expectation horizon, since none of the prior happenings bring it closer to the likelihood area;
- *Major impact*, its significance increases since the event's unlikelihood corroborates with a gap in response / comeback means;
- *Retrospective predictability*, the non-typical events become reasonable and predictable after its occurrence.

One of the main ideas of his approach emphasizes that the mathematical models of probability distribution, based on Gauss theory, are restrictive. Taleb accepts that the events which have not been included in the general average are likely to occur, but since the likelihood is very reduced, it can definitely be ignored (in a certain extent this is another way of saying „*if the only tool you have is the hammer, everything looks like a nail*”)

Further on, the characteristic of these events is the fact that, in most of the cases, they bring about opposite conducts and response reactions: ignored before occurrence and overestimated after they happen. In Taleb's view, when in contact with reality, the human mind undergoes three disorders, which he entitles „*the opacity triplet*”:

- *The comprehension illusion* – everyone believes that they understand what happens in the world (most frequent in the academic circles);
- *Retrospective distortion / alteration/ misinterpretation* – one can only correctly assess some events, only after they happened;
- *Exaggerated assessment of factual information* (most frequent in intelligence circles).

Uncommon and atypical ... meaning non-typical

By the use of the intelligence analysis standpoint, our opinion, although not entirely different from the one presented by Taleb, is


more restrained – it accepts the fact that the non-linear feature of the non-typical events does not cancel entirely their preventability/predictability.

Considering their complexity and dynamic character, and the limitations of our patterns in reading the reality it is obvious that in most cases, we do not act upon reality, but upon our own perception of a reality or another. Between us and the actual reality, as well as between us and our inner-selves there is the destructive and creative simultaneous interference of the “mental model”, “reading pattern”, “stereotype”, “psycho fixation”, or in another word, it is the *bias* that alters our perception, and although it allows randomness, and unpredictability, it does not inexorably comply with it.

This leads to the conclusion that *black swan* is a perception outcome generated by individual and collective epistemic limitations, given that, as Nicholas Taleb highlights the 9/11 events were a *black swan* event for the victims, but not for the terrorists. In other words, we should not go on the blink in thinking that the non-typical event is a given fact, independent of our perception, because it gets factuality only when connected to a recipient, a significance-creator item. In this line of thinking, the retrospective predictability claimed by Taleb is not consistent with the above-mentioned descriptive pattern, because it becomes obvious that the knowledge enablers progressively provide predictability features to those events, *which are different* from the prior determined.

Therefore, the non-determined event can be comprehended as an event that current thinking, knowledge, models and methods dismiss, ignore, overlook, or marginalize as something that will never happen, but which actually has a significant non-zero probability of occurring. In other words, the centre of gravity in the preparation process for this event may include recognition, understanding, preparation/ prevention mandatorily followed by prediction and mitigation⁸.

⁸ Thomas Fowler, Martin Fischer, “Rare Events the Unrecognized Threat”, *Sigma*, vol X, no.1, September 2010, <http://www.noblis.org/noblis-media/20f758e0-b3b9-4b76-8b81-4cde0d7341f9>.



In certain cases experience proved that intelligence analysts, due to knowledge gaps, frequently associated rare events to non-determined events, without considering that randomness does not imply non-determined character unless corroborated with the atypical feature⁹.

It is for this reason, that we consider that our point of view, related to non-typical events can be supported through the presentation of certain particularities of intelligence analysis, as well.

Meta-analysis and non-determined events

The high degree of non-determinedness that characterizes the current security environment is, paradoxically also a consequence of data and intelligence multiplication, which has been requiring a move of the centre of gravity in the intelligence activity from collection to analysis. In this way, intelligence analysis has overcome its primary condition of data/ intelligence fusion and processing and has become a source of intelligence in a supplemental process – meta-analysis which, through its specific features can provide a

See also Martin Fischer, John Shortle “Rare Events Simulation: Enhancing Efficiency”, *Sigma*, vol. X, no.1 September 2010 / <http://www.noblis.org/noblis-media/20f758e0-b3b9-4b76-8b81-4cde0d7341f9>.

perspective oriented not necessarily on non-determined events, but on understanding, and particularly on their inevitability.

The *meta-analysis* of the way in which intelligence analysts approach these events has highlighted the requirement of a new perspective in information analysis, to face events that are unlikely to occur or would have never occurred. Such suppositions are triggered by the fact that the progress in our predictive ability is cancelled by the complex reality in which these events may occur, as well as by the limitations in the analysis capacity (*opacity triplet*, for example).

Through the analysis of their effects, the non-determined events that occurred in the past in other regions, areas of responsibility, states, etc. can be considered when designing scenarios, courses of action or, better said, contingency planning. Such a plan automatically includes responsive reactions that placed in the evolution course of a certain parameter of the security system or environment may lead to the prediction, mitigation and / or control of a potential non-determined event.

An example in this respect is the following: after the Fukushima calamity, the analysis carried out not only by the intelligence community has taken into account a possible accident that may occur at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Most of the designed scenarios, as well as the conducted drills, were based on the presupposition of an earthquake (bias induced by the *black swan event* Fukushima), and that the Plant would withhold an 8.0 magnitude (on Richter scale) earthquake. From this point forward courses of action and contingency planning would have been developed, as well as responsive reactions which involved emergency specialized forces, approaching a relatively limited area of threat and consequences of a potential major nuclear accident.

There was no scenario (or maybe we are not aware of its existence) designed to approach the non-determined, *the black swan*, to consider, let's say, the possibility (or even probability) of a cosmic event (the power plant being hit by a meteorite), a major terrorist

attack or other unknown causes that may cause a nuclear catastrophe that would require the population evacuation from a larger area than 20km, but of 200 km, i.e including the capital city.

In the intelligence analysis any scenario or contingency planning is the expression of a prediction that may influence the cause that triggered its outset. Let us imagine a *black swan event* that may vitally impact on the Armed Forces performance – the accidental / undeliberate blast of several ammunition depots. Beside the subsequent response reaction, the scenario would definitely highlight the main potential causes. Certainly, they would be analyzed by the responsible authorities, that would direct measures to avoid them, before they occur.

In the intelligence community activity this analysis and action method, called *self-denying prophecy* illustrates that a prediction, through its inner taming force, becomes false, particularly because all the necessary measures had been taken as to prevent its occurrence¹⁰.

In other words, we do not necessarily have to discover the non-determined, the *black swan events*, but we can construct and develop them, passing beyond positive scientific knowledge limitations and capitalizing on the fact that the non-determined frequently, brings about circumstances in which, although the security status is assessed as highly stable, the risk reaches the highest values.

The turkey paradox, emphasized by Taleb is illustrative in this respect: a turkey is daily fed in order for it to be sacrificed, every feeding day adds up to the feeling of safety. After three hundred days, when the feeling of safety reaches the highest level, the owner decides to sacrifice it. Therefore, although the safety perception is at the highest point, the risk reached its peak¹¹.

¹⁰ Ionel Nitu, quoted article

¹¹ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Lebăda neagră. Impactul foarte puțin probabilului*, (Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable), Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 p. 69-70

For the intelligence analysts this paradox is also the outcome of the fact that in their substantially specific activity, they simultaneously face two perspectives on reality: a *linear* one and another, *non-linear*.

The linear perspective is characterized by predictability and capitalizes on the fact that the analyzed events have a limited degree of interconnectivity – this allows for the mathematical taming of specific evolutions (engineering, architecture, astronomy, part of physics, and a great part of science, in general, are linear fields).

The non-linear perspective does not identify causative connections among events, and this fact blinds prediction. A non-linear evolution is mirrored by the image of a house of cards / tower of cards: cards are added up successively, the assembly is growing until when the house collapses as another a card is added up. It is obviously wrong to blame the last card for the collapse instead of the structure of the assembly. This mistake is constantly made by analysts, especially when approaching complex systems, especially social ones (political and economic events at the tails of statistic graphics are unpredictable)¹².

There is something worthwhile mentioning here. The instability in the evolution of a social system, its fluctuations are frequently considered as main causes of *black swan* unpredictable evolutions, although the retrospective analysis of such evolutions proves exactly the opposite.

The effort to limit fluctuations frequently led to blinding the perception of exponential growth of instability level and inevitably to non-determined evolutions. This points out to the idea that in certain situations „*early failures*” generate effects that can be controlled and can make the system float but not sink „*fluctuant nec mergitur*”¹³.

The role of fluctuation control is concisely presented by Taleb; he asserts that „*Lebanon is the most stable place in the whole area*”,

¹² Nassim Nicholas Taleb, quoted article.

¹³ Idem.

because „risks are visible to the naked eye there” and even though „media says is chaos – but it is not” particularly because „it’s stable because Hezbollah and the Shiites know that they have to live with the Sunnis and the Christians.

*It can’t fall apart because it’s a perfectly controlled mess.”*¹⁴

One should not overlook that many *black swan* events occurred not necessarily because of lack of information, but because of intelligence services not capitalizing correctly this information, or because decision makers did not reflect on the warnings of the intelligence services, or they tried to involve a service or another in politics¹⁵.

Predicting rain doesn’t count; building arks does

Nowadays, when the fluctuations in the security environment are more obvious and more unpredictable, the joint effort of the representatives of both intelligence community and academic community may result in the knowledge advantage that can provide decisional support, at all levels, even the political one. It is even more relevant since the main challenge of any intelligence service is not necessarily the provision of a long-term analysis, but particularly the timely provision of relevant analyses useful in decision-making¹⁶.

Prognosis and analysis should reflect that the decision-making support needs to permanently capitalize on Warren Buffet saying: „*predicting rain doesn’t count; building arks does*”. In this respect, it would be useful that in the first stage, analysts should consider **taming non-determined events through knowledge management** and subsequently, building probability distribution patterns on the occurrence of these events based on the *central limit theorem* or the heavy tail distribution models, which are better than typical Gauss

¹⁴ Benjamin Pauker, quoted article.

¹⁵ Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship*, Roundtable Report.

¹⁶ Ionel Nitu, quoted article.

classic distribution. The analysis patterns based on the central limit theorem, which states that the sum (and average) of a large number of independent, interacting observations from the same general group tends to have a normal distribution, may be one of the greatest challenges in the intelligence analysis.

Additionally, through the corroborated effort of the academic community and the intelligence community, the *clarity triplet* can be achieved, opposite to *opacity triplet*, stated by Taleb. A triplet that combines / integrates scientific knowledge (academic community), knowledge management (academic community and intelligence community) and intelligence analysis (intelligence community) and that can provide the decision-makers not necessarily, **solutions** to solve issues, but **alternatives** to approach real disequilibrium factors of the current security environment. Such an approach can catalyze the continuous transformation process of the defence intelligence structures – organizations that have taken great steps in transferring / repositioning from reliability-based management to resilience-based management. And a resilient organization is one able to respond to challenges brought about by non-determined events, meaning those events which are *different from the ones comprised in a category or another*, which have already been recognized, studied and are predictable.

Instead of „the end”

„The world was so recent that many things lacked names, and in order to indicate them it was necessary to point.” to quote Gabriel Garcia Marquez in his *“One Hundred Years of Solitude”*.

At the end, we can rephrase and state that non-determined events have so recently been approached by the intelligence services analysis and sometimes in order to indicate them, it is necessary to point ... in order to identify them...

Which is, in one way or another, ... what I have just done.

KALABALYK.THE FAILURE OF THE SWEDISH KING

Victor TVIRCUN

A short, but glorious life of Swedish King Charles XII was abundant with dramatic events. Many of them are drastically affected not only the fate of monarch personally, but also the fate of Sweden, neighboring countries and Europe as a whole. The clash between the Turkish-Tatar units and Swedish troops under the Swedish king at the village Varnitsa, February 1, 1713, which went down in history under the name of Kalabalyk, belonged to these events.

This paper presents a new perspective on this tragic page of biography of the Swedish King Charles XII, based on the new documents, researched by the author in the Russian archives.

Among the multitude of topics relating to the Swedish king's biography¹, one has been attracting increasing interest of profes-

¹ Voltaire M. History of Charles XII, King of Sweden. Parice, 1731. Last edition: Rutherford N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1981. Biographiska Minnen af Konung Carl XII: s Krigare etc. med bilagor af B. A. Ennes. Stockholm, 1818 и 1819; Bain R. N. Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire 1682-1719. London, 1895, G.P. Putnam's.; Amira Alessandro, *Storia del soggiorno di Carol XII in Turchia* București: Nicolae Iorga Press, 1905; Akdes Nımet Kurat. İsveç Kırvalı XII Karl'ın Türkiyede kalışı ve bu sıralarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu. İstanbul. 1943; V. Mihordea, *Carol XII la Tighina*. Bucharest: 1943; Bengtsson F.G. The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697–1718. – Stockholm, 1960; Hatton R. M. Charles XII of Sweden. New York, 1969.; Englund, Peter. *Berättelsen om en armésundergång*. Stockholm, 1988; Roberts, Michael. “The Dubious Hand: The History of a Controversy.” In *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: Four Studies*. Cambridge, U.K., and New York, 1991; Liljegren, Bengt. *Karl XII: en biografi*.

sional historians and litterateurs. We refer to the so called *kalabalyk* or storming of the Turkish-Tatar units of the King Charles XII's fortified camp in the village of Varnitsa². Researchers of *kalabalyk* have actively used evidence and documents of the Swedish and Turkish authors as well as of the event's participants. To a less extent *kalabalyk* found reflection in the Russian publications. So far, we know just of a few documents in Russian, published on the topic³. Nonetheless, the events werenot narrated by the people directly involved, but were presented in the contemporaries' retelling and interpretation.

Numerous research materials in various archives of the Russian Federation, relating to the history of Russian-Turkish, Russian-Moldovan and Russian-Swedish relations of the first quarter of the of the 18th century, revealed a number of unique documents. Their distinguishing feature is that, all of them are the "first hand" sources, reports of persons directly involved, or witnesses of the *kalabalyk*. Some of them were Russian spies or Kazak defectors, others were captured Turks. Taken together they recreate, supplementing and correcting each other, a more complete and detailed picture of events

Lund, 2000.; Sons; Berg, Olof Patrik. Carl XII ochenväldet. Göteborg, 2002; Ericsson, Peter. Storanordiskakrigetförklarar: Karl XII ochdetideologiskattilltalet. Uppsala, 2002. Contains a brief summary in English; Цветков С.Карл XII. Последнийвикинг. 1682–1718 – М.: Центрполиграф, 2005.

² Image of the rightful Ottoman court in Bender of the perpetrators of the attack on the king's palace in Varnitsa, or his bloody retribution, in which openly his Majesty, Sultan Ahmet III has taken part, by predilection and benevolence to the Swedish king's interests.Перевод П. Юрченко. // Записки Одесского общества истории и древностей, Том X. Одесса, 1877; Akdes Nımet Kurat. İsveç Kırallı XII Karl'ın Türkiyede kalışı ve bu sıralarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu. İstanbul. 1943. S.626-636; McCarthy, Dennis J. The Kalabalik, the "Hantingdown" of Charles XII. In: History Today. L., Nr.6(15) June. 1965. P.391-399; Пикуль В.С. «Железная башка» после Полтавы. В сб. Честь имею. Исторические миниатюры. М., 2010.

³ Изображение правого оттоманского суда в Бендерах... и Письмо графа Сапеги, старосты Бобруйского, из Бендер к герцогу Голшинскому в Копенгаген от 12 февраля 1713 г. – Письма и Бумаги императора Петра Великого. М., 1992, Т.13.Вып. 1. С.115-116.

preceding the *kalabalyk* and the direct assault along with the capture of the Charles XII's camp by the Turkish-Tatar units.

All the materials used and presented in the current publication are introduced into the scientific circulation for the first time.

Throughout the years of Charles XII's presence in the Ottoman Empire, his private life, behavior and international relations were under close attention of the Russian Tsar and his administration. Reports coming from Russian residents in the European monarchs' courts, as well as messages from secret informants from the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires were carefully collected and analyzed in the College of Foreign Affairs. A special need for this sort of information was felt during the acute period of political affairs between Russia and Turkey in 1710-1713.

Russian and Swedish diplomacies' open confrontations at the sultan's court a few times changed the vector of the "Sublime" Porte's foreign policy from war to peace. The Swedish Party's last attempt to break the Prut peace once again drew Turkey into direct confrontation with Russia in the fall of 1712, extraordinary meeting of the Supreme Divan, in Istanbul on October 31, 1712, it was decided to declare a new war.

However, instead of active preparations to the upcoming campaign, the sultan's administration has focused its entire activity on expelling the Swedish King out of the Ottoman land back to his homeland. With this regard, specific instructions had been given to the Moldovan Principality's ruler, Crimean Khan and commandant of the Bender fortress and *rayas*. According to the Russian informant's reports from Mejiboja, on January 9, 1713 "from the Bender statement, the Tatar Khan and the Volokh (Moldovan) Ruler, were ready to accompany the King into Pomerania and to get on horses..."⁴.

⁴ РГАДА (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents). Ф.89 (Russian relationship with Turkey) 1713. Дело 22 часть I. Л.4 Донесения из разных мест генерал-губернатору Киевскому Дмитрию Михайловичу Голицыну.(Case 22 Part I. L.4 The reports from various places the Governor-General of Kiev Dimitrii Golitsyn)

At the same time news arrived from the Moldovan Principality, reporting that “indeed, the Swedish King with the Khan and the *seraskir* were willing to go to Pomerania. The Volokh Ruler had almost sent vornik Sturza, from Tsutsora to Hotin to provide the supplies and forage for the army needs, by the path through Hotin and Zvanets (city of Jvanets – V.T). The decree sent by the Volokh Ruler to the Sturza of Iasi, that the King is not willing to go, informed the Khan and the Sultan in Adrianopol (currently, the city of Edirne, the Republic of Turkey)”⁵.

The same information was confirmed in the statement of January 9 by the messenger-emissary Stamatiy: “In Shargorodok, located 4 miles from the Dniester river and Mejiboje, it was heard that the Khan with the horde has returned as the Swedish King has not left Benderi. The Khan had written of this to the Sultan. They had heard that on all the paths from Bender, from Dniester and around the Prut River, on the outposts stood the horde, the people of the Kiev *voevoda* and a few Swedish people. They are ordered not to let anyone pass from the Russian side and prepare supplies and forage for the Swedish King’s campaign, collecting it from the Volokhs and not accepting it from the Poles”⁶.

Charles XII’s refusal to leave back home with the remainders of his army from Varnitsa stemmed from many factors: inconveniences of the winter season, financial problems, and the inability to collect and prepare the necessary luggage and other supplies needed for the long journey. However, the main reason was the lack of security guarantees of his movement across the Polish territory. King’s concerns regarding the reliability of the selected to accompany him Tatar cavalry were not groundless. According to the information received, the Crimean khan and the Bender Pasha had a secret agreement, through Count Sapega, with the Polish King

⁵ Ibid. Л.4об.Из Волосской земли из местечка Окопу 5 января 1713 г. (Retrieved from Moldova, the place Okop).

⁶ Ibid. Л.9об.

August the Strong, on extraditing Charles XII on his way back to Pomerania⁷.

King's unwillingness to leave his camp in Varnitsa had caused a negative reaction in Istanbul. In response to the Crimean Khan's report on the situation "... the Sultan sent the fourth man *imbrohor* that is his stable keeper, with a decree to the Sultan and Ismail Pasha, with the following statement: If the Swedish King is not willing to leave to his land, hand him in to Mustafa Pasha, so he could take him to Thessaloniki, to marina, located in the city of Thessaly. With the mentioned above, he had also sent a *hatt-isherif* (the document was signed by the hand of the Sultan – V.T.) to the Swedish King:

"You, the Swedish King, who is a friend to us, should know that all the necessary preparations are ready for your departure, this winter back to your state. The Crimean Khan and Ismail Pasha, the Bender Governor have been long ago commanded to get the army ready, which is waiting for you. For this purpose, after you shall be awarded with our royal writing, do not lose time, and by the Khan's and Ismail Pasha's advice immediately leave to your land. If you shall not leave and go against our will, take into consideration that there will be another decree, that is why leave as soon as possible."

Seeing the coercion that he was forced into, the King, declared his refusal to leave. Upon receiving such a response, the Sultan had sent the Khan and the Pasha, on the same day, January 12, 1713. The King had been deprived of the food given to him by the Ottoman Empire. Also, they had taken the 7 regiments of janissaries, which were in the King's guard, and had closed all shops in Varnitsa, where the King resided. Moreover, they had ordered all residents to leave. In that instant, by deception all 2900 Cossacks subordinated to the Swedish King, had been excommunicated and taken under the Khan's protection, *as well as sent to his Volokh villages*. Many Tatars were ordered to enter the city and besiege the King with the decree, and not to let anyone pass or leave besides the King, or let anyone

⁷ ПГАДА. Ф. 86 Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп.1. Д.11.Л.20об.

sell him food, hoping that he would leave by forced famine. However, for money, the Tatar guards supplied food and ammunition, selling it four times the cost.

The following day, a message was sent to the Polish lords that were with the King ordering them to come, if they are friends of the Sultan, if not, they could stay with the King and endure everything he suffers. The Polish lords responded that they were willing to leave to their homes into the Bender suburbs, and the very same day. The next day, due to some doubt, they went to the King to Varnitsa daring to endure everything that the King would suffer. Observing this, the Pasha had sent his *kehay* with the order to go to their homes in the suburbs and take all their things they can find in their homes, and mainly: dresses, horses, guns and other household belongings, including their servants to be forced and sent out of those homes. A few *Lipcans* (Lipcan-Tatar – V.T.) were sent to accompany them to the Polish border. Their people and wives on the other hand were taken by the Pasha into his court and converted into the Mohammedan faith”⁸.

Along with the Crimean Khan, the ruler of the Moldovan principality also received the Sultan’s *firman* of expulsion from their own territory of “Swedes and their coherents (supporters - V.T.)”. In pursuance of this order, he “...created a detachment of 500 janissaries along with Volokhs and men with scythes, flails and guns, and others armed”⁹ for the capture and detention of the above mentioned persons.

Day by day, the tension grew around the Swedish camp in Varnitsa. None of the sides was willing to back down. Regardless of the Janissaries’ amount of persuasion and oath promises of ensuring the King’s security did not give a positive outcome. In addition to the above, the last drop that overflowed the Turkish patience was the

⁸ РГАДА. Ф. 86 Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп.1. Д.11.Л.20 и оборот

⁹ РГАДАФ.89 (Russian relationship with Turkey) 1713. Дело 22 часть I. Л.24 и оборот

King's act with regard to the gifts sent from Istanbul. On January 14, 1713 the Sultan had sent King Charles, "with the *kapudji-bashi* Musa aga, 25 horses one of which was harvested, and 10 thousand ducats. Three more horses had been sent from behalf of the vizier Ali Pasha, also known as Chiorlu, one of which was sent dressed, were not accepted, as the King was angry at him by the fact that he was sympathizing the Russians and not him... the King gave *kapudji-bashi* 6 thousand ducats, and another 3 thousand to his servants"¹⁰.

However, soon after the lack of food, he ordered to "... shoot all the horses sent to him from the Sultan for the departure, and burn all the bridles and saddles... as being deprived of hay and oats, as well as Turks taking care of the horses, and due to the inability to buy food for the above mentioned, there is no reason to keep them alive. After that, it was ordered to throw them in the fields to be eaten by the Tatars. He immediately began fortifying in order to defend in case of an attack. Thus, he ordered to hammer great stakes before the gates, which the Turks would not pass, making it convenient to defend, as well as to hammer windows to half from inside and has decided to die in battle, and not surrender to Turks alive"¹¹.

The culminating point has come to the last days of January, when reassured by the Sultan's *hatt-isherif*, the Crimean Khan and the Bender Pasha have accepted the decision to attack the camp and make Charles XII leave the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Events of those days are displayed in the testimonies of several indirect *kalabalyk* participants that were within each of the opposing sides. From one side, it was the interrogational speech of janissary Ali Abdulov, taken prisoner on March 5, 1713 by the Volokh party.

"Extract form interrogation. He identified himself as a resident of the city of Izmail, three years ago sent from Izmail to Crimea into the city of Yenikale to the City Hall. From Yenikale, he asked the

¹⁰ Ibid. Ф. 86 Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп.1. Д.11.Л.35

¹¹ РГАДА. Ф. 86. Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп.1. Д.11. Л.20об.-21.

janissary permission from his commander to go home to Izmail. He came to Bender, however, did not go to his home, due to the fact that:

Throughout his 12 day stay in Bender, *kalga-sultan*, the Crimean Khan's younger brother, came into the city with the entire horde. He remained in Bender with the horde for 20 days, in order to accompany the Swedish King's departure, but he did not know by which path. The Crimean Khan, the Bender Commander Ismail Pasha and the above mentioned *kalga-sultan*, were appointed to accompany the Swedish King.

When he was a janissary in Bender, the Crimean Khan and the Bender Pasha Ismail came to the King in Varnitsa and demanded an explanation why he was not following the Sultan's decree of his expulsion from their land. The King responded that he was afraid to leave just with the Tatars as he could fall into the hands of Moscow troops. He would leave only if he would receive more Turks, and while Charles XII, Khan and Pasha were arguing, the horde was standing in the villages. After that, the Khan and Pasha left to Bender, leaving all Swedes with the King.

Three days after the argument with the King, and the Khan and Pasha's departure to Bender, from there, they have ordered the janissaries to go and finish off the Swedish King, without killing him. By that order, there was a careful selection of janissaries for this hunt-down. Thus, he, janissary Ali Abdullah had volunteered. However, he did not know of their number, as there were way too many strangers and curious witnesses, willing to know the outcome of the assault and the Swedish King's capture. They, along with the janissaries, left before noon, taking along 6 medium sized cannons to Varnitsa to the chamber walls, where the Swedish King was locked away with his people, while the Khan and Pasha were standing somewhere nearby.

The janissaries surrounded the chambers and while preparing the cannons, sent the King the last reprimand to leave, and if not they would fire at the chambers he lived in. In conclusion, he categorically refused to leave, even at the cost of his life. Following

the King's answer, on the same day, upon the orders by the Crimean Khan and Bender Pasha, they began shooting cannons out of 6 guns. However, the shots were fired blank in order to scare and force the King to give up. They had fired for about 30 times. Then, they seized cannon fire and approached the chambers, firing at the chamber windows from guns.

The Swedes were firing at the janissaries, and people of the King's group were saying that the monarch himself fired at them out the window from the *fuzey* (fuzey – gun – V.T.). During the battle, as they approached the chamber windows, their janissaries were beaten by Swedes with 200 men, and many got wounded. The Khan and Pasha, seeing that the Swedish king with his men are courageously defending themselves, they ordered to light up the roof reeds litters, which was covered with small wooden boards. The Swedes were coming out of the chambers with guns, but were shot by the janissaries, and others were running away. Later, the King himself came out and then the janissaries with others began slaughtering the Swedes without knowing which one of them was the king.

Thus, unwillingly they began slaughtering the King himself, when one of the Swedes clasping his King started shouting that he is their King, and the janissaries have captured him. In this confusion, the King was wounded into the left arm and into the right side of his head with the sword, as he, the janissary has heard from his brethren. The battle and the capture went on till the evening. The King was then taken to the Khan and Pasha. Later, the janissaries came into the chamber and have seen around 100 dead Swedes and many wounded¹². In total, there were around 1000 Swedes, captured and distributed among the Tatars. Residents that have been left there by the Swedish King were ordered to search and return those

¹² According to other sources, the number of dead Swedes did not exceed 20 people. Beyond that, 15 drabants were reported missing, who most likely were abducted by Tatars for sale. – See.: РГАДАФ.89 (Russian relationship with Turkey) 1713. Дело 22 часть I. Л.33

prisoners... all royal goods, Swedish horses and guns, were ransacked by the janissaries and the Tatars.

The King was brought to the Khan and Pasha by 15 janissaries. Pasha Ismail had rewarded the janissaries with pure gold and quickly took the King to Bender, where he had stayed for three days. After the storming, he, the janissary came to Bender, and asked the doctor and his friend Magmet, how is the king feeling, to what he replied, that he, Magmet treats the king himself, and even thou he was wounded, he is not hurt badly, just that he is in grief and his face is thin.

Three days later, the khan and pasha have sent the Swedish kind, by giving him 4 post-horses and a very simple Turkish carriage, inappropriate to the monarchic status. He was sent with the same courier that brought the Sultan's decree on expelling all Swedes along with the King, accompanied by 60 Swedish officers on Turkish horses.

After the Swedish king's departure, the very same day, the Crimean Khan had dismissed most of the horde along with *kalga-sultan* towards Crimea. From the same horde, the Khan and Pasha have sent about 10 thousand men, including 4 thousand of Crimeans and Budjeacs Tatars, as well as 2 thousand Cossacks, along with around 200 janissaries and volunteers under the command of the Crimean khan's brother-in-law Sefir Kara Murza. The horde was ordered to march towards Kiev, and those who would surrender to be left unharmed, and those who would not yield, should be slaughtered and burned down. In Kiev they were ordered to gather information and news about the Moscow troops' location. For this purpose, the horde had been marching from Bender for 18 days. They had made their way through the Bender steppe to Umani, to Kiev and approaching, the horde had split for boodle. In his turn, He, the horde janissary left with four people and before the Hudosovka village he was held with his Tatars"¹³.

¹³ РГАДА. Ф.9 (Кабинет Петра Великого – The Cabinet of Peter the Great). Оп.2 Д.59. Л.317-318.

The following evidence is a testimony of the prisoner, Fomka Mitlushenko, the former servant of the Swedish general Miller: "Originally born in Koropa. In Bender, his duty was to serve the Swedish general Miller for one month and mainly watch the twenty horses.

The Swedish King was about to leave the Turkish land the very same winter until Christmas, and when he was almost ready, no one knows what letters were brought to him by the Poles from Poland, after which he had categorically refused to leave. Despite the fact the Crimean Khan and the Bender Pasha have ordered him to leave to his homeland, therefore promising to accompany him. And if he refuses to leave, he should go to Constantinople. They banned to give him anything and not to hand out hay. The King responded that he would not go to Constantinople or his homeland, but would continue living in Bender. In rage, he had shot all the horses given by the Sultan, asking the Turks that if they show him the decree signed by the Sultan's hand, in accordance with which they are willing to send him out, only then he would accept to go.

However, nothing was done by the Turks. Later, he was announced of the Khan and Pasha's order, that in case he shall not leave, they will get him by force, and when they do, they shall take him against his will to the Sultan.

After hearing out the King's responses from the Turks they have sent, the Khan and Pasha had ordered the Crimean, Budjeak and Belgorod Tatars to surround and put guards preventing anyone from leaving. Seeing hostile action against himself, the King turned to the people from his group with the statement that any of them willing to die by his side, should fight with the Turks until the last man alive, and for those not willing to stay, he gives it to their own discretion, and will not force anyone. He expelled all Poles to Bender from his court.

According to his royal words, generals, colonels, officers, drabants and about 200 infantry immediately began their preparations. Among them was General Miller, at whose side, He, Fomka

lived with his *fuzei*. They locked themselves inside their chambers and waited for the Turks the entire day, however, nothing happened.

According to the Khan and Pasha's decree, the following day, more than 10, 000 janissaries and Turks came and spent days standing under the hill next to the chambers sending the most noble Turks to the King to respectfully ask him to give up with honor and without a fight. The King, spitting on the Turks was bravely saying that he was willing to die here and would not go. They can bother him, and he would defend himself. That is how the day has passed without any result.

Three days later, early in the morning, the Turks have gotten closer to the chambers, firing six cannons at the chambers living a cannonade trail proceeding to the chambers by attacking and shooting the entire day into the windows as they could not do anything. Seeing that about 600 Turks have fallen, they have retrieved. Around 30 Swedes have fallen. And he, Fomka, was also firing out of his *fuzei*. From what was left of the 200 infantry, the King ordered them to stop the fighting and put their guns down, after what they were immediately imprisoned by the Tatars.

In the morning, the Turks ordered the Tatars to bring straw and besiege the chambers. With great difficulty, they were done by noon, as the Swedes were firing at them from the windows. When the straw was lit and the roofs had started burning and the vaults had begun to collapse, the Turkish fire had increased. The King, seeing 3 Swedes suffocating and the fire crashing over him, injured in the hand below the elbow by the janissary gun and a few facial scratches, had jumped out of the window. The janissaries, catching the King, had taken him into the Pasha's tent, who out of respect had offered him to sit, but the King, spitting on the Pasha's beard, had laid down on the Pasha's bed and had started talking and cursing. And he, Fomka, was taken from the chambers by Tatars and brought to Bender.

Meanwhile, the King was sent to Constantinople, along with a small number of Turks and Swedes in the total of 18 people. After that, the Turks have taken Fomka to Belgrade and by the Sultan's

order had announced that all the Swedes and their accompaniments should be taken back. That is how they had gathered everyone including Fomka, and brought them to Bender. Then, having agreed with 20 Cossaks, they left to Ukraine in order to give in to local authorities, as in Zaparojskaya Sech there is poor harvest and people swell of famine.¹⁴

After capturing the Swedish camp, persecutions and arrests of Charles XII's subjects and his allies began throughout the entire territory of the Moldovan principality and the Bender *raya*. Among the captured and put under arrest by the order of Ruler Nicolas Mavrokordato, was the overthrown King of Poland, Stanislaw, who was in Iasi *incognito*, under the name of a Swedish officer¹⁵.

Shortly after the *kalabalyk* the Sultan's order was announced to free the imprisoned Swedes and supporters of Charles XII out of the number of the Polish *jolners* (soldiers – V.T) and the Cossacks, seeking redemption of prisoners captured by the Tatars, returning and compensating them for the confiscated goods, weapons, horses and money.

According to a witness's statements "...Four days after the royal departure, Ismail Pasha had ordered to free all the Swedes that were held captive by Turks in Bender, by giving them apartments in the Volokh houses. He also ordered to give them food in the amount of ten bulls, fifty *qantars* of crackers and thirty *okkas* (unit of measurement – V.T) of salt, for all the 911 of them. A few days later, a decree was sent from the vizier to Ismail Pasha, to give all the Swedes stationed in Bender, financial support in accordance to his own discretion. The Pasha had asked general Sparre¹⁶, how much should be given out, the response was – 1023. He also told the Pasha, that all those officers would have food from the King, some more,

¹⁴ Архив Санкт-Петербургского Института Истории РАН. – Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Ф.83 (А.Д. Меншикова) Оп.3. Д.7. Л. 86-87.

¹⁵ РГАДА. Ф. 86 Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп.1. Д.11. Л 20 об.- 24.

some less, and other much more in accordance with their rank. The amount indicated seemed to be too big to the Pasha, and he refused to give it out in form of money, but he left them with ten bulls and fifty *qantars* of crackers.”

When the Khan and Abdi Pasha arrived, general Sparre had told them that the above-mentioned bulls and crackers were not enough to feed such a great number of people. That is why the Khan and Pasha had ordered to give them 15 bulls, 70 *qantars* of crackers and 35 *okkas* of salt each week”¹⁷.


Despite all attempts of the Sultan’s court to justify to the Swedish King for the “unduly harsh and unfriendly actions” of their subjects in Varnitsa, Ahmed III had not been able to break the ice of mistrust and chained the established Swedish-Turkish relations for many decades.

Events which had taken place on February 1, 1713 near the Bender fortress, did not portray a Swedish defeat in the diplomatic confrontation with Russia, but also that of the supporters of the party of peace over the party of war within the governmental circles of the Ottoman Empire.

Along with that, *kalabalyk* became another sign of courage and bravery of the Swedish King and his warriors, who had delivered numerous legends into the Turkish society. They were respectfully passed from generation to generation. The evidence presented by participants and contemporaries of this event are the best example of this.

¹⁶ *Axel Axelsson Sparre*; born 9 January 1652, Visbiu – died 31 May 1728, in the Bruchindestate, Vordnes county, LenEsteryetland) – Swedish Duke (1720), Field Marshall (1721), painter, supporter of Charles XII and participant of the Great Nordic War.

¹⁷ РГАДА. Ф. 86 Russian relationship with Sweden. Оп. 1. Д. 11. Л. 22-24.





Bender fortress modern look

POLITICAL DECISIONS IN ROMANIA DURING WORLD WAR II TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE EFFORTS

Mihai ȘERBAN

Important actions carried out by the SSI until August 1944

During the reporting period the following cases are noteworthy and documented by the Special Intelligence Service as having important implications in the informative activity plan:

a) Research continued on the issue of Autonomus para-trooper's team because as a result of a series of information on the English informative network in Romania which Chastelain, Masterson and Gibson had. Informative documentation actions were extended on all these people.

b) The Professor Eck espionage group was arrested at the General Staff Intelligence because the members worked for the British and they were conducting an ample informative activity. Because this group operated in connection with the Polish organization of British espionage – Czupprich, previously arrested by the SSI, the whole business intelligence research was transferred to SSI Case, until the Armistice was not judged.

c) Another matter investigated by the SSI, which has grown through its political connections, was the Țurcan Business and the radio telegraphy station through which Iuliu Maniu liaised with the Allied Quarter in Cairo. The device had been functioning for a while in the Știrbey House, about which there were details that they have been dealing truce in Cairo, Țurcan was related to Maniu, the business being discovered by the Germans. This could have had very

serious consequences, degenerating into a combined German-Hungarian reaction that could result in occupation of the Kingdom.

Researches in the three cases presented were led by Eugen Cristescu, in order to limit any leakage of information to the Germans and to save the country from new disasters.

d) Another business that has been investigated by The service in this period was the banker Max Auschnitt's running out of the country by a plane piloted by Captain Matei Ghica Cantacuzino, accompanied by engineer Racotă (British spy service). The research has established links with a direction taken to Syria and Cairo. The Germans made a big scandal on this issue, but nothing came of coercive measures.

Another situation that has preoccupied S.S.I. was that of the Soviets Parachute Team launched at Olănești in Vâlcea County in the early days of August 1944 (where Marshal Antonescu could be found for a treatment with mineral waters). The team consisted of three Romanian Iron Guard officers, former prisoners in the USSR (Captain Djona, Captain Miron, lieutenant Gheracostea) and two radio operators. Since land conditions were not favorable, after the launch paratroopers have not met and were captured¹.

In this situation any archived documents would contribute to a better documentation of these cases that took place in the particular conditions of the Second World War.

Monitoring opposition approaches for Romania's exit from the war

In that geopolitical context marked by the increasing number of arguments supporting the idea that Germany could no longer win the conflict, it was obvious that the Romanian political forces would conduct more intense action to find solutions intended to save the

¹ ARCHIVE S.R.I. (ASRI), Fond D., File no. 7433, f. 225-226;

country from disaster. In this political spectrum there were two fundamental directions converged only in the removal of Ion Antonescu and abandoning the alliance with Germany, namely: left force, the embryo of Communism (PCDR), which was constituted to lead the way for the seizure of power and the establishment of Soviet origin regime (direction in which it has prepared its way by forming “United Workers’ Front ‘and’ National Democratic Coalition” in May 1944²); As well as the force that sums up other Romanian political orientations that unquestionably have the objective of returning to democratic values manifested under a constitutional monarchy.

In a note to the Special Intelligence Service on 31 May 1944, an analysis of discussions of the leaders of the Democratic Front on integrating social democrats and communists in that structure³. Noteworthy is the fact that those discussions were conducted based on “malleability of Dinu Brătianu ... because Maniu’s rigidity gravitated towards the failure of negotiations.”⁴

The mention in the SSI document of the inflexibility of the peasant leader is not coincidental because it led to an understanding with Socialists and Communists of a prior recognition of the correctness of annexation “by Soviet of Bessarabia and Bucovina.”⁵

Special Intelligence Service’s concern for the Romanian political circles activity is emphasized by the note dated 30 June 1944 drawn up after the establishment (and the announcement of this endeavor) of the National Democratic Block (the message from June 11, 1944 of Iuliu Maniu⁶). In the document to which I’m referring it is highlighted that the Communists claim that BND is

² GIURESCU, Dinu C., *Guvernarea Nicolae Rădescu*, History Library, All Publishing House, 1996, p. 205;

³ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 7.433, f. 268;

⁴ *Ibidem*;

⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 269;

⁶ *ISTORIA României în date*, coordonare Dinu C. GIURESCU, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2003, p. 461;

not effective and “will be overtaken by the accelerated pace of events”⁷. Besides Iuliu Maniu’s idea, who proposed to sequence the Antonescu regime, a general (the name Rădescu being mentioned), the solution backed by communists, who wanted the King’s active involvement⁸, is distinguished.

The course of events allow me to consider this last idea to be of Soviet origin, meaning that they wanted to soothe possible popular suspicion regarding the communists access to power, using the first phase of the Royal House as a screen.

The synthesis of the Special Intelligence Service drafted on 13 July 1944 revealed another aspect, namely the communist circles dissatisfaction towards collaborating with other Romanian political forces. It emphasized the following idea: “... Communist group will resume its freedom of action and refused to cooperate with bourgeois parties “(sic) immediately after the signing⁹.

Throughout the period of the Second World War it has become increasingly evident that Ion Antonescu requested and received notes and analysis from the Special Intelligence Service on the actions and concerns of the Romanian political leaders. All this desire to know any other geopolitical solutions have not escaped Germany (which had an impressive informative device, consisting of eleven (!!!) secret intelligence service).

In addition to verbal obligations that he has assumed in discussions with Hitler, Antonescu did not exclude other solutions so that Romania could get out of that exhausting conflagration, but in honorable conditions.

1944 January 21

Note of the ISS on domestic politics in the light of developments in military operations on the Eastern Front¹⁰.

⁷ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 7.433, f. 497;

⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 498;

⁹ *Idem*, File no. 4.202, f. 80;

¹⁰ ASRI, Fond Y., File no. 40.010, Vol. 34, f. 140-146;

NOTE Marshal Antonescu had in the recent years the opportunity to know Mr. Iuliu Maniu's ideas on the overall conduct of the war and the special position that Romania has in the conflict between the Great Powers. Although Mr. Iuliu Maniu demonstrates outstanding views, although he was starting in the assessment of general ideas and ignored the immediate realities, although he did not want to take into consideration our limited possibilities of movement, although he suggested solutions that neither he would have been able to achieve, if he had the government's responsibility, however Marshal Antonescu, deeply imbued with historical responsibilities that he had assumed, he always exanimated in a high understanding the patriotic spirit with which the opinions were expressed by former Prime Minister of the country. Mr. Maniu sometimes did not want to know that Marshal Antonescu determined the framework that Romania's war policy was to develop and that the international situation has developed besides Romanian government control. Sometimes Mr. Maniu seemed to forget that in 1940, after the borders were stolen from us, although we had platonic guarantees, we lost the trust of a group of powers, without having gained great military and political friendship which ruled Europe and, later, in the middle of some astounding political and military surprises, Romania was forced to adjust the overall situation, in order to ensure security and to fulfill the high demands of national order, to the extent and in the circumstances imposed by events. But Marshal Antonescu informed about some current ideas that concern the senior management of your group lately. Compared to this information, Marshal Antonescu finds it necessary to make some clarifications, to put you on hand the exact items for assessing the situation. – Marshal Antonescu is notified that Mr. Maniu researched different solutions to achieve Romania's withdrawal from the war with minimum risks and sacrifices – that regarding to his thought, this withdrawal would be immediately necessary to avoid war theater on our territory and to make possible to Anglo-Saxon powers to exercise a meditation or a help in our favor;

– That, to achieve this goal, has to be sought realistic solutions that ensure the least bad conditions to the country, in a very difficult situation;

– That in the present circumstances, the only factor that could to bring the improvement of the situation is Marshal Antonescu and that the Lord would have a new mission to accomplish;

– That the Marshal Antonescu would be able to review its relations with Germany with loyalty and come to consent for our withdrawal from the war. Marshal Antonescu is in the situation to regret that Mr. Iuliu Maniu does not want to take notice – neither this time – to the realities of war, held by the rules beyond our desires and interests. It is not in our power to avoid war theater in our territory. The strategic importance of the country and the amount of our resources will determine. We can withdraw from the war and yet, the hostilities to take place on our territory, as in Italy, but with more serious consequences. Is very difficult for Romania to create a different situation towards the other belligerent group, given the importance of oil and our economy for Germany.

– Mr. Maniu believes, however, that from now on realistic solutions should be sought to change our military and diplomatic position. What are the solutions? Marshal Antonescu asked to be exposed in practice, but you have not been able to show them.

– Mr. Maniu considers, however, that Marshal Antonescu has a mission and that the Lord may immediately withdraw the country from war. What would be the mission? Mr. Maniu should specify it. Relentlessly for three years, are lording the same theoretical ideas that seem deceptive. But Mr. Maniu avoid and hesitate to ask and, especially, to show how it could be done practically Romanian withdrawal from the war, wish that's also of Marshal Antonescu and the entire nation, if the Allies and the Germans would ensure our borders and future. Neither one, nor the other does not give us, do not want, and especially cannot give us these guarantees, which we seek for three years. In these circumstances who can try the solution of surrender or giving up the fight, especially when - and in one case, and in the other – Romania will be forced as Italy by both belligerents to bear the fight on its territory.

– Lord Maniu thinks that Marshal Antonescu may review straightforwardness its relations with the Germans. This test could be provided to have certain guarantees from Allied, that we don't have, which neither Mr. Maniu does not have and cannot obtain.

– Mr. Maniu does no longer see possibility for Germany to maintain Soviet front and prevent an invasion of Russia in Europe. This case, however, is not totally excluded. Germany's huge military force is not as weak as it seems, and recent developments in the allied camp again prove

the hidden intentions of Soviet and the European catastrophe that would occur if the Germans would not be able to keep the Eastern Front.

– Mr. Maniu is wrong but when assumed that Marshal Antonescu based on German assurances, took military and political obligations. Marshal Antonescu took such an obligation, but it is still too early to say that Germany's security was overturned by the latest twists of war.

– Of course, allied obligations cease when they raise serious national security issues of our territory and its inhabitants; of course no one can be required to expose the whole country to the horrors of war and sacrifice the future interests of the Romanian state for the war targets foreign to us. But basically, the thing is impossible. Who looks on map can see that if Germany would be defeated, Southern Reich forces will withdraw to our country, both because of oil, but also without it because the lines of communication: the roads and railways and national defense lines, the Balkans, the Danube, the Southern Carpathians, Bug, Dniester, Prut, Siret, the Eastern Carpathians, etc. In such circumstances, who is the man who can, without technical and practical solution, to prevent the Germans, the Russians, and the Anglo-Americans to fight on our territory? Is only one: that to which has led to thaw ordinary betrayal by Badoglio. However we would end up the war between brothers, at the war of all on our territory, with easy to deduce consequences.

– It's naïve to believe again that it could easily pass from a state of war to a state of non-belligerent and expectant army. It's very hard to believe that our allies would accept this solution quickly and they would stop to take the measures claimed by their war safety. Lord Maniu speaks of the situation which would ensure a country emerging from war and being able to defend better its future. If we do this action, her chances we could not foresee. But the sequel? We are told that the Anglo-Saxon powers could mediate Romania's cause to the Russian and find suitable arrangements regarding us. Marshal Antonescu does not find that these convenient arrangements could consist of cede Bessarabia, Bukovina and "other parts." We are told again that this time, the opposition factors would have the leisure and the possibility of a diplomatic action by the other belligerent group. But what did so far Mr. Maniu than this? What are the results?

– We are also suggesting that, before attempting to review relations with Germans, to proclaim general mobilization, because in this case the

Reich would not hesitate to pass to retaliatory measures. Marshal Antonescu reckons it would be a dangerous solution; it would mean war with the Germans, when the cannon thundering towards Bessarabia, because we are facilitating the Russians to get at us when we have no security in the country and in Europe! Beautiful view!

– Marshal Antonescu asked Mr. Maniu to reflect seriously at the entire situation and take into account all realities, as they are and not as we would imagine them to us.

– Marshal Antonescu made wide and significant concessions to Mr. Maniu, but this does mean that it should be asked to do what no one, in the circumstances in which we find ourselves and that will come, could not do. Leadership's liability of national destinies, in circumstances that the country has not lived up to today – consequences of which Marshal Antonescu is not guilty – requires the statesman a serious and decisive action based solely on politico-military realities, to ensure Romania to come out with a better fate of the great international conflagration.

1944 August 17

Note received by SSI in connection with the political activities of democratic groups towards the possibilities of withdrawing Romania from war¹¹

NOTE regarding the activity of democratic opposition camp regarding Romania's exit from the war Latest military events hastened the activity carried by the factors of democratic opposition related to our exit from the war.

Iuliu Maniu – who leads this action – realizes that, while the movements of a similar nature in other countries, can make real contributions to the Allied cause as military operations expand, the anglophile movement in Romania fails to meet the hopes which they awoke in the upper circles of the other belligerent group. Plans which Maniu has made and which sought an immediate blow – were examined after the return of Mr. Marshal Antonescu from the Fuehrer, in a new light. Important differences have arisen in opposition management. For some communist group and some radical elements, from the two democratic groups,

¹¹ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 17-25;

planning a decisive gesture although the risks it would attract; on the other hand Dinu Brătianu, Gh. Brătianu, Mihalache, Dr. Lupu etc. which were making reservations about the possibility and success of such an action, but give Maniu the whole initiative and responsibility.

Meanwhile, the lack of reliable information about German intentions and changes in the strategic plans of the allies, have raised new difficulties. Divergences between Maniu and Mihalache From the story below, you will see that Maniu has difficulty in his own group. Between Ion Mihalache and Iuliu Maniu arose again important differences of views. Attitude of Mihalache, observed from a long time, has accentuated in recent times and it is explained, inter alia, Mihalache's distrust in the results of collaboration between the National Peasant Party and the Liberal Party. Thursday, August 10 this year, Maniu sent a letter to Ion Mihalache, through which invited him to come to Bucharest before or after will have fulfilled the mandate stated in the letter – meaning after having seen Mr. Marshal Antonescu; Mihalache refused to come to Bucharest, sending to Maniu a written answer. On receipt of the reply, Saturday, August 12, Maniu instructed the Popescu-Mehedinți to bring to Mihalache, at Dobrești, a written reply. We cannot talk of dissension that would lead, for now, to very serious consequences. In any case, with full powers of the party to proceed as they see fit to lead oppositionist action, Maniu is actually devoid of competition of Mr. N. Lupu, because he's sick, no longer moving from Dobrești, and of Mihalache, who prefer to leave the entire responsibility to Maniu.

Clarifying the relationship between Maniu, Russian and American Maniu is concerned with tightening contact with foreign and clarify relations with the Americans and the Russians. Maniu thinks he can count on the support of the government, but he does not yet know quite clear U.S. government attitude also of Russian government towards his policy and the democratic coalition which he presides. An illustration of this confusion is that at "Gazette de Lausanne" appeared recently an article-reportage in which shows that G. Tătărăscu occupy a dominant role in organizing democratic coalition in Romania. Maniu sent to the Lausanne newspaper a telegram of aligning; on this occasion, made the finding, towards his intimates, that they must take into account the possibility that the Russians and Americans – or possibly that only the Russians – try to work in Romania with other political leaders than those present in the "Democratic Union". Meeting Dr. Angelescu with Maniu Saturday 12

august a.c., afternoon, Dr. C. Angelescu returning from the Stălpuestatem after a lack from the capital for nearly a week, he visited Iuliu Maniu, and they had a conversation for almost an hour. Between Maniu and Dr. Angelescu – as a representative of the liberal faction that believes in the possibilities and the role of Maniu – there is a complete identity of views. Dr. Angelescu and Maniu believe that King should replace the current regime with a democratic government that signed the armistice and to proceed to restore a constitutional political life. Maniu and Dr. Angelescu hopes that, having the king's contest and the military commanders, the regime will be replaced very peered time, for Romania to emerge from the war with Bulgaria, if not before.

Dinu Brătianu's reserves, as well as other prominent liberals, however are not too optimistic. After the information that he owns from even general Sănătescu's source, Dinu Brătianu believes that the situation is not yet suitable to armistice because it could count for now on the support of the army commanders. Nor relationship between Anglo-Americans and Russians – still unclear about the fate of countries in the South East including Romania – do not encourage military commanders to support an armistice formula. Most elder's liberals do not believe, so, in likelihood of a quick regime change and sees the possibilities of an immediate ceasefire. However, Iuliu Maniu has the contest of Dinu and Gheorghe Brătianu, as well as the other liberal leader, as, passively, he was enjoying the support of prominent factors from the National Peasant group.

Tătărescu proposed formation of a Romanian government in Botoșani Regarding George Tătărescu the audience that had to the king circles to, close former Prime Minister shows that he suggested a solution that, in his opinion, would be only able to alleviate complaints allied and Soviets particularly grievances and lead to cooperation between Romanian political forces and the other belligerent group. George Tătărescu showed that, since the party may organize by agreement of y solution left is that representatives of all political groups to go to Botoșani, take contact with the Soviet command and assemble there a Romanian government, which would conclude a formal armistice with the Allies, to assume the task of administration the territories occupied by the Russians and lead from there, on behalf of the Romanian people, the action against the Germans. According to Tătărescu, such an initiative would be welcomed by the Soviet government, which could show the world that the Romanian people

made a gesture of dissociation of Germanophiles policy. The solution is discussed in initiated circles. Mihalache announced Maniu that he is not coming to Bucharest on August 16, Ion Mihalache announced Maniu that it decided not to come to Bucharest, because he is not interested in political conversations which are brought there, either within or outside the group.

At the same time, however, Mihalache announced Maniu that he remains faithful soldier of the group, convinced that the social-economic and political turmoil after the Armistice, the National Peasant Party will play a very important role. Mihalache's bespeak is explained by the fact that he is waiting to see to what extent Iuliu Maniu will succeed in action on that he currently leads on behalf of "Democratic Union". Mihalache believes that the situation is very serious, as it might happen that the Russians, feeling the need for new military successes, to resume action on the front of the Prut and therefore seek occupation of the Balkans. In such a case, in Mihalache's opinion there will be no possibility of any kind of negotiations and the Russians will impose to Romania what regime will want without the taking into account previous commitments. Maniu does not share Mihalache's pessimism; he continued to believe that commitments from Tehran provide Anglo-American presence in Romania, regardless of battle sectors fluctuations. Who leads the negotiations between Maniu and legionnaires we talked, in a previous report, of Legionary delegation which has made contact with Maniu. The liaison between the group 'democrat Legionnaire "and Iuliu Maniu is the lawyer Nelu Pădureanu the current owner of the bread factory former" Muller ".

Pădureanu aims to attract for the disappointed Legionnaires as many supporters with which, joining Maniu on behalf of the legionary movement, be able to obtain an important role in democratic youth organization. Meanwhile, the group that is represented by Pădureanu keep contact with other political figures, and now is looking for an approach also by the recognized leaders of the communist movement, to see if – eventually joining the communists, with whom then come to Maniu – would not gain important advantages.

Contact with the Palace suitable with its plan to try to replace the current regime – if it does not want to take measures to withdraw Romania from the war, in time – Maniu at the same time is working to prepare the second formula: a government of armistice made of senior officials or military. This action, which is to be made under the king, encounters various difficulties:

- The senior army commanders are divided so that one day it is believed that it can count on the military contest, that the next day to see that the number of generals willing to give support is reduced;
- General Sănătescu appointed to the role of chair this government, seems to have declined such liability;
- News from the ally sources who oppose such formulas and require that a government comprising representatives of all parties in Romania. In view of this action, Maniu maintains however regular contact with the palace, either directly or indirectly. In the days of Sunday, August 13 and Monday, August 14 ac Maniu made in Sinaia new contacts with Palace circles. Informations on the progress of operations Allied military operations conduct has made some of Maniu's friends to hope that soon British and American troops will take action in order to occupy Bulgaria and Romania, so they will come on our territory before or even along with Soviet troops. Maniu said, however, that from the information that they received from abroad, five days ago, that the allies have not yet regard such an operation; All efforts would be submitted, both by the Russians and by the Anglo-Americans – said Maniu – that to get into Hungary. Maniu revealed that intentions of the High Allied Command should enjoy, because in this way it will avoid a big clash between the Germans and the Allies on our territory, collision which would result in bombing and fantastic destruction.

German intentions towards Romanian politicians .National Peasant group leadership is concerned about the intentions which the Gestapo leadership from Romania would have against Romanian politicians. Following information received Maniu Gestapo would have done in recent days to undertake intense training at a time to raise opposition leaders. Maniu was interested in what are the forces that the Gestapo would have to us, what German paramilitary groups exist and where they would find the offices and stores of weapons and ammunition for these formations. Head of National Peasant group tasked different people from its proximity to provide, quickly, a documentary material in this regard.

New meeting Maniu – Brătianu On Thursday, August 17 ac Maniu and Dinu Brătianu jointly examined various internal and external information. Maniu stated that all rumors stating that Mr. Marshal Antonescu had decided to give the place to another ministerial formation, aiming to conclude an armistice, are unfounded. Maniu claims that Mr. Marshal

Antonescu is not willing to such a gesture, and to prove it, the head of the National Peasant group reported a statement made by the Leader in Azuga's hospital inspection, led by Dr. Topa. Maniu said, however, that the most appropriate solution would be from emissaries sent abroad.

What are the Allies really asking, after reports sent by Știrbey and Vișoianu, the situation would have changed compared to the opposition plans as allies are asking that the onal coalition – and thereby it is excluded a government besides parties or officials government. Soviets want this, because in reality they do not seek an armistice itself, but a peace, before to meet the World Conference with this mission. Vișoianu also said that it is impossible, in the present circumstances, to obtain from the Russian an improvement of the armistice conditions. Taking into consideration the explanations made by the alliance, Maniu and Dinu Brătianu took in research possibilities in order to the composition of a armistice government composed of all parties. Brătianu was however of the opinion that the opposition should remain on hold, until it will be seen:

- Watch new military action;
- It emerge from these actions, the Germans will withdraw from Romania, which will be the situation;
- What attitude will have Mr. Marshal Antonescu towards new military actions and his intentions? Maniu however, said that the opposition must be prepared, as may occur at any time new situations and that towards the responsibilities which he has, all plans must be in place.

Maniu left on 17 August at Snagov, announcing that from there he will go in Transylvania, from where he will return next weekend.

1944 August 20

Rumor from the NPP environments, picked up by the source “K-5”, regarding a governmental formula with Iuliu Maniu premier and Marshal Ion Antonescu military commander¹².

Section CI [Rumor]

Circulating among the National Peasant Party, strongly, after which the old rumor of a Maniu government formula with Mr. Marshal Antonescu

¹² ANIC, Fond PCM/SSI, File 3/1944, Vol. II, 304 f.;

as supreme commander of the armies would be current this time being accepted by Mr. Marshall. It seems that this formula is much favored by party members because Mr. Maniu does not have the army and at present military force is even more necessary to preserve internal order. Military formula is – they say – even in such a position supported by Mr. Maniu that he suggest the formation of a democratic hue troops government but which, by its determination to counter any riot which, eventually, would try by the Communists party and whose troubles the party cannot cope, his peasant guards being just during their romantic phase.

1944 August 22

Report of the Capital Police Prefecture, received by SSI, in relation to the supervision of the main political leaders¹³.

Capital Police Prefecture

Politicians work in the day of August 21, 1944

1. Iuliu Maniu is at Braşov.
2. Mihail Popovici arrived in the capital, going immediately to Buftea.
3. Av. N. Penescu is at Buda – Ilfov.
4. Ion Mihalache is at Dobreşti.
5. Dinu Brătianu is at Florica.
6. George Tătărăscu is at Poiana-Gorj.
7. Mihail Ralea has not been returned from Sinaia.
8. Pandrea Peter on the day of August 21 a.c. was in Bucharest.
9. N.D. Cocea has not been returned from Sighişoara.
10. Laurenţiu Pătrăşcanu has not made an appearance in the Capital.

Communication:

Undersecretary of State of Internal Affairs

General Directorate of Police

General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie

Special Intelligence Service

¹³ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 55-57;

1944 August 22

Note of the ISS about time established by the political groups to take action to save the country¹⁴.

From the political circles

1. The new Soviet offensive on the front of Moldova has caused turmoil in political circles. Both in Sinaia and Bucharest Soviet offensive is seen as likely to clear up a number of internal problems which were found for months in direct or indirect dependence on the Red Army advance. The National Peasant is said that Maniu has solutions prepared in agreement with the other leaders of the democratic opposition and that these solutions will be implemented shortly. Circles mentioned reports that Maniu believes that the threat of the first German reaction in the country cannot be put now in question and that at the time when Soviet troops will be in front of the line Galati – Focsani the Germans will no longer might think to act vigorously within the country.

This time – say the Peasant members – can be used, safely, by Democratic groups to take action. In the same way see the things also the Liberals. Liberals also said that the opposition is preparing a request besides Mr. Marshal Antonescu, to find sooner the solution regarding the lives of the soldiers on the front who are scattered with no chance of success. United opposition will propose that at the eleventh hour to let to the political groups the task of saving what can be saved. Communists consider the situation in another way, claiming that limited purpose, which is, however, also a political character. Pătrășcanu, who for some time has resumed contact with some partisans, claims that it is about occupying parts of Moldova including Iasi, in order to may constitute the democratic government of the elements that are currently in Moscow.

It also claims that the game is not precluded the entry into of the senior officers, prisoners in the USSR and won by Moscow. Concerning the right circles, they think that eventually the situation will improve and that the last word will have the Germans. Gigurtu, Cuza and the others claim that Romania's attitude to the new events must be of waiting, while continuing to respect commitments to Germany. German Legation in Bucharest – Gigurtu states-is very attentive to all the tortures of the

¹⁴ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 67;

democratic groups in Romania, and the Reich is strong enough to react promptly if it would attempt anything. German Legation in Bucharest – Gigurtu-states is very close to all the tortures democratic groups in Romania, and Reich is strong enough to react promptly if they would try something.

In February. Romanian democratic circles were informed that the Secretary of the Swedish Legation in Ankara wrote to a relative of his in Bucharest last week, a letter, which was also shown to Maniu. The letter states inter alia that the mission of Barbu Știrbey would be about to fail and that Romania is currently isolated. However, the Swedish diplomat advises his kinsman, that if the Soviet occupation occur in Bucharest, to remain in Romania, because it will be better here than elsewhere. The text of this letter, counted by the mentioned circles is authentic, produced a deep impression among those around Maniu and the other who have taken note of it. Soviet offensive beginning towards Romania is explained by these circles as follows:

- or is it a general offensive along the whole front from the North to the Black Sea, which must be decisive against the Germans;
- or is it declaration of the offensive in this region because of the difficulties of the rest of the front, where the Germans would try a staunch resistance;
- or is it an attempt to obtain the decisive political results, given the delay in taking a decision by policy makers in Romania In any case, the current week is counted as exceptionally important for the events unfolding.

August 1944 [22]

Note of the SSI on the edge of a rumor about an alleged appeal of democratic opposition leaders, Iuliu Maniu and CIC [Dinu] Brătianu to Marshal Ion Antonescu¹⁵.

A letter signed by Messrs. Maniu and Dinu Brătianu was sent Tuesday evening to Mr. Marshall. The letter states that:

1. Mr. Marshal, ignoring the advices that were given has loaded himself of liability.

¹⁵ ASRI, Fond Y., File no. 40 010, Vol. 34, f. 83-84;

2. Germany was defeated and Romania sacrifices were in vain.

3. Romania will not be able to change the situation helping again Germany instead it will bear the consequences of the Bolshevik victory. Accordingly, Messrs. Maniu and Brătianu ask Mr. Marshall: "Since no one can take responsibility of the situation today, Mr. Marshall is invited to break ties with Germany and declare Romania a non-belligerent state, sharing it also to American – England allies. If he won't do this, he is invited to communicate M.S. Regelui the situation and to leave the place to another government, to resolve what it can be saved." The letter was sent this morning, 10 am, to Mr. Churchill, through Swedish Legation.

– This letter was personally communicated also to Tanrioer.

– The anti-German posters manufactured with the warning to resignation on Mr. Marshall. Attention to printing houses.

It projects two things:

If in 8 days will not occurred any gesture of marshal, in the sense of the letter sent, he and Dinu Brătianu will approach the king to take the initiative of the situation. Parallel, is working on bullying the situation with the help of some generals. Is expected the completion of the callings under arms. Is not about prominent generals, but about some that inspires today confidence to Marshal. Mr. Maniu does not want generals who have personal ambitions, but people who actually exerting an order, have the force and share its ideas. I think that in 4-5 days we will know one of them.

– Mr. Marshall and M. Antonescu were to leave today at the Führer, they will leave tomorrow.

Legionnaires were arrested in the province.

– It is believed that Marshal will strengthen the government with a few Germanophiles General.

1944 August 22

Note of the SSI about steps taken by the leaders of the political groups to save the country ¹⁶

NOTE

The last two days (20 and August 21), I drew the following: The onset of the Soviet offensive on the front of the Siret and Dniester gave

¹⁶ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 65-66;

certain indication to the opposition that the final phase began. In the discussions that took place between Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Brătianu and other leaders of the democratic bloc, was taken into account the impetuous need to move without delay to the implementation of desiderata underlying political democratic parties approach to save the country. It was decided keeping a permanent contact with the crown, in which scops-apropus M.S. King coming to Bucharest. His Majesty came to the capital on the night of August 20-21 for today, August 22, convened a council of democratic cartel, to adopt some final decisions. There is Maniu strong belief that will waive all claims for the truce to be signed by the military, to accept to sign the clause regarding Bessarabia. The way in which the fighting on the front Iasi, German on the front attitude and mood of our military personnel, justifies opposition leaders in believing that they are in the consent of the Romanian people, demanding sooner cessation of war with Russia. German attitude to the front, where their armies would find in the railway wagons, after some to be transported to the battle field, after others to leave the front line. Opinions in the opposition camp can be divided:

- Some political leaders claim that, once the front will approach Milcov, should be announced an armistice with the Russians, by appointing a government in Bucharest, with a mandate from the M.S. King Michael – this under the assumption that the Marshal had not until then agreed to proclaim himself this;

- other political leaders think that will last at least on the front lines of Vaslui and at Nămolosa – Brăila, where the Germans will try a resistance. Then it might repeat the situation of Finland, where Soviet armies could not advance and were stopped, where they can be found now;

- Finally, there are some political leaders who believe that Soviet military action is with a clear political character, following events precipitation in Bucharest, in their majority, but, opposition political leaders agree that the military events will take in a few days at a rate which will not allow any delay, unless it will be adopted the last chance to save the country, through an benevolent agreement with the Russians. There are very few politicians and even military that believes in resistance. For today, August 22, 1944, are announced various secret meetings between democratic politicians, who are likely to make final decisions.

1944 August 23

Note of SSI Maniu's political activity¹⁷.

NOTE From political

1. Among National Peasant leadership approach group is discussed that Maniu, during his last trip to Ardeal, made contact at Sibiu with General H. Cihosky, with whom he discussed for three hours in a room at Hotel Boulevard. On the discussions not even his close ones to Maniu does not have details, but is revealed at National Peasant that whenever the President of this group deems that the situation of the front is likely to influence the political tide, accustomed to consult with superior military, especially those who held high positions in the army. After this meeting, Maniu went to Brașov, from where he continued on to Sinaia, reaching there in the afternoon of August 21, with Leucuția and preceded by Ilie Lazar, who had arrived a few hours before. Maniu descended at Dr. Jovin's villa where he was immediately visited by the lawyer Virgil Venianin and Titel Petrescu. On the morning of August 22 a.c. Maniu arrived at Snagov with Leucuția, and after a quarter of an hour has arrived and Dr. Jovin. By noon arrived at Snagov also Mircea Cancicov, and in the afternoon Maniu went to Bucharest, where he was visited at his home by many politicians. Among those who visited him were Mihalache with Virgil Solomon, Dr. N. Lupu, Vasile Serle Relu Măldărăscu, Ciudin, Coposu with count of Gatterburg, Penescu with MihaiPopovici, Emil Socor, Ghiță Popp, General Iliescu ing. Mironescu with Domocos, Romulus Boilă M. Sturza, R. Cioeulescu and R. Xenopol. By evening Maniu visited of three quarters of an hour at the residence of Barbu Știrbey then has visited nearly half an hour ing. Vasilescu. He took dinner to Mrs. Madgearu, and at night slept at Romulus Pop. In addition to these conferences of Maniu, General Rădescu convened, also, a number of reserve officers and Tătărescu group also was called, being invited those in Ralea's.

2. Among the opposition, there is no full agreement on the Soviet offensive its meaning and development opportunities on the Romanian territory. Left circles expresses the belief that is not about the decisive offensive against Romania, but an action with limited objectives to conquer

¹⁷ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 71-73;

Iasi, security positions to the south, and the conquest of some starting positions on the front lines, more advantageous.

Left circles believe that the Soviet action tends to create the necessary environment for political solution to Bucharest, which is still pending. In the event, however, that the expected events will not occur in a short time, those circles which announce actions pretend to be exceptionally important from the Soviets. First is to be expected formation of a “release” Romanian government at Iasi, with political elements, intellectual, labor and military who are in the USSR. Secondly, in the case of delay of some decisions which are to take by the political world in Bucharest, claiming that it will unleash a rapid and decisive offensive on a large scale through a landing in Constanta and surround Bucharest.

In this second case, also announced that will enter into action in Constanta the Romanian troops trained in the USSR and put under the command of senior Romanian officers. Leftist political circles express their conviction that the time to decide in Bucharest arrived and will not have to be lost without the risk of jeopardizing the agreement with the USSR.

3. The National Peasant Secretariat expressed the fear that the Soviet governments do not establish a provisional government in Iasi, whose role will be to recognize to Soviet concessions required of them, to recruit troops to fight alongside the USSR and to monopolize in the future Romanian political life control during the occupation. These Informations have upstart Turkish Legation secretariat and have produced a deep concern, as it sees the Soviet desire to respond to democratic group’s passivity in the country. Although some leaders see this information a Soviet “blackmail” to boost an action, it is still possible to influence democratic attitudes in the coming days.

1944 August 23

Note received by Group Policy of the SSI, from the Capital Police Prefecture, about the work of the previous day politicians¹⁸.

Capital Police Prefecture Politicians activity on the day of August 22, 1944:

¹⁸ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 77-79;

1. Iuliu Maniu came to the capital from Snagov at 16.30 accompanied by Aurel Leucuța. In his absence from home was visited in the morning by: Vasile Serdici and Virgil Solomon and Mrs. Alice Sturza. Afternoon he was visited at 16.30 by Ion Mihalache and Virgil Solomon, who left at 17. Between the hours of 16.40 to 17.25 Iuliu Maniu was visited by Dr. N. Lupu, Ciudin, Count of Kattenbourg, Ghiță Pop, Coposu gen. Ilescu in Gendarmes, Commander Coșoveanu, engineer and Domocoș Boila Mironescu Jr., Mihail Sturza, Cioculescu and Radu Radu Xenopol. At 19.20 Iuliu Maniu accompanied by engineer left to the residence of Mironescu Barbu Știrbey in Calea Victoriei, where they remained until 20.20 when they went to ing. Vasilescu in Mica Palace. At 20.45 str. Vasile Conta have gone to to Mrs. Virgil Madgaru, which is believed to have 22 hour the dining and Iuliu Maniu a went to Splai Union, No. 5, where he slept overnight.

2. Mihail Popovici came to the capital at 8.40 descended at his home in str. Sofia, No. 22, from where he immediately went out, returning at 10.20 accompanied by av. Măldărescu. At 18:30 he was visited by journalist Ganea.

3. Ion Mihalache and Dr. Lupu came to from Topoloveni the capital in the afternoon. Between the hours of 16.25 to 16.55 Ion Mihalache visited Iuliu Maniu, at 17 he was at the Palace, at 17.45 he returned Iuliu Maniu to the residence of, from where after a half hour he left with Dr. N. Lupu. They went to the home of Barbu Știrbey in Calea Victoriei and at 19.20 they left the capital in Snagov direction. From the information we have, appears that Ion Mihalache returned to the capital, at 20.40 and was received in audience by Mr. Marshal – leading at Presidency of the Council of Ministers. After this he returned at Snagov, from where he is expected to return to the capital in the morning of August 23

4. Av. Penescu was not visited by any political figure both in his home and at matches company. At 17.15 accompanied by Mihail Popovici they visited Iuliu Maniu, where they remained until 18. At 22 he left away at Buftea.

5. Dinu Brătianu is at Florica. It was expected to arrive in the capital on the evening of August 22 18 o'clock, being called by Iuliu Maniu still he did not come.

June. Gh. is at Glade – Gorj and is expected to come to the capital in the day of August 23

7. Mihail Ralea is at Sinaia.

8. Pandrea Peter in August 22 a.c. was in Bucharest.
9. N.D. Coceanu has returned from Sighisoara.
10. Laurențiu Pătrășcanu on 22 August has not appeared at any of the known address in the Capital.

Communication:

Under secretariat of State Internal Affairs

General Direction of Police

General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie

Special Intelligence Service

1944 August 26

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers and the Internal Affairs Ministry about: the meeting between Gheorghe Tătărescu and Mihail Ralea; trying to coagulation of a single block of the right, the mission received by Istrate Micescu to draft a new constitution ¹⁹.

NOTE domestic political information

Tătărescu recently had a meeting with Ralea, with which occasion they established the following: I deem it imperative the existence of strong leftist political groups, both in terms of internal and external point of view. Both want a sincere collaboration with the Social Democrats and the Communists, to whom will give all moral and material competition. Because they have information that the National Peasants and liberals want to exploit the current international situation, the two groups left, following to withdraw their cooperation in peace time, Ralea and Tătărescu provides from now a basis for accurate collaboration and a number of important portfolios in a common cabinet. Want to share information with the two groups of left and collaborate in collecting this information, both at home and abroad. Commit themselves of a political truce for five years after the signing of peace, during which time none of the groups not to attack, agreement which may be extended indefinitely by tacit renewal. In the circles around him Tătărescu states that it would have taken a domestic general offensive, trying to get past the Liberals and National Peasant temporary counted their allies.

¹⁹ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 80-81;

On the evening of August 21, was held a conference of several leaders of the right, which also examined the internal situation in the light of recent information. The conference took place outside the capital, to Dr. Ilie Rădulescu property, near Snagov, without the participation of Guard elements. At this conference has shown, among other things, and dissatisfaction for the difficulties arising at the creation of united internal block of right.

Micescu Istrate said that he received a mandate to work on drafting a Constitution in place of the 1938 one of the former King Carol II. Constitution to Micescu recommended is to be inspired by the one given to the country in 1923 by Brătianu. Also Micescu said that he received a mandate to work on a decree of annulment of all decrees given from 1940 until now. Micescu declined to say from whom he received this mandate.

1944 August 28

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff, about the political activities conducted by Gheorghe Tătărescu, Mihail Ralea and Micaela Masts²⁰.

NOTE

1. Gheorghe Tătărescu is not shown discouraged by the fact that he could not be a part of the current government. Spread His intimate that was convinced beforehand that Tătărescu will not the new contributes to _ government party. Georghel Gheorghiu, one of His intimates, say to people whom he contact, that still has prepared formula Tătărescu a governmental and that it intends to submit to the Sovereign. Also, his friends discuss that Tătărescu is working on a memorandum that will send heads of parties and will serve in political circles.

2. Mihail Ralea, seeing that with all the efforts he cannot be accepted in the “National Democratic Bloc” he made a new attempt in addition to engineer Tudor Ionescu, one of the tutors former unionist factions, to rally to a common action. Ing T. Ionescu, besides that Ralea has recently made other approaches, has refused this approach, saying that he still remains on hold.

²⁰ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 84-85;

3. Micaela Catargi, known by its Carol-it orientation is currently in Sinaia, where his brother resides, Barbu Catargi, and where is working on a political memoir. The first part of his work deals with events before the Balkan War, the second refers to era up to the World War and restore the former King Carol II, the last part deals with its reign and ends with the regime of Marshal Antonescu. Micaela Catargi soon plans to publish his work, his entire manuscript to the events of 1944. The work – in some passages – will try a political justification of the former King Carol II.

1944 August 30

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff, regarding self-dissolution of the Legionary Movement and political actions of the liberal group led by Gheorghe Tătărescu²¹.

NOTE domestic political information

1. Legionary group self-dissolution and exchange of letters between Messrs. Ministers Iuliu Maniu and Comănciu held the attention of political circles. The grouping most affected by this manifestation of Legionnaires in the country was that of Gheorghe Tătărescu, which considers the particularly important fact. Georgel Gheorghiu said on the evening of August 29 when it was known in political circles about the fact that “the National Peasant Party leader understands to organize in this way, by capturing former Legionary elements, a dynamic part to counterbalance the action so vivid of the Communist Party.” Maniu – said Gheorghiu – would particularly appreciate the organizational dynamism and spirit that dominates legionary personnel and would like to use these skills for the benefit of political consolidation of the National Peasant Party.” The chapter is reported by Tătărescu’s group, which understands to reserves it for the campaign, deemed inevitable in fall. The rulers around Tătărescu declares that in assumption until last of the Democratic formula only to the four parties which are found today at the government Tătărescu will move to grouping of all other political parties and independent figures around him for elections to come. There are still hoping voices, however, still hoping who are in the grouping of Tătărescu to a reconciliation with

²¹ ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 86-89;

the Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Dinu Brătianu or when moving of this heads to Costinescu Dr. or by a vehement campaign against Gheorghe Brătianu, considered one of obstacles most important to the realization of this union between liberal.

2. Immediately after the change of regime Liberal group around Tătărescu decided not to involve, until overall government policy materialization of the National Democratic Bloc. Now, however, it means to sympathizers of Tătărescu a tendency to leave of these expectations. Explanation of attitude change, which coincided with the entry of Soviet troops in Bucharest, is given by intimate friends of Tătărescu, showing that the head of their group counts on the support of the Soviet factor in the continuation of its policy. On the morning of August 29 a.c. was held a conference of Tătărescu's intimate friends, which was attended by Georgel Gheorghiu, Costel Tătăranu, Petre Bejan, Ion Nistor etc. It was examined the situation of regime change and decided immediate appearance of a great liberal newspaper to support the view of the group under Tătărescu's leadership and subsidization of one or more papers appearing or will appear in some time to support the organization of Tătărescu. In the event that there will not be obtained authorization of daily newspaper occurrence of party, intentionally, it will resort to editing it without authorization. It was also decided to launch a manifesto to the country, to explain the attitude of Tătărescu and liberal group around him etc. There were two opinions regarding the text and tone of this manifesto, on which it has been completely agreed. A view expressed by former ministers, demanded to avoid some feedback to the government made by M.S. King Mihai I, and other opinion, of the group of young elements, demanded immediate passing to an action of opposition and criticism. In the final phase of discussions it was decided to proceed with this manifesto to "enlighten the country" on Tătărescu's position on the issue of ceasefire, insisting on its manifestations few months ago for conclusion of peace with the USSR and citation of demarches to Palace and abroad, to reach the result of termination of the war with Russia. Tătărescu claimed that its placing in finding government formula would have meant a large and fair union of all existing democratic forces would be due to the action of Gheorghe Brătianu addition the minister Iuliu Maniu. "Gheorghe would lead otherwise, Brătianu said Tătărescu, all political affairs of the liberal faction of government attending the formula of the National Democratic Bloc, although it is a convinced pro-German and the attitude has had known until

now.” It was decided to continue the meeting of liberal committee this week, to begin the battle of categorical affirmation of Tătărescu, group. To Georgel Has been given Petre Gheorghiu and Bejan mandate to treat hiring the pattern for officious groups and making contract with journalists in order to achieve the decisions taken.

3. Mihail Ralea was in the morning of August 30 to printing “Adevărul”, where announced those from the newspaper “Libertatea” that Tătărescu, is about to release a newspaper, but that he encounters difficulties in recruiting editorial staff.

4. Sebastian Șerbescu decided reappearance of “Semnalului”, for which purpose he signed a contract with typography “Dacia Traiana” The newspaper will reappear on 1st September, with the same title from the past. On the other hand, Ion Totu, former editor of “Viitorul” and founder of the newspaper “Semnalul”, whereon then sold it to Șerbescu, seeing that the latter is in no hurry to resume his newspaper, he took the decision to use the title. Accordingly, on the morning of August 29 visited the General Constantinescu-claps leading typography “Curentul” by communicating to him that has the approval of ministers Maniu and Dinu Brătianu for the emergence of the newspaper “Semnalul” under its direction. General Constantinescu asked Totu to bring a letter from Mr. Maniu and Brătianu.

CONCLUSIONS

As major intelligence services, who worked during the Second World War (the American OSS, the British SOE, the Soviet NKVD and the German Abwehr), Romanian SSI proceeded both to the exploitation of official-open sources (newspapers, magazines, books, topographical maps, radio, etc.) and to collect information by clandestine means ²².

²² Cistian Troncotă, *Eugen Cristescu. Asul serviciilor secrete românești. Memorii (1916-1944), mărturii, documente*, with a foreword by Dr. Dan Zamfirescu. Publishing House “R.A.I. Bucharest”, Ed ”Roza Vanturilor“, Bucharest, f.a., p. 40;

Information material picked up by S.S.I. from official sources, by way of intelligence, by exchanging information with similar services in other countries (notably with German Abwehr) or other Romanian military and civilian institutions, it was processed by the Office of Studies and Documentation – department specialized in analysis, synthesis and prognosis of politico-strategic events and military – which operate under a deputy, but under the direct coordination of E. Cristescu. Here were drawn up information bulletins that went directly to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and, where appropriate, to other ministries, according to the issues of interest. An informative bulletin was usually presented every day at 12.30 and consists of two chapters: one on internal events and the second contained news in international affairs. Weekly or by events, it was inserted a chapter about the course of military operations, which develop together with Section II of M.St.Major the main body of the Romanian army. Over the course of 20-30 pages, sometimes 50, an information bulletin of SSI refers to the country's economic situation, at the mood of the working strata (workers, traders, farmers) or minorities (especially Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians), the activity of political parties and organizations (National Liberal and National Peasant). In the right of each information was mentioned the credibility of the source through the following notes: “reliable source”, “information verified” or “unverified”, “official source”, “from foreign press,” “conclusions offered by experts” etc. If we add the fact that many of these information bulletins are handwritten resolution of Marshal Ion Antonescu, we realize the value of these documents.

Special information was presented directly by E. Cristescu in daily audience that he had at Marshal's office. In the days when the State Leader was missing from Bucharest, general manager of SSI, avoid using special sealed envelopes sent by mail and move, depending on urgency, to where he knew that it may contact Ion Antonescu. Even in periods when E. Cristescu was gone on holiday

for treatment, he also personally solves all more delicate problems of the Service²³.

Marshal Ion Antonescu claimed daily information, comprehensive and accurate, and the range of the areas of interest was expanded. He was a relentless man; he did not admit any misconduct, errors or deviations from the orders given. E. Cristescu, along with its entire informational unit, had to respond qualified, documented and very operative at the request of the Head of State²⁴.

All these elements that can be documented historically reveal that the Special Intelligence Service was an essential element in strategic decisions that the state leader has adopted.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 41;

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

SOVIET TROOPS IN ROMANIA (1944-1958). STATUS AND CONSEQUENCES.

Gavriil PREDA

In early March 1944 2 and 3 Ukrainian Fronts forces have launched the offensive operations Proskurov-Cernăuți Uman-Botoșani and Odessa for the release of the south-western Ukraine occupied by German troops. Following victories over the forces of Wehrmacht, the Soviet troops have entered on the Romanian territory advancing on the upper valleys of the Dniester, Prut and Siret. It was yet another attack of the Soviet troops on Romanian territory in the nearly two centuries and a half of direct vicinity between the Russian and Romanian peoples¹. Each presence of Russian troops on Romanian territory was accompanied by numerous abuses, requisition, acts of violence against the population, etc.² But it was the first time in the history of the Romanian-Russian relations since the two neighboring countries were at war, and their armed forces were confronting in very hard battles for over 3 years³.

¹ Russian armies entered the Romanian territory during crises and military conflicts that occurred in south-east Europe in the years 1711, 1735-1739, 1768-1774, 1806-1812, 1821, 1828-1829, 1848-1849, 1853 -1856, 1877-1878, 1916-1918, 1940-1941.

² View widely Alexander D. Xenopol, *Războaiele dintre ruși și turci și înrăurirea lor asupra țărilor române*, Iași, 1880; Ion G. Pelivan, *La Bessarabia Sous le régime russe*, Paris, 1919; Alexandru Boldur, *History of Bessarabia*, Chisinau, 1940; Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, Chisinau, 1991; Nicolae Arnăutu, *12 Russian invasion in Romania*, I.O. Saeculum Publishing, Bucharest, 1996.

³ The Soviet Union annexed by force in June 1940, the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Romania did not respond militarily to the Soviet aggression because during that year has been the subject

The multiple defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht's forces in the spring and summer of 1944 on the Soviet-German front highlighted Germany's inability to respect the politico-military commitments to Romania. Since the defeat of Nazi Germany was increasingly predictable, the political circles in Romania, both governmental and the opposition, sought several options for action to defend the existence of the Romanian state. In the opposition's action plan was designed the replacement by a government coup led by Marshal Ion Antonescu on 26 August 1944.

On the morning of August 20, 1944 the Soviet troops of the composition 2 and 3 Ukrainian Fronts launched the offensive Iasi-Chisinau, which aimed the destruction of German and the Romanian forces of the structure of Army Group "Ukraine South" and the advance in the direction of Focșani. On the afternoon of 23 August 1944, in Bucharest, took place coup after which the government Ion Antonescu was replaced and was decided Romania's exit of the ruling coalition with the Axis states. As a result of breaking the strategic device of Army Group "South Ukraine", performed since the first two days of the offensive, initiated on 20 August 1944, and the output from the Axis of Romania, Soviet troops managed up to August 25, 1944 to achieve breakthroughs in German-Romanian defense device deep from 80 to 110 kilometers and on a broad front of several hundred kilometers, crushing the majority of Romanian and German forces⁴.

of concentric revisionist actions executed against it by the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria. In 1941, Romania went to war alongside Germany against the Soviet Union in order to liberate the territories of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina. It was the first time in a shared history of over 300 years when the Soviet Union (Russia) and Romania have been in a direct war. Romanian army fought against Soviet troops from 21 June 1941 until 23 August 1944.

⁴ *Istoria românilor*, Vol IX, *Romania during 1940-1947*, editor Dinu Giurescu, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, pp. 291-293; *Marea conflagrație a secolului XX. Al doilea război mondial*, Bucharest, 1974, pp. 372-373.

Romanian decision of exiting the Axis was made by King Michael in a statement broadcast on the evening of August 23, 1944. In the said statement Romanian head of state, as the “supreme commander” of the Romanian army ordered to stop “fighting and any act of hostility against the Soviet army as well as the state of war with Britain and the United States.” Also it was specified that “the United Nations have guaranteed the country’s independence and non-interference in our internal affairs” and „recognized the injustice of the Vienna Treaty, which resulted in the taking of Transylvania from us”⁵.

Romania’s transition from an alliance in the other was a huge surprise for both the allies and the enemies. In the new conditions of change of alliances, Romanian military forces complied and met the new political and military orientation of the government and the country. Romania’s exit from the alliance with the Axis caused significant changes in the balance of power between the two warring camps and led to “crushing the south wing of the east German front”⁶. Through the extent and composition of the participating forces, through the spatial dimension on which were carried, by the ways and methods of action, through the subsequent consequences, Romania’s leaving, August 23, 1944, from the alliance with Nazi Germany and joining the United Nations Coalition forces, is unique in form and its contents in the history of the Second World War⁷. The Soviet offensive started on 20 August 1944 and Romania’s exit from the alliance with Germany, was a second Stalingrad for the Wehrmacht, has created a huge gap in the German military front in south-east, which resulted in the loss over several weeks of

⁵ Romanian National Archives, Ministry of National Defence Fund, file 173/1944, pp. 239-241.

⁶ Hans Kissel, *Die Katastrophe in Rumänien 1944*, Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft MBH-Darmstadt, 1965, p 13.

⁷ Gavriil Preda, *Ploieștii în perioada celui de al doilea război mondial*, in *Marea carte a Ploieștiului*, Volume I, editors C. Trestioreanu, Gh. Marinica, Publishing House “Ploiești Third Millennium”, Ploiesti, 2012, p. 557.

Romania, with its oil region, the countries of the Balkans and opened to the Soviet forces the “Danube corridor” to the heart of Europe⁸.

The Soviet offensive began on August 20, 1944 against Army Group “South Ukraine” ended with the clear defeat of the German and Romanian armies. In a few days the Soviet forces from the composition of 2 and 3 Ukrainian Fronts have destroyed armies 6 German and 3 Romanian and half of the armies divisions 8 German and 4 Romanian⁹. Romanian troops unilaterally ceased actions against Soviet forces even on the evening of 23 August 1944, but the behavior of the Red Army has remained offensive on the front in Romania. On the evening of August 24, 1944, Stalin ordered 2 and 3 Ukrainian Fronts “to disregard any statement of Romanians about a cease warfare” and meet the “tasks set by the Directives of Army Headquarters”¹⁰. As a result, by the end of August 1944 the Soviet forces destroyed and captured all formations and units of the Romanian 3rd Army encircled in southern Bessarabia, disarmed and taken into captivity over 140,000 Romanian soldiers from the 4th Romanian Army composition, concentrated in the area Bacau – Piatra Neamt. In conclusion it can be said that the actions of Soviet forces from the 1944 were completed through a serious defeat of Romanian Army and the beginning of Soviet military occupation in Romania.

Armistice Convention of the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States – as state winners – and Romania – as a defeated state, was signed in Moscow on the night of 12 to 13 September 1944 only

⁸ See widely George Buzatu *Din istoria secretă a celui de al doilea război mondial*, 2nd edition, Tipo Moldova Publishing House, Iași, 2009; Alesandru Duțu, *Between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army*, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000; *23 august 1944. Evaluări și controverse. Studii și comunicări*, editor Gavriil Preda, Publishing House “Ploiești Third Millennium”, Ploiești, 2006 etc.

⁹ Hans Kissel, op.cit., pp. 151-152.

¹⁰ Alesandru Duțu, *Between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army*, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 232.

21 days after Romanian act of August 23, 1944. The delay in signing by the Soviet government, the British and American of the Armistice Convention was due to disagreements between allies related to Romania and other countries in the region. Instead continuing military actions in the Romanian and south of the Danube brought huge geostrategic advantages for United Nations, the main beneficiary being the Soviet Union.

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* *

Romania was the first country, with its own state institutions and which was exercising their sovereign authority over the national territory, the Red Army entered its offensive to Europe. As a result, the Moscow government gave an official statement on 2 April 1944 which stated that “the entry of Soviet troops in Romania is only required dictate war” because the Soviet Union did not seek to acquire any part of Romanian territory or to change the political system and social order in Romania. It was a statement “reassuring” for the governments in London and Washington, including political circles from the Romania, through which Soviet Union stated that the actions taken by the Red Army offensive against the Wehrmacht on the territory of countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe was not intended annexation of territory and non change of political regimes¹¹. In the spring of 1944 the balance of power was not favorable to acts of Sovietization and annexation of territories¹².

Throughout the war, Moscow has sought tenaciously to obtain from the British and American allies recognition of territorial annexation made in the 1939-1940 and the creation of a security area

¹¹ Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, Third Edition, revised and enlarged, Encyclopedic Universe Publishing, Bucharest, 2002, p. 396.

¹² Laurențiu Constantiniu examines in the book *Uniunea Sovietică între obsesia securității și insecurității*, evolution of the Soviet political thinking on the formation of strategic glacis at the frontiers of the Soviet state. (*Uniunea Sovietică între obsesia securității și insecurității*, Corinthian Publishing, Bucharest, 2010).

at the European border of the Soviet state. Negotiations with the British regarding designation of areas of Soviet influence in Europe started even since Anthony Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941, when were developed the first aspects of Soviet-British military cooperation against Nazi Germany¹³. In 1943, Cordell Hull, Head of State of the United States confirmed to Vyacheslav Molotov the U.S. government agreement relating to setting up of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe. American diplomat has entrusted the Russian interlocutor that the Western allies will recognize after the war annexations of territory made by the Soviet Union at the expense of smaller states¹⁴. In October 1944, Winston Churchill proposed to Stalin, during his visit to Moscow "Let's settle our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests there, missions and agents. Do not fight for junk / rubbish"¹⁵. As a result, on October 9, 1944, British and Soviets have agreed on setting up spheres of influence in the Balkans¹⁶. Later, the U.S. government has given its consent on the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans established by Churchill and Stalin. Following that secret agreements, dictated by geopolitical interests of the great powers, was determined, in a very cynical way, the postwar evolution of the of the Romanians, Greeks, Hungarians, Serbs and Bulgarians. In the vision of the two leaders – Churchill

¹³ Anthony Eden described in his memoirs the consistency with which Soviet diplomacy pursued recognition by the Allies of territorial annexation made in the years 1939-1940 and warranties for the European borders. "Russians ideas were very solid defined and they have not changed much over the next three years. Russia seek to obtain concrete guarantees for the security of its borders. "(Sir Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: the reckoning*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p 290).

¹⁴ CL Gardner, *Sferele de influență*, Elite Publishing, Bucharest, 1993, p 195.

¹⁵ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, Cassel, London, 1953, Volume VI, p 235.

¹⁶ André Fontaine, *Istoria Războiului Rece*, Military Publishing House, vol 1, pp. 274-276.

and Stalin – the peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe were some “nothings” in world politics.

At the end of the world conflict, the Soviet Union annexed in its territorial structure the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the eastern part of Poland (about a third of the territory of Poland was devastated) 50 704 km² of Romania (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) 46.568 km² of Finland, 15,000 km² of Germany (East Prussia / Kaliningrad). Western borders postwar Configuration of the Soviet empire was largely determined by the non-aggression treaty signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 when the two totalitarian powers have divided the spheres of influence in Central and South-East of Europe but extended by the new postwar territorial annexations made at the expense of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Peace Conference of Paris in the years 1946–1947 enacted all territorial annexations made by the Soviet Union. The conduct of the Paris Peace Conference in the years 1946–1947 showed that the organization of the postwar world, the status of the defeated states and determining areas of influence were the result of secret arrangements made during the war between the Soviets, the British and Americans, and less the result of negotiations between the delegations of the participating states¹⁷.

¹⁷ Of the many works dedicated to secret diplomacy we remember: Henri Bernard, George-André Chavallaz, Roger Gheysens, Jacques de Launay, *Les Dossiers Second World guerre*, Gerard & Co., Verviers, Belgium, 1964; Gordon Wright, *L'Europe en guerre, 1939 - 1945* Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1971; Alain Decoux *Dosarele secrete ale istoriei*, Publishing, Bucharest, 1970; Jacques de Launay *Mari decizii ale celui de al doilea război mondial*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988; Liddell Hart, *Histoire de la guerre second world*, Fayard, Paris, 1970; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1979; Leonida Loghin *Mari conferințe internaționale, 1933-1945*, Publishing House, Bucharest, 1989; JB Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a nos jours* edition 8e, Dalloz, Paris, 1981; Florin Valeriu Dobrinescu, *România și organizarea postbelică a lumii*, Romanian Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, etc.

Soviet empire known after the Second World War the largest territorial extent in the history of the Russian state, and managed to “export” its political regime in a number of countries in central and southeastern Europe. Glacis Soviet expansion was a matter of the relations of power between the three winners of the Axis, negotiations and compromises tacitly accepted by major Western democracies. The huge military force developed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War, accompanied by an unprecedented increase in the influence of leftist ideology in the world, including in Western countries such as Italy and France have deeply anxious the governments in London and Washington. The British government was concerned to establish by agreement with Stalin, the line where it was to stop the “communism line”¹⁸ in the sense that it sought a clear delineation of spheres of influence between the two great powers in different parts of the world. On a similar position was set also the American diplomacy interested in obtaining “Stalin’s commitment not to expand their empire beyond a certain line”¹⁹. The United States was interested in cooperation with Russia on the basis of an agreement on “non-intervention of Americans in Eastern Europe, of Russia in the Western Europe or in the two Americas”²⁰.

Abandoning the central and southeastern Europe by Western major powers in the sphere of Soviet control meant bringing the leadership of these countries to the communist parties, the Soviet military stationing in the respective states, modeling the entire internal and external policies if the satellite countries after Moscow’s interests. The establishment of the Soviet political regime in

¹⁸ Winston Churchill, *Al doilea război mondial. Memorii*, Vol 1, Ed Saeculum Institute, Bucharest, 1996, p 135.

¹⁹ Arthur Conte, *Yalta them partage du monde ou (11 Février 1945)*, Éditions Robert Laffont, SA., Paris, 1964, p 91-92.

²⁰ André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, p. 93.

Romania brought enormous suffering to Romanian people, who lived a tough process of denationalization and Sovietization²¹.

Romania's geopolitical and geostrategic position at the intersection of the major axis to the Balkans and Central Europe occupied a special place in Moscow's strategy of setting up a "security belt" consisting of friendly states located at the European border of the Soviet Union.

Through the Armistice Convention, signed in Moscow, Romania was forced to admit that it lost the war and was imposed a regime of Soviet military occupation throughout the national territory. Armistice Convention contained many interpretable formulations, provisions that disadvantage Romania, including burdensome economic obligations. The Statute of the victorious states was stated in Article 3, which provides: "The government and the Romanian High Command will ensure, Soviet and other Allied forces, facilities for their free movement in Romania, if required by the military situation"²². One of the Annexes to the Convention referred to the many amenities enjoyed by Soviet troops in Romania "during the ceasefire." During the discussion on Article 3, the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov denied the request of the Romanian diplomat Constantin Visoianu to register in the text of the

²¹ The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, including the Romanian society has been analyzed in many papers, such as those published by: Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, *The Model of Romania's Sovietisation* in „Totalitarianism Archives”, vol. IV-V, nr. 13-14, winter 1996-spring 1997, p. 130-177; Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Adrian Pop, *Sovietizarea României. Percepții anglo-americane*, Publishing House Ionica, Bucharest, 1998; Radu Ciuceanu, Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Vitalie Varatec, *Misiunile lui I. A. Vâșinski în România. Documente secrete*, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest, 1997; Andrew Christopher, Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB. Istoria secretă a operațiunilor sale externe de la Lenin la Gorbaciov*, ALL Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994, Nicolae Baciu, *Agonia României. 1944-1948*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1990; Jean-François Soulet, *Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele noastre*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 1998 ș.a.

²² Central Historical National Archives, Prime Minister's Fund, file 2745/1944, f 2.

armistice the principle that foreign troops, in fact the Soviet, would leave Romania after the war²³. The presence of Soviet troops in Romania was the result of military developments on the Soviet-German front, but also the arrangements among the three great allies accord in to which the countries in central and southeastern European continent entered the zone of Soviet influence²⁴.

Soviet troops were kept on the Romanian territory 14 years, from early March 1944 until 15 August 1958. In this period several phases can be distinguished regarding the official legal status of Soviet military forces present on the Romanian territory.

²³ *România, marele sacrificat al celui de-al doilea război mondial*, Documents, Vol 1, Radu Mocanu coordinator, Bucharest, Romania State Archives, 1994, pp. 305-307.

²⁴ Impact of Soviet military occupation on the Romanian society was barely addressed in Romanian historiography before 1989. Numerous studies and papers on this subject have been published after 1990, including: Sergiu Verona, *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in România, 1944-1958*, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1992; Roger E. Kirk, Mircea Răceanu, *România Versus the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1994; *Armata Roșie în România. Documente*, The collection „Revista de Istorie Militară”, coord. Constantin Hlihor, 1995; Ion Alexandrescu, 1945–1956: *Din «cleștele» german — în brațele «fratelui» de la răsărit. Societățile mixte sovieto-române (Sovrom)*, in „Dosarele Istoriei”, no. 3/1996; Florin Stănescu, Dragoș Zamfirescu, *Ocupația sovietică în România - Documente 1944-1946*, Vreamea Publishing House, 1998; Constantin Hlihor, Ioan Scurtu, *The Red Army in Romania*, Iași, Portland, 2000; Gavriil Preda, *Instituirea controlului sovietic asupra industriei și comunicațiilor navale românești. Înființarea Sovromtransport*, în vol. *Omagiu istoricului Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu*, Focșani, 2003; Ibidem, *Evoluții ale industriei petroliere românești în primii ani postbelici (1945-1948)*, in *Omagiu istoricului Florin Constantiniu*, Focșani, Pallas Publishing House, 2003; Florian Banu, *Asalt asupra economiei României*, Editura Nemira, 2004; Gavriil Preda, Aurel Pentelescu, *Atrocități și fapte reprobabile săvârșite de ostașii sovietici în Români (23 august 1944-1 martie 1945). Documente inedite*, in vol. *Convergențe istorice și geopolitice*, coordonatori Stela Cheptea, Gheorghe Buzatu, Demiurg Publishing House, Iași 2009; Laurențiu Constantiniu, *Uniunea Sovietică între obsesia securității și insecurității*, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 and others.

Romania was engaged in the war against the Soviet Union on 21 June 1941. Meanwhile, the Romanian troops in cooperation with German forces liberated Romanian territories annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) and participated in military actions in depth Soviet territory until Stalingrad. In early March 1944 the Soviet armies occupied eastern Romania, the front stabilized from March to August 1944-on alignment Iasi-Chisinau-Dniester. On the night of 23 to 24 August 1944 the Romanian Army ended the military actions against the Red Army. The Soviet forces actions against the Romanian army however continued until the first days of September 1944²⁵, though Romania unilaterally terminate the fight against the United Nations on the evening of August 23, 1944.

From 23 August 1944 until February 10, 1947, Soviet military forces stationed in Romania have had the status of occupation troops, under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944. Under existing geostrategic framework in Europe in the 1944-1945 the transit and stationing of Soviet troops on Romanian territory was motivated by military considerations related to warfare to defeat Nazi Germany. Soviet troops staying on Romanian territory continued after Germany's surrender and the end of military actions in Europe. At the end of the Second World War, Romania was treated as a defeated state envisaged, although its military contribution to the defeat of German fascism was giving it the right to be recognized as a co-belligerent State. Romania's condition as a defeated country led to the maintenance of Soviet military occupation until the signing of the peace treaty. At the same time there were serious interference in the Romanian internal life of the Soviet Union through its military forces stationed here. Forced levies of goods and products and the obligation to pay the war

²⁵ During the period 24 to 28 August 1944 the Soviet Army disarmed about 10 Romanian divisions and captured over 140,000 troops, and on days 5 to 7 September 1944 Soviet naval forces disarmed the crew and seized the entire Romanian military and civilian fleet.

reparations imposed by the Armistice Convention caused a serious disruption of Romanian economic life. Soviet Commanders took in the first year of occupation over 800,000 tons grain²⁶, confiscated 40,000 tons of oil equipment²⁷, ordered the change of the main railway lines after Russian gauge, which meant basically paralyzing economic and social life of the eastern part of country. For the delivery of petroleum products required as war reparations, the Soviets were forced to build a pipeline for transporting oil products directly from Ploiești to the border with the Soviet Union operation completed in the fall of 1944 until the winter of 1946²⁸.

In 1945, Romania had an oil production of 4.7 million tons of which 3,142,214 tons were taken over by the Soviet Union, and 1,440,000 tons were domestic consumption, which shows that over 70% of the Romanian oil production was seized by the Soviet state²⁹.

In time of war all armies commit numerous abuses, levies and violence on the population and civil authorities. No army is an exception to the rule. At the same time you can make a clear distinction between the behavior of allied troops to population in Italy, Greece, Germany, Austria and France and behavior of Soviet troops regarding these occupied countries in central and southeastern Europe. Soviet troops entered Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, and especially in Germany they were extremely violent³⁰. Soviet military behavior was characterized by extreme brutality: violence, murders, rapes, robberies against

²⁶ Mircea Ioanițiu, *Amintiri și reflecțiuni*, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, p. 89.

²⁷ Gavriil Preda, *Importanța strategică a petrolului românesc. 1939-1947*, Printeuro Publishing House, Ploiești, 2001, p. 315.

²⁸ Constantin Zidaru, Lucian Stancu, Nicolae Dumitrescu, *Din istoria transportului țițeiului prin conducte în România*, Silex Publishing House, 1999, vol. I, pp. 161-176; 222 – 225.

²⁹ Gavriil Preda, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

³⁰ Arthur Conte, *op. cit.*, p. 47-49.

authorities and population, facts that contributed to increased feelings of anti-Soviet and anticommunist among the population in these countries. In Romania, the Soviet troops, both occupation and those in transit, have committed a huge number of crimes against the population, Romanian civilian and military authorities, as reflected in numerous official documents of the time³¹. The number and severity of acts of force, abuse and crimes committed by the Soviet decreased in Romania since 1945.

Acute disagreements between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain over German problem, amplification of the lack of confidence between the great powers, the need to strengthen the capacity of influencing the countries in their areas of geopolitical interest, have determined the former Allies not to withdraw troops from occupied countries after the war. In this context the “liberating” armed forces became what they were actually occupying troops. Therefore American troops remained in Italy, Austria and West Germany, the British in West Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, the French in Germany and Austria and Soviet military forces in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Austria. Although during 1945-1948 the winning states have demobilized most of their armed forces³², the number of existing occupation troops in Europe in the early postwar years reach more than 2.1 million troops, of which 1,530,000 were Soviet soldiers, and about 650,000 were American soldiers, British and French³³. Most of these forces remained in occupied countries by the year 1947, when the Peace Treaty was signed in Paris between the victorious states and defeated states.

³¹ Central Historical National Archives, the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie fund, file no. 23/1945, pp. 220-242.

³² Soviet Union reduced its armed forces from 12 million people in 1945 to about 3 million people in 1948. (Eric Hobsbawm, *Secolul extremelor*, Publishing House Leader, Bucharest, 1994, p. 273).

³³ *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice 1958*, coord. Ioan Scurtu, Didactică and Pedagogică Publishing Houses, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 39-40.

Keeping Soviet forces on the territory of European countries in central and southeastern Europe was the most “convincing” means used by Moscow for the establishment of communist regimes in the countries of the region. In Romania, the Red Army was the main tool which supported the Communist Party and other pro-Soviet political forces to bring to power of the government Groza on March 6, 1945³⁴.

Soviet military forces got involved in a brutal way in the political life of Romania, with direct support for the forces of the left, especially the Communist Party in establishing pro-communist administration (Craiova, Constanta, Galati, Braila, etc..) and winning the political elections by the Communist Party in the fall of 1946³⁵.

Stationing of these impressive armed forces in the defeated countries was made only of geopolitical reasons pursued by each great power winner. There is an obvious parallel between the

³⁴ The liberation of Northern Transylvania from Hungarian and German occupation was made by Romanian-Soviet common military operations and ended on 25 October 1944. Reintegration into the Romanian State of this Romanian territory annexed by Hungary following the Vienna Diktat was a means to pressure the government in Bucharest. Romanian government in northeastern Transylvania was expelled by Soviet troops at the beginning of November 1944 until March 12 1945. In a document sent by the Soviet government’s representative in Bucharest, I.A. Vâșinski stated that “the problem of delivery to Romania of Northern Transylvania should serve as the most important lever for influencing the Romanian government, not only in the fulfillment of the economic obligations from the armistice Convention but also in the promotion of its internal and external policy”(Scrisoarea comisarului poporului pentru Afacerile Străine al RSSF Ruse, A. I. Lavrentiev către A. I. Vâșinski, despre crearea Conducerii Administrative Provizorii a Transilvaniei de Nord din 26 decembrie 1944) în Radu Ciuceanu, Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu, Vitalie Varatec, *Misiunile lui I. A. Vâșinski în România. Documente secrete*, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 103-104.

³⁵ Lavinia Betea, *Partea lor de adevăr (Alexandru Bărlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu. Convorbiri; Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României; Convorbiri neterminate cu Corneliu Mănescu)*, Compania Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 269-277.

behavior of the Soviet Union and the major Western powers on the modalities of control over the states in their areas of influence. Due to the fact that Britain did not have the financial, economic and military resources to influence political and social developments in Turkey and Greece, United States have taken “under the wing protector ‘respective states intervened heavily in influencing the political life in Italy, France and other Western countries threatened by the rise of communism³⁶. At the same time, Stalin understood that a action of great western powers to support the countries of “Eastern Europe was impossible³⁷. As a result, the Soviet Union operated unhindered for takeover by communist parties in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, followed by the imposition of a program of measures which led to the establishment of regimes of “people’s democracy” in these countries. “Soviet military power was responsible for the creation of the Communist states of Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia, Albania and Czechoslovakia in part)”³⁸.

Herds of Soviet troops stationed in Romania have different values depending on the political and military changes on the continent, especially of Central and South-Eastern Europe. The evolution of Soviet forces stationed in Romania after the war ended in Europe until the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 is shown in Table 1³⁹.

A large number of Soviet troops stationed in Romania in the first two years after the war, their number exceeding half a million people. Should be noted that Romanian authorities have never known the actual number of foreign troops on national territory, not being informed thereof by the Soviet headquarters. Maintaining such

³⁶Peter Calvocoressi, *Politica mondială după 1945*, ALFFA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 13-15.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 269.

³⁸ A. R. Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact. Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1981, p. 7. (<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P6583.pdf>).

³⁹ Sergiu Verona, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-51.

impressive force in Romania was determined by geopolitical and military interests pursued by the Soviet Union in the region and due to economic reasons.

Tabel no. I. Efectivele sovietice staționate în România în anii 1945-1950

Date	Herds
May 8, 1945	80.000
November 1, 1945	500.000
January 4, 1946	420.000
March 1, 1946	615.000
July 1, 1946	400.000
November 1, 1946	240.000
1947	130.000-60.000

The war with Nazi Germany had catastrophic effects for the Soviet society. Soviet economy was exhausted after 5 years of devastating war. National income fell by over 25% compared to 1940⁴⁰, agricultural production halved⁴¹ and the human loss were huge⁴². Keeping under arms in the early postwar years of some numerous effective was a very difficult economic problem for the

⁴⁰ Mark Harrison, *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison (Studies in Macroeconomic History)*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. XVI.

⁴¹ Peter Calvocoressi, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴² The figures advanced by various historians differ. Peter Calvocoressi says that the Soviets lost 25 million people (*Politica mondială după 1945*, ALFFA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 5), and data published by Iris Kesternich, Bettina Siflinger, James P. Smith, And Joachim K. Winter in the work *The Effects of World War II on Economic and Health Outcomes across Europe*, shows that the Soviet Union lost during the Second World War over 10 million soldiers and 13 million civilians (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR917.pdf)

government in Moscow. Maintenance of Soviet troops stationed in other states was achieved with financial and material resources of those countries, which meant a significant relief for the Soviet economy on their military support.

In Romania, the Bucharest authorities have faced great financial and economic difficulties maintaining Soviet troops, given the fact that the Romanian economy was severely affected by the consequences of war⁴³. Maintenance of over half a million Soviet soldiers on Romanian territory only in one quarter of 1945 meant for the Bucharest government obligation to provide significant quantities of food, equipment and financial resources to Soviet headquarters: 3,865 tons of meat, 320 tons tobacco, 2,575 tons fish, 26,400 tons of potatoes and vegetables, 190 tons butter 1,235 tons fat, 805 tons sugar, 7.085 tons hay, 90 million pieces cigarettes, 70,000 pairs of leather shoes, 20,000 jackets, 70,000 cotton blouses, 35,000 pairs trousers, 70,000 shirts, 70,000 linen breeches and the amount of 3.8 billion ROL monthly⁴⁴. Soviet troops were placed on the entire Romanian territory, being deployed in the following cities: Arad, Oravița, Turnu Severin, Turnu Magurele, Giurgiu, Bravu, forthe Alba Iulia, Calarasi, Jegălia, Ploiesti, Mizil, Iasi, Bacau, Buzau, Mangalia, Constanta, Tulcea, Galati, Huși, Oltenia, Budești, Sibiu, Alexandria, Timisoara and Bucharest⁴⁵. Lodging of Soviet forces was made in the Romanian army barracks, the situation which forced the Romanian troops move into unsuitable accommodation and training venues. As a result, Soviet troops were perceived as a giant foreign body and discretionary army

⁴³ View extensively: Ion Alexandrescu, *Economia României în primii ani postbelici (1945-1947)*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1986; Victor Axenciuc, *Evoluția economică a României. Cercețări statistico-istorice, 1859-1947*, vol. I, *Industria*, vol. II, *Agricultura*, Romanian Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992-1996; Bogdan Murgescu, *România și Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2101.

⁴⁴ Romanian Military Archives, Section III of Operations Fund, file 2903, pp. 214-215.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, The Romanian Commission for the implementation of the Truce Fund, file 242, pp. 512-513.

abusive installed in Romanian barracks, public places and private homes, who robbed and assaulted authorities and population⁴⁶.

Romania's efforts to restore in sovereign way the economic, diplomatic, cultural, political, scientific links, with the other countries of the world, have been seriously affected by the presence of Soviet forces on its territory, by the direct interference of the Allied Control Commission (actually Soviet) on the activity of the Romanian authorities. Therefore, Romania was very concerned about his participation at the peace conference in order to get cobelligerent status, cessation of foreign military presence on the national territory and regain free and sovereign state attributions. Romanian delegation present at the Peace Conference in Paris in the years 1946-1947 has encountered great obstacles to the promotion and defense of its national interests⁴⁷. On February 10, 1947 Romania signed the Treaty of Peace with the Allied and Associated Powers with the status of a defeated country. Treaty clauses contained territorial, economic, political and military burden for Romania, the main beneficiaries of the peace treaty being the winning states, especially the Soviet Union⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ *România. Retragerea...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 40.

⁴⁷ Ștefan Lache, Gheorghe Țuțui, *România și Conferința de pace de la Paris din 1946*, Cluj, Editura Dacia, 1976, Ion Enescu, *Politica externă a României în perioada 1944-1947*, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1979; Valeriu Fl. Dobrinescu, *România și organizarea postbelică a lumii (1945-1947)*, Socialist Republic of Romania Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, * * * *România în anticamera Conferinței de Pace de la Paris. Documente*, coord. Marin Radu Mocanu, Bucharest, 1994; Valeriu Fl. Dobrinescu, Doru Tompea, *România la cele două Conferințe de pace de la Paris (1919-1920, 1946-1947). Un studiu comparativ*, Focșani, Neuron Publishing House, 1996.

⁴⁸ See Nicolae Baci, *Agonia României. 1944-1948. Dosarele secrete acuză*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1990, Gheorghe Buzatu, *România și Marile Puteri: 1939-1947*, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2003; Liviu Țirău, *Între Washington și Moscova. Politicile de securitate națională ale SUA și URSS și impactul lor asupra României (1945-1965)*, Cluj-Napoca, Tribuna Publishing House, 2005; Aurel Pentelescu, *Distrugerea Armatei Române prin clauzele Tratatului de pace de la Paris*, in vol. *România și al doilea război mondial*, coordinators Gheorghe Buzatu, Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Horia Dumitrescu, Focșani, 2000, pp. 452-463.

Peace Treaty involves withdrawing Soviet troops from Romania. The Soviet Union was interested in maintaining not in withdrawing its troops from Romania. Moscow succeeded, after nearly a hundred years, to bring back Romania in its sphere of influence⁴⁹. In the treaty negotiations with Romania, the Soviet delegation forced the introduction of an article according to which the Soviet Union “reserves the right to keep on Romanian territory armed forces that might be needed to keep the communication lines of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria”⁵⁰. Through the that clause Moscow legitimized by a document internationally recognized maintaining its troops in Romania after 1947. After the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947 the official status of Soviet forces from Romania was related troops. In reality Soviet military forces remained and acted also as occupation troops for Moscow’s geopolitical objectives regarding Romania.

An immediate consequence of the Treaty of Peace was leaving the Allied Control Commission in Romania, followed by a significant decrease in the number of Soviet troops stationed in Romania. According to data presented by Sergiu Verona in his work *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958*, the number of Soviet troops from Romania fell in 1947 to less than half⁵¹, most of these troops have left the territory Romanian during 1 September to 15 December 1947.

In the years 1947–1948 there was an acceleration and uniformity of the process of Sovietization imposed by Moscow in

⁴⁹ Since the beginning of the eighteenth century until the Crimean War of 1853-1856 Russia has exerted a strong influence on the Romanian territory. After attending the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 years, Romania has achieved its independence . In the period 1878-1944 Romania was under the influence of the major Western powers.

⁵⁰ *Istoria politicii externe românești*, coord. Ion Calafeteanu, Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 354-355.

⁵¹ Sergiu Verona, *op. cit.*, pp. 55.

satellite countries. In our opinion, the Soviet Union reduced its military presence in Romania because it met its ultimate objectives in the Sovietization of the country. Herds of Soviet troops fell significantly, from 130,000 at the beginning of 1947 to about 32000–35000 troops in the '50s. Even if the numbers of Soviet troops from Romania have decreased their maintenance costs have remained high for the Romanian economy. In 1947 Soviet troops were quartered in 122 barracks deployed in 39 towns across the country, and only those barracks repairs costs only for the first 9 months of the that year have cost the Romanian state 421,330,769,790 lei⁵².

After signing the peace treaty, Romanian and Soviet governments signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance (February 4, 1948) and they have regulated by several conventions the status and insurance conditions, with resources, of Soviet troops still remaining in Romania. A first document was the Convention for making available to Soviet Army units in Romania barracks, warehouses, airfields, training fields and means of transmission, between the Government of the Romanian People and Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Bucharest on 26th December 1948. The document was signed by Ana Pauker, as Foreign Minister of Romania and Sergei Ivanov Kavtaradze, the Soviet ambassador in Romania. In Article 1 was provided that Romanian People's Republic was putting for free at "the disposal of the Soviet Army units, all barracks and buildings necessary for headquarters, hospitals, warehouses, and other special buildings,

⁵² Romanian Military Archives, Romanian Commission Fund for Armistice's application, file 157, f 28-31. In the interpretation of this amount should be considered the excessive inflation in the Romanian economy in the early postwar years. The amount reflected in the document cited was calculated before realizing monetary stabilization. In August 1947 the Romanian government made a monetary stabilization parity 1 leu nou/20.000 ROL, and parity dollar / lion was set at a ratio of 1/6. Applying corrections resulting from stabilization results in a sum equivalent to about £ 21.1 million, approximately \$ 3.5 million.

with the inventory that is in them, furniture and facilities, and airfields and polygons belonging to the Ministry of Defense and other ministries of the Romanian people's Republic, State institutions and organizations, firms, corporations or individuals, besides stores and shops belonging to firms, companies and individuals. "Also the Romanian side engage to provide the headquarters of the Soviet Army in Romania "construction materials and facilities necessary for the maintenance and operation of buildings occupied and instruction land in the quantities requested" (Art. 2), the necessary utilities (electricity, water, sewage, septage, etc.) (article 3), the means of transmission (Article 6) at mutually agreed price⁵³.

On the same day two other documents were signed that regulate the activities of Soviet troops stationed in Romania. The first was a convention according to which the headquarters of the Soviet Army in Romania was able to import food, goods, field engineer materials, transportation, medical equipment, veterinary intendance, weapons, fuel and other military equipment from the Soviet Union without paying customs duties⁵⁴.

The second document was another Convention by which the Romanian State is obliged to provide the necessary railway transport for the Soviet troops stationed in Romania⁵⁵. In the Regulation of the Soviet Army military transport on the lines of Romanian Railways, document included in that Convention, it was stated that Romanian side, by the relevant Ministry, provides for free (our underline) many services to the Soviet troops transported on the Romanian railways,

⁵³ Ibidem, Secretariat Division Fund, file 988, pp. 262-265.

⁵⁴ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Responsible Treaties, Conventions, Agreements, Protocols Fund, file 2261, p 1. (*Convenție privitoare la importul scutit de taxe vamale a bunurilor pentru trupele Armatei Sovietice din România, între Guvernul Republicii Populare Române și Guvernul Uniunii Republicilor Socialiste Sovietice*).

⁵⁵ Ibidem, file 2259, pp. 1-15. (*Convenție provizorie cu privire la transporturile feroviare pentru nevoile unităților Armatei Sovietice în România, între Guvernul Republicii Populare Române și Guvernul Uniunii Republicilor Socialiste Sovietice*).

such as fuel, lighting, hot water in large stations, medical aid, facilities for loading and unloading materials for these operations, mobile stoves for heated wagons, rooms for Soviet military canteens with all appropriate facilities, with all necessary utilities and maintenance personnel for cleaning service, telecommunications links for management of the Soviet military communications from Romania, rail transport (hand cars, railcar) for members of the Soviet leadership from military headquarters in Romania, Romanian railway employees connoisseurs of the Russian language⁵⁶.

Comparative analysis of the provisions of Articles 3 and 10 of the Armistice Convention concluded in Moscow on 12 September 1944⁵⁷, and the Convention signed in Bucharest in late December 1948 highlights the continuity of economic terms extremely favorable to Soviet troops left on Romanian territory after the completion of the Treaty of Peace in Paris. Economic effort required for maintaining and transporting Soviet troops stationed in Romania was further supported, almost entirely by the Romanian state, endorsed situation in full awareness of the new political power installed in Bucharest. Maintenance of Soviet troops still required a huge financial and economic effort to Romanian society.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Romanian National Archives, *România și Armistițiul cu Națiunile Unite*, vol. I, editor Marin Radu Mocanu, Bucharest, 1995, p. 72. (Art. 3. *Guvernul și Inaltul Comandament al României vor asigura forțelor sovietice și ale celorlalți Aliați, înlesniri pentru libera lor mișcare pe teritoriul României, în orice direcție, dacă este cerut de către situația militară, Guvernul și Inaltul Comandament al României acordând orice concurs posibil pentru o astfel de mișcare, prin mijloacele lor proprii de comunicație și pe cheltuiala lor, pe pământ, pe apă și în aer. [...] Art. 10. Guvernul Român trebuie să facă, în mod regulat, în monedă românească, plățile cerute de către Inaltul Comandament Aliat (Sovietic), pentru îndeplinirea funcțiilor sale, și în caz de necesitate va asigura folosința, pe teritoriul românesc, a întreprinderilor industriale și de transport a mijloacelor de comunicație, stațiunilor generatoare de energie, întreprinderilor și instalațiilor de utilitate publică, depozitelor de combustibili, petrol, alimente și alte materiale sau servicii, în acord cu instrucțiunile date de către Inaltul Comandament Aliat (Sovietic). [...]).*

Romanian public perception of Soviet military forces remaining in Romania has not changed after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty. In the context of economic, political and social reforms of the Romanian society, Soviet troops were to Romanian a presence “traumatic”⁵⁸ being considered as the main factor in support of communist political power in Bucharest installed and supported by the Soviet Union. On this reality Romanian Communist leaders were well informed. For this purpose, Ana Pauker stated that “if the last red soldier left “entire administration imposed by the communists would disappear quickly, highlighting that “the luck” of Romanian Communist lies in the fact “that the Red Army will stay for quite a while here”⁵⁹.

It was an open recognition of the decisive influence that the presence of Soviet troops from Romania had on the internal political life. Instead, the political authorities in Bucharest have extolled “huge and multilateral aid” given by the Soviet Union for economic and social progress of Romania. Official propaganda presented the stationing of Soviet troops as a valuable and selfless assistance granted by the Soviet state to “Romanian army reorganization and strengthening of national defense.” The words actually describe the process through the existing military body was decomposed and the Romanian army was rebuilt according to the Soviet Army standards⁶⁰.

Reorganization of the Romanian army according to the Soviet military model covered all components: structure, equipment, combat training, doctrine, etc.⁶¹ Romanian Army transformation

⁵⁸ Constantin Hlihor, *Armata Roșie în România*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 180.

⁵⁹ Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră...*, p. 416.

⁶⁰ Central Historical National Archives, CC of the P.C.R. fund, file 4/1959, pp. 1-2.

⁶¹ Gavriil Preda, Eftimie Ardeleanu, *Epurări, disponibilizări, deblocări în Armata Română în perioada 1946-1948*, în *Analele Sighet*, vol. 3, *Anul 1946-începutul sfârșitului (instituții, mentalități, evenimente)*, 1996, pp. 251-256; Florica Dobre, Alesandru Dutu, *Distrugerea elitei militare sub regimul ocupației sovietice în România*, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001; Marian Moșneagu: *Elita Marinei Regale Române în rezistența anticomunistă*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

began with a violent act of destruction of Romanian military elite who survived the war: officers and NCOs who had fought both on the Eastern Front and in the West, experts with very good training and rich war experience, but considered “uncertain” in terms of new ideological regime⁶².

Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between Romania and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on February 4, 1948, had validity of 20 years and provided commitment of the signatory parties to take action together to ensure peace and security⁶³. One effective form of control of the satellite countries used by the Moscow was sending Soviet advisors in them. It should be emphasized that the Bucharest leadership made a demarche to send Soviet specialists in Romania. These specialists have worked in the fields of defense, economic, central administration etc. and received both wages and housing conditions extremely generous compared to the Romanians living⁶⁴.

Postwar world was characterized by the existence of two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union-which exerted a powerful influence on the political, economic, diplomatic and military international links. Establishment of a heightened state of mistrust between the two superpowers was accompanied by a complex set of actions to strengthen their control over their respective spheres of influence. A number of political and military events that took place in Europe and Asia strongly marked both the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the states in their areas of influence. The events and activities in the various regions of the world were perceived by Stalin and his associates as the stages of a program to form a huge coalition against the Soviet state and trigger a new world war. In response, in the early ‘50s, Moscow has stepped up the actions of strengthen communist

⁶² See widely Florin Șperlea, *De la armata regală la armata populară*, Ziua Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003.

⁶³ *Istoria politicii externe românești, op.cit.*, pp. 360-361.

⁶⁴ Romanian Military Archives, Financial fund, file 6372, pp. 103-105.

political regimes in the satellite countries in Europe, simultaneously with the initiation of a comprehensive program of rearmament of these countries.

At the Moscow Meeting of January 9 to 12, 1951 was set the framework for organizational, logistical and doctrinal standardizing of armies in countries of “people’s democracy” (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) according to the model imposed by the Soviets and preparing these armies for a future war⁶⁵.

Within the existing geopolitical frame in Europe in the early 50’s, Romania followed entirely the political and military decisions set in Moscow. The secret protocol of the Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in 1948 stated that the number of Soviet military advisors sent to train Romanian Army was 2,500 military experts, including 300 senior officers, 700 junior officers and 1,500 instructors⁶⁶. Meanwhile in Romania also was a Soviet military advisory mission, led by Konstantin S. Kolganov, numbering 40 officers, including 8 generals, 13 colonels, 8 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors and 9 junior officers transformation of the Romanian army after the Soviet model was made under the supervision and with human and material resources of the Soviet Union. To these Soviet military structures were added later also Collaboration military mission of the Treaty of Warsaw, installed at Bucharest after the creation of respective political-military organization in 14 May 1955⁶⁷. Through these military structures, the Soviet government had secured full control of the transformation of

⁶⁵ Alexandru Oșca, Vasile Popa, *Stalin a decis: lagărul socialist se înarmează* in the work „Romanian Military Archives Bulletin”“, year I, no. 2-3/1998, p 74.

⁶⁶ Larry Watts, *Ferește-mă, Doamne de prieteni. Războiul clandestin al Blocului Sovietic cu România*, RAO Publishing House, 2011, Bucharest, p. 192, apud Adrian Pop, *1950. Legația SUA informează: Dominația URSS asupra României nu poate fi slabită*, in „Magazin istoric”, nr.4/2001.

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

the Romanian army into a “popular army” on others institutions of force of the Romanian state: special services and police (militia), including over the work of the political Romanian leaders⁶⁸.

In compliance with the decisions taken at the conference in Moscow in January 1951, Romanian authorities have taken extensive measures to develop national military system. Troop numbers have increased from 125,000 people to 213,000 people, which was a violation of the Treaty of Peace signed in Paris in 1947. Were imported large quantities of modern combat equipment (aircraft, tanks, warships, radar technique etc.) from the Soviet Union and other socialist states⁶⁹. Have been restored to service arms and ammunition factories closed after the war⁷⁰. In the Soviet-Yugoslav schism extensive fortifications were built near the border with Yugoslavia⁷¹. Were intensified retaliation against political opponents, considered “dangerous elements to state security,” including deportation of Romanian citizens and other nationalities (Serbian, German, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Croatian) from the border with Yugoslavia in the southeast region of Romania, Bărăgan⁷².

In conclusion it can be stated that the stationing of Soviet troops in Romania in the early postwar years was part of the great power strategy of the Soviet Union preoccupied to strengthen the communist regime in Bucharest, of Romanian army modernization according to the Soviet standards, under the conditions it was expected a large outbreak of military conflict in Europe during 1954-1955.

⁶⁸ Ibidem, pp. 192-193.

⁶⁹ See widely Petre Opreș, *Industria românească de apărare. Documente 1950-1989*, Petroleum-Gas University of Ploiesti Publishing House, 2007.

⁷⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹ Mircea Chirițoiu, *Între David și Goliath. România și Iugoslavia în balanța Războiului Rece*, volume groomed and introductory study: Silviu Moldovan, editor Gheorghe Buzatu, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2005, pp. 84, 146.

⁷² Irina Sălăvăstru, *Bărăgan 1951-1956. O deportare în vremuri de pace*, in ”Magazin istoric”, year XXXVIII, nr. 5 (434), may 2003, p. 75.

The activity of psychological influence of public opinion in Romania particularly concerned about the new regime. Official propaganda continued the threat of war psychosis, highlighted the importance of Soviet troops in Romania for “defense of peace”, attributing the entire responsibility for the tension created to capitalist states in international life. Within the existing national and international frame, political authorities in Bucharest pursued Romanian military education in accordance with the new ideological norms and values promoted by the communist regime in the spirit of cooperation with the Soviet and other socialist states armed to save peace⁷³.

The two superpowers were willing to improve relations with the defeated states and territory within whose they still had military bases and armed forces. The situation of postwar Germany was the most sensitive issue of the Cold War in Europe, the issue that marked the entire evolution of security strategies pursued by the two superpowers on the old continent. In 1951 was signed the declaration of cessation of war between the Federal Republic of Germany with the United States, France and Britain. In 1952, the U.S. government, the British and French decided to end the occupation regime in Germany. NATO Lisbon session decided the admission of Greece and Turkey in NATO, which meant ensuring the southern flank of the respective military organization. London Conference of Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, England, Holland, West Germany and the United States, held between 28 September and 3 October 1954, adopted a series of proposals aimed at restoring the sovereignty of the Federal Republic Germany, three weeks later, after the failure of Pleven plan were signed at Paris (19 to 23 October 1954) documents duly was recognized the sovereignty of R.F. Germany, ending the occupation regime of the three great powers in this country, RF Germany right to form an army, prohibition on West German state to build NBC weapons, missiles, aircraft battle and war ships R.F. Germany, joining NATO etc.. After

⁷³ Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-43.

recognition of West German sovereignty, American troops, British and French were still stationed in the country, but on the basis of bilateral agreements with the government in Bonn. West Germany's NATO accession has led to changes in the status of U.S. troops, British and French stationed in the country. Foreign troops were turned from occupation troops to allied troops, designed to defend West German territory against a possible Soviet attack.

Creating the West German army (500,000 soldiers, 12 divisions, with large tanks and aviation units, over 1,000 aircraft) and accession to NATO has changed the balance of power in Central Europe, especially taking into account the value and battle traditions of the German Army.

The new leadership in Moscow, installed after the death of Stalin, has initiated a process of international politics detente, has reconciled relations with Yugoslavia, participated in meetings in Geneva concerning ending the war in Indochina, it acted to normalize relations with Japan, has unblocked negotiations for a peace treaty with Austria. In this skillful game of detente, Soviet diplomacy has used an arsenal of diplomatic, political and media resources through which it has shown willingness to reduce tension in the relations between states and the creation of a European system of collective security⁷⁴, Soviet foreign policy being, after Stalin's death, more "prudent and friendly" compared to ways of expression during the former leader⁷⁵.

At the same time, the Soviet government continued preparations to create a politico-military organization similar to NATO. Stepping up preparations for the Warsaw Treaty Organization was

⁷⁴ On 13 November 1954 the Soviet government sent the invitation to 23 European countries and the United States to attend a *conference in Moscow in the work of European countries for peace and security in Europe* on the day of November 29, 1954. Soviet invitation only echoed among the states of the Soviet bloc, which sent representatives to Moscow. The conference was held between November 29 to December 2, 1954 and at its completion was signed a *Joint Statement* of the participating States.

⁷⁵ Peter Calvocoressi, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

made after the United States, Britain and France decided to integrate West Germany into Western economic and military structures.

The question is why the Soviet Union has not made a political-military organization like NATO before 1955? The authors of *Romania in the Warsaw Pact. History. Testimonies. Documents* state that the Soviet Union did not consider necessary to achieve an immediate military alliance as a counterweight to NATO as “it owned the atomic bomb” and brought to power communist governments in the “states under control”⁷⁶.

It was obvious that in the late '40s Moscow knew that installed communist governments in power were not sufficiently strengthened political, economic and social in the satelitate countries. At the same time, the Soviet leadership knew that the armies from satellite countries were heterogeneous in terms of organization, the level of training, level of endowment of combat technique and weapons, and most of these armies officers and NCOs were “uncertain” in terms of political. In terms of military the Soviet Union collaboration with the satellite countries was provided through the bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance concluded in 1948-1949. Following the accelerated arming process of countries in the Soviet influence was succeeded that in a few years the armies of satellite states to be converted to the Red Army standards.

Organizational structures, facilities, endowment, equipment, training, rules of combat, military doctrine, training policy were made by the Soviet military model and under the Soviet military advisers. In this context, Romania and the Soviet Union military cooperation has intensified and targeted accelerated raising of combat capacity of the Romanian Army according to the Red Army's standards for training and endowment with combat technique of the troops. In the period 1949-1955 were removed from Romanian military units endowment light type weapons (rifles, pistols, machine

⁷⁶ Constantin Olteanu, Alesandru Dușu, Constantin Antip, *România în Tratatul de la Varșovia. Istoric.Mărturii.Documente. Cronologie*, Pro Historia Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 16.

guns, rifles, submachine guns and machine guns) and artillery material old and outdated of Western European origin. At the same time entered into Romanian army endowment the Soviet combat technique for all armed forces⁷⁷. In 1954 and the early months of 1955 were signed a series of protocols on the Romanian-Soviet endowment plan for Romanian armed forces with weapons and combat technique during 1955-1959; coordination of operational plans⁷⁸, permanent and temporary basing of parts of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in the basics and Romanian ports etc.⁷⁹

In our opinion the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was primarily a political response to NATO. Formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization until 1955 was determined by West Germany's accession to NATO. To prevent entry of West Germany into NATO Soviet diplomacy has acted on several fronts. It offered to hold a general conference of European peace and security on the continent. The invitation was sent to 23 European countries and USA. The conference was held in Moscow from 29 November -2 December 1954 and was attended only by the Soviet Union's satellite states. Moscow's proposal to create a collective security system failed. In the current geopolitical context in the mid-50s, the Soviet Union sought other diplomatic solution to resolve the "German problem", one of the most important in Europe. It was evaluated the possibility of a German democratic and neutral state such as Austria. Austrian model could become a possible alternative to follow for a unified Germany, but military uncommitted in NATO. As a result, the Soviet government began discussions with the government of Vienna concerning the conclusion of State Treaty. During the months of March-April 1955 there were negotiations between the two countries, after which Austria became independent and neutral, and Soviet troops were to be withdrawn by the end of

⁷⁷ Romanian Military Archives, Directorate General Endowment Fund, Planning Department, File 1701, Vol. 2/1948-1966, pp. 115-124.

⁷⁸ Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-45.

⁷⁹ Romanian Military Archives, Fund 3089, file 1794, p. 18-20.

the year. The signing of the peace treaty with Austria was set for May 15, 1955. On May 5, 1955 Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO, according to schedule set by the Paris Agreements of October 1954. A few days later, on 7 May 1955, the Soviet Union denounced mutual assistance treaties concluded during the war with Great Britain (May 26, 1942) and France (10 December 1944).

Diplomatic actions relating to the treaty with Austria were conducted in parallel with the project launched by Moscow on creating a supranational politico-military structures in Central and Eastern Europe which ensures further the maintenance of Soviet troops in the States from the zone of geopolitical control. In the declaration of the Conference in Moscow on 29 November to 2 December 1954, stated that in the case of admission of Germany in NATO, the participating States reserves the right to take “joint measures in the organization of the armed forces and their headquarters, and other measures to strengthen its defense capability”⁸⁰.

On 11 May 1955, the Soviet leadership convened in Warsaw the prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, which together with representatives of the host country and the Soviet Union formed Warsaw Pact Organization May 14, 1955, the political-military structure with defensive nature of the Member States. For Moscow, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a military instrument able to oppose NATO, but also a way of keeping control of the “allies” by maintaining Soviet troops on their territory.

On 15 May 1955 was signed a peace treaty with Austria which stipulated that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austrian territory was to end in mid-September the same year. A direct consequence of the signing of this treaty was the withdrawal of the linking Soviet troops from Romania and Hungary, their presence in the respective states had no justification.

⁸⁰ *Istoria politicii externe românești, op. cit., p. 369.*

Formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization with only one day before the signing of the Treaty with Austria show a coordinated and deliberate action of Soviet diplomacy made in order to ensure continued maintenance of Soviet troops in Romania and Hungary. Through the creation of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union won the right to maintain troops in Romania and Hungary as allied military forces. Soviet forces maintained within the territories of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty became allied troops. By withdrawing its troops from Austria, the Soviet Union “did not lose anything in terms of strategic”⁸¹ because it still managed to maintain its military forces on the territory of satellite countries as friendly forces. This metamorphosis of the status of the Soviet occupation forces represented a success of Soviet diplomacy against Rumania and Hungary.

At the same time, the Soviet government understood the need for reforms in the socialist system designed to provide more freedom of choice to leadership in satellite countries and to contribute to the reduction of anti-Soviet sentiments of the people of those countries. Through these actions Moscow has proposed a reduction in the control over satellite states. In his memoirs, Nichita Khrushchev acknowledged that the policy used by Stalin created a certain “antagonism” of the states allied to Moscow, because the former generalis “treated very tough” those countries. Stalin considered socialist countries “as subjects of the Soviet Union, not allies.” One of the proposed solutions to help decrease anti-Soviet feelings of the population of the satellite countries was a “reduction of garrisons in these countries”⁸².

Reconsidering the relationship between the hegemonic state and satellite countries in the “socialist camp” launched by Moscow in the mid 50s encouraged local elites to adopt economic and political measures in accordance with national priorities. Forms of

⁸¹ Peter Calvocoressi, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁸² *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233, apud N.S. Khrushchev, *Remembers. The Last Testament*, Strobe Talbott, Little Brown Co, Boston, 1974, pp. 221- 222.

expression were different in Poland, Hungary and Romania. Unquestionably that to the assertion of this process contributed the example of Yugoslavia. In 1954 (31 March and 18 September) Romania signed two agreements with the Soviet Union concerning the transfer to the Romanian state of Soviet participation share (50%) of 12 Joint Committee Soviet-Romanian societies (Sovrom). By abolishing Sovrom was reduced significantly the Soviet interference in the Romanian economy and due to increased economic freedom of movement in relation to the Eastern neighbor⁸³. Romanian state was to pay financial compensation to the Soviet Union in the coming years worth about \$ 590 million⁸⁴. The action was a first step in the process of “progressive distancing” of Romania toward the Soviet Union. Political leaders in Bucharest, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, followed a strategy “reasonable and prudent”⁸⁵ in order to remove Romania below the Soviet control. Abolition of Sovrom (1954-1956), the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania (1958), the departure of the Soviet counselors in Romania (1958-1964), refusal to participate in the Sino-Soviet dispute, rejecting supra-national economic planning projects in the CMEA were actions that support this assessment.

The presence of Soviet troops in Romania started to “interfere”⁸⁶ the Romanian political leaders in their actions

⁸³ Brândușa Costache, *Activitatea României în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc 1949-1974*, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 43-44.

⁸⁴ Ion Alexandrescu, *Evoluția economiei în Istoria românilor*, vol IX, *România în anii 1940-1947*, coordinator Dinu C. Giurescu, Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 808.

⁸⁵ Lavina Betea, *Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj Napoca, 2001, p. 128.

⁸⁶ *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice...*, *op. cit.*, p. 43. According to the confession of Ion Gheorghe Maurer: *Fără trupele rusești, normal că ne-am simțit mai aproape de îndeplinirea dorinței noastre de a ieși de sub hegemonia rusească*. See widely Lavina Betea, *op. cit.*, cap. VII *Ieșirea de sub hegemonia rusească*, 323-342.

and maintained their high anti-Soviet feelings in the Romanian society⁸⁷.

In the context of the Treaty with Austria, has been discussed in the Politburo of the Romanian Workers' Party, in August 1955, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania⁸⁸. Removing the Soviet troops from the national territory was a prerequisite for starting the actual consolidation effort of the communist political power in Romania. The approach of a problem so risky was done in a favorable context created by the policy of "relaxation" of Moscow towards the West, by the measures proposed by Soviet Union to reduce the number of troops in Romania⁸⁹ and the interest to demonstrate that the stability of the communist regimes in Europe was not due to "sovietc soldiers bayonets"⁹⁰.

The application for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania was asked by Emil Bodnaras to Nichita Khrushchev during his visit from 21 to 26 August 1955 of Soviet leader in Bucharest. The reaction of N Khrushchev was not a "positive" one⁹¹, but Romanian leaders justified their proposal on the basis of two arguments: one of strategic and the other political. From a military perspective, the presence of Soviet troops was not justified in Romania, a country that had no border with any member of NATO.

⁸⁷ 7In the opinion of Mioara Anton "rusofobe peaked" in the Romanian society in the first two decades of the postwar, being generated by two complementary phenomena: the Soviet military presence, with the whole assembly of violence and abuse and bringing to power of the communist regime. (Mioara Anton, *Pătrunderea Armatei Roșii pe teritoriul României. Propagandă, mituri, realități*, în in vol. *Материалы Двусторонней комиссии историков России и Румынии (X Научная конференция, Москва, октябрь 2005 года)*, Институт славяноведения РАН, Москва, 2007, p. 62).

⁸⁸ Central Historical National Archives, the RCP-Chancellor fund, file 32/1956, pp. 7-8.

⁸⁹ Larry Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁹⁰ N.S. Khrushchev, *Remembers. The Last Testament*, Strobe Talbott, Little Brown Co, Boston, 1974, p. 222.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*.

From the political point of view keeping Soviet forces within Romania was a factor of internally discrediting the communist regime (population believes that Soviet troops were the ensurance of the existence of the communist) and perpetuated the negative image abroad.

Proposal for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania was made in August 1955 and the actual implementation took place after three years, from June to July 1958. At this time there was a series of political, military, diplomatic, scientific events, etc. influencing the strategic decision of the Soviet government on the withdrawal of its military forces in Romania. According to the memoirs of some important politicians of the time and directly involved in the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania, during 1955-1958, the Bucharest authorities have consistently promoted this request within discussions with the Soviet leadership.

Actions of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist character from Poland and Hungary of 1956, followed by the harsh intervention of the Soviet Union, especially in Hungary, demonstrated clearly which were the power relations between Moscow and the satellite countries, which were the limits of “relaxing” promoted by Nichita Khrushchev . During the events of Hungary in October 1956, Romanian officials have vigorously condemned “counterrevolution” in the neighboring state provided the necessary means of transport for the Soviet troops transit through Romanian territory⁹² and supported the new leader in Budapest, Janos Kadar, in the reconstruction of Hungarian communist Particle. Through the attitude shown during the Hungarian crisis leadership in Bucharest, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej especially, gained the trust of N. Khrushchev. However in Soviet-Romanian Declaration made public in Moscow on December 4, 1956, was appreciated as “temporary stationing” further of Soviet troops in Romania due to increasing international tension and the danger of war⁹³. Despite the official

⁹² Constantin Olteanu, Alesandru Duțu, Constantin Antip, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁹³ „Scântea”, nr. 3769 of 4 decembrie 1956.

statements, Ion Gheorghe Maurer⁹⁴, one of the major leaders of the Romanian Government in those years, showed that the Romanian authorities have not loosened with their insistence upon Nikita Khrushchev on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania⁹⁵.

The Romanian-Russian military relations experienced different forms of collaboration, either within the Warsaw Pact or bilaterally. Romania entry in the Warsaw Pact led to increased military spending required by endowment effort of the Romanian army. In order to cover these expenses, Romania began to manufacture certain categories of weapons, ammunition and other special products for equipping the army. Development of military production in Romania during 1955-1960 was made with Soviet support, based on the licenses offered by this state⁹⁶. To harmonize the commandment cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in the fall of 1955 a group of Romanian superior officers was sent to Moscow for professional training development. Also in the same year, Romanian military forces began to participate in joint training activities planned within the military organization created in Warsaw⁹⁷.

In 1957, 15 April, was signed in Bucharest Agreement between the R.P. Romanian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the legal status of Soviet troops temporarily stationed on territory of Romanian People's Republic. The document was signed by the foreign

⁹⁴ Ion Gheorghe Maurer (1902-2000) a lawyer, was one of the most important communist leaders: Foreign Minister (1957-1958), Chairman of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly, position of head of state (1958-1961), Prime Minister (1961-1974).

⁹⁵ See widely Lavinia Betea, *Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj Napoca, 2001; Idem, *Partea lor de adevăr (Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu. Convorbiri; Maurer și lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României; Convorbiri neterminate cu Corneliu Mănescu)*, Compania Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008 a.o.

⁹⁶ Petre Opreș, *Industria românească de apărare. Documente. 1950-1989*, Publishing House Petroleum-Gas University of Ploiesti, 2008, pp. 27-28.

⁹⁷ Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op.cit.*, p. 70-71.

ministers and defense ministers of the two countries and has regulated the legal basis for the first time, the relationship between the Romanian and Soviet forces present in Romania. Analysis of the provisions of the Agreement signed on April 15, 1957 and the previous agreements and conventions reveals a substantial change in the status of Soviet troops stationed in Romania. Under the new agreement, the Soviet troops do not “interfere in the internal affairs” of the Romanian state (art. 1) their movement on Romanian territory is only “with the consent of the Government of the Romanian People” and applications and maneuvers were made “based on plans made in accordance with the Romanian authorities “(Art. 2). Soviet troops were obliged to “respect and comply with the provisions of Romanian law” (Article 3) and in case of crimes and misdemeanors “committed by Soviet forces personnel was applied Romanian legislation (Article 5)”⁹⁸. The agreement was followed by several special agreements governing multiple aspects related to the logistic of the Soviet troops, the conditions of use of buildings and land on which were deployed these foreign military forces, securing railways and telecommunications etc.

On 17 April 1958, N.S. Khrushchev sent a letter to the Central Committee of Romanian Workers’ Party in which was considered that in the opinion of the Soviet leadership “is no longer necessary the stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of the Romanian People’s Republic. [...] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of the Romanian People would be another evidence concrete and convincing of peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, of Romanian People’s Republic, of the entire socialist camp “outlined in the letter⁹⁹. Romanian Workers’ Party Central Committee responded with a letter signed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, stating that “the stationing of Soviet troops in RPR corresponded to the interests of both Romanian People’s Republic and the interests of the common cause of socialist camp“, but taking into account the” current favorable

⁹⁸ Archive of Foreign Ministry, Convention Fund, file 2441, F. 102-108.

⁹⁹ *România. Retragerea...*, op.cip., pp. 273-274.

circumstances, we agree with the proposal to waive the stationing of Soviet troops on the Romanian People's Republic¹⁰⁰. The exchange of letters was made in secret, "without being brought to public knowledge"¹⁰¹.

The decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Romania was the result of interaction of several processes and events such as the signing of the peace treaty with Austria; government insistence in Bucharest to withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, the liberalization under the socialist system initiated by N.S. Khrushchev after Stalin's death, political and social developments in Poland and Hungary economic and technological successes achieved by the Soviet Union in cosmic and nuclear programs, the plan of reorganization and reduction of the Soviet army, the need of external image recovery after interventions from Poland and, in particular, Hungary, etc.

On 24 May 1958, the Soviet government's proposal was made public, reconciled with the Romanian government to proceed with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. The measure was subject to the approval Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, meeting on the same day in Moscow and included in the *Declaration* adopted on the occasion of the creation of a non-aggression pact between Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and other members of NATO. Also on that date, was signed in Moscow a *Agreement between the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People's Republic and the Ministry of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the way of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania to the Soviet Union*. In the that agreement was specified: "will be cleared of all Soviet troops which will be there the day of signing this agreement" and the operation "will be made in the period 15 June to 15 August 1958" (art. 1); Romania is bound to keep a number of airfields in operational condition required for any use by combat aircraft from the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty,

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, pp. 274-275.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 48.

implementation until 1 July 1958 of the anti-aircraft defense cooperation plans between Romania and the Soviet Union (art. 4) surrender to the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People's Republic of all barracks, shooting ranges, airfields, buildings, housing with the inventory and furniture respectively (Article 5) specifying the condition and value (Article 6), Romania will provide transportation to Soviet troops and combat technique which were returned in the Soviet Union (art. 8) ¹⁰².

During the months of June to August 1958 there were a series of official events in localities in Romania where Soviet troops were stationed to highlight the mutual feelings of trust and solidarity. Disputes regarding damages made by the Soviet troops and payment of compensation were sent to settle any reason that could influence the timing of Soviet withdrawal from Romania. In the bilateral public events was aimed accreditation of the idea that the political system is strong, that Romania is a stable socialist country, an ally of the Warsaw Pact. The exact size of Soviet herd withdrawn from Romania is not yet known ¹⁰³. An exact figure will be known after the opening of former Soviet archives. According to the decision of the Romanian authorities, all Soviet personnel were awarded, at the departure from Romania, with the medal "liberation from the fascist yoke." Based on the results of the Romanian archives were awarded a total of 34,121 troops, which is probably the number of Soviet forces withdrawn from Romania in the summer of 1958 ¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰² Ibidem, pp. 276-280.

¹⁰³ The historian Florin Constantinescu, consider that the number of Soviet troops withdrawn from Romania was 25,149 troops (Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, third edition, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p. 464).

¹⁰⁴ Distribution per garrison of decorations was: Galati 2430 copies, Focsani 2232 copies, Ramnicu Sarat-1730 copies, 3486 copies Braila, Constanta 9016 copies, Timisoara 9657 copies, Cocargeaua 2117 copies, Ianca 2957 copies, Ploiești 1402 copies. (The data are taken from *România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice. 1958*, Didactic and Pedagogic Publishing House, R.A., Bucharest, 1996, pp. 326-327, cited in Romanian Military Archives, Department personal fund, Decrees Collection /1958, pp. 87-119).

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania was a unique event in the history of the Cold War, but scientific investigations on this decision were not commensurate with the importance and implications.

The analysis of the geopolitical context in which was done the Soviet military occupation, the status of Soviet troops from Romania and the consequences of their presence in the evolution of postwar Romanian society allows highlighting some conclusions.

The defeat suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front created military favorable conditions of penetration of Soviet troops in Romania in the spring of 1944. Although Romania has come out of the alliance with the Axis powers on 23 August 1944, the Soviet forces actions in the summer of 1944 were completed by the defeat of Romanian army and the military occupation of Romania.

A key objective of Soviet diplomacy during the Second World War was the establishment of Soviet a zone of influence at western frontier in Europe. Abandonment of Southeast and Central European to the Soviet sphere of influence was made with the agreement of the U.S. and England.

Amplification of mistrust and misunderstanding between the former allies and their interest to strengthen its presence in postwar spheres of influence led to the winning countries troops maintaining on the territory of defeated countries after the war. The presence of Soviet troops on the territory of European states in central and south-eastern Europe has been the main tool used by Moscow to install communist regimes in those countries. Stationing of Soviet troops in Romania in the period 1944–1958 was part of Soviet power strategy concerned with bringing to power and consolidation of a communist regime in Bucharest.

Mutations produced internationally after Stalin's death, relations between Moscow and the liberalization of satellite states, reinforcement of internal political regime have led the leaders in Bucharest to demand Moscow the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Romania. The decision to withdraw was taken by the Soviet government and represented the cumulative effect of multiple inter-conditionings political, economic, diplomatic, military, propaganda etc. Noteworthy is the fact that it was the only decision of this kind in the history of the Cold War. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania falls into the category of significant events in the history of Romanians in their effort to regain true independence after the Second World War.

ROMANIAN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE IXTH DECADE OF THE TWENTIETY CENTURY: ONLY A CRISIS OF THE SYSTEM?

Ion ALEXANDRESCU

After three decades of rapid economic growth, during which GDP per capita expressed in PPP dollars, the 2000 currency increased almost 7 times (in 1342-8939 dollars)¹, but Romania faced in the second half of year 1981 with a severe financial crisis and was forced to ask, with some delay, the rescheduling of its debt in convertible currency in 1982 and 1983.

Crisis origins must be sought in the structural trends and the excessive domestic demand in Romania, as well as international hostile conditions manifested in the 70th. In contrast to many market economies that have introduced precautionary or restrictive measures, as result of the oil crisis from 1973/1974, Romania continued to give priority to its rapid economic growth and focused on expanding the energy-intensive industries. Prices were adjusted slightly, ie these for energy, which greatly deviated from the rapidly changing of the international prices. The large loans on the market,

¹ Victor Axenciuc, *Romania's gross domestic product, 1862-2000*, vol. I, Ed. Economică, Bucharest, 2012, p.40; see also Romania: *The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning*, coord. Andreeas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. (Report of a mission sent to Romania by the World Bank).

– including these from IBRD and the IMF where Romania was admitted since 1972, when she received the amount requested with some relative ease, – have done, in their turn, possible to delay the structural adjustments imposed by the extremely high prices of crude oil imports in 1972, when Romania became a net importer of oil. Domestic oil production has fallen by about 20% during 1976-1980. In the same period, imports increased from 8.5 to 16 million tons². The trade balance of the oil was seriously deteriorated: from a surplus of \$ 138 million in 1975 to a deficit of \$ 1.947 million in 1980. Note that in the seventh decade, the imports in general increased rapidly and due to natural disasters (the catastrophic floods from 1972 and 1975 and the earthquake from 1977³).

The quick growth of exports, especially in the engineering, which, in the concept of the Romanian planners, could offset the shortfall recorded in other sectors has not happened. Worried about this situation, the MFA State Secretary, A. Duma, sent, in November 1980, to the Romanian Ambassadors in seven European countries (France, Italy, Austria, West Germany, East Germany, Denmark, SR Czechoslovakia), circular telegrams asking them insistently to requests, from the suppliers having enterprises in those countries to determinate them make quickly deliveries in advance for the equipment (more or less complex) required for completion of the Romanian equipment destined to be exported. Approaches were not successful. The answer was that delivery providers can be performed after a period between 6-12 months⁴.

In these conditions, **the deterioration of the current account in the convertible currency** increased, reaching a deficit of \$ 2.399 million in 1980 (5.2% of GNP)⁵. At the end of the same year,

² National Bank of Romania – Archives (now NBR), the Fund of the Currency and Precious Metals Department (further Fund of DVMP), file #33/December 1979- September 1983, f.230.

³ *Ibidem*, f.230.

⁴ Ministry of External Affairs Archives (now AMAE), Fund 241, file #24111980.

⁵ ABNR, Fund. Cit., file # 3311979-1983, f.230.

Romania's foreign debt in convertible currency amounted to \$ 9,557,000 (approximately 17% of GNP) and the non-convertible currencies summarized, at the same time, \$ 253 million (see Annex. 1). Of the total, \$ 7,005,000 represented the medium and long term loans and actually a very serious \$ 2,124,000 short-term debt⁶. By comparison with other middle income countries, the external debt of Romania was not an excessive one, compared to the size of its economy. But the gravity lies in inadequate structure and maturities with appropriate terms.

Until 1978 deficits were financed exclusively by loans on medium and long term, both the credit provider, but also to those of financial institutions. After this time resorted to the use of short-term financial loans to cover the gap between current receipts and payments, the share on short term debt in total external convertible debt rapidly increasing from 7% in 1977 to about 25% at the end of 1979⁷.

As an answer to the need for reform of the financial crisis looming, the government introduced in 1979 – in order to be applied on an experimental basis in a number of years – a program of economic reform entitled New Economic Mechanism.

The report concerning the Consultation on the 1979 with Romania, presented and discussed in the IMF Executive Committee

⁶ Romania, Financial crisis, adjustment measurements and perspectives, September 1983, in ABNR, Fund DVMP, file 3311979-1983, f.230.

⁷ ABNR, Fund cit., file #3311979-1983, f.230. *IMF staff appreciated that the announced changes concerning the economic and financial mechanism *must* (our underline) lead to a bigger efficiency in the enterprises field, specially the passage from the global production to the added value as economic sign which will encourage *a more rational production* (our underline). A greater participation of enterprises to the scheduling process and to their productive investments, and also one of some investments with a social character for their employees, will be able to encourage greater accumulations inside the enterprises. In the same way, the incentives concerning their workers participation to receive benefits could lead to bigger increases of the productivity. It is hard to judge – concluded the IMF staff – how effective are measures because they are complex and in some cases we do not know their precise shape.”

meeting on September 14, 1979 highlighted a greater extent than in previous years some of the critical aspects of the economic evolution. "Compared to the previous consultations, the current situation of the Romanian economy – has shown HO Ruding, the Executive Director representing Romania in Council – has remained essentially unchanged in one important aspect: the growth, but changed substantially in another respect: the balance of payments"⁸. The Romanian authorities should be appreciated, – he said, – for their trying to maintain in the recent years, but also in 1979, – this impressive expansion of the national income, investment and production, even in the current global economic conditions strained, but the current account of balance of payments had a much larger deficit in 1978 than in any year since Romania became a member of the IMF, in 1972, but the deficit is expected to rise further in 1979 and probably in 1980. The Romanian authorities – specified Ruding – “clearly believe that their ambitious policy is not only an essential element within the five-years plan, but that it could also be realized on long term, while the IMF staff expressed serious doubt⁹ on this matter”.

To summarize – affirmed Ruding – Romania has the intention to continue her ambitious policy concerning the high rhythms of growing plans and will try to annihilate the potential hostile consequences of this policy towards the trade balance by stimulating continuously her exports and reducing imports and improving overall efficiency and oil imports by energy conservation in all sectors, a transition to production methods with less energy and an increase of the domestic oil production, as well as the development of the nuclear energy“. The Romanian authorities – he continued – disagree with IMF’s staff’s opinions that the tasks on 1979 would be unrealistic and that they could not be achieved, but he appreciated, at the same time, before the Members of the Council that ”in this

⁸ ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 50/1978-1980, f. 247.

⁹ *Ibidem.*

stage the Romanian authorities must be considered to be right from the pessimistic point of view”¹⁰.

The leader of the Executive Council meeting from September 14, 1979 concerning the consultation about Romania noticed that, inter alia, the impressive economic domestic fast growth and the very swift investments“, but also the directors’ concern about “deterioration of the balance of payments for the current account for 1979 especially in the second half of the year“, but also the worrying perspective for 1979, especially with regard to ”the ambitious task of the internal growth”¹¹. He noticed, also, that the “clear signs of overheating in the economy may imply an internal relatively slow growth in order to reduce the pressure of the balance of payments and prevent an unwanted growth of foreign debt, from which a substantial part is on short term”¹².

At the beginning of the 1980 **the signs of a profound financial crisis become more visible**. On May 14, H.O. Ruding expressed, in the Executive Board, his full agreement with the statement of the Romanian authorities, according with which “if, however, the exports are not made as provided in 1980 and because that the current account deficit in convertible currency would exceed the established level, imports will be reduced enough so that the current provided deficit will not exceed “and that” accordingly to the economic indicators of production, the investment, the foreign trade and others will also be revised down as a reflection of the plan’s flexibility¹³. After five months, on October 10, 1980, H.O. Ruding clearly demonstrated, in the meeting of CEOs who reviewed their staff’s report about the consultation with Romania, that Bucharest ”has the intention to discuss his request for support from the Fund in financing the balance of payments deficit in early 1981

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Ibidem, f. 249.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ ABNR, Fond DVMP, dosar nr. 2111978-1980, f. 220.

when major decisions have been taken on the precise content and timing the application of currency reform and prices¹⁴.

In June 15, 1981, the Fund's Executive Board approved for Romania, – following negotiations in Bucharest IMF mission, led by Geoffrey Tyler, a credit of SDR 1,102.5 million (about U.S. \$ 1,390 million) under an arrangement stand-by on a period of three years (June 15 1981 – 15 June 1984)¹⁵. The arrangement established that Romania could still receive no credit instalment (except the first instalment of 140 million SDRs), unless she would respect the measurement schedule for the period arrangements that provided performance criteria for the trade deficit on short term, convertible currency, the total international reserves (foreign currencies and gold) and net assets of the banking system, some measures to simplify the system of currency exchange since 1982; Romania's abstaining from imposing restrictions on payments relating to transactions for foreign trade, the introduction or modification of multiple currency practices, concluding bilateral payments agreements, imposition or intensification of import restrictions for balance of payments reasons¹⁶.

For the beginning, the stand-by arrangement only established performance criteria for September 30 and December 31, 1981. For the years 1982, 1983 and 1984, the performance criteria attended to be established at the beginning of each year, in negotiations with the IMF representatives, in which the position of the parties will record evolutions not found in their relations established in the previous years.

But, despite the measures agreed (the adjustment within their exchange rate system sites, the pricing structure and debt reduction and increasing short-term external international reserves), in the last period of the 1981 year, the creditors trust that Romania's credit-worthiness has vigorously reduced, even if the signal to end the

¹⁴ ABNR, Fond DVMP, dosar nr. 2111978-1980, f. 293.

¹⁵ *Idem*, f.214.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

stand-by had to be positive. It had been a certain withdrawal of deposits and credit lines suspended. Instead of a \$ 1.7 billion inflows occurred an out about \$ 0.6 billion net. There appeared, in that way, some arrears of pay and an international liquidity acute failure”¹⁷.

At Bucharest, in the summer of 1981 took shape the perception that “certain Western circles” want to accredit through rumours and articles, the idea that Romania’s creditworthiness is deliberately challenged, which was brought to the attention of the Executive Director of BIRD, Anthony Looijen and alternate Executive Director of BIRD, Miodrag Stojilkovic, during their visit in Romania, conducted from July 27 – and August 22 to 29 1981 ¹⁸.

Bucharest’s concern regarding the score of a campaign directed to induce a distorted image about Romania was fuelled by the telegram of the charged d’affaires *ad interim* of Romania in Washington, E. Popa, who transmitted, on September 17, 1981, conveyed that within the call he had with G. Tyler, director at the IMF, he “referred, on his own initiative, to some aspects of Romania’s current financial situation”. IMF and he personally – showed Tyler, – they receive numerous questions on the financial and banking situation in Romania, questions which, conjugated with articles and comments were likely to damage the interests of Romania. Tyler “left clear to understand – has communicated E. Popa by telex – that behind the campaign were circles of the U.S. Administration, as evidenced by the U.S. banks, especially in New York, bringing prejudices to Romania, and not those in Western Europe, which address now to New York and Washington for clarifications”¹⁹. Tyler suggested that the finance Minister Petre Gigea, must have a discussion with D. Regan, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, in which he could show that the actions of the U.S. financial circles are hard to understand well and could have

¹⁷ *Memorandum economic, 1983, ABNR, Fund DVMP, file #,3311979, f.26.*

¹⁸ AMAE, Fund 241, file #211981, f.11.

¹⁹ *Idem, f.20.*

unintended consequences on the economic and political plan. Tyler suggested that the Romanian side does not believe that the U.S. Administration is insensitive within the processes which can cause damages to Romania's independent policy²⁰. "Within the contacts that the Romanian delegation will have to the annual IMF-IBRD session beginning on September 29, Tyler appreciated that it is necessary to be adopted a firm position", "with arguments and data" in order to combat appreciation from the press and some financial circles, to assert and demonstrate that the situation in 1980 was a better one than in 1979 as Romania moves better than promised and agreed with the IMF, that the exports evolve normally and that it has been provided a good harvest in 1981²¹. At the same time, Tyler suggested also that the Romanian delegation should have discussions with the financial ministers from 5 or 6 developed countries, to whom "was obviously given the question: what follows by creating difficulties to Romania and who uses this?" and to be required intervention besides some banks in their own countries to demonstrate responsiveness and support the efforts of Romania, not to create problems that affect confidence in the creditworthiness of Romania, and last but not least, that the Romanian delegation should also discuss with representatives of some New York banks²².

Another kind of approach expressed E. Lawson, deputy assistant for East-West trade and chief of the U.S. Department of Commerce, who, in a meeting with N. Eremia, the President of BRCE, showed that he was consulted by the Commerce Department and the National Security Council on the actions and positions of the U.S. toward the socialist countries, including also Romania, and that he had a duty to speak out and present U.S. government concern over Romania's current financial situation, the fact that many commercial banks and commercial firms claimed not being paid by the Romanian contractors, that the maturity of the financial liabilities

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ *Idem*, f.21.

²² AMAE, Fund 241, file # 211981 (series II), f. 37.

were recorded with late payments going ever with a delay between 90-180 days, when he was asked to explain the cause of this situation and which measures had been taken to overcome them, inquiring especially if Romania will honour her contract with the company "General Electric". Lawson showed that the American press has written enough on the creditworthiness of Romania, saying that, under the current circumstances East-West, adding yet another element of uncertainty it wasn't welcomed²³.

Complaints belonging to some banks but also the articles printed in press about the financial difficulties of Romania's capacity in order to honour her financial obligations were taken by the IMF and IBRD, while staff from their board underlining that „it was extremely important that the Romanian enterprises must respect and honour their obligations, maintaining the confidence in her creditworthiness, because a certain damage concerning the confidence in Romania could have negative long term effects and that it could be hard to be restored²⁴”.

Confronted with this situation, the Romanian government was forced to take more extensive measures than those foreseen in the stand-by program. It reduced the imports from the convertible area to 13% and the investments by 7.3%. The decrease of the agricultural production for two consecutive years gave rise to a drastic austerity measures, when sugar, edible oil and meat were rationed, and shops have to serve only residents of that locality. The volume of purchases of food consumption was limited to a monthly store, with the intention to discourage the stocks of individual households. In 1982, the retail food prices increased on average by 35%, thus reducing the pressure of the demand. The energy prices have risen for some services concerning the mail post and telephony²⁵.

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴ *Idem.*, f. 38.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, f.27, see Dr. Traian Lazăr, *Settlement of prices on economic principles in Romania*, Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1985, p.120.

The consequence was that, after many years, in 1981, the trade account showed a surplus (204 million dollars)²⁶. Prices were supported by the population, its wages and real incomes fell sharply.

In 1982, the current account recorded a surplus of \$ 655 million, compared to a deficit of \$ 2.4 million in 1980 and \$ 818 million in 1981, (despite lower than expected inflows of foreign loans), mainly by reduction of about 33% of the dollar value of imports from the convertible currency by reducing import plans of enterprises, by reducing population's consumption and import-intensive investment and drastic energy saving measures. With all these austerity measures, real gross domestic product increased by 3.2% in 1982 influenced in part by favourable crop.

The rational solution to overcome the difficulties caused by the increasing of the external debt repayments, – for short-term paid debts in order to pay the financial obligations and to avoid suspension of payments, – were initiated approaches for the banks and government's debts to be rescheduled in a longer period. In the second half of 1982, Romania has reached a debt restructuring agreement from the government to officially guaranteed short-term debt, the debt to commercial banks under the aegis of the Paris Club (\$ 1.5 billion), a debt to suppliers or other banks²⁷.

Agreements concluded in Paris (May 1983) and Mamaia (June 1983) for rescheduling the debt maturing in 1983 provides rescheduling of repayments of 60% of medium and long-term debt falling due in 1983.

In total restructuring agreements indicated for Romania some debt relief at \$ 2.7 billion from \$ 5.5 billion payments provided, (see Annex.2) repayments and interest payments in 1982 (including arrears from 1981)²⁸.

²⁶ *Ibidem*. • According to Professor V. Axenciuc estimates, GDP expressed in dollars rose PPE with 4% in 1982 compared to 1981 (Victor Axenciuc, *op. cit.*, p 40.)

²⁷ ABNR, Found DVMP; file # 7/1983-1985, f.494; AMAE, Fund 241, file # 1 /1983, f.53-54.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 28.

Simultaneously, – or as a result of negotiations with the IMF and other foreign creditors, – were continued the financial and economic adjustments (see Annex. 3).

The previous system of the multiple exchange rates was simplified. A complete unification of the exchange rate was adopted in the second half of 1983 (a year earlier than originally agreed with the IMF). In early 1983, the national currency was devalued in two steps (14%), in order to improve the international competitiveness of Romania. On July 1st, 1983, the link to the U.S. dollar was abandoned in the favour of a basket of currencies, weighted according to their importance in the commercial transactions of Romania²⁹.

The frequent price adjustments in the years 1979–1983 clearly shows the transition to a greater flexibility in pricing, in stark contrast to the previous policy pursued when prices adjustments made at time intervals (1963, 1979 – see also the Romania's statistical Yearbook statistical). In order to be fully effective, the adjustments should continue within reforms aimed to increase the share of enterprise-level decisions (even on the tasks set at central level) and give each greater financial autonomy. This did not happen in any case, what gave rise to tensions in Romania's relations with the IMF.

The manner of establishing prices ensured a full coverage of costs even for the less efficient firms. The stated objective of the Romanian authorities, whereby enterprises of which losses will not receive the financial support from the state budget has not been realized. No company was forced into bankruptcy. This practice was justified by the priority given to jobs security and by the full utilization of labour. Thus, any closer links between the income of each person in production, productivity and economic efficiency were not fully realized, even if on July 2, 1983, a law in this regard has been adopted.

The vigorous improvement in the current account in convertible currency in 1980-1982 was made especially by adopting

²⁹ *Ibidem*, f.31.

restrictive measures, focusing on reducing imports, and reflected only in a small extent the effects of the structural policy measures required by the IMF.

In a work of the IMF (EBD/83/2000) from August 4, 1983³⁰, there were considered the causes of the financial difficulties of Romania and how the external debt rescheduling was done, and it was said that “Romania is currently in a phase of exit from a crisis of external debt and liquidity. After a period of rapid economic growth, fuelled by a wide investment program, which resulted in increasing current account deficits and increasing external debt, Romania was hit by stopping short-term loans as a result of the Polish crisis. She had to sign agreements with its creditors on restructuring its debt falling due in 1982 and 1983 and to make a massive internal adjustment under a Stand-By Arrangement with the Fund, which sought a current account surplus³¹.”

The IMF, – it was shown in the paper, – had to face a dilemma in suggesting an adjustment program for Romania and for other centrally planned economies. “Whether to use standard tools (for those countries with market economy – Ed), such as credit ceilings which were limited meaning, or to rely on the tools used by the very countries that do not contain in themselves incentives to move towards more market-oriented mechanisms. The external use of the quantitative criteria were a substitute for other criteria, but maybe occurred for the financial markets as not putting enough emphasis on the internal necessary changes.”

The conclusion which was drawn in the paper was that “for Romania to regain its ability to attract capital flows and to return to a more appropriate term growth medium after a period of severe adjustments from 1981 to 1984, a solution will be to continue to make fundamental changes. In cooperation with the World Bank, the IMF should therefore – as they appreciated in the quoted work

³⁰ ABNR, Fund. Cit., file # 7/1983-1985, f.491-492.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

– to emphasize the need for profound changes in the financial system through decentralization, foreign trade system, reviewing the role of foreign trade enterprises and pass the multilateral trade relations through decentralization and the productive sector decisions on prices and investment. Such a process should be an integral part of the overall strategy which seeks a more balanced economic policy, more diverse and more oriented to the market³².

The adjustment program recommended by the IMF differ essentially from the assessments made by the Director Polak, who represented the group of countries that included Romania, during the stand-by agreement reconsideration on March 30, 1983, who, in his final statement emphasized that the Romanian authorities were fully prepared to make the necessary adjustments, but that they must be prepared and implemented carefully so as to avoid distortions³³. «I agreed – he informed in the Board Council meeting of NBR – about the reconsidered arrangements – with the Venezuelan Director that the IMF should not push their countries to move from one system to another. It must maintain neutrality in the system problem and should focus on helping countries to make improvements within the system that themselves choose»³⁴.

Consultation with Romania in 1983 based on Article IV, which took place at the meeting of the Executive Council of September 14, 1983, occasioned a discussion attended by eight CEOs. According to the general director's summary, the speakers "praised Romania for its important turning intervened in its current account position in convertible currency between 1980 and 1982 and underlined that this trend must be continued in the first half of 1983"³⁵. It was noticed, however, that, being given the poor performance of exports "the improvement was achieved primarily through a reduction of imports and did not lead to a significant increase in international

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ ABNR, Fund cir., file # 10/1980-1983, f.75..

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 10/1981-1983, f.29.

reserves, despite a substantial rescheduling of the external debt and the use of resources from the IMF³⁶.

Generally speaking, the directors agreed with Romania's economic policy planned for 1983, which materialized also IMF staff's suggestions made in the study concerning the capital, money, energy and currency in the Romanian economy (survey conducted in January 1983 – Ed) for continuity of the improvement of the current account in convertible currencies, which included restrictions on fiscal policy and the wage and tightening of the monetary policy and the measures taken in order to increase the efficiency of the resource allocation, including two devaluations of the national currency and the unificated system of the commercial courses, the large increases in the prices of oil and natural gas' within increased rates. Most executives "were of the opinion that the substantial distortions in the relative prices of the remaining energy, capital and imports and non-oil exports decreased in recent large convertible currency, requiring further that the authorities now provide a structural reform of prices and the removal of administrative controls"³⁷. They said, however, that other measures are also needed because there is a risk of further unnecessary restriction of imports and a sharp drop compared to the projected increase in reserves for 1983. Most Directors considered significant the devaluation required further for *leu (the national currency)*, maximizing the domestic energy production and reducing the energy consumption, the corresponding policy of prices (in a sense of its increase – Ed). While some executives felt that the further increases in interest rates to positive real levels would be needed to ensure a better allocation of the capital, other managers felt that "due to the Romanian conditions, the current levels of interest rates are high, suitable for this purpose, while the interest rates has little significance in terms of savings deposits"³⁸.

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

³⁷ *Ibidem.*

³⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 30.

The Directors emphasized that, being given the increase in debt of the repayments ahead to the middle of the decade 1980-1990, “the need for further agreement between the IMF and Romania and the need to reach new understandings at the next review of the arrangement”³⁹.

In the introductory exposure on Romania of the Executive Council meeting of September 14, 1983, the Executive Director, Polak, stated: “The international debt crisis forced the Romanian economy to make a major adjustment. Having been adversely affected by several events that took place in 1979-80 - the economic recession in the industrialized countries and the corresponding reduction in world trade, the rapid increase in international interest rates and higher for oil prices – Romania has witnessed almost to the abrupt cessation of its international credits as a result of some events that occurred in another part”⁴⁰. As pointed out by IMF staff – he continued – the Romanian authorities had to make a major adjustment of the current account position, which went from a deficit of \$ 2.400 million in 1980 to a surplus of \$ 655 million in 1982 “and for 1983 it produced a new \$ 800 million surplus.

This massive adjustment was achieved through a reduction of capital expenditure and in 1982 through a reduction in the real wage of not less than 7.4%.

In 1983 the policy continued to restrict the demand and to promote the growth of the efficiency, obtaining a surplus, partly as a result of the restricting investment and the real income growth in a very modest extent, so that they continued to restrict consumers’ spending⁴¹. “Despite some significant adjustments, Romania could not meet its debt service obligations “as the country continued to have no absolutely access to the international financial markets,” because of the rescheduled of the outstanding debt in 1982 and 1983.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 38.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

The reserves could not be increased and could not be avoided the accumulation of the arrears (which were removed in May 1983).

In order to promote the economic efficiency – as the Executive Director Polak appreciated – “for a number of years the Romanian authorities have continued a policy of fundamental adjustments. While the basic framework of the socialist planned economy has been maintained, the authorities have accomplished fundamental changes within the role of prices policy in the economy⁴². When the multiple exchange of rates’s system was abandoned, leaving only the commercial transaction course and that one for non-commercial operations, courses of exchange which would be unified on July 1st, 1984. The structure of domestic prices come closer to the structure of the international prices.

Discussions in the Council meeting of September 14 were focused on other issues and considerations particularly interesting to assess Romania’s relations with the IMF, which were not retained in the summary of the General Director. Director Zhang (China) showed, – according to Liviu Ionescu’s report⁴³, – who was one of the IMF officials – report he made about the consultation concerning discussions with Romania, as very unfavourable external conditions, “unlike other borrowers, Romania did not achieve a certain degree of accessibility to international capital markets and consequently its internal adjustment program implementation was very hard⁴⁴ and stressed that “the IMF met the requirements, fulfilling their obligations under the stand-by. “It is important, – Zhang said that – “ when it is recommended to follow the policy, staff should refrain from insisting the recommendations were taken from the models of market economy countries and may not be applicable to a country with a planned economy. “The Chinese director expressed his concern that” the four studies “have been organized under the stand-

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 10/1981-1983, f.33-36.

⁴⁴ *Idem*, f.33. Studies aimed at the cost of capital, money, energy and currency in the Romanian economy.

by arrangement and was gradually transformed into a new form of conditionality”⁴⁵ and said that he takes under doubt the very concept of “bring the domestic prices at the same level with the one of world market prices,” lacking a precise content.

The conditions imposed by the IMF on the further devaluation of the domestic currency, the increasing prices for gas, crude oil and refined petroleum products, as well as the interest, so that the existing economic mechanism in Romania to approach the characteristic of a market economy, obviously affected Romania’s relations with the IMF and IBRD despite the official optimistic statements from Bucharest and even the Romanian desire to continue good relations in previous years. The foreign Minister Stefan Andrei and the Finance Minister Petre Gigea appreciated, in a telegram addressed to the Romanian ambassador in Washington⁴⁶ “that in 1983 Romania fulfilled the performance criteria agreed with the IMF and conditions were ensured in order to be fully achieved on December 31, 1983 both these criteria and other measures agreed” and asked, taking it into account, “that the two instalments (\$ 200 million each-n.n)will be awarded this year under the existing arrangement, emphasizing that the request is a matter of principle arising from the above-mentioned arrangement”⁴⁷.

Misunderstandings between Romania and the IMF, the abnormal development of the relations between them have been broken through newsletters belonging to the IMF, where was published on November 23, 1983, the summary of an article “which appeared on 17 November in the” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung “entitled Romania and IMF in conflict”. According to the article, “Romania has refused to meet the conditions of this SBA, which prompted the IMF to stop further payments”. The measure has not been met in IMF relations with another Member State, because “Romania either did not provide the information required by the IMF

⁴⁵ *Idem*, f. 33,35.

⁴⁶ AMAE, Fund 241, file # 1/1983, f. 36.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

or if it did, it did not provide the accurate information.” This conflict seems, however, as it was written in the article, to be more serious⁴⁸. About the head of the Party and State, Nicolae Ceausescu, – it was said that he has declared to the IMF representatives that Romania, in principle, would like to satisfy the IMF requirements, but would also like to reserve its right to decide which one of the steps it has to take to meet those requirements. As a result of this statement, which has stunned many just outside the IMF, payments were discontinued. “In essence, the conflict is the fact that Ceausescu intends to maintain his policy that led to these difficulties in the first place, refusing to introduce changes in the economic system of the country. The IMF, on the other hand, is interested in introducing a realistic system production costs, especially those of export products as an initial condition for the economic recovery⁴⁹.”

Two years ago, said the German newspaper, Romania massively increased the prices for consumer goods, which drew a major disapproval between the Western lenders, while refusing to perform a fundamental reform of the entire pricing system of the type adopted in Hungary⁵⁰.

Referring to the remarks made by N. Ceausescu in the presence of guests from abroad, supposedly the German newspaper – says CEO Polak – Romania moved toward autarky, gradually breaking its economic relations with the West and the last meeting of the CMEA was observed that “Romania seeks to closer ties with the East in various fields, like those of the construction of the nuclear power plants⁵¹.”

Worried about the effects that the article could have outside the IMF, Brehmer, – who was the head of the IMF mission in Romania, – confirmed that the article contained many inaccuracies, “without,

⁴⁸ ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 7/1983-1985, f.465.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

however, revealing them,” and added – as executive information Polak did – that “he is satisfied that no other high circulation newspaper reproduced the article, (that were requested nor any explanation from the international banking community were requested“.)

Discussions continued on the stand-by and getting the last two instalments reveal further the IMF decision to impose new requirements in the cover letter, “and non-negotiable minimum price” increases aimed at the production, delivery and retail over the previously agreed, which also notified the Director Polak, who believed that “the IMF’s current proposals containing the additional elements to the version that was communicated in Bucharest in October, which would call into question the IMF board to continue the stand-by arrangement”⁵².

The latest instalment credits of the arrangement approved by the Executive Board in January 1984 based on a program which included, clearly, the new requirements imposed by the IMF: the devaluation of the national currency by 15%, and inter-bank interest rate increased by 2 percentage points, the establishment of a fee of 7% depreciation allowance on machinery and equipment in the MICM, wellhead oil price increase from 1100-1750 lei/ ton⁵³. In the discussion of the Council on January 23, 1984 the representative of China, Zhang noted, *inter alia*, that the basic structural reforms require a reasonable period of time to produce the desired effect and emphasized, as in September 1983, that “The IMF should not ask a country to do more just for the simple reason that the country has managed to do more “and” asked staff to apply to Romania a little more flexibility, as it was the recent case of in stand-by arrangement with Hungary”⁵⁴.

With an excessive emphasis on the role of the exchange rate for devaluation, the IMF staff seems to lessen the impact of external

⁵² AMAE, Fund 241, file # 1/193, f.50.

⁵³ AMAE, Fund 241, file # 1/1984, f.4

⁵⁴ ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 7/q983-1985, f.355.

market conditions or restrictions for the convertible currency on export opportunities in this area of Romania – Zhang noted – adding that he found the work presented (by the staff-*nn*) some external factors influencing the Romanian exports, including protectionist measures affecting traditional markets for Romanian exports.

Again, Zhang criticized the staff ‘s request for a full and immediate passage of the effects of devaluation on domestic prices due to “the lack of a mechanism able to ensure that the effects (of devaluations – Ed) automatically switch on”, implying that such adjustment is automatic in market economies, which is not correct. In the real world – said Zhang – full of monopolistic practices, such a view may reflect only a theoretical, an abstract point of view, which may not be supported by substantial empirical evidence⁵⁵“.

The representative of Venezuela, Senior, said that the set of comprehensive adjustment measures adopted by Romania after the consultation in September 1983, adding that “it is not clear what are the reasons for the premature cancellation from January 31, 1984, of the remaining part of stand-by, which could give a wrong signal to the financial markets’⁵⁶, and that “would have preferred a continuation of the program on the same basis as that which was used in Hungary, namely to give more time for discussion on domestic structural reforms without introducing an element of uncertainty and lack of continuity.⁵⁷ “Please note that the views expressed were shared by Senior final remarks and Polak Director.

The most critical to the policy and economic relations of Romania was manifested by the U.S. representative, Erb, who “agreed adjustment recent measures taken by the Romanian authorities as a basis for obtaining the remaining purchases under the program in 1983,” although “he would have preferred measures to have been taken earlier and more severe and a most significant

⁵⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁷ *Idem*, f.356

adjustment in the sectors covered by the analysis’⁵⁸ It’s disappointing that it took so long for the Romanian authorities to reach an agreement with the IMF on measures of policy which – believed Erb – were in their own economic interest of Romania”. While recognizing that there is progress in the four sectors analyzed in September 1983, he estimated that adjusting energy prices was going in the right direction, but very slowly, and that “the prices of domestically produced crude oil and natural gas were subsidized”. Erb said that “the U.S. will closely monitor the economic achievements of Romania in the context of the supervision of the IMF, even if the current stand-by is no longer in force (we underlined – I.A) to see if the Romanian authorities continue the economic reforms begun under the IMF program, as U.S. authorities would like to see a continuation of these reforms and certainly not a reversal of the situation⁵⁹.

In disagreement with U.S. representative, Director Polak said at the end of the meeting that if the grant has construed strictly additional payments from the government budget, then “in Romania natural gas prices are not subsidized.” They are lower than world market prices, but “they exceed their cost of production”, as is the case in many other countries producing natural gas⁶⁰.

In his statement, Polak pointed out that “there is absolutely no need for a market mechanism to carry away the effects of devaluation for the final prices of goods and the IMF must be a non-dogmatic one, a new appreciation of the measures that could be applicable for Romania”, whereas the reality is that” staff do not know about the Romanian economy as much as they would like to know and correctly points out that the Romanian statistic is not as abundant as it should be⁶¹.

The IMF paper (EBD1BI200) from August 4,1983 and the Executive Board’s discussions that followed the consultation with

⁵⁸ *Idem*, f.357.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Idem*, f.358.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

Romania and the continuing stand-by arrangement reflects the aim and the essence of measures that the IMF was trying to implement in the planned economy centralized from Romania. They were in apparent disagreement with the head of the economic policy of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu wanted to continue “no offense”.

Nicolae Ceausescu intended to further maintain his policy that led to the difficulties that confronted the country and refused, in fact, to introduce changes that profoundly altered the existing economic system in Romania.

U.S. authorities wish to see the continuation of reforms as envisaged in the IMF and its Executive Board representative and not a reversal of the situation on an unexpected answer on November 1, 1984, when Bucharest ceased to satisfy IMF demands for further devaluation of the national currency, the increase in interest rates and prices, ending the structural adjustment that they promoted at the request of IMF after stand-by agreement in June 1981.

The measures taken by the Romanian authorities were reviewed by the European Department and the Department of Foreign Exchange and Trade Relations in a document entitled “Romania. Exchange rates and other measures introduced on November 1, 1984”⁶².

The staff learned from the press that the Romanian interests have changed, being reduced by three percentage points. The main category, “current loans database of industrial, transport, scientific research, public service, deliveries and sales and trade” was reduced from 8% to 5%. And some prices were reduced by lowering the ceiling of profitability in some sectors. To increase incentives, the benefits of meeting the above plan for distribution toward workers was increased.

Staff conclusion was that there were more and more doubts about the extent to which Romanian authorities shared IMF objectives, especially after cancelling the stand-by in January 1984.

⁶² ABNR, Fund DVMP, file # 7/1983-1985, f.194-198

“There are indications that increase, showing that authorities remove their previously stated intentions to carry out a reform of prices and at the same time allowing greater autonomy at the enterprise level. If this is the real direction that the applied policy goes (our underline. – I.A), then the exchange rates and prices policy in general can be expected to have only a subordinate role in resource allocation.⁶³”

The economic development of Romania in the 80's was largely conditioned by the need to improve the current account balance to meet the external debt obligations, including interest, estimated at about two billion dollars annually, and to finance imports of capital equipment necessary to the restructuring of the economy.

The significant improvements of the obvious trade balance and payment in the early years of the ninth decade were achieved mainly by reducing the administrative imports, coupled with a decline in consumption and investment. To avoid the negative effects of the excessive use of such measures, the focus for improving the balance of payments had to be made on the use of measures enabling international competitiveness and export growth in the medium and long term by increasing economic efficiency and fundamental restructuring of the economy.

Unfortunately, the delayed adaptation to new economic realities of Romania had to be made in a time when global markets have increased in quite modest rates and competition from other countries with the same need for improvement of the balance of payments was fierce. Access to external borrowing was limited and real interest rates on foreign debt continued to be high.

Lack of currency, but mostly, the dogmatism and seclusion have limited policy's options of the authorities in an attempt to adjust the economic structure. The difficulties were compounded by the need to shift from growth strategy based primarily on resource mobilization least productive work (in agriculture, especially) and high rates of investment, followed by decades of intensive growth

⁶³ *Idem, f.196.*

based mainly by the efficiency of existing resources as a source of development. Finally, improving the efficiency of the economy was closely linked to the nature of the economic management changes that were or had to be adopted.

Response to the crisis was a mixture of introducing new forms of stimulation in some areas of the economy (which existed in the early years of the decade) and centralized control in the coming years, which were amended or cancelled by prior reforms.

The essential issue to find an answer, as a result of the crisis lay in the option that the authorities were going to do, from resorting to more centralization – as it actually happened – or implementing decisions within important changes towards decentralization and increasing use of forms of incentive to allocate resources between different economic activities. After searching, hesitation and successful frail returned to greater centralization, the consequences of which are known.

Development strategy “inward”, which was followed by meant and fast refund, forced an early foreign debt, which took priority over other goals of economic policy. Loans to finance imports of new technologies have been made. Prices have continued to have a minor effect on resource allocation and business influence in the formation of prices continued to be limited. The main tools for achieving external balance were widening the range of products manufactured in the country and the administrative steps to minimize imports. Increasing substitution of imported fixed assets with investment goods produced in the country continued and increased, having a negative effect on the rate of technological progress. Foreign trade was focused in these circumstances, to a greater extent than before, to the area with non-convertible currencies. Adopting a modern market economy mechanisms remained, in the late 80's, a goal.

The swift liquidation of the foreign debt in 1986 had become an obsession. Convertible currency debt to be repaid at any sacrifice. Trade balance surplus, considered one of Romania handy way those

years, achieved by drastic compression of imports, by administrative, affected consumption among the population for years, product quality, technical level of domestic production, and, of course, that of export production and the competitiveness of the Romanian economy.

In 1989, after she had paid about \$ 23 billion for the liquidation of loans which amounted in 1981 to nearly \$ 11 billion, Romania was a country isolated from the international financial gear, low compared to other European countries, consistent with the economic and financial existing order, little obvious attempts reformed after the beginning of the ninth decade, later abandoned. **But without external debts.**

Annex no. 1**External debt ***

(NER millions U.S. dollars: at the end of period)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Capital	2876	3684	5170	7342	9810	10546	9969	9077	7437	6956	6745
Convertible											
Currencies	2812	3582	5074	7173	9557	10160	9766	8880	7198	6634	6395
Medium and											
long Term	2422	3016	3838	5085	7005	7694	7676	7320	5826	5549	5371
Short term	114	238	903	1765	2124	643	1159	490	327	221	310
Arrears					1143						
Subtotal	2536	3254	4741	6850	9129	9480	8835	7810	6153	5770	5681
Credits from											
the Fund	276	328	333	323	426	680	931	1070	1045	864	714
Non convertible											
currencies	64	102	96	169	253	386	203	197	239	322	350

* Excluding interest related to the liquidation of the debt

Annex no. 2**PREVISIONS FOR PAYING THE SERVICE OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT****At December 31, 1981**

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	after 1986
Convertible currency debt service	5482	2184	1515	1650	1046	1803
capital	4338	1449	961	1227	801	1384
Interest	1144	735	554	423	2451	419

* Inclusive on short-term debt.

December 31, 1982

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988 and after
Debt service in convertible currency**	3434	1769	2192	1841	1502	2328
capital	2544	1039	1582	1391	1182	2028
Interest	890	730	610	450	320	300

** including short term debt and arrears. The data in the table include the effects of rescheduling from 1981 and 1982 to the future debt service, but does not include the effects of rescheduling agreements for 1983.

Annex no. 3

Measures agreed with the MONETAR INTERNATIONAL FUND between 1981-1984

A. COURSES

January 1st, 1981

- Was introduced during commercial 15 l / \$ (previously was 18 l / \$)
- The equalization fund has been abolished
- Number of courses (outside of sales) was limited to 2 for imports and 26 for exports
- Imports: 10 l / \$ for oil
- On exports: 14 l / \$ for iron ore and coking coal

January 1st, 1982

- IMPORTS: THE EXCHANGE RATE FOR IRON ORE AND COKING COAL WAS UNIFIED WITH THE COMMERCIAL (IE BROUGHT TO 18 Lei / \$
- THE COURSE FOR OIL IMPORTS WAS DEPRECIATED FROM 10 L TO 12 Lei / \$
- THE NUMBER OF DISTINCT RATES FOR EXPORT (OTHER THAN THE SINGLE COMMERCIAL 18 L) WAS REDUCED FROM 18 L TO 13 L, THE LOWEST BEING 12 Lei / \$, AND THE HIGHEST 22 L / \$

B. INTERESTS

January 1st, 1983

THE INTEREST RATE ON LOANS TO BANKS INCREASED AT 5-8% (FROM 2-5%)

THE INTEREST RATE ON BANKS UNITS AVAILABILITIES INCREASED AT 3% (FROM 1.5%)

THE INTEREST RATE ON HOUSEHOLD DEPOSITS TO THE CEC BANK INCREASED AT 3-6% (FROM 2-5%).

January 1st, 1984

THE INTEREST RATE ON LOANS FROM BANKS INCREASED AT 7-10% (FROM 5-8%)

THE INTEREST RATE ON THE AVAILABILITIES TOWARD BANKS INCREASED AT 5% (FROM 3%).

C. PRICES**July 1st, 1982**

NATURAL GAS: Domestic production price rose to 1.000 lei / one thousand cubic meters

Oil: Domestic production price has been set at 550 lei / tonne

January 1st, 1983

Oil: price has been increased at 1,100 lei / tone

July 1st, 1983

Natural gas: the price was increased to 1,350 lei / one thousand cubic meters

October 1st, 1983

Natural gas: the price was increased to 1,500 lei / one thousand cubic meters

January 1st, 1984

Oil: domestic price increase production to 1,750 lei / tone

July 1st, 1984

Oil: there will be a further increase to 2,000 lei / tonne

D. OTHER MEASURES**January 1st, 1984**

THE INTRODUCTION OF A TAX ON FUNDS FROM THE BUDGET FOR THE NEW INVESTMENTS TO THE INTEREST RATE FOR BANK LOANS

FEE IS SET AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR

AT **JANUARY 1st, 1984** THE FEE WAS SET AT 7%

SHORTEN THE PAYBACK OF FUNDS FROM THE MOTOR INDUSTRY, REFLECTED IN INCREASING ANNUAL AMORTIZATION RATES FOR THESE FUNDS BY 15%

EFFECTS OF THESE MEASURES ARE PUT ENTIRELY ON THE PRODUCTION COSTS AND THE FINAL PRICE

ROMANIA AND THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA AREA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR ¹

Mihail Dobre

I would like to bring to the attention of the participants two distinct dimensions of international cooperation in the Black Sea area, which can complement the views expressed at this conference.

The first dimension is related to the fact that a first initiative with a view to organizing an institutionalized cooperation between the Black Sea riparian states emerged soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. That initiative is presently known as the *Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation*.

It is important to note that before the end of the Cold War there was no form of institutional cooperation among the Black Sea riparian states. If the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits did not stipulate anything in this direction ¹, the inter-state cooperation was not possible even after the end of World War II. The specific post-war bipolar division line passed through the Black Sea, as long as Turkey joined NATO in 1952,

¹ For the text of the Montreux Convention, see Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bușe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, *Relații internaționale în acte și documente*, vol. I, 1917-1939, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1974, p. 238-241. Romania's interest for the Black Sea area was expressed by Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu at the Montreux Conference on 22 June 1936, when he said that „everything touches the Black Sea is of utmost importance for my country, given that our only access to the high seas is via the Black Sea and the Straits” (*Ibidem*, p. 242).

whilst the USSR and the other two riparian states, Bulgaria and Romania, became in 1955 founding members of the Warsaw Pact.

The ending of the Cold War created the appropriate conditions for the emergence of a format of cooperation among the Black Sea riparian states, and the first project in this respect was a Turkish-driven initiative. Being launched within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as early as the beginning of 1990, and taken on board rapidly enough by the Turkish state authorities², this project aimed at developing economic cooperation between the countries in the region and at ensuring the sustainable development of their economies so that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity.

It was in this purpose that a meeting was held in Ankara, on 19-20 December 1990, with the participation of deputy Foreign Ministers from the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Beyond the specific aspirations of the host country – at that time the only booming market economy in that particular region – to build a „common market of the Black Sea”³, it was pretty noticeable the general political will to establish lines of cooperation in the fields of energy, environment, transport and communications, as well as the very symbolic fact that within the Soviet delegation there was an Armenian representative who went to Ankara to promote cooperation with Turkey and thus to overcome the differences of the past⁴.

The negotiation of the political document in order to launch that form of cooperation was practically achieved during the first

² That idea belonged to a Turkish diplomat, namely Sukru Elekdag, who formulated it in January 1990 during a debate held in Istanbul. Shortly afterwards the Turkish government embraced the initiative, while it enjoyed the support of President Turgut Özal. See in this regard, Radu Tudorancea, *The importance of BSEC area and the Caspian basin for the European security and political economic development*, in „Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană”, vol. I, 2002, p. 266.

³ The President of Turkey Turgut Özal was the supporter of this idea, and the initiative was very much welcomed in Moscow. For details, see „Rompres. Puncte de vedere”, n. 5614, 20 December 1990.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

semester of 1991. The experts dealt with the details in Bucharest (March 1991) and Sofia (April 1991), and the deputy Foreign Ministers agreed the main lines of cooperation during their meeting in Moscow, in mid-July 1991. However, the high-level approval of the political document could not take place immediately, due to a dramatic shift in the geopolitical conditions of the Black Sea area: at the end of 1991 the Soviet state passed to the history books, so that a plurality of new regional actors emerged in the Black Sea cooperation scheme.

In that particular context, the Foreign Ministers of the riparian states met in Istanbul, on 3 February 1992, and initialed the political document, opening the way for the signature in the historic city of Istanbul, on 25 June 1992, of the *Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation*⁵ by the Heads of State and Government from 11 countries⁶. Laying the ground for that kind of cooperation, the participating states reaffirmed their political will to develop constructive and peaceful relations, based on the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, currently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe = OSCE), to facilitate the development of market economy and partnership relations and to strengthen the respect for human rights in the region⁷.

⁵ For the text of this document, see the website of the organization: <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul1992.pdf>.

⁶ The 11 Participation States – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russian Federation, Romania, Ukraine and Turkey – adopted as well the *Bosphorus Declaration* (see <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Bosphorus%201992.pdf>).

⁷ Para 13 of the 1992 *Summit Declaration* stipulated that the fields of cooperation considered by the participants were: „transport and communications, including their infrastructure; informatics; exchange of economic and commercial information, including statistics; standardization and certification of products; energy; mining and processing of mineral raw materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries; veterinary and sanitary protection; health care and pharmaceuticals; science and technology”.

It was just the beginning of a cooperation structure ⁸ that has been severely affected since its inception by the crisis situations in its neighborhood: on the one hand by the post-Yugoslav succession crisis; and on the other hand by the security problems emerged north of the Black Sea after the fall of the USSR, where the so-called „frozen conflicts” began to make their presence felt ⁹.

As for the attitude of the Romanian government with reference to this initiative, it was clearly expressed by the then Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase on 3 February 1992, at the Istanbul ministerial meeting. The Romanian dignitary made in that occasion a large number of proposals with the aim to ensure a more structured posture for the Black Sea cooperation. Among the Romanian proposals there were those advocating for: the establishment of a „Foreign Trade and Investment Bank of the Black Sea”; the development of a „Feasibility study for the creation of an EFTA type free trade area between participating states”; or „the setting up of an institutional framework for economic cooperation in the Black Sea area”, to be seen as „a kind of joint body to ensure consistency of the whole project” ¹⁰. On the other hand – and again before the official launching of this cooperation initiative in Istanbul –, it was the head of the Romanian diplomacy that promoted the idea that the Black Sea „could become in the near future an attractive area for Western investment, especially if one takes into account its connection with

⁸ This cooperation initiative became an international organization – *The Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation* – after the adoption on 5 June 1998, at the Yalta summit, of the „Charter of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation” and its entry into force on 1 May 1999.

⁹ Above all, *The Bosphorus Declaration* acknowledged, in a premonitory manner, „that the region is already faced by serious conflicts and that there is the danger of new tensions arising”.

¹⁰ The Foreign Minister’s speech was published in Adrian Năstase, *România și noua arhitectură mondială. Studii. Alocuțiuni. Interviuuri*, Regia Autonomă „Monitorul Oficial”, București, 1996, p. 160-161.

Rhine-Main-Danube Channel, which allows for faster access to resources and important markets outside Europe”¹¹.

At the time of its launching, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation was received with particular interest by the Romanian independent foreign policy analysis, but that interest was expressed in a contradictory manner, ranging from the optimistic approach that this form of cooperation „has revived the interest of the European organizations for Romania”¹², to the rather pessimistic one that perceives this initiative as „going far beyond its region and becoming for the countries of Eastern Europe a secondary framework for their own security”¹³. However, as seen from the Western world, this initiative was in no time perceived as a form of cooperation relevant for the former Communist states’ aspiration to come closer to the European Union and NATO¹⁴, but rather as a mechanism for those countries relations with the former Soviet area¹⁵.

The *second dimension* I want to address brings to light the fact that the importance Romania attached to its participation in the sub-regional organizations, and in this context to the Black Sea initiative, was based on a concept that the authorities in Bucharest publicly

¹¹ It was the viewpoint that the Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase expressed in the occasion of the WEU Assembly Symposium that was held in Berlin, on 31 March 1992, on the subject „A New Security Order in Europe”. See *Ibidem*, p. 320.

¹² Adrian Pop, *Europa Centrală, Balcanii și „noua” Europă răsăriteană între politica identității și cea a integrării*, in „Sfera politicii”, n. 6, May 1993, p. 21.

¹³ Mihail E. Ionescu, *După hegemonie. Patru scenarii de securitate pentru Europa de est în anii ‘90*, Scripta, București, 1993, p. 122-123.

¹⁴ A 1996 report to the North Atlantic Assembly (Longin Pastusiak, *Sub-Regional Co-Operation Among Central European Countries and their Struggle Towards Membership of Transatlantic Structures*, Draft Special Report, Sub-Committee On Transatlantic And European Relations, North Atlantic Assembly, 8 October 1996) did not even mention the very existence of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

¹⁵ For this approach, see Ian Bremmer and Alyson Bailes, *Sub-regionalism in the Newly Independent States*, in „International Affairs”, vol. 74, issue 1, 1998, p. 131-148.

defined in 1991. Thus, on 6 March 1991 the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document with the title „*Romania's Security Policy*”¹⁶, which emphasized that „the radical transformations taking place in Europe, particularly the changes in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, have brought to the forefront of the concerns shared by many European countries the search for new ways and means to ensure their security protection”. The document stated as well that this search had „a more acute character in Eastern Europe, largely in the context of the right decision that led to the abolition of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact”.

Against that background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategy document advocated for a security policy of Romania that should have been designed in a number of principal lines of action, and further developed on several levels, as follows:

- a „General European level”, which had in view to „further develop and strengthen the security component of the CSCE process”;

- a „Sub-regional level”, which had the goal to actively promote the cooperation programs with countries in the region to which Romania belonged, particularly the Balkan Forum, the setting up of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the definition and the implementation of some complex cooperation projects among the Danube countries, respectively;

- a „Bilateral level”, which, by means of concluding new friendship and cooperation treaties „with all neighboring states and other European countries and from other continents”, aimed, *inter alia*, „to prevent any situation in their mutual relations that was likely to affect their national security”;

- a „National level”, which was „to stimulate the development of a modern and efficient economy, to achieve the unity of action of all Romanians inside the country and abroad in promoting the

¹⁶ An internal document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that was published by former Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase (*op.cit.*, p. 262-264), and reprinted in Mihail Dobre, *România la sfârșitul Războiului Rece. Statut geopolitic și opțiuni de securitate*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2011, p. 346-349.

national interests, and to ensure a modern and efficient defense capability, respectively”;

– Finally, a „Global level”, which emphasized the role of the UN in promoting the international law and justice.

As regards the „Sub-regional level”, it is worth highlighting the explicit mentioning of the Black Sea cooperation along with the Balkan Project and the Danube Project, as well as the specification that „the connection with security of these cooperation programs consists in that they are designed to help maintaining and strengthening stability in those areas”. The document stated that the defining feature of all three sub-regional projects consisted in their open character, as long as „all of them were conceived as parts of the CSCE process and were designed to help speeding it up”. However, the document was also keen to mark their differences as compared with other sub-regional projects in the Central-European area, and in this respect it made specific references to the „Pentagonal Initiative” and the „Trilateral Group” (i.e. the structures that afterwards transformed themselves into the Central European Initiative and the Visegrad Group, respectively).

The basic ideas of this internal document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were translated into the actions Romania promoted at least during the first half of 1991. Above all, its conceptual lines were further developed by way of a document Romania distributed to the CSCE participating States on the occasion of the first Meeting, held in Berlin, on 19-20 June 1991, of the Council of Ministers of the pan-European forum¹⁷. Entitled „The European Architecture and the Strengthening of Security in Europe”, this document was oriented by the belief that the „building-up of an efficient all-European security and co-operation system will take a considerable time”. Based on that assumption, the document made clear the Romanian approach to the way forward: „throughout the transition period, until reaching

¹⁷ This Romanian concept paper was distributed, as an official document, on 17 June 1991, few days before the Berlin session of the CSCE Council of Ministers. The text of this document, in Mihail Dobre, *op.cit.*, p. 359-362.

this objective, the European architecture will consist of the institutions which exercise, each one in its own sphere of activity, essential functions in the fields of security, co-operation and human rights. The main such institutions are those of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the EEC, the NATO and the WEU". It is very much interesting to note that the way the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceived in June 1991 the re-making of the European security system was closely linked to the developments in the European debate on this issue¹⁸, and found itself reflected in what the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome defined as a system of „interlocking institutions”¹⁹.

As far as the Sub-regional co-operation was concerned, the Romanian document called for the „Promotion of sub-regional co-operation programmes, based on the CSCE principles, as means of accelerating the development of the States in the respective areas, of hastening their integration into the main European structures, and of consolidating sub-regional and all-European stability and security”, for then making clear that „The Romanian Government is particularly interested in the implementation of such sub-regional co-operation programmes in the Balkans, in the Black Sea zone and in the Danube’s area”.

¹⁸ For instance, during the preparation of the „Conference on the Future of European Security” (Prague, 25-26 April 1991), the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of 9 April 1991 expressed the view that „the best means of ensuring stability and development in tomorrow’s Europe would be by means of a harmonious interaction between the key institutions of the European security architecture, all fully respecting their own missions - the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, Western European Union and the Council of Europe”. Cf. Jiri Dienstbier, *The Future of European Security. Prague Conference Confirms Agreement on Basic Ideas*, in „NATO Review”, vol. 39, no. 3, June 1991, p. 22-27.

¹⁹ This formula was introduced in paragraph 3 of the political declaration adopted by the summit (NATO Press Service, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome*, 8th November 1991).

THE GEOPOLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY DURING THE POST COLD WAR ERA

Constantin HLIHOR

The issue of identity, irrespective if it is formulated through ethnicity, culture, race, gender or other personal and social attributes, has generated during the last decades a strong dispute in political and academic debates, cultural studies, and history, race and gender studies. The need for an identity can be associated to the fundamental needs for any individual or human group. But this is not a given but a result of a long socio-historical, cultural, spiritual process during which the change and conservation of identity definition / identification elements had extremely fluid borders. The accumulations of a people in terms of culture, the emergence or extinction of some beliefs, acceptance or rejection of some politico-ideological systems, shifts occurring in the collective mentality, prejudices, stereotypes and historical psycho-fixations lead to altering or preserving individual or group identities.

The profound changes taking place in the border geopolitics during the recent history of the European continent, resulting from world wars and the end of the Cold War, also inevitably marked the political identity of many peoples and ethnic entities. As a result of these historical events full of drama and extreme situations, entire peoples and ethnic minorities were in the particularly difficult situation of living within political arrangements dictated by the force of peace treaties or *de facto* situations in which a new political order and a new border architecture on the continent were defined.

Political identities emerged / vanished on the political map of the continent, which did not take into account the mental map of national identities. After the First World War, by the extinction of great empires some peoples built a political identity according to the mental map of national or ethnic identity, but there were also cases in which the political identity was a hybrid of national identities, such as the situation of Czechs and Slovaks, of Southern Slavs, who lived until the end of the Cold War in single countries, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. There were peoples that received recognition of national identity through the existence of a state only after the end of the Cold War, apparently in a paradoxical process of political fragmentation at a moment when Europe was promoting the unity of the continent! It is the case of countries emerging on the ruins of the former Soviet empire and of those resulting from the demise of multi-national states from Central and South East Europe. We do not wish to discuss upon the factors determining such processes and mutations. There are several experts¹ and historians that include foreign policy among these factors, as being a decisive constituent element in building or deconstructing national identities². Others include culture and spirituality, prejudices etc. We believe that more important are the consequences such changes have upon the life and security of the individual and the collective entities to which he / she is affiliated. The post Cold War era was a period of deep accumulation in what concerns progress and prosperity on the continent, but also one of inter-ethnic conflicts and crises that also profoundly marked the lives of citizens. It is not

¹ See, Karen A. Cerulo, *Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions*, online <http://identities.org.ru/readings/cerulo.pdf>. accessed on 10 October 2011, 20.00; M Allan, 'Why Brand Places?', Opinion, No. 64, The Medinge Group, online http://www.beyond-branding.com/Agenda_MSA_Article.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2011, 20.30

² Erica Simone Almeida Resende, *Identity, Discourse and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Writing of a Puritan National Identity in The War on Terror*, online, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/imi3ever1281010.pdf#page=59>, accessed on 10 October 2011, 20.30

difficult to notice the fact that, not only on the European continent, there are rare cases when political borders of a state correspond to the ethnic majority map³ and then, is it correct to explain conflicts, xenophobia, racism by associating them with the existence and influence national ideology has as a cohesion and state legitimacy factor?⁴ Is nationalism guilty of violence and wars that took place in the Balkans and some regions of the former USSR? In the context of intensifying integrationist political and economic processes at regional level and of increasing global interdependences, is nation obsolete as a form of political organization?

The answer to such questions divided the academic world and, equally, the political world, into two camps. Some speak of the need for historical continuity in the political organization of human communities on the European continent and criticizes the radical positions of those rather seeing discontinuity and demise of the nation-state as an essential condition of success for Europe's integration and pacification. In order to approach these problems, the present study aims, during his first part, to approach the meanings which the concept of "nation" entails within the academic world and, then, how it was perceived and applied in the construction of the nation-state within the western world. This double analysis has a theoretical value but it is also empirically

³ M. Hechter, D. Okamoto, *Political Consequences of Minority Group Formation*, online, <http://sociology.ucdavis.edu/people/dinao/pdf/political-conminority-group-information.pdf>

⁴ See, Constantin Hlihor, *Sfarsitul statului natiune si al identitatii nationale sau criza de solutii?* (*The End of the Nation-State and of National Identity or Solution Crisis?*) online http://istorie.ucdc.ro/7.%20Revista%20PDF%20files/AUCDCI%202%20Website/9_Hlihor.pdf; Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995; Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People/Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity" in *International Organization* no. 54, vol. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 845–877

testable. People react in what concerns the paths for state building in relation to the great political, cultural and spiritual ideas prevailing in the collective mentality of a society / civilization at a certain moment and to the evolutions from the international environment. In Europe, the nation-state could not appear but after the force ideas⁵ emerged and consolidated in the collective mentality of a society and afterwards turned into great political ideology concerning concepts such as: nation and nationalism, nation-state and national identity, homeland and patriotism. Nationalism as ideology and force-idea proved its maximum efficiency in clarifying an older conscience problem of human personality – identity. People cannot exist as social beings without an identity. The dissolution of imperial states, be it the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist empires in Europe, or the Ottoman one, started much before they disappeared from the world political map. The moment is hard to establish from a historical point of view, but we can estimate that it began when nationalism acquired political legitimacy and social exposure in these society, in spite of the obvious ambiguities of its scaffolding of principles and discourse practices. Early modern nationalism is indissolubly linked with the national state concept asserted during the second half of the 18th century, in the context of the American and French revolutions and which accredited the principle of national sovereignty, according to which nations have the natural and indefeasible right of organizing as sovereign states. On the other hand, at the level of collective solidarities and emotions which are characteristic to nationalism, it was interpreted as a secular religion based on “fusion of patriotism with national consciousness”⁶

The second part of this study proposes an analysis that will lead to a possible answer to the question why the state building in the

⁵ About the role of the force ideas in the social and political organization of a human community also see Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica. De la clasic la postmodern (Geopolitics. From Classic to Postmodern Approach)*, Editura KartaGraphic, Ploiesti, 2011, p. ?

⁶ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion*, New York, 1960, p. 2.

south east of the European continent, during the post Cold War period, was achieved through a process which, in many respects, had similar features with the process of national states building emerging after the First World War, although the political context was totally different.⁷ During the first years after the end of the Cold War on the European continent, the political and economic action of post-modern / post-nation state integration and building was almost unanimously shared by peoples from Western Europe. In the south east of the European continent the processes had a totally opposed character through political fragmentation and classical state construction. Geopolitical explanations resulting after the analysis of causes determining the emergence and unfolding of some inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts⁸ can be satisfying but not sufficient.

An explanation in this reading grid can be found at Silviu Brucan who noticed, at the middle of the last decade, that people from this part of Europe “are not inclined to transfer their loyalty, aspirations and political activities towards a new power centre, larger than the national state. European political leaders did not openly attack until now this sensitive side of European integration because transition from the national state to the European federation requires

⁷ Also see Constantin Hlihor, *Istoria secolul XX (History of the 20th Century)*, Editura comunicare.ro, Bucuresti, 2002, p. ?

⁸ See Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis (eds.), “South-Eastern Europe: History, Concept, Boundaries”, a special issue of *Balkanologie*, 3 (2), December 1999; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. See also Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society” in *Review of International Studies*, 17 (4), 1991; Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997; Alexandru Dutu, “National and Regional Identity in Southeast Europe” in Guney Goksu Ozdogan and Kemali Saybasili (eds.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New World Order*, Istanbul: EREN, 1995; Maria Todorova, “What Is or Is There a Balkan Culture, and Do or Should the Balkans Have a Regional Identity?,” in *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 4 (1), January 2004, pp. 175-86.

an extremely audacious vision”⁹. This is the way in which the Romanian political scientist explained the major contradiction between the political map of a historical present and the collective mentality map of a people, shaped / formed by the public discourse and the manner in which citizens of a state relate to realities built throughout time. The way in which the political map of Kosovo is perceived today by Serbs and Albanians is even more obvious to this end. The well-known Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic stated about Kosovo, in 1999, that “it is the source of the great epic poetry and the precious recipient of the Serbs’ spiritual identity. It is not only a piece of land; it represents the very Serbian identity. With the loss of Kosovo (...) the Serbian people was spiritually mutilated”¹⁰. This is how the politico-administrative map of a state does not only serves to help imagine a geographic reality but also serves for fuelling myths that are at the basis of the identity matrix shared by people living in that space. This is most obvious in the Balkans and the space of the former Soviet Union. The resulting border architecture after the fall of communism could not be based upon a map that would be in agreement of political communities from these territories due to the fact that the homeland imagined by these peoples had “parts” under the political sovereignty of the neighbors.

In his turn, Robert Cooper also drew attention that: “What came out into the light after 1989 is not the re-arrangement of a system, but simply a completely new system. Behind it lies a new concept about statehood or at least a system behaving in a radically new way towards the past”¹¹. The quoted author is conscious of the

⁹ Silviu Brucan, “Statul natiune va dura mult in Europa” (“The nation-state will last for a long time in Europe) in *Ziarul financiar*, 10 July 2006, online <http://www.zf.ro/opinii/statul-natiune-va-dura-mult-in-europa-3005426>

¹⁰ Benjamin Miller, *State natiuni si mari puteri. Surse ale razboiului si pacii la nivel regional (Nation States and Great Powers. Sources of War and Peace at Regional Level)*, TipoMoldova, Iasi, 2010, p. 2-3

¹¹ Robert Cooper, *Destramarea natiunilor. Ordine si haos in secolul XXI (Unraveling of Nations. Order and Chaos during the 21st Century)*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucuresti, 2007, p. 29-30

fact that both the construction and the reconstruction of a community cannot be achieved without ideological, political and cultural-spiritual conceptions, as he affirms that “conceptual errors can incur heavy consequences”¹². Can we notice *conceptual errors* especially when they define politics, ethics or morality and, in our case, identity and nation? It is hard to answer when we are dealing with notions and concepts that can acquire different representations and understandings for different communities. Referring to the identity concept, James D. Fearon from the Department of Political Science, Stanford University, noted that “despite this vastly increased and broad-ranging interest in identity, the concept itself remains something of an enigma”¹³.

Observation of a reality existing in the Balkans, but also in many of the former Soviet empire regions – political frontiers recognized by the international community for a state or another did not overlap with those from the social imagination of that state – can lead to the conclusion that this gap between political reality and popular desire gave birth to conflicts and crises that affected the regional or even global security but it is not enough. This conclusion is also reached by Dimitar Bechev, who states that: “Undoubtedly, nationalist antagonisms, a specimen *par excellence* of identity politics, are at the root of many evils in the Balkans today. In the 1990s, the wars of Yugoslav succession led to political fragmentation, economic decline, proliferation of weak states and rise of organized crime”¹⁴.

Although the assertion of analyst Dimitar Bechev fits to a certain unanimously accepted explanatory trend of the public international opinion concerning the cause of Balkan conflicts, we

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 32

¹³ James D. Fearon, *What is Identity (As we now use the word)?*, online <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/iden1v2.pdf>, accessed on 20 October 2012

¹⁴ Dimitar Bechev, “Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in South East Europe” in *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 4, no 1., Winter 2004, p. 82

cannot take into account other factors. The political analysis of these extremely complex and contradictory processes requires the use of concepts and notions that belong to those essentially questionable, therefore with different significance in different civilization areas and for different historical periods¹⁵.

Nation and nationalism the in the state building processes

The *nation* phrase / notion covers two realities: a concrete one, related to a *human community* bound by common feelings and aspirations, having a visible existence materialized into the nation-state¹⁶, but also a *language-built reality*, a concept explaining and theorizing the existence, evolution and becoming of a political actor called nation-state.¹⁷ It is what the people, as part of public opinion or scientific communities, imagine, perceive and express through words as being the political community in which they live. Nationalism is defined in various ways from an era to another because people have not only different political beliefs at certain points but also accumulate knowledge concerning the evolution of political human organizations. **Benedict Anderson** considers, for example that the notion of nation emerges as a theoretical concept at the end of the 18th century in America¹⁸ and defines it as being “*an imaginary political community imagined as being both intrinsically*

¹⁵ Constantin Hlihor, *op., cit. in loc. cit.*

¹⁶ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Natiuni si natonalism din 1780 pana in prezent: program, mit, realitate (Nations and Nationalism from 1780 until Today: Program, Myth, Reality)*, Editura Arc, Chisinau, 1997, p. 28

¹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *L'identité et la representation (Identity and Representation)* in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, Vol. 35, novembre 1980. pp. 63-72, online, http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/arss_0335-5322_1980_num_35_1_2100, accessed on 20 October 2012

¹⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Comunitati imagnate. Reflexii asupra originii si rasparandirii nationalismului (Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism)*, ed. Integral, Bucuresti, 2000, p. 67.

limited and sovereign”¹⁹. His arguments are rational and acceptable in that no citizen of a state could ever get to know all his compatriots, but will always have an image of their communion, a fact which will require imagination. For Max Weber the nation emerges as a social construction typical for modernity, an idea taken and re-circulated by Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm at the end of the 20th century. They used as a theoretical basis the definition that Max Weber gave to the *nation-state*: “a political enterprise with an institutional character” which has the “monopoly of legitimate physical force.”²⁰ Gellner defines the nation as a “political principle showing that the political unity and national unity must be congruent”²¹. Thus, nationalism, as a cultural and ideological discourse promoted by a power-hungry elite, does not necessarily represent, in Gellner’s view, “the awakening of nations’ self-consciousness”, but, moreover, “it invents nations where they do not exist”²².

Analyzing the few definitions enumerated within a vast conceptual aggregate which is hard to identify and submit to exhaustive interpretation we can notice that they include different elements. A possible explanation is that this kind of concept is part of the essentially questionable concepts beside others from the same class: ethnicity, national consciousness, national identity. They have different meanings and, as a consequence, are *differently* understood by communities and, even within the same community, by different generations. It cannot be surprising the fact that nationalism and the political process of nations’ evolution are differently perceived, reaching to irreconcilable contradictions. On one hand, there are historians and men of culture, political leaders that see them as long-lasting phenomena in a constant dynamic and, therefore, “*the nation must not be considered a final, immutable reality, which the historian can*

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 12

²⁰ Max Weber, *Economie et Société (Economy and Society)*, I, Paris, Plon, 1971, p. 97.

²¹ Ernest Gellner, *Natiuni si nationalism. Noi perspective asupra trecutului (Nations and Nationalism. New Perspectives on the Past)*, Bucuresti, 1997, p. 12

²² Ibidem, p. 88

*circumscribe, once and for all, to a biological determinism as in an «insectarium» from the props of entomology and as an organic and complex reality, but as a constantly changing one, of course.”*²³ There are several who already identified the clear signs of the nation-state and national consciousness decline on the European continent. Damian Tambini considers that “*national citizenship emerged, and national citizenship will pass. Many already see signs of its immanent decline. In recent years, the link between citizenship and the nation, and that tense equilibrium in which national citizenship served various social actors and interests, have become increasingly problematized, particularly in Europe. This has occurred as a result of the following economic, cultural, demographic and institutional-political processes*”²⁴. It is very hard to certainly foresee the evolution of such a complex process which has proved its resilience in Europe and which has not yet lost all its seduction force as long as it is a state cohesion and legitimacy factor on the African continent. Even if, taking into account the discourse of globalization adepts, the conclusions of some analysts who do not predict the de-structuring and death of the nation-state do not fit to the present fashion; it does not mean they are wrong. There are authors who consider that, by modernization and transformation, this type of political construction has a clear future in spite of fundamental changes taking place within post-modern society. Richard Lee Hough, for example, considers that “*the nation-state is the core unit of order in an interconnected world. There is nothing to replace it. Its disintegration invites lawlessness.*”²⁵ Paul Gottfried considers that the violent denial of the nation-state is a deep political error of our days. Moreover, he considers that threats endangering the

²³ Alexandru Zub, *Identitate nationala si globalizare (National Identity and Globalization)*, online, <http://convorbiri-literare.dntis.ro/ZUBfeb4.html>, accessed on 12 May 2010, 16.30

²⁴ Damian Tambini, *Post-national citizenship*, online, <http://hevron.haifa.ac.il/~soc/lecturers/smooaha/files/1776.pdf>

²⁵ Apud Paul Gottfried, Review of Richard Lee Hough, *The Nation-States: Concert or Chaos in The Independent Review*, Volume 9, Number 3, Winter 2005, online <http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=514>.

citizens' freedom and democracy at the beginning of the 21st century do not come from nationalism. The fight against this ideology is a false problem generated by adepts of globalism. In a discourse at the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, in June 2010, he identified as one of the threats for human communities "*the universal homogenizing state which levels until annihilation nations, states, sexes and communities.*" In his opinion, this type of state, which is obstinately promoted by all circles, from politics to academia, is "*now the danger taking place of Hitler, Stalin, Ceausescu and other recent tyrants. If old tyrants organized rallies against national enemies or mobilized masses against so-called «hostile classes», the new enemy embraces all humanity to re-educate it. I don't know what is more dangerous, the tyrant that steals our life or the one that steals our identity and tradition. I would prefer, in any case, not to face either of them.*"²⁶ In such a state, "*Europeans should see themselves not as members of an ethnic or historic nation, but as citizens of a generic democracy. This democracy resists or falls together with what were declared to be universally applicable human rights, although within this system immigrant groups are sometimes considered «more equal» than the indigenous population. From this point of view, association with a country is relevant only for reasons related to linguistic convenience.*"²⁷

International relations professor Arie M. Kakowitz, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, also notices that after the end of the Cold War it has become fashionable, or even a ritual, to attack the state and the Westphalian international system. The question Arie M. Kakowitz asks is if the national state "*has become obsolete and has ended its historical mission?*"²⁸ From such a question he goes on to perform an extremely farsighted analysis on the impact some factors have on the national state, which act beyond national borders and without the possibility of being stopped by national govern-

²⁶ Ibidem

²⁷ Ibidem

²⁸ Arie M. Kakowicz, *Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping?* online, http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3513_2.pdf, accessed on 12 May 2010, 19,00

ments' decisions. He identifies four such factors: the global ecological crisis, the development of an international civil society at world level, the increasing economic and financial interdependences and the intensification of transnational relations. He concludes that "*all pose a current challenge to the state system and obviously erode state sovereignty, changing the nature of the state and its functionality. But do erosion and challenge mean necessarily obsolescence. Do the forces of globalization and regionalization lead to the neutralization of nationalism and the irrelevance of the nation-state?*"²⁹. The complexity of phenomena and processes which affect the multitude of opinions and theories which are elaborated to support a position or another determines Arie M. Kakowitz to conclude that "*The answer is not clear. It is evident that regimes and governments (as representing states) are under stress, civil societies are contesting state roles, and citizens everywhere are turning away from their active support for their states in the direction of alternative foci of loyalties and identities. Yet, alternative forms of governance domestically, internationally, and transnationally coexist with the state system; they have not replaced it.*"³⁰

A brilliant international relations analyst and well-known political scientist, Stanley Hoffmann, affirms referring to the role of the nation-state: "*As a result, nation-states – often inchoate, economically absurd, administratively ramshackle, and impotent yet dangerous in international politics – remain the basic units in spite of all remonstrations and exhortations. They go on 'faute de mieux' despite their alleged obsolescence.*"³¹ Greek diplomat Georgios D. Poukamisas, Ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to Romania thinks that "*Globalization did not disband the nation-state and this is not even going to happen. On the contrary, we have entered a*

²⁹ Ibidem

³⁰ Ibidem

³¹ Stanley Hoffmann, *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe* in Brent F. Nelsen et Alexander C. G. Stubb (dir.), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 159.

*period of a world with several poles, within which the USA is at the top of the pyramid, but without having a dominant role and around it gravitate the European Union, China, Russia etc. This did not result into an end of history, although conflicts still persist, especially within civilizations.”*³²

On the other hand one must notice the fact that globalization processes, from the economic to the cultural and nation integration phenomena on the European continent deeply marked the political thought and influenced the theory of state building, including the concept of nation. From this point of view, I don not think it is unnatural the fact that some historians and political scientists consider that the nation-state “consumed” its resources and something else must be found to replace it. Prestigious historians reached the conclusion that “*the national idea, it is well-known, contributed to the formation of modern states during the 19th century, but became harmful during the 20th century, the phase of this idea’s excesses.*”³³ They question the nation-state’s capacity to adapt to the evolutions from the international or cultural international space. Referring to this aspect, neo-Marxist philosopher Juergen Habermas observes that “*Today, the nation-state witnesses a double challenge, domestically from the explosive force of multiculturalism and externally from the pressure of globalization issues.*”³⁴

In Europe we are witnessing a post-modern state building with functioning rules and standards politically negotiated among members. From this point of view, it is impossible for any EU member nation to attempt to rule according to its own national or religious standards, without being blamed that it breaches some of the norms

³² Interview published by *Ziarul Financiar*, online <http://www.zf.ro/ziarul-de-duminica/interviu-georgios-d-poukamisasambasadorul-republicii-elene-mondializarea-nu-a-desfiintat-statul-natiune-si-nici-nu-se-va-intampla-acest-lucru-4993176>.

³³ Alexandru Zub, *cit. work*.

³⁴ Apud, Thibaud Zuppinge, *Habermas et l’avenir de l’Etat-nation (Habermas and the Future of the Nation-State)*, online <http://www.implications-philosophiques.org/philosophie-politique/habermas-et-lavenir-de-letat-nation>

and principles assumed through the Lisbon Treaty. From a political point of view, there are no more borders within Europe. But differences of economic development, beliefs, mentalities, language lead to maintaining some borders hard to overcome by clichés and norms administratively imposed to a people or another within the Schengen Space. Taking into account this huge diversity, but also the fact that theories and points of view referring to the nation-state political organization are diversified as well, the analysis of political processes leading to the construction or de-construction of some political communities can be achieved only if the appropriate concept and notional categories are chosen. The need that the researcher or the analyst specify what kind of concept he /she thinks is useful for analyzing a society during a certain moment of its evolution is greater as, besides the fact that we use essentially questionable concepts, there is also the trap of *anachronism*, determined by the tendency of extrapolating current meanings of the terms to long gone historical periods. One should not forget the fact that sometimes a theoretical confusion occurs between the concept of *nation*, ethnicity and people³⁵. Historian Ioan Aurel Pop drew the attention upon this fact, especially for multi-ethnic and multi-cultural political communities, such as the cases of provinces that used to belong to the Habsburg or Ottoman empires³⁶.

³⁵ Dinu Balan, *Etnie, etnicitate, natiune si nationalism. Cateva precizari terminologice* ("Ethnic group, ethnicity, nation and nationalism. Some terminological specifications") in *Codrul Cosminului*, 12, 2006, p. 93-115

³⁶ Among his numerous works, see especially the study Ioan Aurel Pop, *Sensibilități etnice și confesionale în Transilvania în timpul lui Nicolaus Olahus (Ethnic and confessional sensitivities in Transylvania during Nicolaus Olahus)*, Yearbook of the Cluj History Institute, XXXIII, 1994 and *idem, Natiunea romana medievala. Solidarități etnice romanesti in secolele XIII-XVI (Medieval Romanian Nation. Romanian Ethnic Solidarities during the 13th – 16th centuries)*, Editura Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1998. For interesting comparisons, also see *idem*, "Observatii privitoare la structura etnica si confesionala a Ungariei si Transilvaniei medievale (secolele IX-XIV)" ("Observations concerning the ethnic and confessional structure of medieval Hungary and Transylvania – 9th -14th centuries) in Dan Berindei (coord.), *Istoria României. Pagini transilvane (History of Romania. Transylvanian Pages – 9th – 14th Centuries)*, Cluj-Napoca, 1994. To

Geopolitical changes after the Cold War and their impact upon theories concerning evolution and role of the nation-state in the new millennium

The current tendency, especially in Western Europe, is that solidarity among members of a national political community be based especially on the civic factor. This is possible due to the high level of political culture these societies have. It is harder to get such solidarity within the so-called “periphery” of the European continent, where solidarities were created in the context of exalting the ethnic factor. Peoples from East and South East Europe built their identity matrix upon fear of the *Other*, an individual that was perceived as alien to the community, but also upon some founding myths. A paradigmatic history is made up of myths. They speak about a perfect model of society and about perfect behaviors that must be preserved, applied or rehabilitated in order to insure continuing happiness and past glory, which in fact never existed. Since each of these competing models is perceived to be perfect, they are exclusive. Those who undoubtedly believe in their own model are intolerant. Each of these mythological societies from the Balkans was encouraged to promote its own model against the others. History implies orientation of societies towards the future. Mythology is permanently oriented towards an imaginary past, since its only preoccupation and single project is to continue such a past in the future by using the means of the present. The clash between the historical approach and the mythological approach in the Balkans raises big problems as it puts into contact or even into conflict two different political cultures. At the same time, the situation is complicated by the fact that in the Balkans pre-industrial (tribal) societies coexist with industrial (national) and post-industrial (cosmopolitan) societies. The clashes between these political cultures

broaden the discussion area and present the evolution from medieval ethnic solidarities to modern nations in Europe, also see idem, *Geneza medievală a națiunilor moderne (secolele XIII-XVI) (The Medieval Genesis of Modern Nations, 13th – 16th Centuries)*, Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane, Bucuresti, 1998.

and the conflicting character of relations among them lead to the birth of terrorism, corruption, organized crime, accompanied by the lack of economic development and an incomplete democracy.

Those wishing to give up the national matrix forget too often that the imaginary has not only a negative side, but we also owe to it symbolic productions of culture, faiths and even our moral forms. The political Europe must also be based upon a cultural formula; it cannot be administratively imposed. Paul Gottfried is extremely skeptical in what concerns the success of “*those advancing the new order*”, that by using the “*magic stick of universal rights*”, “*they will be able to build a new efficient political matrix upon the support of globalism ideology.*”³⁷ He believes that the term of universal rights “*came to illustrate the danger of armed doctrine*”, a term which Edmund Burke invented in order to describe the “*universalism claims and expansionist violence of the French Revolution. What a certain ruling group decides that it is convenient for itself must be applied to all and, if this cannot be achieved by peaceful means, then pressures will be exercised in order that everybody complies with a certain principle, to a certain value or to a certain right.*”³⁸

Accepting the myth according to which the civic nation represents the optimal framework for the development and functioning of a political community in the world after the Cold War leads, in some cases, to the occurrence of paradoxical situations. A phantom-state, such as the so-called Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic, self defines itself as being such a political construction. Referring to this aspect, John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Andrei Tchepalyga assert that: “*According to official declarations, the TMR is defined as a civic nation, bound to protect human rights and not national rights.*”³⁹ According to their affirmations, ethnical groups making

³⁷ Paul Gottfried, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

³⁸ *Ibidem*

³⁹ John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, Andrei Tchepalyga, *National Construction, Territorial Separatism and Post-Soviet Geopolitics: The Example of the Transdniester Moldovan Republic*, online, www.colorado.edu/ibs/pec/johno/pubs.html.

up the so-called state have equal rights from all points of view and there is no majority oppressing a minority. Relations between majority and minority in democratic societies seem to be caught for the moment in a real vicious circle: what a minority perceives as being a minimum of its nationalist claims is suspected by the nation-state majority as being a first step towards secession and what the majority considers a maximum of the constitutionally acceptable offer is perceived by minorities as a first step towards assimilation. Referring to this aspect, Professor Benjamin Miller considers that *“if an important group from a democratic country does not accept the state’s legitimacy and territorial integrity, this represents a serious problem for the democratization process and for democratic consolidation.”*⁴⁰ The issue is to find an optimum balance between the aspirations of a minority and the existence of a nation-state as international law. Maximizing the demands of a minority on the basis of democratic mechanisms until discussing its constitutional bases can have nasty consequences. These conclusions are also reached by Benjamin Miller, who considers that, in some situations, democratization can bring into power political forces representing radical minorities, which are opposing majority-minority reconciliation or even *“can cause disintegration of regional states, especially the weak ones, or intensification of ethnic and regional conflicts or both”*⁴¹. Victor Neumann is right when he states that *“The relation between an ethnic group and the concepts of nation and nation-state is not only fanciful but also damaging, to the extent to which linguistic or religious differences within the same living space are sectioning or creating artificial separatisms at the society level.”*⁴² Minority groups from Romania and other states in the region which were tempted to imitate or acquire identity theories

⁴⁰ Benjamin Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*

⁴² Victor Neuman, “Conceptul de națiune la romani. O explicație teoretică” (“The Romanian concept of nation. A theoretical explanation”) in *Timpul*, nr. 6-7, July-August, 2005

similar to the majorities created problems in the democratic functioning of society and, in some situations, were involved in extremely violent interethnic conflicts, as was the case in the Balkans or in some areas of the former Soviet empire. Thus, Kosovo Albanians, on the basis of ethnic identity, assimilated to that of nation, initially challenged the administrative organization of the ethnic Serbian majority nation-state. Afterwards, as the international political situation became favorable to them, they demanded the recognition of an existing Kosovo nation-state. Is this political construction a civic type of nation, as Transnistria self-proclaims? If not, why the international community, who does not accept the ethnic nation, recognized Kosovo as an independent state? The answer can be found in the manner in which political and intellectual elites are relating to this nation-state political construction, in the meaning they attribute to the mass belonging feeling towards this type of state, but especially in the way in which national consciousness is used / manipulated. People are not born Romanian, Hungarians, English or German, they become, during the process of education and formation, what the society / group to which they belong thinks they are. The nation-state political community is not a given, it is in a permanent construction / de-construction, under the impact of educational and formative factors, of the pan-ideas predominating at a certain point in the collective mentality, but most of all of the manner in which democratically elected or self-imposed political elites are building and manipulating national interests.

Nationalism is a product of social modernization, of mass culture, but also of political propaganda. Knowing the type of national or ethnic propaganda that elites are proposing to masses is extremely important. It can be populist and manipulating in favor of a leader or small or patriotic group. The confusion between patriotism and populism is the most serious thing happening today within contemporary societies. This comes out strongly especially during political, cultural-spiritual and, also, economic-financial crises and the Balkan wars abundantly emphasized this aspect. The Balkans has become, even in everyday language, a synonym for violence acts

and politically motivated bloodsheds, for interethnic hatred, “ethnic cleansing” and barbarism. The term “balkanization” became, both in Europe and in other parts of the world, the general political metaphor for conflicts, disorders and chaos. The concept of balkanization, emerging during the 20s, with the separation from the former empires – Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian – of many new smaller states, plays an important role in the arsenal of racist culturalism. “Balkanization” means disintegration of multi-national states in several small, often rival, national states. This concept has made a career, reuniting anti-Balkan resentments and racism. Xavier Bougarel, analyzing the role played by nationalist mythology in conflicts from the former Yugoslavia, arrives at the conclusion that this confusion between patriotism and populism was artificially cultivated by all sides in conflict, in order to mobilize the population for supporting pursued political objectives. This confusion can emerge within any kind of society, including the western one, but in the Balkans it is manifesting more intensely “*history plays a much more prominent role in the public and political life of the Balkan peoples than among the peoples of Western Europe*”⁴³. In this way a mental fracture is created in the case of conflicting communities, in that people perceive differently the same phenomenon. *Our nationalism* is good and positive and *the enemy’s nationalism* is xenophobic, wild and evil.⁴⁴ Xavier Bougarel seems to understand the perceptions that Sarajevo architect Ivo Straus has in his book “*Sarajevo, the Architect and the Barbarians*”, when he describes the Serbian fighters besieging and shelling the town as “*armed, toothless and ill-washed primitives*” and considers that they are the representatives of a specific social category: the “*hardly cultured newcomers*”, but he does not understand why such expres-

⁴³ Srečko Džaja, *Bosnian Historical Reality and Its Reflection in Myth*, in *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, Pal Kolsto, ed., London, Hurst & Co., 2005, p. 106.

⁴⁴ Xavier Bougarel, “Yugoslav Wars: The “Revenge of the Countryside” between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth” in *East European Quarterly*, vol. XXXIII, n° 2, June 1999, p. 157

sions were adopted by some western commentators, who turned them into analytical categories⁴⁵.

Manipulating the image of the Other by using the component of national identity has strategic reasons in case of conflict between two states or nations. Experts consider that it is also easy to create the image of an enemy, as well as that of an ally⁴⁶, if psycho-social mechanisms are used. Human mind, when reflecting the physical / social-political, economic reality etc., has the tendency of simplifying processed images. These simplifications are inevitable, as "*human imagination can only process a certain kind of complexity. When the complexity becomes unbearable, it withdraws into symbolic images.*"⁴⁷ Symbolic images play an important role in international relations. "*Symbolic image of one's own nation is a shade with ideas of security or insecurity, according to the image of someone about other nations*"⁴⁸. A nation that feels threatened by others, by its own attempt to increase its security generates insecurity for other nations, who perceive its behavior as being aggressive. This "action-counteraction" can be noticed also in the case of conflicts in former Yugoslavia and we consider it is wrong to ascribe it to nationalism as an ideology. Manipulation of nationalist ideology in some situations, as the ones of crisis and conflict, is the factor leading to human behaviors and actions hard to conceive in peaceful and stable situations⁴⁹. It is hard to think that, during the Tito regime, only terror and cultivating feelings of fear were the ones keeping under control interethnic conflicts.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 160

⁴⁶ Michele G. Alexander, Marilyn B. Brewer, Richard K. Herrmann, "Images and Affect: A Functional Analysis of Out-Group Stereotypes" in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 77. No.1, 1999 p. 79

⁴⁷ Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image*, University of Michigan Press, 1973 p. 111

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p. 112

⁴⁹ Also see Constantin Hlihor, *The Post Cold War Era: Romania and the Stability in the Balkans*, online, http://www.bmlv.gov.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/hlih01.pdf.

Manipulation of identity by conflicting sides from the Balkan space along the years was also included, during quiet times, in the adopted linguistic policies and the official historical discourse. Disintegration of Yugoslav society did not lead to the emergence of linguistically and homogenously entities. In many situations, a Serb living in Croatia and Slovenia and did not speak official Serbian was perceived by Serbia's inhabitants as a traitor to the nation. This was also true about a Croatian or Slovene living in Belgrade. In the West, it is very well-known the Serbian nationalist discourse related to the historical mythology of Kosovo and the role it played within Belgrade's official propaganda, but it must not be forgotten that Croatians also have a historical myth related to the town of Knin⁵⁰. During the eleventh century reign of King Zvonimir, Knin was the capital of the medieval Croatian Kingdom (which lasted from the 10th to the 12th century). During the post-communist nationalist revival in Croatia, that medieval kingdom re-emerged as a focus point for Croatian nationalism as Franjo Tudjman proclaimed it his "historical duty" to once again form a strong, independent, Croatian state. In some ways, the role Knin came to play in Croatian nationalist propaganda could be compared to the importance of Kosovo for Serbia. Both were seen as central in terms of linkage to a "historical fatherland", but both areas had an ethnically mixed population. Just as Kosovo was home to a vast majority of ethnic Albanians (estimated at around 85% of the total Kosovan population in 1991), about 80% of Knin's inhabitants were ethnic Serbs. Here too, a process of ethnic cleansing took place, but not with the same reverberations into western public opinion. This cleansing process was the aftermath of a kind of nationalism perceived by many western circles as being totally different from the one practiced by Serbs⁵¹.

⁵⁰ Thomas Moens, *Using the history as an weapon in Yugoslavia*, <http://thevieweast.wordpress.com/2012/04/02/using-history-as-a-weapon-in-yugoslavai/>, downloaded in July 2012

⁵¹ Robert Hayden, *Serbian and Croatian Nationalism and the Wars of in Yugoslavia*, online <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csqa/article/serbian-and-croatian-nationalism-and-wars-in-yugoslavia>, downloaded in July 2012

The economic and financial crisis created new conditions for occurrence of the confusion between nationalism, patriotism, populism and the occurrence of national feelings. This kind of manipulation is, in the opinion of some experts, different from its previous embodiments: it is not related to solidarity or belonging to a specific ethnic, religious or cultural community, but with the logos and appearances: not with ethics but with *aesthetics*. As Erich Fromm said, you don't live it, you just have it⁵². Its popularity is not related to commemorations inducing an overwhelming sense of guilt – still present on public television – but with an *infiltration* of the national in the global consumerist culture. In some Balkan countries, writing e-mails in Cyrillic, eating *Czar* pickles or listening to folk-pop music concerns each one's lifestyle. Additionally, as globalization mixes populations a growing need is created to get different from the rest by a simple unequivocal logo.⁵³ The franchise system also contributed to reinventing the national. For example, *McDonald's* will release the hamburger "*Hajduk*" in order to lower the distance between global and local and the television version of the reality-show "*Survivor*" divides participants in two proto-Bulgarian tribes, announcing they will educate the audience in the spirit of most significant national features (which has always been survival, as we all know). And only think about the American transnational NGO *Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance*, which designs the brand *Authentic Bulgaria*, which is to be associated with local tourist attractions⁵⁴. This fact does not mean that the populist discourse is missing at this point from some European countries or Romania. The Spanish Minister of Industry urged not so long ago his fellow countrymen to help their country by consuming products made there. President Traian Basescu urges Romanians to buy *Dacia* cars and

⁵² Apud, Ivailo Dichev, *Nationalismul ca stil de viata (Nationalism as Lifestyle)*, online <http://www.criticatac.ro/4422/nationalismul-ca-stil-de-viata/>, downloaded in July 2012

⁵³ Ibidem

⁵⁴ Ibidem

the former Minister of Tourism, Elena Udrea, warns that it is high time to spend our holidays on the Romanian seaside or in the “Carpathian Garden”. As long as Romanian capital does not have a majority in fields considered to be strategic for Romania, these exhortations cannot have but a national-populist propaganda role. Many Romanian businesses shake for fear they will not receive money from their “parent groups”. From this perspective, for such countries, the temptation of protectionism is nevertheless dangerous but with minimum chances to be supported by impoverished consumers. In these conditions, few people vibrate for the slogan of buying merchandise with a local “perfume”; especially if the local perfume costs more and has a doubtful quality. A great connoisseur of realities in the area, Professor Paul Gottfried addressed to the academic staff of “Al. I. Cuza” University of Iasi, on the occasion of celebrating 150 years of higher education, with the following words: *“Eventually, your country can only have two types of futures: becoming a second hand America, praising «openness», «diversity» and «human rights» or being the descendants of your ancestors. Being Romanian must not stop you from politely listening to American sermons about global democracy, but it should stop you from taking it too seriously. And, if you are entitled to re-build the material infrastructure after the devastating decades of communist dictatorship, these economic preoccupations should not be exclusive. They should not make you forget who you are. Public morality and national culture define you as historical nation and you have a collective duty to control these forces from inside of your borders.”*⁵⁵ It is difficult, in a cosmopolitan region, as that of the Balkans, dominated by ideological confusions and a false perception of values, to support a solution or another concerning the evolution of the nation-state in the area.

⁵⁵ Paul Gottfried, *Ce se intampla cu natiunile istorice ale Europei (What Happens with Europe's Historical Nations)*, online, <http://forum.realitate.net/showthread.php?t=46314>

HISTORICAL DISPUTE OVER THE AEGEAN SEA: TURKEY AND GREECE

Ayşe Beyza BÜYÜKÇINAR

In the course of the last 40 years, Greece and Turkey have found themselves on the brink of war because of their basic opposition concerning the exercise of sovereignty on the waters of the Aegean Sea. Historical factors weigh heavily Turkey lost most of its European territories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see map), while Greece maintained cultural hegemony over the area as well as the shoreline of Anatolia since ancient times: Constantinople fell into the hands of the Ottomans five centuries earlier (1453) but the Greek populations remained until recently on the eastern bank of the Aegean Sea. The Treaty of Lausanne dated 24 July 1923 led to the flight of 1.3 million Greeks from the regions of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, and of 400,000 Muslims who left Western Thrace to settle in Turkey. There are two opposing historical realities coupled with resentment¹.

Brief History of the Turkey's Geopolitical Position

Today, Turkey has the world's most important oil reserves in the Caspian Basin and the Middle East at the crossroads of major sea transport which takes place in the Mediterranean Basin.

¹ See Didier Ortolland, *The Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea : a possible solution?* in La Revue Geopolitique on line, <http://www.diploweb.com/The-Greco-Turkish-dispute-over-the.html>

At the same time, the Caucasus and Central Asian oil and natural gas, most of the routes designated for delivery is situated on the west. Turkey UN and NATO peacekeeping initiatives, participation in regional security and stability, and some play a leading role for in the European security and weight. Turkey has become a central zone of the Eurasian done in radical and rapid changes in the world at the end of the 20 century. Turkey has a powerful army in the area. Turkey, due to geographical position, many different are the commercial, economic, military and politic member of international organizations. At the same time, it is the only state that is a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), D-20, and the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), the only state that is a member.

For centuries, relations between Greece and Turkey have been tumultuous. Periods of peace have existed, yet longer periods of conflict have dominated their affairs. With exception a period of relative harmony from 1920 until 1950, the previous century, and especially since 1974, there has been a lot of tension, mistrust, anger, hatred, threats of war, and even conflicts.² The Greek–Turkish boundary region is located in the southeastern extremity of the Balkan Peninsula. One of the important geopolitical issues experienced by Turkey and Greece, “Aegean Sea” is problem. The fact that Greece and Turkey rival claims to an Aegean islet indicates the level of tension simmering just below the surface.³

Aegean island problems began in 1830 april 24 with Greece gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Aegean

² ARAPOGLOU, Stergios “*Dispute in the Aegean Sea The Imia/Kardak Crisis*”, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, p.1, Alabama, April 2002.

³ BAHCHELİ, Tozun; COULOUMBİS Theodore A., CARLEY, Patricia; “*Greek Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability*”, United States Institute of Peace, p.V., August 1997.

Islands Issue has been one of the most commonly discussed regional problems since the first quarter of the 20th century. Although the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) introduced a short-term solution to the Aegean Islands Issue, Italy and Germany reopened the issue for their own national interests. Because of the strategic significance of the Aegean islands, at the beginning of World War II Italy and Germany turned the issue into an international problem.⁴ The dispute in the area has had a profound impact on the relations between these two countries since the 1970s and throughout the 1980s.⁵

The problem of Aegean constitutes the main axis of Turkish-Greek relations. This

question brings about many other problems, too, which are related to each other.⁶ Many struggles throughout history has been the subject of the Aegean Sea. The issues cover the disputes on territorial waters, national airspace, continental shelf, flight information regions, demilitarized status of Greek islands.

Territorial Waters

Maritime border between Greece and Turkey in a deal not yet determined. But, the agreement to determine the boundaries of marine areas is a basic necessity of the rule of international law. However, in areas adjacent to the coast within the framework of the territorial waters of any sea border between Greece and Turkey are not available. Removing the 12 nautical mile **territorial waters** in the Aegean Sea against Turkey disproportionately change the balance of interests. At the moment, due to its many islands, consti-

⁴ ALTUNCUOĞLU, Neslihan; “*The Aegean Islands Issue under the Light of International Treaties*”, History Studies International Journal of History, p.1., Kayseri: November 2012.

⁵ YAVAŞ, Gökçen; “*The Europeanization of the Aegean Dispute Between Turkey and Greece: A Constructivist/Discursive Approach*”, Paper to presedent at the ISA panel, p.1, Chicago, 1 Mart 2007 .

⁶ ÖNDER, Adnan; “*Turkish-Greece Relationship, Problem of Continental Shelf*”, Master Thesis, University of Trakya, p. V., February 2008.

tutes 40% of Greece's territorial waters of the Aegean Sea. In case of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, this rate will increase to 70%.

Continental Shelf

Another key issue related to jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey is to determine limit of the **continental shelf**. The most relevant documents pertaining to the case are the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁷ However, the positive outcome has not yet been achieved.

This dispute began in 1973 when for the first time Greece attempted to find in the Aegean seabed oil, minerals and gas. From this period and till 1976 Turkey was constantly sending research ships to explore the seabed in areas maintained by Greece. As a result of this the two countries came at that time close to war. In 1987 the two neighbouring states came close to war once again.

The dispute over the continental shelf prevails due to the fact that both countries understand the seabed from a different perspective. Greece states that the islands do have a continental shelf. Greece emphasizes the importance of international law to solve this dispute. Turkey on the other hand understands this clash of interests as being a political one, and so believes that bilateral talks will be the best solution. Turkey does not recognize that the islands obtain a continental shelf, believing that the seabed and the islands are a prolongation of the Anatolian peninsula. This of course makes it impossible for the two countries to delimitate the continental shelf.

The problem has been Turkey's oil exploration initiative. Greece has been bothered by it and subject, the Court of Justice in The Hague took the council has jurisdiction in the matter. Then the judiciary fleeing for Turkey say the topic is incorrect. This issue and

⁷ PAULENOFF, Alex; "*The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Dispute: Greek and Turkey Interpretations*", *Perspective and Global Issues*, p.1., Spring 2009.

a lot of other ongoing dispute is only one problem with Greece and Turkey.

National Airspace and Flight Information Regions

One of the problems of the Aegean, is that of Greece is in violation of international law, claiming that the national airspace 10 nautical miles wide and the Flight Information Region (FIR) is that the responsibility for the abuse. According to international law, at the same time the width of the territorial waters of a country that determines the width of the country's national airspace. 3 nautical miles of territorial waters, the width of Greece in 1931, although at that time, then declared the national airspace 10 nautical miles. Then implemented by Greece in 1936, six nautical miles today increased its territorial waters. Therefore, the claim that Greece's national airspace 10 nautical miles, as there isn't a justifiable under international law. Therefore, this condition is not recognized by Turkey.

Demilitarized Status of Greek Islands

The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the Treaty of Paris in 1947, and within the framework of other international instruments on the subject demilitarized status of the East Aegean Islands, is one of the major concerns of the other. Since the 1960s, the islands of Greece acts contrary to the status of demilitarized to keep arming the East Aegean Islands. Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, which is dominated, in violation of the treaties regulating the status of these islands militarization /arming, in the context of bilateral relations strained, after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, intense discussions and pioneered a rapid arms race. In Turkey has started to act contrary to the agreements, such as Greece.

The Kardak/Imia Crisis

The story really begins in the spring of 1912 when Italy seized the Dodecanese islands from Turkey, primarily as a bargaining

counter in Italian diplomatic manoeuvres in the Balkans and Asia Minor.⁸

But the current crisis, in January 1996 between Greece and Turkey from the Turkish-flagged ship ran aground about Kardak Rocks dispute between the Turkish and Greek rescue teams when the two countries to the was brink of war. Regretfully I remember this crisis. I was a child and I was so afraid, because maybe there will be war.

Sat on a Turkish ship the Imia islands in 1995. Greece claimed that, they planted the flag and Greece said that this was their own side of the Greece island. Turkey said that it was this own side of the Turkish island, and the prime minister Tansu Çiller, asked the soldiers to go to war, saying Greece. Then the Turkish side of the flag planted on the island. And the war has solved the problem through diplomatic channels.

In February of 2013, the Human Rights Committee, a member of the Radical Left Coalition Party lawyer Nastos Theodoridis said, IMIA name is Kardak rocks.⁹ This shows that even in the case justified the Turkish side on this issue.

CONCLUSION


The Aegean dispute is a problem for both states, consisting of many difficulties. The Aegean Sea doesn't have the characteristics, in terms of geographic and geologic perspective, which enable to practice the authorities of International Maritime Law forms the basis of the dissidence between the two countries about determining Continental Shelf. That characteristic makes the status quo controversial and sensitive when it joins with the uncertainty of territorial waters whose principles are determined by Lozan Peace Treaty but, its place hasn't been spotted on the map yet.

⁸ PRATT, Martin; SCHOFIELD, Clive; *"The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea"*, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, p.65., Spring 1996.

⁹ Hurriyet Turkish Newspaper, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/22547394.asp>, February 8, 2013.

According to the decisions of International Court of Justice, mutual negotiations have priority about the solution of the disagreements related to the limitations of continental shelf. These negotiations must be meaningful. According to Court of Justice’s point of view, states must have responsibilities to make meaningful negotiations to solve the disagreements. Even so, it is impossible to say that Turkey and Greece make progress on the way of meaningful negotiations to solve the problem. It is even impossible to say they could give a start to such a continuum exactly.¹⁰

Whereas, Turkey wants the problem to be solved with mutual negotiations and treaties on the principle of equity. Also, I want will be for sure Greece want the problem to be solved. About the solution of this problem which brought the two sides on the threshold of war, both states need to act with the idea that “Aegean is the sea combining the two sides but not separating them” and start doing meaningful negotiations to solve it in equity.




Map1: Present distribution of territorial seas in the Aegean (6 nautical miles)

¹⁰ ÖNDER, Adnan; “Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (Kıta Sahaneliği Meselesi)”, University of Trakya, master thesis, February, 2008, p. V.



Map 2: Possible distribution of territorial sea in the Aegean (12 nautical miles)



MAP 3: About The Kardak/Imia Crisis

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