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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

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Proceedings of the First International Conference on EU and Black Sea Region

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Editors: Antonello Biagini, Constantin Hlihor, Andrea Carteny

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THE ELUSIVENESS OF BLACK SEA SUBREGIONALISM

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Abstract

The paper briefly reviews the notions of region, subregion, Black Sea region and Black Sea subregionalism as well as the main subregional initiatives created from within the region. It underlines the recent strides rooted in the new regionalism approach in conceptualizing subregionalism as a policy-coordination process among states in a circumscribed space and vis-à-vis a larger regional political project. The paper concludes that despite the mode of governance approach in conceptualizing subregionalism, Black Sea subregionalism remains basically an elusive notion.

Keywords: *region, subregion, new regionalism, subregionalism, Black Sea*

1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1. Defining Regions and Subregions

Attempting to delineate a region is not an easy task since there are five different levels of conceiving a region: as a *geographical unit* delimited by physical and ecological characteristics; as a *social system* based on trans-local relations between human groups (for instance, a regional security complex); as *transnational cooperation* which may be institutionalized or informal; as *civil society* with a formal or informal organizational framework; and as *acting subject* with a clear identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making (Teunissen 1998: 204-205). Consequently, as it has been noted, ‘an international region does not mean the same thing to all analysts at all times. It could refer to a continent such as Europe, or to a broader geographically specified area such as the Asia-Pacific or a single territory covering parts of several states (Euroregions) or to a non-geographic area. It could be *de facto* or *de jure* depending on whether it is institutionalized or not’ (Manoli 2012: 14). Indeed, scholars proposed various criteria for states and societies in order to qualify for their belonging to a region: geographical proximity; economic, political and security interdependence; social and cultural homogeneity; social and political cohesion or integration; high level of communications; accommodation of national decision-making to the interests of other regional actors; a shared sense of collective identity; and ‘global influencing characteristics’ (Groom and Taylor 1994: 45).

As a rule, there are three elements which are emphasized in various degrees in the definition of an international region: geographical spatial indicators; interdependence and the establishment of networks of transaction and communications; and cognitive elements (namely, collective identity). Thus, countries that make up a region either share significant past and current historical experiences (Eastern Europe), or develop economic, social, political and/or cultural linkages that distinguish them from the rest of the world (USA-Canada), or develop a set of institutions to manage their collective affairs (EU).

The fact that a subregion shares with a region basic features such as geographic proximity, common cultural elements, historical experience and social interaction makes it often difficult to distinguish between the two. However, there is a crucial element present in all definitions of

subregionalism which distinguishes a subregion from a region. It is its subordinate character vis-à-vis 'larger' or 'macro' regions. A subregion could be a neighbour or a constituent part of a regional project such as the EU. That being said, the differences between subregion and region are to be found not only at the level they evolve, but they relate to their substance and nature as well.

In the case of a subregion, geographic proximity means neighbourhood to, inclusion in, or geographic vicinity to an international region as a basis of cooperation. Many subregions are emerging around a natural, physical border such as a sea – North Sea, Baltic Sea, or Black Sea. However, the actual delineation of a subregion is highly abstract and to a certain extent even arbitrary as borders are by definition flexible in their nature and membership in subregional formations is overlapping, with one member participating in several groupings or being at the same time member of an economic union or security alliance.

Moreover, from a constructivist point of view, regions and subregions are mere social constructs. From a 'cognitive regionalism' viewpoint, one could say that a subregion is not creating an exclusive, separate identity, but is sharing a broader cultural identity with the broader regional project it is embedded to. In this context reference has been made to the symptomatic significance of the popular 'return to Europe' slogan present in most if not all subregional cooperative frameworks in the post-Cold War era.

As they depend on or are part of a broader regional process, subregions do not aim at creating strong economic blocs or political-security communities. Rather than aiming at economic or political integration, subregional groups aim at coordination of policies in issue specific areas with a strategic goal of inclusion of its members into a larger regional project.

Last but not least, contrary to regions, subregion formations do not have global influencing and reaching effects as purposive actors (Manoli 2012: 16-20).

A way of overcoming difficulties stemming from the absence of one or more of the above-mentioned distinctive features is to conceive regions and subregions as policy-making spaces and regionalism and subregionalism as modes of governance based on neoliberal principles and multilevel and regulatory governance. In that case, the region-building process is rooted on the one hand, on the recognition of the existence of (sub)regional as opposed to state policy problems and on the other, on the existence of sufficiently strong policy networks that see the need to articulate policy responses to problems in a (sub)regional context. Seen through the lenses of governance, the Black Sea subregionalism presents itself as a loose policy coordination process led by state elites which preserves a strictly inter-governmental character (Manoli 2012: 38-39).

1.2. The New Regionalism Approach

The new regionalism is not a theory properly speaking, but an inter-disciplinary and eclectic theoretical framework for researching the outlook of regional cooperation projects worldwide. The proponents of this approach, especially those working in the field of international political economy, claim that cooperative regional economic groupings are responses to globalization. Compared to the first wave of regional cooperation/integration of the 1960s, post-Cold War regionalism is a qualitatively new type of regionalism. According to this line of interpretation, there are basically six features that make the contemporary regionalism to a large extent different to the old one. First, the new regionalism operates in a substantially different world order, i.e. a multipolar one. Second, contrary to the Cold War regionalism, which was created from outside, often by big power intervention, the new one is created from within the regions. Third, as it focuses on trade liberalization, the new regionalism has an 'open' feature, fully compatible with an interdependent world economy. Fourth, as it comprises economic, social, political and security issues, it has a multidimensional, comprehensive character, contrary to the old regionalism focused either on security alliance formation or trade blocs building. Fifth, while old regionalism was a state-centric process, the new regionalism comprises both state and non-state actors at different levels. Sixth, there is a *post*

factum definition of regions, feature which triggers a plethora of ideologically-driven regionalisms (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999: 7).

Consequently, the proponents of this line of reasoning claim that in order to fully grasp the multidimensionality, pluralism, comprehensiveness and social construction of contemporary regionalism, a new framework of analysis, which transcends the dominant theories of regional integration is needed: the new regionalism approach.

2. DEFINING BLACK SEA REGION

2.1. Geographical-historical Concept

The Black Sea region is the geographic space in the proximity of the homonymous sea. The Black Sea itself is a geographic area with a total surface of 436, 400 sq km, a maximum depth of 2, 212 m and a maximum east-west length of 1, 175 km. It is an almost closed sea bordered by land in all directions, most of it of a mountainous nature, to the south (Pontic Mountains), to the east (the Caucasus) and to the west (the Balkans). To the north, there is a wide continental shelf with significant natural resources.

The Black Sea communicates with the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean via the Bosphorus Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles Strait. Also, it communicates with the Sea of Azov, to the north, through the Kerchi strait. It has access to the Central Asian Steppes through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea and to Central Europe through the Danube and other major European rivers.

To nullify the geographic description of the Black Sea as an entity is quite easy since current geographic accounts presents this region as a series of territories. Its political and economic fragmentation has strengthened the image of a divided land. Moreover, most accounts of the Black Sea have placed it on the margins of important and distinctive regions such as Europe or the Mediterranean. For a leading exponent of *L'Ecole des Annales* (School of Annals) for instance, the Black Sea was mere an extension of the Mediterranean world (Braudel 1976: 110).

Historically, a thriving trade took place through the ports of the Black Sea during the ancient Greek and Roman times, linking its south and north, east and west coasts. During Roman rule, the *Euxēinos Pontos* (Hospitable Sea) became a Roman lake with garrisons placed along the north and east coasts to protect trade around the Black sea coasts and with Asian lands (India, China). During Byzantine rule, the output of Black Sea economic activity was channelled towards Constantinople. Once Byzantine power started to fade away, the area became politically fragmented and open to outside economic penetration (Bratianu 1969: 177). In the sixteenth century the Black Sea was gradually reduced to the status of an Ottoman lake. Due to the imposition of a certain division of labour by the Ottomans, the Black Sea formed an ad-hoc economic unit cut off from the rest of the Mediterranean.

In the 19th century one can identify a constant interest of the Russian Empire for the control of the Black Sea region, especially of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits; in order to fulfil this objective, several conflicts with the Ottoman Empire took place. Russian interest for controlling the Black Sea basin was an intrinsic component of the ideological theme of the Third Rome, by which Russia claimed to be the heir of the Byzantine Empire.

After the First World War, in July 1923, the Lausanne Convention provided for a demilitarization of the Straits and freedom of navigation for all commercial ships. Subsequently, in 1936, the Montreux Convention legally consecrated the establishment of a *de facto* Russian-Turkish dominion over the Black Sea, Turkey being able to limit the access of military ships in war time.

Throughout the Cold War period, the Black Sea region remained fragmented, being divided into two political and economic blocks that allowed no space of communication. Basically, it was a space of

conflict between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. In fact, the Black Sea basin was undisputedly controlled by the USSR and its allies, being turned into a Soviet lake.

Thus, throughout modern ages, two axes defined the balance of power in the region and conditioned its behaviour as a unit: the north-south (Russian-Ottoman/Turkish) axis and later the east- west (Soviet/Communist-Capitalist) axis.

The enlargement of EU and NATO towards the Black Sea marked the removal of the divisions of the Cold War from the heartland of the European continent to its periphery.

At present, there are six countries directly bordering the Black Sea from west to east: Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey. Apart from these, there are also some countries which are considered belonging to the area, due to access to rivers, which drain into the Black Sea or due to close proximity to the area, such as Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

2.2. Ethno-cultural Concept

The region presents itself as a mixture of ethnic groups and cultures. The people living around the Black Sea belong to the Indo-European group (those to west and north), the Altaic group (to the south) and the Caucasian group (to the east). Within the Indo-European group the most important subdivisions are between Slavic people (eastern branch – Russians, Ukrainians, southern branch – Bulgarians), Latin people (Romanians), Hellenistic people (Greeks) and Iranian groups (Ossetian). The Altaic group is dominated by Turkic people, including the Turks and the Azeris as the most significant components of it, but also minority groups such as the Gagauz, Karachay-Balkar, Crimean Tatar and Krymchak. The Caucasian group comprise Georgians, Abkhazians, Chechens, Ingush, Adyghe and Kabardian (Severin 2009: 2).

From the viewpoint of religion, the people living around the Black Sea are predominantly Christian Orthodox believers. They are divided into three main groups: the Old-Rite Orthodox Churches – Russian (including Ukrainian and Moldovan) and Georgian; the Eastern Autocephalous Orthodox Churches – Romanian, Greek and Bulgarian; and the Oriental Orthodox Churches – Armenian. Significant Muslim communities are living in the south of the region, divided into the Sunni (majority in Turkey) and Shi'a (majority in Azerbaijan). Mosaic minorities can be found also among the Jewish communities around all big ports of the area or among the Krymchak Tatars.

Marked by a cultural fault line separating chiefly the Orthodox and Muslim civilizations, the area has been prone to conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Huntington 1991: 25). However, the conflict and violence was not greater than in other parts of Europe and Eurasia. Rather, the distinctive feature of the area of the region was 'the belated advent of the central organizing ideas of nineteenth – and twenty – century Europe' (King 2004: 6).

2.3. Geopolitical Concept

Unlike the geographical-historical and ethno-cultural concepts, which are for the most part descriptive, the geopolitical concepts have obvious functional and ideological dimensions, articulating the aims and interests of those creating them.

Throughout the 1990s the Black Sea area has been largely neglected by major Euro-Atlantic and European organizations as well as international relations (IR) studies. The region has been divided among the studies of the Balkans, Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Located at the edge of the European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern geopolitical spaces, the Black Sea region has not been in the spotlight of any of them (Tsantoulis 2008: 4).

Nevertheless, the area presents multiple and significant geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic connotations. As new south-eastern frontier of European Union (EU), the Black Sea region represents, through its population of almost 200 million inhabitants, a giant market for the EU exports. A transit area for oil and natural gas from Central Asia and Middle East towards Europe, the Black Sea region represents also the connecting link in an emerging geopolitical and geo-economic axis

Mediterranean Sea – Black Sea – Caspian Sea. At the same time, it is an area of illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism, and also a platform for military operations, reconstruction and stabilization in Afghanistan, Iraq and possibly Iran. Moreover, the region is a meeting point of several other regions (the Balkans, South Caucasus, Asia Minor, Crimea etc.), each having its specificity and internal coherence, inhabited by peoples who traditionally were landwards and not seawards oriented, a buffer zone between Europe and Asia, and a space of contacts, permanent exchanges and blending together between Orthodox, Islamic and Western civilizations and cultures. Last but not least, the area presents itself as a clashing point of the major Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian global players' interests and peripheral strategies, an area characterized by a high degree of geopolitical pluralism and competition.

The re-occurrence of strategic visions concerning the Black Sea region was determined, on one hand, by the advance of Euro-Atlantic space towards Central Asia and, on the other hand, by the relocation of the world conflict centre from Europe to the Middle East and Central Asia. The decisive moment which led to a change in the Western perception of this area was the 9/11 events. Against the background of the redefinition of the heartland, the Black Sea area has been 'rediscovered' by the West and pushed 'from the periphery to the centre of Western attention' (Asmus and Jackson 2004; Asmus, Dimitrov and Forbrig 2004: 17-26). The move included launching into debate the concept of Wider Black Sea region, encompassing besides Black Sea riparian NATO Member States (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey), CIS members from both the Northern Black Sea area (Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine) and South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). Concomitantly, during the George W. Bush Administration, the concept of Greater Middle East was created, covering countries in Northern Africa, Middle East and Persian Gulf, all the way to Afghanistan. Thus, the Wider Black Sea region was presented as being located in the close neighbourhood of the Greater Middle East or is even a part of it, through the Caucasus. However, it was not entirely clear if the Wider Black Sea region had a specific identity or was subordinated to the political-military logic embedded in the concept of Greater Middle East.

The EU, after becoming a Black Sea actor in its own right through the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, has set to create a synergy among the actors of the region, without explicitly assuming a strategy with geopolitical dimensions. In European Commission point of view, the Black Sea region represents a 'distinct geographical area rich in natural resources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East' which comprises ten states: six littoral states – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey – and four states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece – whose history, proximity and close ties with the Black Sea area make them relevant actors in this area (COM (2007) 160 final: 1).

Among the ten countries identified by the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) initiative as belonging to the region three are EU Member States (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria), a country is a candidate for accession into EU (Turkey), five countries are covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), and a key country benefits from a strategic partnership with EU (Russian Federation). Consequently, EU has contract-based relations with all the countries in the region.

By and large, the European definition for the Black Sea area is overlapping the concept of Wider Black Sea region previously promoted by NATO in its relations with allies and partners in the area. The novelty of the European concept consists in the fact that, while having a traditional presence in the region, it associates to the BSS initiative one more non-riparian Member State - Greece. While from the geographical coverage point of view the two concepts are to a large extent similar, at the level of intention there are certain differences. The North-Atlantic Alliance, highlighting the fact that the Wider Black Sea region is both a bridge towards the energy rich region of the Caspian Sea and a barrier in front of the trans-national threats, promotes a 'bridge/barrier' concept regarding the area (Pop 2007). For the EU, the Black Sea region represents a distinct area for the implementation of the ENP, which aims at setting up at its borders a 'ring of friends', where the EU principles, values and mode of governance are respected and promoted to a greater or lesser extent (Prodi 2002).

2.4. Governance Concept

Although its origin can be traced back to the twelfth-thirteenth centuries, the governance concept is a relatively new one in political science, being talked to again in academic and political milieus only in the twentieth century. Moreover, it is a multifarious semantic concept. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Commission on Global Governance, the European Commission, and various authors propose diverse definitions of it. We will not dwell on all of them, but review only some which are more relevant for the purpose of this paper.

According to the point of view of the Commission on Global Governance, the concept of governance refers to the ways through which institutions and individuals manage their common affairs (Kahler and Lake 2003: 1-32).

Patrick Le Galès defines the governance process as a coordination process of actors, social groups and institutions in order to attain certain aims collectively defined and agreed upon (Le Galès 2006: 243).

The European Commission emphasizes the institutional pluralism which characterizes the EU horizontal and vertical decision-making process. In the European Commission viewpoint, European governance refers to the rules, processes and practices which influence the manner in which power is exercised at the European level (COM (2001) 428 final: 7-8). In fact, governance is a key component of the EU policies and reforms meant to promote democratization and development both within Member States and beyond them in areas heavily influenced by the EU (COM (2003) 615 final).

As regarding the Black Sea region, the EU promotes a concentric circles variable geometry approach, which includes geopolitical, cultural, transactional, legal and institutional boundaries and which is consistent with its overall vision of governance (Gänzle 2009: 1719; Telò 2007). Indeed, the implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Euroregion initiatives has meant the extension of the European project further east, way over the borders of the enlarged Europe in its eastern neighbourhood, more exactly the secondary stage of a process through which the 'goods' to be 'exported' are translated from the internal periphery of EU towards the external periphery of EU (Pop and Manoleli 2008: 14).

As the Black Sea subregional process is now more and more EU-driven, the Black Sea subregionalism can be conceived in terms of governance as a policy-coordination process among the Black Sea region states.

3. EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA SUBREGIONALISM

3.1 Waves of European Subregionalism

European subregionalism displays all the features claimed by new regionalism: multipolar operating system, multifarious (state and non-state) actors, comprehensiveness, 'open' character, *post factum* definition, and initiation from within the subregion. As a politically conceived process heavily influenced or driven by the EU in order to counterbalance the Russian power, the European subregionalism developed basically in three stages: a first stage, in the early 1990s when the post-Cold War geopolitical and security environment posed new challenges to which the subregional initiatives were a response; a second stage in the late 1990s and early 2000s when against the background of the ending of Yugoslav wars new subregional initiatives were created meant to alleviate the multiple fault lines generated by the NATO and EU enlargement to the east; and a third stage in the late 2000s when the emphasis was put on the role of subregionalism in a post-enlargement geopolitical and security environment where further enlargement beyond the Balkans seems unlikely and Russian-Western relations have become more complex (Cottey 2009: 3-4).

3.2 Waves of Black Sea Subregionalism

Black Sea subregionalism has experienced three distinct waves, which are consistent with the three phases experienced by European subregionalism in general. The first wave took place in the early 1990s against the background of the systemic changes of the post-Cold War era. During this

period, the phenomenon was largely neglected by external actors such as the U.S., NATO, and EU. While local powers aimed at maximizing their regional standing, declining powers tried to maintain as much influence as they could and the newly independent states (NIS) saw in subregionalism an opportunity to strengthen their international status and the newly acquired statehood. The second wave took place in the early 2000s and was associated with the NATO and EU eastward enlargement and the increasing regional impact of global issues. During this period, subregional cooperation was preoccupied with combating transnational security threats, mitigating the inevitable ‘dividing lines’ created by enlargement, and governance issues beyond the EU borders. The third, post-enlargement wave has developed since 2007, operating in a strategic environment where Russo-Western relations have become more problematic, with the Black Sea subregionalism increasingly caught between two integrative systems and development paradigms: a European and Euro-Atlantic community, represented by the European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO); and a Russian-oriented one represented by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSO) (Manoli 2012: 43-44).

3.3. Black Sea Subregionalism Variable Geometry

It is true that conceiving Black Sea subregionalism as a policy-coordination process minimizes the significance of the geographic factor. However, a comparison of its coverage as revealed by subregional groupings membership with the one of the Black Sea geopolitical and governance concepts as promoted by major Euro-Atlantic and European organizations seems unavoidable. Thus, this subchapter reviews only the membership of those subregional initiatives created from within the region, which is, as previously stated, a distinct feature of new regionalism.

Among Black Sea initiatives, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization is the most comprehensive in terms of membership, as it encompasses twelve countries: all ten countries of the Black Sea region in the European Commission definition, i.e. Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece, plus other two South-East European countries peripheral to the Black Sea affairs, i.e. Albania and Serbia.

By contrast, the least comprehensive grouping is the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (ODED-GUAM), named after the initial letters of each country that established it: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

It is also interesting to note that no other subregional formation, except BSEC, includes Greece in its membership.

The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) is a particular case as it gathers nine East European countries from ‘the three seas’ region – the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Slovenia and Macedonia (Pop and Manoleli 2008: 27).

Seven initiatives point to a more narrow understanding of the Black Sea area as encompassing solely the six Black Sea littoral countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey. These are the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BlackSeaFor), the Operation Black Sea Harmony, the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Cooperation Forum (BSCF), the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre, the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution (Black Sea Commission), and the Turkish initiative for a Black Sea Defence Ministerial Process, which follows the model of the South East European Defence Ministerial Process.

Another grouping, the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) numbers also six countries, but its membership includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.

More importantly, there are regional initiatives which by name belong to South East Europe, but by membership belong both to South East Europe and Black Sea areas. To give just one example,

the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), formerly known as the Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime (SECI Center) brings together thirteen states – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary – out of which five belong to the Black Sea region.

From this brief enumeration results that there is a certain fuzziness as far as the Black Sea subregionalism is concerned and a certain incongruence with the Black Sea geopolitical and governance concepts as promoted by the U.S./NATO and the EU. This incongruence is a consequence of the neglect of the area by major powers and European and Euro-Atlantic organizations during the first phase of Black Sea subregionalism, when local actors generated from within the region their own subregional initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS

Understanding a subregion in terms of its subordinate character vis-à-vis a larger, regional project such as the EU and subregionalism in terms of a policy-coordination process is a particular fertile ground for researching Black Sea subregionalism. However, the notion of Black Sea subregionalism remains basically an elusive one. The reason for that is that there is a certain incongruity between the concept of Wider Black Sea region promoted by the U.S./NATO, the notion of the Black Sea region promoted by the EU, and the variable geometry concept of Black Sea subregionalism as envisaged by various subregional groupings created from within the region. While the difference between the U.S./NATO and the EU concepts is mostly at the intentional level and much less in terms of membership, the difference between the concepts of the two major European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and the ones of the subregional groupings is given precisely by its varied membership. The latter is path-dependent, a legacy of the first wave of Black Sea subregionalism, when subregional initiatives were largely neglected by major external actors. If the Black Sea subregionalism is to be conceived as a policy-coordination process, potentially this incongruence could become a problem for the coherence of the EU governance process in the area.

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MACRO-REGIONAL APPROACH AND THE INNER SEAS IN EUROPE

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Abstract

European Union aims to extend the stability and democracy area within and outside the current EU borders. To this purpose the reduction of inequalities between different regions represents one of the Union's main goals. The macro-Regional strategy represents an innovative pragmatic model of multilevel governance that involves in an open and shared dialogue all of the actors according to an integrated approach: EU, states, regional and local authorities and the civil society. The paper compares the experimental experiences of Baltic and Danube macro-regions and the recent proposal of a European macro-regional Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian area as conceivable models for Black and Caspian seas. As a model of multilateral political and economic initiative the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation could represent the preliminary remarks for a macro-regional strategy that identifies in the integrated approach the key of transnational and cross-border territorial cooperation to achieve concerted solutions.

Keywords: *Macro-region, cross-border cooperation, Black sea region, multilevel approach.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The paper examines the European Macro-regional strategy [1] presenting it as a model of regional cooperation for the inner sea regions with particular regard to the Black sea region. Numerous sources inspired the paper that is the result of the analysis of the most recent European regional and cross border cooperation strategies. The essential sources are for first historical overview are:

- Prin 2007 - Project of Relevant National interest, Minister of Instruction and University - Miur, National Director: Prorector Prof. Biagini - the "Inner Seas" ("Mari Interni Mediterraneo, Adriatico, Egeo, Mar Nero, Baltico"- "Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean, Black Sea, Baltic") in Eurasia;
- Fernand Braudel's [2] monumental work and his description of the Mediterranean as a space where the sea acts as a "liquid continent" connecting different places and people and establishing shared identities based on both environmental and cultural evidence. Braudel affirmed that there is no single Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean cannot be understood independently from what is exterior to it. Therefore any rigid adherence to boundaries falsifies the interpretation. There's a strong connection between the region's geomorphologic/environmental qualities and its social/cultural/economic features. The Mediterranean sea could be seen as the archetype for a category of maritime spaces of connection known as Middle (or Inner) Seas;

- “I Turchi, il Mediterraneo e l'Europa” (The Turkish, the Mediterranean sea and Europe), Professor Giovanna Motta, Phd in History of Europe Coordinator at Sapienza University of Rome, CNR Project. (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche);

- Charles King’s “The Black Sea: A History” in which he investigates the myriad connections that have made the Black Sea more of a bridge than a boundary, linking religious communities, linguistic groups, empires, and later, nations and states;

- “European Macro-regional strategies and approaches: Baltic Sea and Danube experiences and the new perspective for Adriatic-Ionian cooperation”, C. Bassetti, A. Carteny, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Volume 3, No. 8, April 2012.

With regard to regional policy two terms have recently polarized the debate within European Union context: territorial cohesion and multi-level governance. In this frame, Europe 2020 targets are: i) to fully use the strength of each territory within a perspective of a sustainable and balanced development of the whole European Union; ii) to manage concentration: cities increase innovation and productivity but also pollution and social ostracism; iii) to better link territories with the aim to let people live where they want and to guarantee them access to public services, efficient transportation systems, trustworthy energy networks and broadband Internet; iv) to develop new cooperation instruments between countries and regions through a transnational cross-border perspective for the resolution of those issues whose nature and dimension exceed the national area [3].

2. MACRO REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The pilot experience [4] of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region introduced in practice the concept of Macro-Region defined by the European Commission as “an area including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges.” The geographical borders of these regions can vary depending on the type of issue existing at Macro-Regional level. For instance, some regions could overlap. Therefore a region could be part of one or more Macro-regions simultaneously. It is worth mentioning that Macro-regional strategy needs no new funds, no new legislation, and no new institutions (the ‘three No’s’). Macro-regions do not overlap with regional or national existing identities. This new approach is focused on the involvement of local bodies and civil society to create stronger synergies between different actors involved in the process. The macro-regional approach could be synthesized in four principal points:

- To achieve better governance on large territories confronted with similar problems;
- The will of a more efficient use of resources. The need to rationalize and optimize the management of some common resources (such as, energy), or the need for coordinating the efforts for the resolution of common issues (such as, fighting against organized crime) are at the base of the Macro-Regional model that identifies in the integrated approach the key of transnational and cross-border territorial cooperation;

- The Macro-regions can become a prime way of giving substance to the territorial objective espoused by the Treaty of Lisbon to facilitate the entry of third countries into the European Union;

- Macro-regions are not an extra institutional instruments within the European Union but an innovative *modus operandi*, a form of joint action that involves various European, national, regional and local players, various policies and various funding programmes.

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region [5] involved eight Littoral countries of the Baltic Sea that are EU member states (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia. The strategy was launched by the European Commission in June 2009 and confirmed by the Council in October and it is considered today as a model for other potential Macro-Regional approaches. A second region that developed around the Danube [6] includes 8 EU member countries (Germany-Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria-Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Romania), and 6 extra-EU countries (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine). The European Council asked in June 2009 to the Commission to elaborate a strategy within the end of 2010. The Commission expressed its opinion adopting in December 2010 the document known as “EU Strategy for the Danube Region”. Another area of enormous interest for European regional cooperation is the Adriatic-Ionian area. The eight AII [7] (Adriatic and Ionian

Initiative that today includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Italy, Serbia and Slovenia) member countries established several goals at the base of their cooperation divided in five macro-areas that represent a general cooperation frame open to further development: SMEs, tourism, rural development, culture and inter-university cooperation, environmental and fire protection. Cooperation is also aimed to the value of cultural identities of all member countries and to the rationalization of the human and financial resources. In the AII project the multilevel approach is integrated with a multidimensional attitude aimed to develop the involved territories through the integration of economic, cultural, social and institutional cooperation. The declared purpose of the initiative is integrating the existing European strategies for Macro-Regions with the Adriatic-Ionian Regional strategy, bringing a significant contribution not only for the region itself but also for the whole European Union's territory. The goal of a European's recognition is estimated for 2013 [8]. The surplus value of the AII strategy is represented by a strong political signal addressed to the Western Balkans countries for a concrete collaboration towards a future integration in the European house to which they naturally and historically belong.

The Macro-regional aims to coordinate the actions of States, regions, EU, regional organizations, financial institutions and NGOs for a sustainable and balanced development of the whole region. With regard to the Baltic Sea Macro-Region for instance four strategy pillars are aimed to make this part of Europe more: sustainable from an environmental point of view; prosperous; accessible and able to attract capitals and resources; safe and protected. The idea of elaborating a specific strategy for the region is dated 2004 and from then on eight out of nine coast side Baltic Sea countries became EU members. The Macro-Region's concept took place from the "bottom" since the countries of the Baltic area have carried it out. National governments and a euro-parliamentarian inter-group submitted a new strategy for the development of the area to the Council and the Commission. Shared challenges mean also share opportunities and for this reason such issues could be faced only through an active collaboration of all the interested countries within the frame of a more vast European interregional cooperation. Macro-Regions have the potential to be a new mode of territorial cooperation at interregional and transnational level for an efficient use of financial resources. Thereby the strategy could represent the sunset of the sectorial approach in the resolution of Macro-Regional urgent issues shared by the EU members. It represents at the same time an innovative pragmatic model of multilevel governance that involves an open and shared dialogue all of the actors according to an integrate approach: EU, states, regional and local authorities and the civil society.

3. MACRO-REGIONAL STRATEGY AS A MODEL FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION

The European Commission played an active role in the elaboration of a Macro-regional strategy and now it suggests this strategy as an innovative pragmatic model for other regional areas within and outside the European Union's borders. Those steps inspired the debate about other potential Macro-regional areas internal and external to EU borders such as: the North Sea-English Channel region; the Alpine region; The Adriatic-Ionian area and the Mediterranean Sea. To this regard worth mentioning is the "Communication of the Commission Black sea synergy - a new regional cooperation initiative". The Commission pointed out that in 2007 two Black Sea littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the European Union. More than ever before the prosperity, stability and security of EU' neighbours around the Black Sea became of immediate concern to the EU. The Black Sea region is a distinct geographical area rich in natural resources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. Three EU policies are relevant in this context: the pre- accession process in the case of Turkey, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation. In the Communication the Commission underlines that there are significant opportunities and challenges in the Black Sea area that require a more integrated and coordinated action at the regional level. These opportunities include key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security [9].

The macro-regional approach could represent a model of cross-border territorial cooperation, a worthy example of sustainable development for the whole Black sea area for the improvement of the cooperation started with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC [10]). The new approach should

be based not only on the management of common resources such as energy but also aimed to encourage a strong economic and social cohesion and ecological balance. The Commission's vision is to one day make the Black sea area a political and economic entity able to overcome a much more narrowed logic.

With regard to Black Sea Economic Cooperation-BSEC- [11] (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine) the core issues of the organization are: environmental degradation and economic cooperation, the development of SMEs and entrepreneurship in the member countries. Similar narrow-minded goals can be identified for GUAM [12], the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. GUAM is a regional organization of post-Soviet states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan. The purpose of this organization is to neutralize the Russian influence in the post soviet space. For this reason it has been criticized as a part of a strategy sustained by the United States that financially supported the organization against the Russian leadership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). BSEC and GUAM are therefore organizations that have a strong economic focus, while lacking a strong humanitarian, political and security dimension. There are also differences in the structure of these Organizations: on the one hand we have a bottom-up EU Macro-regional strategy and on the other hand a top-down approach in the example of GUAM and BSEC, where there is also hesitation in the involvement of non-state economic and societal actors in the development and implementation of regional projects. Lastly, in these organizations little attention is paid to long-term structural integration projects and there's no will to accomplish important steps towards the creation of supranational structures. It is also clear that some countries (e.g. Azerbaijan) take advantage of these memberships to consolidate sovereignty and to restore the country's territorial integrity. As a result of that those kind of cooperation activities so far have been short-term in character, with only a limited structural impact.

CONCLUSIONS

The Macro-regional strategy - now in its implementation phase - generated concrete actions optimizing and rationalizing the use of financial and human resources and achieving positive results. It is worth underlining that no additional financial or human resources as well as no new legislation or ad hoc institutions were used. Moreover it is important also to highlight that new successful working methods repeatable for other European Macro-Regions have been tested. Therefore for the cross border cooperation in the Black sea region the suitable approach should be the one described by Charles King: the Black Sea should be read by the International Community more as a bridge than as a boundary. This interpretation coincides with the orientation of European Union Commission. Coastal nations on Internal seas – Black sea, Caspian sea, Marmara Sea, Azov Sea – are likely to assume a greater importance in the future in economic and technological exchanges between East and West. The Balkan Peninsula with the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania is a geographical bridge towards Danube valley and the Carpathian States. All the nations of the area are wholly part of Europe and for this reason a more integrated regional cooperation is required. There's a Macro-region stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Undeniably this region will be an increasingly important area for strategic reasons in the next future. With the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the resulting enriched diversity of the Union, the importance of territorial cohesion for the integration process has been strengthened by all EU institutions. This explains why "territorial cohesion" became so important as a significant purpose of the Lisbon Treaty [13].

In a Union that pretends to be a model of integration and cooperation for the construction of a peaceful area, particularly at regional level, the Macro-Regional strategy could represent an important chance to assure stability in all European and extra-EU countries. The overall democratization and stabilization process of Countries in and around the Black Sea cannot be interpreted as a distinct aspect separately from the European Union integration process but, on the contrary, is an integral part of this process.

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- [3] For more details about Europe 2020 targets visit the following website:http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/targets/eu-targets/index_en.htm.
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- [8] Since the beginning of 2010, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Adriatic- Ionian Initiative, the Marche Region started a series of initiatives aimed at raising awareness among the main European Institutions on the acknowledgment of the Adriatic- Ionian Macroregion. On March 3, 2011, in Brussels, the COTER (Territorial Cooperation) Commission of the Committee of the Regions entrusted the Marche Region with the drafting of an opinion on “ Territorial Cooperation in the Mediterranean basin through the Adriatic- Ionian Macroregion”.The opinion approval process involved a first step on July 4, which has a successful outcome, and was completed on October 12 when, during the plenary assembly of the Committee of the Regions, the final validation was given. Council of June 23 and 24: in the Conclusions, member States were invited “to keep working, in collaboration with the Commission, at possible future Macroregions, with the particular reference to the Adriatic- Ionian Macroregion”.The procedure for the final approval of the Adriatic Ionian Macroregion should be concluded by 2013, in order to benefit from the financial interventions included in the new EU programming 2014- 2020.
- [9] The Commission concludes that “The Black Sea regional constellation has substantially changed in the past years and will continue to evolve. In these conditions, the EU’s new regional cooperation initiative would usefully complement its existing wide-ranging bilateral and sectorial activities. The European Union’s presence in the Black Sea region opens a window on fresh perspectives and opportunities. This requires a more coherent, longer-term effort which would help to fully seize these opportunities, to bring increased stability and prosperity to the region. Greater EU engagement in Black Sea regional cooperation will contribute to this objective”. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf
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LA DÉLIMITATION DES ESPACES MARITIMES DANS LA MER NOIRE. IMPLICATIONS DE L'ÎLE DES SERPENTS DANS LE PROCESSUS DE LA DÉLIMITATION

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Résumé

La délimitation des espaces maritimes représente l'un des problèmes les plus complexes pour la définition des droits et des obligations des États concernant les espaces qui leur reviennent. La détermination du statut de l'Île des Serpents a eu un rôle essentiel pour la détermination des espaces maritimes qui reviennent à la Roumanie. Dans la présente étude, nous précisons quel est ce statut, en évoquant la Décision de la Cour Internationale de Justice de la Haye, rendue le 3 février 2009, au sujet de la dispute entre la Roumanie et l'Ukraine concernant les espaces maritimes dans la Mer Noire.

Mots clé: espaces maritimes, Mer Noire, Île des Serpents, Cour de Justice de la Haye, Union Européenne

La Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer, tenue dans les années 1973-1982, s'est notamment penché sur l'élaboration de principes et de méthodes de délimitation des espaces maritimes entre les États. Ces principes et méthodes ont été au fondement des négociations de la délimitation des espaces maritimes de la Roumanie à la Mer Noire. Dans ces négociations, l'Île des Serpents a joué un rôle important.

„Située à approximativement 42 km (23 milles) du rivage, à l'endroit du Delta du Danube, l'Île des Serpents - notifiée dans les actes internationaux comme appartenant à la Roumanie - est entrée au sein de l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques» à partir de l'année 1948, en pleine dictature staliniste. Étant par ailleurs dépourvue de ressources biologiques et inhabitée, cette île a servi de prétexte à la Grande Puissance du Levant pour s'approprier des espaces maritimes *qui ne lui revenaient pas de droit* si elle aurait été disposée à reconnaître le statut juridique de l'Île reconfirmé par le *Traité de Paix* de Paris de 1947. L'acte de coercition de 1948 - par lequel l'Île était transférée à l'Union Soviétique - a été contesté dans les années '70 par la diplomatie roumaine, conduite à l'époque par Ștefan Andrei, avec l'aval express du gouvernement du pays. Mais récemment, par le *Traité politique de base* signé avec l'Ukraine en 1997, le gouvernement de Bucarest vient de reconnaître l'effet de l'acte de coercition imposé par la dictature staliniste en 1948 en faveur de l'État successeur de 1997. Cette reconnaissance contre-nature comporte les implications les plus graves concernant la démarcation de l'espace maritime de la Roumanie.

1. Le statut de l'Île des Serpents sur la base du Traité de Berlin du 13 juillet 1878

Après la guerre russo-roumaine-turque de 1877-1878 le *Traité de Paix* du 13 juillet, 1878 notifiait formellement l'Île des Serpents comme appartenant à la Roumanie. L'on admettait que ce territoire rocheux nous appartenait, aussi bien que le Delta du Danube tout entier et le territoire de Dobroudja, jusqu'à Silistra.

Le traité stipulait expressément que: les îles du Delta du Danube, ainsi que l'Île des Serpents, Tulcea, Sandgiac et les zones (cazas) Chilia, Sulina, Mahmudia, Isaccea, Macin, Babadag, Harsova, Kustenge et Medgidia sont partie intégrante de la Roumanie [1].

Le traité précise aussi que la Principauté de Roumanie recevra, outre les territoires déjà mentionnés, «le territoire au sud de Dobroudja, jusqu'à la ligne droite tracée à l'est de Silistra jusqu'à la Mer Noire, au nord de Mangalia». Le traité stipule aussi que «les frontières seront tracées par la Commission Européenne initiée pour délimiter le territoire bulgare» [2].

Pour comprendre correctement les coordonnées juridiques de l'Île des Serpents, il faut brièvement reconsidérer les événements historiques majeurs qui concernent ce territoire.

L'Île rocheuse des Serpents d'aujourd'hui était appelée Alba, Léukè ou Achillèis, par les marins et les marchands qui s'y arrêtaient [3]. Dans son principal ouvrage sur la Mer Noire, Gheorghe I. Brătianu attirait l'attention sur le fait qu'«à la place de Callatis - Mangalia d'aujourd'hui - se trouvait un établissement dorien, Héracléa, tout comme Mesembria, fille de Mégara». Le fameux chercheur notait que «l'une des plus anciennes places d'arrêt était l'Île Alba, Léukè ou Achillèis, un rocher en pleine mer, vis-à-vis du Delta du Danube, aujourd'hui connue comme l'Île des Serpents» [4].

Gheorghe I. Brătianu explique le nom de l'Île: «Cette place d'arrêt des Milésiens contient un sanctuaire dédié à la mémoire d'Achille Pontarchès, protecteur de la navigation et du commerce» [5].

Du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle, du temps où la partie orientale du continent européen se trouvait sous la domination de l'Empire ottoman, la Mer Noire était un espace intérieur turque. Comme l'Île des Serpents s'y trouvait, elle relevait de la souveraineté de l'Empire ottoman [6].

En 1812, après la guerre russo-turque qui consacra la victoire de l'Empire Russe, une nouveauté apparaît dans le statut de la Mer Noire [7]. Le traité trace la frontière entre les deux empires le long des rives du Prout et du bras de Chilia, comme frontière nord du Delta du Danube. Le traité d'Adrianopolis (1829) confirmait le traité de Bucarest (1912). L'Empire Russe, renforcé, obtenait le Delta du Danube, dont la frontière se traçait maintenant au sud, le long du bras St. George [8].

Le *Traité de Paris* (1856) changeait le statut du Delta du Danube et de ses îles, après la défaite de la Russie dans la guerre de Crimée (1853-1855) [9].

L'alliance de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, de la Prusse, de la Sardinia et de l'Empire Ottoman ayant vaincu le Czar, la Russie fut repoussée du Delta du Danube. Il faut observer que ni le traité de Bucarest (1812), ni celui d'Adrianopolis (1928) ni celui de Paris (1856) ne contenaient des stipulations spécifiques concernant l'Île des Serpents dont le statut relevait de celui, plus général, de la zone maritime, légiférée conformément à ces traités internationaux.

L'Île des Serpents se trouve expressément mentionnée, pour la première fois, dans le protocole signé à Paris, en 1856, par les forces alliées mentionnées [10].

Les alliés convenaient que «les îles situées entre les bras du Delta du Danube, dans la zone de leurs estuaires et le delta proprement-dit, passaient maintenant sous la souveraineté ottomane, comme il était avant la guerre» [11].

Les plénipotentiaires des grandes Puissances admettaient, comme les traités antérieurs ne mentionnaient rien sur l'Île des Serpents, que «cette île devrait être considérée comme partie du Delta du Danube et partager le sort de celui-ci» [12].

Conformément au même protocole, le gouvernement ottoman promettait - au bénéfice du commerce maritime - «d'installer un phare, pour plus de sécurité de la navigation au long de Danube et vers Odessa» [13]. Aussi les plénipotentiaires ont-ils décidé que le phare devait fonctionner sans faute, pour que «la sécurité de la navigation, le long du fleuve et dans la zone maritime prochaine, soit assurée» [14].

En 12-24juin 1878, Ion C. Brătianu – en tant que Président du Conseil des Ministres - et Mihail Kogălniceanu - en tant que Ministre des Affaires Étrangères – ont adressé un mémoire au Congrès de Berlin, réquérant des garanties «pour l'intégrité territoriale du pays» [15].

Au moment où le *Traité de San Stefano* se débattait en Europe, les illustres hommes d'État adressaient cinq requêtes fondamentales aux plénipotentiaires des grandes Puissances, qui répondaient aux «nécessités et aux doléances légitimes du pays», consacrant «ses droits et la garantie des intérêts européens» [16].

À ce moment historique, Ion C. Brătianu et Mihail Kogălniceanu formulaient les cinq requêtes comme suit: «**1.** Aucune partie du territoire national présent ne sera détachée des Principautés Roumaines; **2.** Le territoire roumain ne sera pas traversé par l'armée russe. **3.** Les Principautés Roumaines détiennent la propriété des bras du Delta du Danube et des îles, y compris l'Île des Serpents, conformément aux droits traditionnels sur les-dites îles. **4.** Proportionnellement à l'armée disponible, une indemnisation en argent sera attribuée aux Principautés roumaines selon un montant approprié. **5.** L'indépendance est déclarée comme définitive et le territoire considéré comme neutre» [17].

Conformément à ce document exceptionnel, on requérait la propriété de l'Île des Serpents, des autres îles et des bras du Delta du Danube, en raison des «droits centenaires de la Roumanie». Les deux dignitaires roumains soulignaient que de «telles requêtes sont pleinement soutenues par la loi et l'équité», en «parfaite harmonie avec les intérêts européens généraux» [18].

Comme on le sait bien, le Mémoire de Ion C. Brătianu et Mihail Kogălniceanu a été considéré pertinent et bien argumenté. Par les traités de paix de Paris et de Berlin, l'Île des Serpents, le Delta du Danube tout entier et Dobroudja jusqu'à Silistra revinrent à la Roumanie. Depuis, l'Île des Serpents nous a appartenu, sans interruption.

Par l'*Ultimatum* de juin 1940, l'URSS a annexé la Bessarabie, la Bucovine du nord et la province Herța. Le 2 août 1940 était créée la République Soviétique de Moldavie [19].

Il nous faut préciser que par l'*Ultimatum* de juin 1940, l'Union Soviétique n'exigeait pas que l'Île des Serpents changeât de statut juridique. L'Île continuait d'être territoire roumain.

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le *Traité de Paix* de Paris stipulait que la frontière entre la Roumanie et l'URSS restât comme définie en juin [20]. Ce document avait été signé par l'U.R.S.S., le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Australie, la République Socialiste Soviétique de Biélorusse, le Canada, la Tchécoslovaquie, l'Inde, la Nouvelle Zélande, la République Socialiste Soviétique d'Ukraine et l'Union Sud-Africaine, en tant que Puissances alliées et associées d'un côté, et la Roumanie de l'autre.

Conformément à ce *Traité*, l'Île des Serpents gardait son statut juridique de 1940, en tant que territoire roumain.

Les pays co-signataires, alliés et associés, y compris l'URSS et la République Socialiste Soviétique d'Ukraine reconnaissaient ainsi que l'Île des Serpents continuait d'être territoire roumain.

2. 1948: l'année de l'annexion de l'Île des Serpents par la dictature staliniste

En 1948, par un acte d'agression typiquement staliniste, l'URSS s'approprie l'Île des Serpents.

Conformément à l'*Annexe II* du protocole rédigé pour tracer la frontière entre la Roumanie et l'URSS, signé à Moscou le 4 février 1948, la ligne devait passer «au long des rives du Danube, de Padina jusqu'à la Mer Noire, les îles Tatarul Mic, Daleru Mic et Mare, Maican et Limba passant du côté de l'URSS, alors que les îles Tatarul Mare, Cernovca et Babina revenaient à la Roumanie; l'Île des Serpents, localisée dans la Mer Noire, à l'est des estuaires des bras du Delta du Danube, revenait à l'URSS» [21].

Le 23 mai de la même année, à midi, précisément sur l'Île des Serpents (Zmeinai), un procès verbal était signé par Nicolai Pavlovici Sutov, Premier-secrétaire d'ambassade, mandataire du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS et par Eduard Mezincescu, ministre plénipotentiaire, mandataire du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la Roumanie.

Les deux co-signataires y décidaient que, conformément au Protocole soviéto-roumain de Moscou, signé le 4 février 1948, ils concluaient l'acte notifiant que «dès aujourd'hui (23 mai 1948), à midi, (heure locale), l'Île des Serpents (Zmeinai), localisée dans la Mer Noire, 45 degrés, 15'18" latitude nord et 30 degrés, 19'15" longitude est de Greenwich, a été rétrocédée à l'URSS par la République Populaire de la Roumanie et intégrée au territoire de l'URSS» [22].

Les représentants des deux pays stipulaient qu'avec la signature de ce document «les procédures légales de la concession de l'île étaient accomplies» [23].

3. La Contestation par la diplomatie roumaine des années 1970-1980 de l'acte commis par la dictature staliniste

Après les négociations du président roumain Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej avec Nikita Khrouchtchev, les troupes soviétiques se sont retirées en 1958. Un style nouveau de la politique en matière d'affaires étrangères pouvait être adopté dès lors, ébauché en avril 1964 et dans les années qui suivirent. Le Plan Valev a été rejeté, car l'effet aurait été la subordination de l'économie roumaine à une vision intégrationniste. De même a-t-elle été rejetée la théorie de l'appartenance du peuple roumain au monde slave, en faveur de la reconnaissance de notre latinité. Quant aux affaires étrangères proprement dites, les actes stalinistes abusifs ont été contestés, y compris l'appropriation en 1948 de l'Île des Serpents par l'URSS.

La diplomatie roumaine a contesté, pendant les années '70-'80 l'acte par lequel l'Île des Serpents «devenait territoire de l'URSS» [24]. J'ai personnellement négocié pour nombre de sessions dans une équipe où se trouvaient également Gheorghe Saulescu, Costache Ciubotaru, Iftene Pop, le Commandeur Emilian Munteanu et d'autres personnalités. Notre délégation démontrait que «l'acte de 1948 contrevenait au Traité signé à Paris, le 10 février 1947». Les représentants soviétiques changeaient en permanence d'une session de négociation à la suivante, et à chaque fois nous leur présentions les documents qui prouvaient l'appartenance de l'Île des Serpents à la Roumanie, insistant sur le fait qu'un «acte dictatorial, qui contrevenait au *Traité de Paix* de Paris signé en février 1947 par les représentants mandatés par l'URSS, n'avait aucune légitimité».

Il faut attester ici de la caution dont nous bénéficions de la part de notre gouvernement de l'époque dans la fermeté adoptée par la diplomatie roumaine. Sur la base des documents présentés par Ștefan Andrei - le coordinateur et par la suite le chef de notre action diplomatique -, Nicolae Ceausescu a dénoncé, devant l'Assemblée Nationale, «l'acte dictatorial de 1948, par lequel un territoire roumain avait été approprié par l'URSS», comme illégitime et contrevenant aux stipulations du *Traité de Paix* de Paris (1947).

L'autorité soviétique insistait pour imposer cet acte, car la possession de l'Île des Serpents avait des conséquences pour la délimitation de la zone maritime dans la Mer Noire [25].

L'acceptation du statut de l'Île tel qu'imposé en 1948, se traduisait par la réduction de l'espace maritime qui revenait de droit à la Roumanie. L'annexion de l'Île - territoire légalement roumain - par l'URSS signifiait donc «l'extension de la zone maritime de l'URSS jusqu'aux côtes du littoral roumain», un objectif militairement stratégique majeur.

4. Le Traité signé avec l'Ukraine en 1997, conclu conformément au concept de “sacrifices historiques”

Les traités de base entre les États sont des actes internationaux d'une grande importance. Ils sont nécessaires pour promouvoir et renforcer les relations de voisinage amical entre les co-signataires. Les négociations du Traité de base de la Roumanie avec l'Ukraine a ses particularités, car il s'adressait «à un État successeur de l'ex-URSS». La position de la Roumanie à l'égard d'un tel État a été exprimée dans la Déclaration du Parlement de la Roumanie sur le Référendum d'Ukraine du 1^{er} décembre 1991, affirmant «notre désir d'entretenir les relations avec l'Ukraine», avec une réserve toutefois, à savoir qu'en ce qui concerne la Bucovine du Nord et les provinces Herța et Hotin, le référendum «n'avait

aucune légitimité», telles territoires ayant été «abusivement annexés par l'ex-URSS», «alors qu'ils appartiennent de droit à la Roumanie».

Un acte dictatorial émis abusivement, comme l'a été celui dont on s'est servi pour annexer des territoires «appartenant de droit à la Roumanie», reste abusif jusqu'à son invalidation et la rétrocession des territoires annexés à leur possesseur légitime. Le caractère abusif d'un acte ne cesse pas s'il est hérité par un État successeur [26]. L'héritage peut seulement perpétuer l'abus et l'illégalité, avec toutes les conséquences sur les relations entre les États concernés; l'iniquité de tels actes a toujours été fermement dénoncée dans l'histoire.

Pour justifier son incapacité de défendre les intérêts nationaux de la Roumanie, le pouvoir politique instauré à Bucarest en 1996 a lancé le concept de «sacrifices historiques» [27]. Évidemment, un tel concept a seulement «prolongé l'injustice faite à la Roumanie et aux Roumains qui habitent les territoires annexés par le pouvoir staliniste».

Les «sacrifices historiques» ont servi au maintien des effets découlant des actes abusifs auxquels avait eu recours l'ex-URSS [28].

Contrairement à la position de la Roumanie adoptée le 28 novembre 1991, par la Déclaration du Parlement de la Roumanie sur le Référendum d'Ukraine du 1^{er} décembre 1991, stipulant qu'un tel référendum «était invalide pour les territoires abusivement annexés par l'ex-URSS», Bucarest a signé un Traité qui cautionnait l'abus staliniste et même le justifiait selon le concept de «sacrifice historique» [29].

L'éminent historien Florin Constantiniu relève combien il est dangereux d'admettre les effets d'un acte abusif «au profit d'un État héritier». On a indubitablement à faire à «une option déshonorante pour le pouvoir de Bucarest de 1997».

Le grand Socrate disait qu'«en aucune circonstance il n'est bon ni honnête de commettre une injustice», mais qu'il était encore «plus grave de cautionner les conséquences dévastatrices de l'injustice et de contribuer à les perpétuer».

L'Île des Serpents, La Bukovine du Nord, le territoire Herta et d'autres, annexés de manière abusive par l'ex-URSS, reviennent de droit à la Roumanie. Les gouvernants du pays ont le devoir de rappeler cette vérité et de s'engager par tous les moyens stipulés par les normes du droit international en faveur de la reconnaissance des droits du peuple roumain, car, ainsi que le mentionnait Jules Simon (de l'Académie française), «lorsqu'une cause est juste, tôt ou tard elle triomphera».

5. La Cour de la Haye a admis la juridiction de la Roumanie sur 79, 34% de la superficie en litige avec l'Ukraine

La superficie en litige avec l'Ukraine était de 12 700 km². En jugeant que l'Île des Serpents «n'est pas pertinente pour la délimitation des espaces maritimes entre les deux pays», la Cour a accordé à la Roumanie 9 700 km² du plateau continental et l'exclusivité de la zone économique, ce qui représente 79, 34% de la zone en litige [30].

Les efforts déployés par l'Ukraine afin de «démontrer» le fait que l'Île est habitée, ayant même une vie économique, avaient comme but l'appropriation des richesses présentes dans cette zone maritime, c'est-à-dire d'à peu près 100 milliards m³ de gaz naturel et des millions de tonnes de pétrole.

La Cour a accordé à la Roumanie, par la délimitation effectuée, 70 milliards m³ de gaz naturel et 12 millions de tonnes de pétrole [31].

C'est la responsabilité du Gouvernement de la Roumanie d'adopter les meilleures mesures, conformément aux principes et aux normes impératives du Droit International Public et des Droits

du Commerce International, afin que ces richesses ne soient pas aliénées, mais bien exploitées dans l'intérêt du peuple roumain, à qui elles reviennent de droit.

La décision de la Cour a été fondée sur : **1.** les normes générales du Droit international et **2.** les réglementations spécifiques adoptées par la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer [32]. Au cours des négociations de ces réglementations, la délégation roumaine a eu une collaboration fructueuse avec les délégations des États membres de l'Union Européenne [33]. Compte tenu du fait que l'Île des Serpents – territoire roumain – a été annexée par la force par l'ex-URSS, toutes les mesures ont été prises pour que les espaces maritimes dans la zone reçoivent un fondement juridique pour un partage équitable [35].

En même temps, une très bonne collaboration avec les États membres de l'Union Européenne a eu lieu concernant la réglementation sur le passage des navires militaires en mers territoriales. Il a été convenu que ce passage devra être inoffensif [36], la recommandation étant faite qu'une notification préalable à l'État riverain devra le précéder [37].

Présentement, des négociations ont lieu entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie en vue de la délimitation des espaces maritimes dans la Mer Noire.

En conclusion, la délimitation des espaces maritimes dans la Mer Noire s'est avéré difficile également à cause des richesses présentes dans les zones concernées. C'est ainsi que s'explique l'intérêt des États riverains de s'approprier des espaces maritimes aussi étendus que possibles, en ayant recours à maints reprises, pour ce faire, à des interprétations discutables des normes impératives du Droit International.

Notes

[1] Article 46, 1^{er} Alinéa du Traité de Paix de Berlin, entre l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, l'Empire Ottoman et la Russie, 1/13 juillet, 1878.

[2] *Ibidem*, Article 46, II^e Alinéa.

[3] L'Île Blanche, Léukè ou Achillèis.

[4] Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *La Mer Noire, des origines à la conquête ottomane*, Tome I, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 1988, p.142.

[5] *Ibidem*. Le texte original a été publié en français, comme «La Mer Noire: Des origines à la conquête ottomane», par Societas Academica Dacoromana, München, 1969.

[6] *Le Traité de Bucarest de 1812 et la Paix d'Adrianopolis de 1829*.

[7] *Le Traité de Bucarest de 1812*, G.F. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil des traités d'alliances de paix*, vol. I-IV.

[8] *Le Traité d'Adrianopolis de 1829*, G.F. de Martens, F. Saalfeld, *Nouveau recueil des traités, conventions*, vol. VIII.

[9] *Le Traité de Paris de 1856*, G.F. de Martens, Ch. Samwer, *Nouveau recueil général des traités*, vol. XV.

[10] *Le Protocole conclu à Paris, le 6 janvier 1857*, G.F. de Martens, Ch. Samwer, *Nouveau recueil général des traités*, vol. XV, pp. 493-494.

[11] *Protocole des Mandataires plénipotentiaires des Grandes Puissances, Conférence de Paris, 25 décembre – 6 janvier, 1857 (loc.cit. supra n. 10)*.

[12] *Ibidem*.

[13] *Ibidem*.

[14] La Commission du Fleuve, instituée par l'art.17 du *Traité de Paris*.

[15] *Le Mémoire de Ion C. Brătianu et Mihail Kogălniceanu*, de juin 1878, adressé au Congrès de Berlin.

[16] *Ibidem*.

[17] *Ibidem*.

[18] *Ibidem*.

[19] L'*Ultimatum* de juin 1940.

- [20] Le *Traité de Paix de Paris*, de 1947, Par.2, art.1, Traité de paix de Paris, 10 février 1947.
- [21] *Protocole pour la délimitation de la frontière entre la Roumanie et l' URSS*, Par.1, Annexe II.
- [22] Acte signé le 23 mai 1948, l'Île des Serpents, Par. 1.
- [23] *Ibidem*, Par. 2.
- [24] L'annexion de l'Île des Serpents par l'URSS: un acte contraire aux ententes du *Traité de Paix*.
- [25] L'acceptation de l'acte commis par la dictature staliniste implique des graves conséquences quant à la délimitation de l'espace maritime.
- [26] Le caractère abusif d'un acte dictatorial n'est pas effacé par la ratification de cet acte par un Etat successeur.
- [27] Le "sacrifice historique": une conception qui sert le maintien des effets découlant des actes de la dictature staliniste.
- [28] *Ibidem*.
- [29] La reconnaissance des effets d'un acte abusif en faveur de l'Etat successeur: une option inqualifiable.
- [30] La *Décision de la Cour Internationale de Justice de la Haye sur le différend entre la Roumanie et l'Ukraine concernant la délimitation du plateau continental et la zone économique dans la Mer Noire*, 3 février 2009.
- [31] *Ibidem*.
- [32] *Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer*, Art. 74, 83 et 121.
- [33] Y compris avec les délégations des États qui avaient des îles dont il fallait tenir compte dans le processus de délimitation des eaux territoriales.
- [34] L'équité étant juridiquement consacrée comme un critère obligatoire dans le processus de délimitation.
- [35] De sorte qu'il ne mette pas en cause la sécurité de l'État riverain.
- [36] Tommy T.B. Koh, *Déclaration à l'adoption de la Convention*, avril 1982.
- [37] Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un espace maritime important que la Bulgarie revendique par une interprétation douteuse des réglementations de la Convention et d'autres normes du Droit International.

THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SPECIFICS TOWARDS THE EU SUPPORTED NEIGHBORHOOD GRANTS SCHEMES

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Abstract

The paper concentrates on the project implementation (not the application process), with main efforts on several of the TA tasks. The review and update of guides for administrative and financial implementation. Counselling beneficiaries as regards to the preparation of reports. Respond on Beneficiaries’ enquiries as regards to the VAT, project activities, amendments and regulation procedures. Development of training curricula and development of training materials. Delivery of training seminars. Monitoring visits and hoc advice and coaching to the beneficiaries.

Keywords: Technical assistance, neighbourhood policies, EU finance, Consulting tools, Capacity building

INTRODUCTION

As reflected in the “Practical Guide”, enlargement countries are fully fledged members of FP7 and the CIP-EIP. Researchers and companies established in these countries can apply for any call published under these programmes. With regard to Structural Funds, candidate countries follow a very similar pattern of work to Member States when using their pre-accession assistance to support regional development, human resources and rural development. Advice listed below is therefore of relevance also to them. Advice given on Structural Funds Cross Border Cooperation is relevant for all enlargement countries cross border programmes with Member States and among enlargement countries themselves.

The objective of the paper is to provide insight on the process of expert assistance to potential Contracting Authorities and to grant Beneficiaries in the implementation and monitoring of CBC grant projects/contracts. The scope of the paper will identify the effective and efficient implementation of the grant contracts by the grant Beneficiaries that is in accordance with the undertaken contractual obligations (that includes- application of EU best practices, especially PRAG, proper grant implementation reporting, accurate financial reporting, etc.). Further it will increase the level of competences and capacity of the responsible staff in the beneficiary institutions for future independent implementation of the grant contracts. In the paper some recommendations on how to enhance the capacity for follow-up and monitoring the progress of awarded grants will be provided.

CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AND THE EU AID

The Member States of the European Union (EU) have been major players of the international aid architecture since the times of the Cold War and decolonization. At present, the EU comprises 27 Member States and an executive arm, the European Commission (EC). Collectively the EU is the largest source of official development assistance (ODA). In 2008, the fifteen EU DAC Member States provided US\$ 70.2 billion or 58 percent of total DAC ODA. Adding US\$1.2 billion from the remaining twelve Member States, total EU ODA amounted to US\$ 71.4 billion (OECD, 2008).

Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) is a key priority of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Its objective is to reinforce cooperation between Member States and partner countries along the external borders of the European Union. The CBC strategy has four key objectives:

- Promote economic and social development in border areas
- Address common challenges
- Ensure efficient and secure borders
- Promote people-to-people cooperation

A major innovation of the ENPI CBC is that there is a fully balanced partnership between the participating countries. This approach will allow both partner countries and member states to work together within a common management structure, applying a single set of implementing rules and sharing one single budget.

Regional and local partners on both sides of the border will identify common needs and priorities for activities that are most relevant to their local situation. The Paris declaration survey 2008 showed that while progress has been made, much remains to be done (An EU Aid Effectiveness after Accra, April 2009). All donors, including the EU, need to step up their efforts dramatically if they are to achieve the Paris targets. Within the EU, the EC is working on an “aid effectiveness road map” for 2009, giving a priority to the four drivers for change, agreed by the EU in the run-up to Accra: division of labor, use of country systems, predictability, and conditionality.

The cross-country dimension touches on the very political and institutional issues, where EU donors need to revise (mostly limit) their geographic concentration (e.g., darling countries vs orphan countries). This is highly political, as implementation would reduce the influence of member states in foreign policy in a number of countries. It certainly will take time to get commitments from big EU member states. A cross-sector division of labor is also sensitive and expected to be a medium-term goal. Although large EU member states, such as Germany, have announced their intention to review their sector engagements only very few donors, e.g. Denmark, have so far engaged in an in-depth sector concentration process. This is an issue which remains challenging for all the donors including the EU. But 8 EU donors exceed the target for the use of public finance management systems, and 7 exceed the target for country procurement. Use of country systems is certainly a two-way street where partner countries must do their part to deliver the necessary changes in order to facilitate the use of country systems by donors.

EU intends to increase the use country systems by providing assistance through direct budget support (general or sectoral). This is one of the reasons why it has decided to increase significantly the use of budget support in particular for ACP countries. Within the EU, five donors (the EC, the UK, Germany, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) provide a quarter or more of their ODA through program-based approach, including budget support. In 2007, Ireland delivered 42 percent of its aid through program-based approaches, excluding budget support (EC, Staff working paper on aid effectiveness after Accra. SEC 2009, 443; 8 April, 2009).

Looking ahead, the EU faces several challenges. First, Member States will need to deliver on their commitment to scaling up aid. This does not affect the EC, since the resources for development assistance have been already decided up to 2013. Despite the upward trend reported in 2008, significant political and budgetary efforts remain necessary to reach the individual and collective targets decided in 2005 to achieve the ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7 percent in 2015. To reach the collective target of 0.56 percent ODA/GNI in 2010, US\$28 billion additional would be required. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the crisis and the economic downturn will affect the Member States’ ability to scale up ODA.

The second challenge concerns the aid effectiveness agenda. The EU has taken ambitious decisions to fight fragmentation of assistance and proliferation of donors at the country level. In particular, its code of conduct on division of labor is a significant step toward achieving this goal, but much of the success would depend on strong political will. As far as the EC is concerned, some Member States may look to the EC to manage some of their scaled up aid, either through contributions to new trust funds which will be set up by the EC (like the Infrastructure trust fund for Africa) or through delegated cooperation in the framework of division of labor. Either way, the EC will need to demonstrate the added value of

channeling part of the increase of Member States ODA through its own mechanisms, rather than through other multilateral organizations.

Finally, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, may affect the way the EC delivers its development assistance going forward. While DG Development will continue to oversee development policy in particular for ACP countries, the new institutional setting involves the establishment of a European external action service and the appointment of a “high representative for foreign policy”, who at the same time functions as Vice President of the EC in charge of all external affairs. Under this setting, the new EC will be challenged to ensure complementary between development and foreign policy while keeping its promises on development aid and further enhancing the coordination of the EU development aid.

The Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) was introduced to the ENPI region in 2006 to short-term assistance and advice to Partner Countries as they implement their ENP Action Plans. It was initially set up in 1996 to provide short-term, targeted technical assistance to the candidate countries. It supports Neighbouring countries in the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is mainly demand driven, channels requests for assistance, and contributes to the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address problems at short notice. Assistance is given through expert missions, workshops or seminars and study visits.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TOOLS

The information in the chapter will be based on a real case of a project to which the author of the paper was a Team leader. It was an INTERREG III-A programme Greece – Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia into operation from 2007, including 2 regions from the Greek side (Central Macedonia and Western Macedonia), and on the side of the other country, the border to Greece municipalities. This Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) programme was implemented through grants. Under the ongoing CBC programme 14 projects have been selected and contracts signed with the beneficiaries. For the purposes of assisting the Contracting Authority (CA) – the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) office in Skopje and after September 2008 the Delegation to the European Commission (DEC) in Skopje and the direct beneficiaries – the 14 grant holders under the above CBC scheme in December 2007 a tender procedure for a framework contract was launched. The Polish company EPRD, winning the tender was assigned with the contract for “Technical Assistance for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Cross Border Cooperation 2004 and 2005 Grant Contracts in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”- the author had contractual relations as a Team leader to this company.

During project implementation, we concentrated our efforts on the following:

- Review and update of a Guide for administrative and financial implementation
- Counseling Beneficiaries as regards to the preparation of reports
- Respond on Beneficiaries’ enquiries as regards to the VAT, project activities, amendments and regulation procedures
- Development of training curricula and development of training materials
- Delivery of two first training seminars
- Delivery of two second training seminars
- First monitoring visits
- Second monitoring visits
- Ad-hoc advice and coaching to the beneficiaries

Those were organised into four main activities, namely: Activity 1 - Preparation of the administrative and financial guidelines for managing the projects; Activity 2 - Information and/or training sessions for the Beneficiaries (Grantees) in order to present the main requirements of the contract reporting requirements (technical and financial); Activity 3 – Serving as advice point for Beneficiaries; Activity 4 - Assist in technical and financial monitoring of the contracts.

Approaching the end of the project in January 2009, we consider our TA team performed strongly against the risks that arose and hindered partly the grant projects of the beneficiaries. Those were both exogenous – the tension between the two CBC countries and endogenous factors – like the lack of experience in grants project management and their financial management. It happened with the positive intent and understanding of the new (after Sept. 2008) CA – the Delegation to the European Commission in Skopje.

The first Axis of this programme includes two Measures pertaining to Transport Infrastructures and the Improvement of External Borders Security. The second Axis includes three Measures pertaining to Aid to Business Activities, Development of Alternative Forms of Tourism / Highlighting and Promotion of Cultural and Tourist Resources, Human Resources and Promotion of Employment. The third Axis includes three Measures pertaining to the Improvement of Quality of Life and the Protection, Promotion and Management of the Natural Environment, Protection of Health, and Co-operation among Educational Institutions for the Promotion of Cross-border Co-operation. The Programme supporting cross-border co-operation at the external borders of the EU, between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, began during the programme period 2000-2006, in accordance with the Communication of the EU on the implementation of INTERREG Programmes and the Structural Funds Regulations. An additional objective was to further enhance and integrate the use of ERDF and CARDS resources.

The Neighbourhood Programmes was jointly financed by the two financial instruments, INTERREG and CARDS, and allows for joint implementation procedures. The procedures of the two financial tools / instruments will be combined in the implementation of the Neighbourhood Programmes. Therefore, the Neighbourhood Programmes will be implemented on the one hand through different types of financing, and from the aspect of management through joint structures. The implementation of the programme is based on the European Union's Directives on the implementation of the Neighbourhood Programmes.

The grant amounts ranged between Euro 286 410 and 45 000. Availability of co-financing estimated in percentage of the cost of project is obligatory and is specified in the relevant contract. In principle minimum 10% of co-financing is required by the awarded applicants. If implementation of the Action involves the conclusion of contracts by the Beneficiary, the contract-award procedures and rules of nationality and origin set out in Annex IV to the grant contract shall apply. The tendering, evaluation and contracting of the projects implemented through grant schemes are the responsibility of the relevant Beneficiary.

Considering that the current TA project is a framework contract, there was initially no project fiche provided by the CA and respectively no methodology prepared by the Contractor, as a part of the tender application documents. Thus the assumptions were established by the team of experts ad hoc and were namely: Good project management and financial practices among the beneficiaries; Available at a competitive and quality level sub-contractors for the required by the beneficiaries services, works and supplies; The active engagements of the respective institutions at state level in FYROM.

Just like with the case of the assumptions, the risks were identified in the course of the project. Among them were: the tension between the FYROM and Greek side at governmental level; the limited financial independence of the municipalities in FYROM; the lack of experience of the majority of the grant beneficiaries both to the CBC aspects and the aspects of the grant management.

The flexibility towards the identified risks was assured with the full mobilisation of expertise and the very close contacts of the TA team to the needs and changes to perform of the beneficiaries. In the cases of the tension between the countries, were found ways of additional engagement of the target groups on the Greek side and through their interest the involvement of the partner organisations (mostly municipalities) was assured and participants for the joint events.

Quite challenging was the way to solving the issues of the limited financial independence of the municipalities combined with their limited resources. Those efforts combined additional contacts explanatory notes prepared for the sake of the beneficiaries and formal and informal meetings to representatives of the governmental bodies responsible for the budgetary regulations in the country finally gave a positive result.

The efforts for the flexibility of the previous risk were strongly related with the lack of the grant project management of the municipalities - beneficiaries. To the case, the TA team started from the very beginning of its engagement with focusing on the issue of the full costs coverage by the beneficiary before the reporting and requesting a balance payment – it was through the Guide designed and distributed, the trainings performed and the monitoring sessions. At the end of August and September 2008, when the reaction of some of the municipalities became serious enough not to reject the advice, but to look for solutions the TA team strongly focused the attention of the CA representatives and the different bodies at governmental level in FYROM.

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The efforts in the initial period were concentrated on the updating and fine tuning for the purposes of the CBC Greece – former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2004/2005 grants schemes of the administrative and financial guidelines for managing projects. In the same time, due to the fact that most of the beneficiaries' projects were already in their 5th or 6th month of implementation, ad hoc

started the individual visits and the information on the progress of the beneficiaries (oriented towards a monthly progress template). The assistance was dominated by issues on advice to grantees in sub-contracting procedures. For achieving unified understanding and benchmarking to the good practices among the projects, information training sessions for the Beneficiaries (Grantees) were holden out. At them, the main requirements of the project implementation and reporting were presented.

After clarifying with the Guide and the initial trainings again the scope of activities and the management practices the Beneficiaries needed to strengthen a round of monitoring visits to each of the grant holders was performed. In parallel, throughout the TA project period advice on request of the beneficiaries was provided. Following their progress and status both second monitoring, second joint training and individual coaching sessions were conducted in order to support the smooth finalisation and reporting. Regular consultations and co-ordination of activities happened with the CA.

The social factors are not directly to be influenced as the Contractor provided a TA to beneficiaries as municipalities and one enterprise promotion NGO, not to the direct target groups. If regarding the crosscutting gender and ethnics issues it must be clear that there was no reason for filtering in advance and providing quotas of the participants in the trainings delivered by the TA team. Though, almost equal was share of women and men. Similar was the case with the provision of advice – more in the financial management were women and more in the technical construction men. That corresponds to the structure of vocations inside the organisations of the beneficiaries.

All the beneficiaries represent municipalities and organisations where predominantly Macedonians live – the fact that their teams and active target groups are Macedonian is not a matter of worry as corresponds fully to the positions in the respective municipal authorities. In the municipality of Krusevo where a substantial part is the Vlahos, so is the project management team. In the team of the TA, all the experts as per the contract are unchanged – a TL from a EU country (Bulgaria), two of the experts Macedonian and one of them Vlahos, all men. In the case we don't have a beneficiary – but a provider of services, the decision is with the CA – the EAR at that moment. No case of ethnic discordance ever happened inside the team so far; neither of the experts entered or caused situations of encouraging or discouraging any gender or ethnic groups.

The biggest effect that supports the sustainability of the project results will be the fact that the Beneficiaries improved (in some cases built) their management of grants capacities. The majority of them were municipalities that never experienced grants projects up to now and with the upcoming new grants schemes under IPA they will prove much more experience and will widen their absorption capacity. Much of the effect goes also to the sub-contracted suppliers of services, works or goods from the country. They also learnt a lot and may prove themselves in the bigger (as volumes and content) tenders under the IPA.

The problem experienced by most of the beneficiaries with the tension between the country and Greece is mostly at the administrative level. In fact in none of the 12 municipalities where the projects are implemented there is a Greek minority, so direct affecting of the tension between the countries was not produced. All of the 13 project beneficiaries continued to express their positive stance towards their Greek partners and most of them managed well despite limited contacts by some of the municipal authorities on the Greek side (reported by our beneficiaries).

The current TA project was a fully service provision framework contract and the characteristics of the expertise were not oriented towards provision of economic and financial analyses. Still the promotional elements in the grant contracts of the Beneficiaries – such as joint meetings with Greek partners, materials for the tourism attraction, improvements in the infrastructures, events focusing on filed of interest for the businesses and the tourists, will prove in the period after the end of the single projects.

Lessons from the TA to the CBC Implementations in the South East Europe

The experience of the Beneficiaries (mainly Municipalities) with the management of grants funded by CARDS – in terms of appropriate rules and regulations of PRAG was rather limited. Most of the grant

holders are also first time CBC projects beneficiaries. On the other side, their Greek partner organisations had work only according to the procedures of the INTERREG and as the type of projects were not mirror, were not a party in the technical and financial reporting.

In view of the ex-post approval mechanism and the limited experience of the municipalities in EU grant management, it has been decided to provide technical assistance to both the Beneficiaries and the Contracting Authority to ensure appropriate management of the grants. Another important aspect is the monitoring of project progress through reliable reporting, the achievement of objectives and additionally the co-financing issue.

In parallels to the assistance to the beneficiaries (the grant contracts), the TA team shared its experience to the established in Strumica Joint Technical Secretariat. It happened in a way of direct training to the beneficiaries to which the experts from the JTS were invited and actively participated and as ad-hoc advice. Thus the assigned for the CBC with Greece expert from the JTS could directly meet most of beneficiaries. One point the TA team could not help was to provide the documentation it received from EAR in Skopje to the respective JTS expert. This documentation was confidential and the access to it was only to the team of the TA.

During the whole period of the TA, as a side effect happened the raising of the awareness among the current and potential beneficiaries for the essence and the mechanisms of the cross-border cooperation projects. It happened in times of political tension among the country and Greece, which made it even more useful. The Contractor (the TA team) transferred know-how and provided on-the-job practical training to the grant beneficiaries staff in charge of implementation of the awarded grant project under the CBC scheme and executed other specific tasks directly for the Contracting Authority (Reporting, Contract Addendums advice, etc).

The Contractor supported and monitored (in close co-operation with the EAR/ DEC staff) the grant Beneficiaries, as listed in Section 2.3, during project implementation, by providing the following services: Preparation of the administrative and financial guidelines for managing the projects; Holding information and training sessions for the Beneficiaries in order to present the main requirements of the contract reporting (technical and financial); Throughout the contract period, the Contractor served as advice point for Beneficiaries; Assisting in technical and financial monitoring of the contracts; Holding regular consultations and co-ordinating activities with the Contracting Authority, particularly concerning the interim and final evaluation of the awarded grants.

Within the inception period, the Contractor proposed other activities that added to the above specified services following the actual requirements of the Beneficiaries, i.e. the group seminars with experience sharing among the different project teams and options for the JTS expert to share at the training.

The following indicators were identified and according to them the monitoring process was implemented:

1. Objective
2. Progress
3. Results (indicators) and quality
4. Budget
5. Risks
6. Commitments for financing after implementation
7. Project or grant management systems
8. Partnerships

9. Procurement

10. Required permits obtained, or other legal issues

11. Compliance with EU visibility guidelines

12. Any other findings of significance for monitoring

The on-site monitoring was preceded by examination of the whole documentation of the certain grant contract, the minutes of meetings and monthly updates which reflect activities development. During the visits the check was on-spot to the technical as well as financial progress of the projects.

The monitoring reports were provided to the CA after the certain round of visits and followed the template designed at the beginning of the TA project. The monitoring visits were:

- assessing the compliance between planned and implemented activities;
- assessing the level of partners' involvement in project development;
- evaluating projects' management;
- checking whether the planned internal monitoring activities are in execution;
- focusing on the results achieved and namely on their comparison with expectations stated in Logical Framework matrix and the Application form;
- evaluating how transparent for local communities the projects are, what the level of involvement of the target groups and other interested people is. From this point of view, the promotional activities will be one of the targets of monitoring.

The interviews and documents revision were the main monitoring methods during the site visits. Documents revision included examination of lists of participants, minutes, copies of media coverage, and copies of publications or CDs, other written evidences. Monitoring paid special attention to EU visibility requirements.

Interview followed a standardized form /questionnaire/ in order to obtain information on outputs and results that is comparable with the other projects under the CBC Program. At the same time, the experts of the Contractor provided the project teams with consultancy and advice /upon solicitation/ about reporting, public relations, transparency, promotion. Monitoring visits collected all kind of information about beneficiaries' recommendations and observations /ex., obstacles to implementation, new ideas etc. / that will contribute to the overall program evaluation.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the volume of the TA project was limited some lessons learnt were identified as:

- In the applications evaluations process the elements of the volume and complexity of the activities to be referred carefully against the financial resources allocated
 - Some of the cases with beneficiaries showed misbalances from the originally approved budgets – with overvalues activities against undervalued
 - Some TA or a separate campaign to the potential sub-contractors of the beneficiaries – at a local level there are good capacities of small suppliers of services, good and works, but with practically no experience in PRAG procedures
 - Some of the tendering proved unsuccessful due to lack of interest among the local business society

As a first EU grant scheme for many of the municipalities, at a central level a decision had to be found (and it was) for provision of temporary state budget transfers/credits to the special project accounts of the beneficiaries. Those temporary transfers might be automatically cleared back to the state budget at the moment the EU balance payment is effectively received at that account

The beneficiaries – it concerned all the 12 municipalities with projects in that scheme had expectations the final balance payment, to be transferred after the advanced payments of 80% are amortized, but they were not under the EU PRAG 2006 rules

Just then the transfers over the final 20% of the payments to be made effectively. Regarding the possibilities for similar project sectors and follow-up measures, from the stand point of this CBC TA projects it will be useful to consider: the TA to start in the period of promoting the grant schemes and before project application campaign and the services to include design of methodology for the applications evaluation. It is very much probable in the frames of IPA the number of CBC beneficiaries to raise substantially – both in different regions and in volumes of finance. Instead of increasing substantially the volume of the TA, it might be focused more on support to the JTSs and the CA and just in single cases directly to the beneficiaries; Training of future evaluators and monitoring experts for the CBC at a governmental level; Training of future project managers/administrators among the range of potential beneficiaries will prove more efficient before the contracts start and even before the application to the projects is in process.

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FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION: AN OVERVIEW

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Abstract

The accession of Bulgaria and Romania brought the EU border to the Black Sea. It also increased the challenges and opportunities for the wider Black Sea region. Within this context, cooperation between the EU and the countries of the Black Sea region in various fields became inevitable but rather a complicated task due to the different political, economic and social conditions in each country. The development of the relations with the EU is reinforcing the integration of the wider Black Sea region within the European architecture. The authors make an overview of the main EU cooperation instruments such as: the European Neighborhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. EU has to place more attention to its regional policies parallel to the enlargement negotiations. Consolidation of regional cooperation can positively contribute to a sustainable political and economic relationship between the EU and its neighboring countries and reduce regional disparities.

Keywords: *EU enlargement, European acquis, regional development*

INTRODUCTION

The last rounds of the European Union enlargement were a challenge facing all the components in the EU institutions, the member states and the candidate countries due to the number of acceding candidates, the area and population and the variety of different histories and cultures.

A comprehensive Wider Europe policy on a new neighborhood, developed to confront global challenges and maintain peace and stability on the continent, represents a coherent approach of an enlarged Union to the neighboring countries through the mix of bilateral and multilateral activities.

The concept of Wider Europe implies further continuation of the process of expansion of the European Union and the prospects and incentives for membership in a long time perspective. The proximity policy focuses mainly upon the strategic challenges in the relationship between the enlarged European Union with its land and sea border neighbours in north, east and south overlapping the Black Sea region.

The Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, proposes that the European Union should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood with whom the European Union enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations. It stresses that over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours. The enlargement gives new impetus to the effort of drawing closer to the 385 million inhabitants of the countries who will find themselves on the external land and sea border, namely Russia, the Western Newly Independent States and the Southern Mediterranean [1].

Following the enlargement, the border of the EU is today to the Black Sea region occupying an important part of the Black Sea coastline. To this end, cooperation between the EU and the BSEC in various fields became inevitable but rather complicated task due to the different political, economic and social conditions in each country and their status with regard to the EU.

Due to its geographical proximity and considerable potential with its rich natural and human resources the European Union also has particular economic interests in the Black Sea region. The EU enlargement to the East and subsequent development of its bilateral policies towards the neighboring countries and the adjacent regions will gradually strengthen the EU involvement in the Black Sea area and will draw the European Union more involved into the affairs of the Black Sea region.

The Black Sea region takes as a basis the European Union standards and norms in elaborating their policies for improvement of economic management, strengthening political institutions and sustainable development. On the other hand, credible and predictable path for the Black Sea countries towards integration with the EU through the EU policies towards the non-member countries such as customs union or single market generate expectations and provide a strong stimulus to reform.

The main objectives of the Black Sea region countries are a stable, open and pluralistic democracy governed by the rule of law underpinning a prosperous market economy with modern political, economic, social and administrative structures. The internalization of the political and economic criteria leading to a political stability and sustained economic growth will be beneficial to the whole continent.

Currently, the Black Sea countries are in different positions regarding their relations with the European Union. *Bulgaria, Greece and Romania* are full-fledged EU member states; within the framework of the Decision of the Brussels European Council of 16-17 December 2004 the accession negotiations with *Turkey* were officially opened at the Intergovernmental Conference on 3 October 2005; *Albania and Serbia* are potential candidate countries for EU accession following the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council and have Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU; the EU relations with *Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova* are governed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and they are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); *Russia's* cooperation with the EU is based on "common spaces,, covering priority issues although in 2008 EU-Russia Summit launched negotiations on a New EU-Russia agreement, which should update and replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. As for *Ukraine*, it is a priority partner country within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and in 2009 the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was adopted in order to prepare a new Agreement.

EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY

In March 2003, the European Commission presented its Communication "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours". This communication described the new challenges and opportunities facing the enlarged European Union in relation to its new neighbours. EU enlargement has led to the creation of new EU border areas, in which economic, political and social disparities will create new challenges. The new changes in the geopolitical position of the European Union affect not only the EU institutions and Member States, but also have profound implications for the regions [2].

This set out a proposal for the development of a new financial instrument to support cross-border and interregional co-operation between regions within the EU and their counterparts along the external borders. Both the policy and the programming concepts for the European Neighbourhood Policy have been further developed in the Commission's Strategy Paper issued in May 2004 which launches the proposal of jointly agreed Action Plans, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs, capacities and common interests, covering the following areas:

- commitments to specific actions which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy;

- commitments to actions which will bring partner countries closer to the EU in a number of priority fields [3].

The Strategy Paper on the ENP was preceded by the Commission Communication on Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, adopted in March 2003, which states that Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.

The document refers to two major objectives that EU should follow in its existing neighborhood policy towards these regions:

- to work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration; intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbors;

- to anchor the EU's offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform [4].

- The European Neighbourhood Policy covers the following countries of the Black Sea region: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia. It does not apply to those countries that have a perspective of becoming members of the EU in the foreseeable future, such as the countries of the Western Balkans. Turkey is also not included, since it has a different framework of cooperation with the European Union.

- The European Neighbourhood Programmes have the following priorities:
 - promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas;
 - working together to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime;
 - ensuring efficient and secure borders;
 - promoting local 'people-to-people' type actions.

The European Neighbourhood Policy aims at reinforcing ties with neighbouring and partner countries, through new forms of cooperation and assistance and was elaborated to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the opportunity to participate in various EU programs.

At the same time, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine participate in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, introduced by the EU in relation with its neighbours.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) between the EU and the six Black Sea states constitute the framework for the relations between the EU and these countries outlining the basic principles of bilateral political and economic cooperation on various levels.

Therefore the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are not only signed by the EU but ratified by each Member State in accordance with the national laws. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are in certain cases supplemented by separate EU strategies and instruments. The PCA represents a so-called mixed agreement with the EU itself as an international legal entity and each of its Member States. This structure stems from the matters covered by the agreements some within the competence of the EU, others shared between the community and its member states or just appertain to the member states only.

The main aims of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are to develop closer relations through regular dialogue on political issues; to foster trade and investment; to provide the groundwork for mutually beneficial economic, social, financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation; to consolidate democracy, to complete the transition to a market economy.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements evolve in any direction depending on the current developments. The PCAs remain in effect for a period of ten years, after which it is automatically renewed unless either party wishes to terminate it. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements require that its provisions are observed and implemented through monitoring structures, namely, the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Committee and a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. The Cooperation Council meets once a year and is formed from members of the Governments on the one hand, and of the members of the Council of the European Union and members of the European Commission on the other. The Cooperation Council supervises the implementation of the PCA. The Agreement assigns the Cooperation Council a number of specific tasks, but it has the right to discuss any subject of mutual interest and make recommendations. The Cooperation Committee meets at senior civil servant level. It must prepare the meetings of the Cooperation Council and ensure continuity between its meetings. The Presidency of both the Council and the Committee is chaired alternately by a country and the European Union.

The main assistance instrument under the PCAs has been the Tacis programme, which as from 2007 is replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – a single financial support programme for European Neighbourhood Policy partner countries and Russia.

The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument is aimed at focusing more on political and geostrategic objectives and is intended, first and foremost, to help implement the ENP actions plans, having as strategic objectives the following: supporting democratic transition and promoting human rights, the transition towards the market economy, the promotion of sustainable development; and policies of common interests (antiterrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict resolution, the rule of international law, etc.).

The Commission proposed two innovative mechanisms:

- the Neighbourhood Infrastructure Facility – to use the UE funds to leverage a larger amount of money from the international financial institutions, thus providing a higher level of financial support in order to amortize the costs of transition;
- the Governance Facility - represents an additional source of ENP money awarded to those partner states who make the greatest progress in their reforms, a recognition of the efforts made in order to attain the reform objectives.

The legal basis for Russia-EU relations is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994, which came into force in December 1997 for an initial period of ten years. The main idea of the Agreement is that it established a new political dialogue between Russia and the EU, based on the mutual understanding that the two parties are strategic partners.

Strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union has a particular importance. The Country Strategy Paper 2007-2010 is based on the premise of the following Common Spaces as the defining expression of EU policy towards the Russian Federation: the Common Economic Space aiming to make the EU and Russia's economies more compatible to help boost investment and trade; the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice covering justice, home affairs, the rule of law and human rights; the Common Space on External Security aiming to enhance cooperation on foreign policy and security issues; the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture aiming to promote scientific, educational and cultural cooperation. Stable cooperation is now underway between Russia and the EU in order to work out the necessary implementation plans for these common spaces. That implies active interaction in the field of fight against organized crime, illegal migration, establishment of a visa-free regime, joint actions in international affairs such as fight against international terrorism.

Currently the EU and Russia are preparing a new agreement according to the new economic, political and social conditions. It can be noted that Russia doesn't belong in the group of the ENP partner states, wishing a relation with the EU based on equality, partnership and non-interference in internal affairs [5].

In May 2011 the European Commission and the High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy reviewed the European Neighborhood Policy and proposed a new approach in order to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries of the neighborhood in order to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links. The new approach will be based on mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The aims of the new ENP strategy are: provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy and other civil and human rights such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion; support inclusive economic development in order to trade, invest and grow in a sustainable way; strengthen the two regional dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Southern Mediterranean, in areas like trade, energy, transport, migration; provide the mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these objectives. The partnership will develop with each neighbor on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives and additional resources of up to EUR 1242 million until 2013 will be added to the already EUR 5700 million planned for the period 2011-2013 [6].

BLACK SEA SYNERGY

In its Communication of 11 April 2007 [7], the European Commission launched the concept of Black Sea Synergy as a new regional cooperation initiative of the EU, complementary to the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU-Russia relations and accession negotiations with Turkey.

The document stresses that the primary task of Black Sea Synergy is the development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the European Union. It also emphasizes that the Black Sea Synergy focuses on the issues and cooperation sectors which reflect common priorities and where EU presence and support is already significant, namely, democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, managing movement and improving security, “frozen” conflicts, energy, transport, environment, maritime policy, fisheries, trade, research and education, science and technology, employment and social affairs and regional development.

The Black Sea states remain the EU’s main interlocutors, whether in a bilateral framework or during discussions at the regional level. The Commission is not proposing the creation of new institutions or bureaucratic structures. The bulk of the EC’s contribution will continue to be provided through the established sectoral programmes managed by the Commission.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union and the Wider Black Sea Area gathered in February 2008 in Kyiv to initiate the Black Sea Synergy Cooperation and adopted a Joint Declaration that highlights that the primary task of the Black Sea Synergy is the development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the European Union [8].

The European Commission presented in 2008 the Report on the first year of implementation of the Black Sea Synergy [9], proposing several actions to be further explored and promoted, such as:

- long-term, measurable objectives in fields like transport, environment, energy or maritime safety;
- sectoral partnerships the Black Sea Synergy participants in order to facilitate the realization of projects;
- the frequency of ministers meetings should reflect concrete needs.

The Report concludes that the initial results of the Black Sea Synergy reveal its practical utility and potential. Also, it demonstrates that continued progress requires the consistent and growing involvement of a growing number of participants, including the EU Members States and the countries of the Black Sea.

One of the key achievements of the Black Sea Synergy is the fact that it managed to put the Black Sea region as a single distinct policy area of the EU, raising the policy profile of the region and thus paving the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole. Also, the Black Sea Synergy has the potential to play a positive role in improving the good neighborly relations and the

climate in the region through the implementation of its cross-border cooperation programmes and initiatives [10].

The Black Sea Synergy is a concrete initiative aiming to reinforce the Europeanization process in the region and represents the creation of a new distinct EU policy area. Although it is not an independent Black Sea strategy, as the broad EU policy towards the region is driven by its three different strategies, the Black Sea Synergy nevertheless raises the policy profile of the region and paves the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole [11].

ASTER PARTNERSHIP

In March 2009 the European Union decided to add the Eastern Partnership as a new part to the European Neighborhood Policy, in order to boost the strategic cooperation with the six former Soviet Union republics that are neighboring the eastern border of the European Union - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - and to help them with their integration in the EU. It should be mentioned that Belarus participation will depend on the further development of the EU-Belarus relations [12].

The Eastern Partnership is a policy based on a differentiated approach with each partner and dedicated to supporting each individual country to progress in its own way and at its own speed [13].

The Eastern Partnership summit in Prague on 7 May 2009 marked the launch of this initiative, having as main goals to accelerate political association, to establish deep and comprehensive free trade areas between the EU and partner countries, and to take measures for gradual visa liberalization, leading to a visa-free regime.

The Joint Declaration adopted **in Prague [14] states that the** Eastern Partnership will be based on commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to market economy, sustainable development and good governance. The Declaration also envisages four thematic platforms in several areas of common interest: Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; Energy security; Contacts between people. These platforms will serve for open and free discussion and will allow target oriented sessions.

In September 2011 the Second Eastern Partnership summit was held in Warsaw and renewed the political commitment of all participating countries to the main objectives of the Partnership. The Declaration [15] adopted by the participants recognizes the European aspirations of the partner countries and states their readiness to fully integrate with the EU internal market and to create a common economic area in the future.

The Eastern Partnership consists of multilateral cooperation measures that help the partner countries legislative approximation with the EU acquis, as well as of bilateral cooperation measures through Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas.

At the same time, the Eastern Partnership brings together the civil society, parliaments and regional and local authorities by establishing the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, the EU-Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly – EURONEST and the Conference of regional and local authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

On January 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Union officially entered the Black Sea region. Until then the EU institutions had been very reticent over expressing any interest in the Black Sea region as a region of policy relevance. But after 2007 the enlargement the issue could no longer be a question mark given the obvious new legitimacy for the EU to take an active interest now in the region and equally obvious demands by the two new member states for it to do so [16].

The first action towards establishing a coherent policy framework towards its new neighbourhood was the Black Sea Synergy in 2007, which represented an intermediary step towards an EU strategy for the region. After the launching of the Black Sea Synergy, the Commission adopted the Eastern Partnership in 2008, following a Polish-Swedish proposal regarding the need to consolidate the presence of the European Union in its neighbourhood that called for the creation of a new policy that would further continue the bilateral cooperation and would establish a framework for multilateral cooperation [17].

The problems of the Black Sea region like the environmental disasters, organized crime, frozen conflicts, demographic changes, have the potential to spill over in the EU area, threatening a disruption of the smooth functioning of the EU's economy and its political stability. After the last enlargement and with the planned future enlargements, these problems acquire even greater emergency for the EU, which must find ways to avoid and escalation of various problems before they affect the member countries [18].

The strong attraction of EU membership provides powerful incentive for domestic reforms consolidating political and economic stability and sustained economic growth. The activation of the assistance programmes has reduced economic disparities. Approximation with the basic principles and standards of the EU paves the way towards peaceful, secure and prosperous coexistence and responds to common challenges, as well as serve as a model for countries having differing historical and cultural backgrounds.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and several countries of the Black Sea (the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) have established viable partnership based on shared common values with regard to democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and civil rights.

Apart of the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU relations with the countries of wider Black Sea region imply the enlargement process towards Turkey and other potential candidate countries of the South-Eastern Europe and the strategic partnership with Russia. Although all these frameworks are founded on bilateral relations with separate Black Sea countries, following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania with the Black Sea as the EU external border, the Black Sea region becomes a zone of increased interest and action for the EU. Active involvement of the three Black Sea countries that are the full members of the EU will strengthen the establishment of a proper EU policy towards the Black Sea region.

There are various concerns within the EU due to the differences between the EU border regions with the candidate and neighbor countries in terms of socio-economic development, especially on how to bring together as harmoniously as possible the enlarging European Union and the rest of Europe. That is why the current policies in the EU have been directed for elimination of possible dividing lines on the European continent.

An enlarged European Union will add more weight to the Europe's impact upon the global affairs enhancing the stand of the EU as a global actor confronting the challenges. Within this framework the European Union and the European Parliament discussed the Wider Europe policy as a coherent approach of the Union towards the neighbors in north, east and south overlapping the Black Sea region opening up prospects and incentives for membership in a long time perspective.

The cooperation founded on the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support provide an appropriate framework for the gradual integration of a number of Black Sea countries into the wider Europe.

Over the last years the Black Sea countries have reached substantial success towards transformation into the market-led democracies, open political systems, strong civil society and efficient institutional infrastructure. It was created a solid framework for the conduct of economic policies and significantly fostered economic integration process. But the variety in the levels of the national economic

development, reform programmes and pace of economic growth further deepens the already heterogeneous character of the Black Sea region in terms of development levels and with the countries that are integrating into the EU, more obvious becomes the differences in living standards.

The differences between the EU border regions with the candidate and neighboring countries in terms of socio-economic development may generate justified concerns resulting from the existing conditions, but at the same time attractive benefits can be expected from the creation of an integrated economic area. For this reason and in order to secure proper cooperation on the new frontiers, the EU has to place more attention to its regional policies parallel to the enlargement negotiations. Consolidation of regional cooperation can positively contribute to a sustainable political and economic relationship between the EU and its neighboring countries and reduce regional disparities.

The Black Sea region involving three large actors on the European continent (Russia, Ukraine and Turkey) is an important part for the policy strategy for the EU as point of interest in energy transit route and important transportation crossroad. Therefore, in spite of a tendency to give priority to the relations with the Black Sea countries at bilateral level, there is a necessity for institutional relations and special regional policy towards the Black Sea region, especially after the last rounds of the EU enlargement.

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PROMOTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE REGION OF THE BLACK SEA THROUGH ENGLISH LANGUAGE CULTURE

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Abstract

The decline followed by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the XIX century favored the penetration of another superpower in the region of the Black Sea: the British Empire. Its settlement of diplomatic relationship with the newly independent countries is followed by a strong deliberate influence of the Western culture pattern in this area which is still going on. The article highlights the historical perspective on the culture patterns shift through language learning as an instrument of political and economic influence. The presentation is limited to Romania as an object of influences of British culture under its geo-political position of the Black Sea.

Keywords: *education, cultural values transfer, language learning, political openness, economic and social development*

Motto: “The instrument of cultural influence is education which has proved to be effective when choosing” [Iorga, N., 1971]

I. THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL APPROACH

The research on cultural values issue have been carried out and gathered in a remarkable theoretical infrastructure which made possible the development of understanding, evaluation, and planning the economic and political development.

The major phenomenon of intergenerational shift in the cultural values [1] is considered to be the measure of the far-reaching micro-and macro-economic and social developments which bring out new political options and institutions specific to the original culture. [2].

The political events that made Romania independent from the “sick man of Europe” (name given to the Ottoman Empire by Alexander the I, Russian czar, when referring to its fall) – is a follow-up of the direct access of the oppressed countries to the Western culture through the French, German and ultimately, the British starting from the late XIX century.

1. Foreign Language Learning – economic and political implications

The process of cultural value transfer is facilitated by the direct contact through the instrument of language which can be valued politically and strategically. The language is the missionary of a culture which brings out its social, professional dimensions and economic standards resulting from its specific historical evolution. Moral and religious principles, work motivation, attitude on education, family, and gender are language imbedded and make it an open door to the culture values transfer.

Cultural awareness makes room to the flexibility attitude, tolerance and cultural intelligence which translate gradually into economic and political option developments. An appropriate focus on language learning will result in a silent revolution [3] of economic development and a major

intergenerational shift in cultural values. The process of cultural values transfer is interrelated with the economic growth rate and socio-political changes. The professional adult need to communicate effectively will speed up the process of change and replacement of the native cultural values with the ones imbedded in the foreign language that they need to learn. The gradual replacement of the older generation with the younger generation will also contribute to the change of the native cultural patterns regarding the work motivation, religious beliefs, social attitude, political choice, etc. that will bring new patterns in economic evolution. An appropriate language learning political strategy will result in far-reaching, long lasting global political and economic implications.

2. The environment of education policies and the Romanian cultural break-through

Education is the most effective way of promoting and making culture values work for the human society. Science has proved the close relationship between behaviors, attitudes and shared knowledge as sources for growth and development. [4]

The spread of the historical cultural movements in Europe in quest for nation-wide aspirations, reflect the common underlying process of human development and choice.

The European Enlightenment ideas were a source for the development of a powerful cultural movement in Romania of the XVIII and XIX century in social, economic and political areas. The country breaking away from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 and its independent political strenghtening were paved by the cultural environment and elites in the two principalities which contributed to the raise of awareness of the Romanian cultural identity and to the broad understanding and enhancement of education for social, economic and political performance. The steps taken for the development of a new educational approach led to the rapid change of cultural and political patterns. The union of the two principalities followed shortly.

Primary education became mandatory in Muntenia (1853) and Moldova (1834); in 1859, which made Romania take the lead in Europe, as this aim was carried out in 1877 in Italy, in 1892 in France, in 1870 in great Britain, 1874 in Switzerland, 1879 in Bulgaria, 1868 in Hungary. [5] A university was set up in Iasi in 1860 and another one in Bucarest. (1863)

But the social educational effort to split away from the pre-modern backward stage was not fully successful but until the late XIX century when coherent change and reform developed a strong social layer of qualified human resources and an intellectual elite was successful in raising cultural identity awareness. Nicolae Iorga said that *“schooling aims full training of man to face, understand and rule over his life challenges, make him smart and champion, but honorable, kindhearted, and gentle”* which translates into *“Romanian formal schooling aims reforming its cultural identity but also matching the western European cultural values and standards”*. [6]

II. LANGUAGE TEACHING AND CULTURAL PROMOTION: AIMS AND FACTS

The new educational, social and economic growth patterns needed the match of language professional communication. The openness to the French culture and education brought about by the Romanian students in France, made French a language subject for the secondary school curriculum development. Arsenie Vlaicu was the first to search and publish specific language pedagogy for the Romanian schools in 1899. [7]. Language syllabus improvements were permanently added by Romanians specialized in French teaching and learning to meet the specific communication needs of school girls and boys. French keeps the first rank of working language until early XX century when English replaces it due to the tremendous development of business relationship with the British Empire. French and German come to limit their learning and use to the cultural development area and to the technique professions area. [8]

The language teaching environment developed in Romania opened opportunities for new cultural patterns as language is rooted in culture [9] and language learning involves culture awareness and

openess. [10] The language trained young Romanians were prepared to open up to further cultural otherness.

2.1. The French and the Germans ...

Gustav Stresseman was the first European politician who noticed France making use of culture to promote its own interests beyond borders... by drawing Eastern and Central European countries to the Western cultural patterns through French language schools and through educating their young generations in French Universities [11]. The French involvement into making Romania approach the Western cultural patterns started even before the defeat of Russia in the Crimeea War (1853-1856) and the settlement of Romania as a country in 1859 by supporting French language education as a subject for secondary public and private schools and by educating young Romanians in French universities. The French cultural strategy was soon copied by the Germans and both of them contributed to the education of the Romanian 1848 revolution intellectual elite.

Romanian professionals chose to be educated and trained in French and German language countries, making foreign cultural patterns available for the Romanians and contributing to the development of new socio-professional infrastructures in their country. (*see appendix*)

Thus, it is the late XIX and early XX century that Romania split away irreversibly from the underdeveloped social, economic and cultural values, by changing responsibility behaviors and attitudes.

2.2. ... The British, the last, but not the least...

The linguistic and cultural strategy used by the French in Romania was soon adopted by Germans, Italians and finally the British in the early XX century. Lord Curzon is the one to establish the first British supporting body in Romania for the British working abroad, belonging to the Foreign Office. In 1934 it turned into a British committee for foreign relationships, then it finally became British Council in 1935. [12]. Our country was one of the first four countries in the world where the British Council set up an overseas office, along with Egypt, Portugal and Poland. [www.britishcouncil.org]

The institution development is also the result of an active admiration of Romanian personalities that supported the British culture and civilization in our country. Viorel Tilea (1896-1972) was a remarkable Romanian politician who helped settling a British culture body in Cluj in 1923, and another one in Bucarest. [13]

In 1937 Sir Reginald Hoare, who was appointed minister plenipotentiary in Romania, brought into being the first English school affiliated to the British Council aiming to “raise the spoken English quality in Bucarest” [14]. The school blazed the path to the young and adult Romanians wishing to learn English in Bucarest, 20, Slatineanu Street. The king Charles II himself witnessed the event. The first 150 students enrolled raised to 300 to the end of the school year, inspite of the French school neighbourhood, which had 1000 students in 1938. The school provided access to British culture and civilization lectures: History of literature, from Chaucer to Wordsworth and History of modern English literature, from Tennyson to modern times. [15]

The English language school developed tremendously due to the young people who were employed in either British commercial exchanges or businesses and were in need to communicate in English effectively. The following year, the Italian students of the British Council in Rome numbered 1000, but in Romania the number of students outgrew to 2, 300, in 75 groups. There were 8 British teachers and 2 Romanians [16]; it is also this very year that the university in Bucarest opened an English language department. The association between Foreign Office and British Council activity aimed to pull down the German nazi propaganda in South East Europe by inviting British culture personalities to lecture on carefully selected issues: Robert Bruce (*Are the British Soapy?*); Sir Ronald Stors: (*T. Lawrence*)

The activity of the British Council in Bucarest was not limited to language teaching and lectures on British culture. It also carried out research projects on sociology, history, geography and economic

development areas and produced Guns and Butter pattern research projects to identify Romanian effective development goals. [17]

The British Council extended its activity in other Romanian cities before the WWII, but for a short time: Cernăuți, Iași, Timișoara, Cluj, Constanța, Galați, Iași. They closed their doors to the public when king Charles II stepped down and the military dictatorship of Major General Ion Antonescu set in 1940.

2.3. British Council in Romania: before... and after...

The Romania political landscape is fully changed after the coup d'état on August 23, 1944, when the communist regime set in by the Soviet military occupation. The new regime used terror as an instrument of the political power inside and outside the country, even against the former allies. Any contact to the culture and the civilization of the Western countries was under political terrorist control, and obviously, Great Britain turns into a danger for the regime. The Anglophiles in Romania become subject of political police harassment. In spite of the political constraints that followed, the British Council went on its activity of British culture dissemination. The conclusion of the cease fire agreement between Romania and the Allies in September 1944, in Moscow was the starting point for the full, invasive control of the (Soviet) Ally Commandment in the Romanian political and social life.

From that moment on the activity of the British Council was practically limited to book lending only to the enrolled who were closely chased by the political police, till 1989. Occasionally, it also organized movie and information program watching, which were commented in Romanian and Russian to avoid suspicion and tensions.

In 1947 Foreign Office attempted to refresh the activity of the British Council in Romania by appointing Tom Murray as a manager [18]. He dared to employ some natives who were arrested 18 months later for "espionage for the British". The follow up was that the Romanian Foreign Affairs ministry of that time, Ana Pauker, ordered the closure of the British Council and the removal of the British lecturer at the university in Bucharest. In the official statement she declared that Romania needs "lecturers in technical domains, medicine, agriculture, but not in philosophy" The arrest session of school young people and students which were enrolled with the French institute library in Iași, Cluj, Timișoara și Craiova, Italian Institute library, British Council and American Library made everyone understand the position of the new Romanian political regime against the Western cultures. The decision to close all the western institutions in Romania, taken by the secretary general of the Romanian Working People Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, as he declared them to be "espionage and propaganda offices under the cover of book borrow and movie".

The Romanian government refusal for two British offers for medical help, made the British government understand that any expectation for cooperation between the two countries was closed.

In 1963 it was a short time of political softening when the two countries decided for a cultural exchange program under the management of David Williams as a cultural attache of the British legation. [19] The most important event of the program was the Royal Shakespeare Company tour. It was the time to shift off from the USSR Stalinist policy.

2.4. Economic Impact of the Educated Romanian workforce in the XIX-XX century

The raise of cultural awareness, tolerance and openness is a source of coherent and predictable economic development, political understanding and cooperation that make human society evolve towards autonomy, equality and democracy.

The very few facts provided show the opportunities that cultural openness, education and language instruction can develop.

In 1912 the Romanian prince George Valentin Bibescu opens the first military and then, civil airplane pilot school on a former air field where the French pioneers Louis Bleriot in 1909 and Romanian Aurel Vlaicu in 1910, make their public flights by planes built by themselves. In 1920 a joint-venture

Romanian-French air company is set, the first in Europe to transport goods and passengers across Atlantic. In 1923 Baneasa airport is built, the second ranked in Europe, which is renewed and extended between 1947-1952.

Carol Davila, a scientist doctor and inventor, studied medicine at the University of Paris, and he organized the first military medical service and the public health system in Romania. He founded, together with Nicolae Kretzulescu, National School of Medicine and Pharmacy in 1857, the medical health care system in Romania, and the Red Cross organization. Davila is also credited with the invention of the Davila tincture for the treatment of cholera and some specific medicine for digestive disease.

The domain of biological, geological, anthropology and speology research were developed by Emil Racovita who participated on the Belgian Antarctic Expedition Belgica, together with Roald Amundsen, the Belgian physicist Emile Danco, the Polish geologists Henryk Arctowski and Antoni Boleslaw Dobrowolski and the American physician Frederick Cook. He was a teacher of the university of Cluj where he settled and developed the first department of biospeology in the world.

The Romanian Darwinist biologist, Grigore Antipa continued his professor work and studied the fauna of the Delta Danube and the Black sea. He was the founder and the director of the Bucharest Natural History Museum, which now bears his name. Additionally, Antipa was a specialist in zoology, ichthyology, ecology and oceanography. He was a university professor, member of the Romanian Academy and several other academies in the world. He was the first Romanian to explore the North pole.

The first Romanian forensic scientist, and criminal anthropology, the founder of the Institute of Legal Medicine in Romania in 1892, and of the modern medico-legal system, was one of the most prominent personalities in this field of activity in Europe at that time. He was the first to develop the concept of the morgue and created the term "legal medicine" and the medical domain forensic research.

Anghel Saligni a Romanian descendant of a French immigrant family from Alsace, pursued engineering studies In Germany and then contributed to the construction of railways in Saxony He was a founding member of the Bucharest Polytechnic Society (the precursor to today's Bucarest Polytechnic Institute and was even appointed a Minister of Public Works. In 1892, he was elected a member of the Romanian Academy, and he served as its president between 1907 and 1910. He drew the plans and built the first mixed-use (railway and highway) bridges in Romania, but his most important work was the King Carol I Bridge over the Danube that became the longest bridge in Europe, and the third longest bridge in the world. The structure was famous for its era, competing with Gustave Eiffel's engineering works. He also planned and built the first silos in the world made of reinforced concrete, which are preserved today in Constanta, Braila, and Galati. In the port of Constanța, he designed a special pool to allow oil export and two silos for grain export.

CONCLUSIONS

The two Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, had their own specific historical development. In the early XIX century their economy were broadly agrarian, with poor industry and urbanization, and a scarce commercial exchange based on high cost raw materials export and expensive end products import. The two social classes – the archaic nobility and the peasantry – were typically structured by the feudal relationship. The low professional profile of the Romanian population and the cultural values typical for the South-East at the end of the XVIII century, made the economic and cultural gap even deeper, if considering the place that the industrial revolution provided for the Great Britain and other Western European countries.

The Black Sea border area between civilizations could be successfully wiped out by the late European Enlightenment influences brought to the Romanian principalities by the French, German and British cultural values influences that were implemented by the educational and law reforms of the early XIX century. The academic education in the most developed European countries and the language-

embedded cultural values learning had their own contribution to the cultural shift that brought a thorough and radical change of mentality concerning the intellectual elite. It was the time to understand and make cultural values a bridge between civilizations through education and making Romanians professionals.

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Appendix

ROMANIAN PERSONALITIES XIX-XX century			
Name	Life	Domain of activity	Education
Titu MAIORESCU	1840-1917	law, philosophy, writing politics	Berlin; Paris
Nicoale IORGA	1871-1940	history	Paris; Berlin; Leipzig
P.P. NEGULESCU	1872-1912	philosophy	Berlin; Paris
Spiru HARET	1851-1912	mathematics	Paris
Dimitrie GUSTI	1880-1955	philosophy; sociology	Paris; Berlin
Petre ANDREI	1891-1940	sociology	Berlin
Constantin BRANCUSI	1876-1957	the arts of sculpture	Paris
Nicolae GRIGORESCU	1838-1882	the arts of painting	Paris
Nicolae TITULESCU	1882-1941	politics	Paris
Take IONESCU	1858-1922	politics	Paris
Alexandru ODOBESCU	1834-1907	humanities	Paris
Theodor AMAN	1831-1891	the arts of painting	Paris
Emil RACOVITA	1868-1947	biology science	Paris
Mihail KOGALNICEANU	1817-1891	politics	Berlin
Vasile ALECSANDRI	1821-1890	humanities	Paris
Gherghe TATARASCU	1886-1957	politics	Paris
Carol DAVILA	1828-1884	mediciner	Paris, Sorbona

Mina MINOVICI	1857-1933	forensic doctor	Paris, Sorbona
Anghel SALIGNI	1854-1903	engineer	Paris, Berlin, Posdam

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE BULGARIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

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Abstract

Growing challenges facing agriculture in Europe (including Bulgaria as a member of the Community) impose its continuing reform in terms of its alignment with the higher demands of society for health food, protection of rural areas, ensuring the production of high-quality products and maintain farm income. The Common European Agricultural Policy of the European Union focuses on efficient and sustainable agriculture.

Keywords: *Agricultural sector, European Union (EU), Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), reform, Bulgaria*

INTRODUCTION

Common Agricultural Policy consists of European legislative acts and practices aimed at implementing a common (single) policy on agriculture. Conducting agricultural policy is regulated in Art. 32-38 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

The decision to Common Agricultural Policy, adopted at a conference in Stresa in 1958, a system for maintaining the prices of agricultural products is eliminated tariffs on trade in these products between Member States of the European Community (EC) and creates a common external tariff.

This paper aims to study the instruments and mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union and its application in the Bulgarian agricultural sector in the conduct of European agricultural policy. [9]

FOUNDATION OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

European agricultural policy play a significant role in the Community. On the one hand, agricultural land and forests occupy approximately 91% of its area. On the other hand, the Common Agricultural Policy enables the European Union, to cope with major challenges in several aspects, namely:

1. Ensuring a safe and quality food to consumers;
2. Environmental protection;
3. Adapting to the changing international trade rules.

Fundamental Principles of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union are as follows:

➤ ***Unity of market***

This principle is expressed in a free trade within the Community based on common (uniform) prices. Such uniform prices are not market as it is formed under the influence of the market mechanism. They are determined annually by the Council (Commission proposal).

➤ ***Priority Community (community preferences)***

This is generally dictated by the importance of foreign trade in agricultural goods to the Community. By this principle, European production is covered by imports from third countries from fluctuations in world prices.

➤ **Total financial responsibility**

By this principle all Member States jointly participate in the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. For this purpose form a common budget.

Initially this budget is funded by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and currently consists of two separate Funds: the European Agricultural Fund for Guarantee Fund and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

➤ **Setting up a common market**

In essence, the Common Market Organisation (CMO) [10] is a set of measures which the European Union on the one hand to regulate the marketing of agricultural products, on the other hand, to support farmers' incomes.

The legal basis for implementation of the Common Market Organisation is Regulation (EC) № 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organization of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products („Single CMO Regulation”).

The European Union recently functioned 21 common market organizations (covering about 90% of agricultural production), which at present are united into one. [1]

Growing challenges facing agriculture in Europe require continuous reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in terms of its alignment with the higher requirements of public health and food quality, preservation of rural areas and ensure a fair standard of living for farmers. From this position the objectives of European agricultural policy can be combined into two:

- Supporting the competitiveness of European farmers at world level;

Encourage the development of rural areas (mainly those in which GDP is below 75% of European Union average).

The role of the common agricultural policy consists in replacing the national systems of customs duties, import quotas and minimum prices of harmonized system of free trade in agricultural products within the Community and general protection on imports of agricultural goods from third countries. Market rules are limited to *three organizational principles*:

- Market rules to maintain prices by providing a guarantee of placement.
- Market rules for total protection from external competition from third countries conducted by the duties.
- Market rules providing direct additional aid.

Interventions for the protection of producers of commodities consists in using several **methods**.

Method of intervention purchases or puncture method by which the purchased quantities provide supporting effect.

Method of compensation payments (used for non-essential industries - tobacco, oilseeds, etc.).

By **methods that restrict the offering** is intended to limit the sales of certain products above certain quantities.

Practical Common Agricultural Policy in the European Union has existed since the early '60s, due to the presence of deficits in most markets for food products. This system quickly show its drawbacks in terms of surpluses of agricultural commodities. It marks, however, various stages of evolution.

Classical Period (1962-1972) The policy of the early '60s can be traced in two respects: firstly it affected consumers who pay higher prices, and - very quickly overcame the shortfall after the Second

World war. Used instruments of the common agricultural policy is reduced to a common mechanism consisting in the use of: guaranteed prices, import charges and compensatory export subsidies.

Reform of the stabilizers (1985-1990) The - With the Green Paper [11]- a consultation document, place the guidelines for future development of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The mechanism of action of stabilizers consists in that when production exceeds predetermined by the European Commission number, the level of funds to support the sector is automatically reduced. A key element of EU policy for the period 1988/89 prices are restrictive.

The aim of **the reform Mc Sherry (1991-1997)** is to adapt the mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy to the situation differs substantially from that in the '60s on through for the first time was reasonably recognized the inability of the system to maintain the prices of agricultural goods both in income support for farmers and lead to better balance the markets.

More positive results attempted by introducing a complex system of administrative control are expressed as: reduction in intervention stocks; limiting the areas sown, reduction of guaranteed prices.

The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy is associated with international trade in agricultural goods, conducted on the basis of the Uruguay Round negotiations under the **GATT** (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The transition from a state of deficits to surpluses in many sectors of agriculture determined the increase in exports to third countries in order to stabilize the markets in Member States.

Fischler reform („Agenda 2000”) The objectives of reform are aimed at: promoting farmers (by increasing product quality, not quantity), production of organic products, developing farming, friendly environment. The main goal of reform is the transformation of farmers into entrepreneurs.

Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of 2003 aims to support the agricultural sector and rural development. The proposed system integrates all existing direct payments a producer receives from various projects in a single payment. The reform aims to strengthen the market orientation of farmers who are leading in demand and customer requirements.

With so-called. **“Health Check” of 2008** aimed at modernizing, simplifying and streamlining the Common Agricultural Policy in terms of new challenges facing European agriculture: climate change, better water management and biodiversity protection.

In terms of the objectives of the **new Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union** and trends reformed Common Agricultural Policy („Europe 2020”) [2] seeks its restructuring into three aspects:

1. Ensuring food security;
2. Environmental Protection;
3. Ensuring sustainable rural development.

Thus farmers will increase their competitiveness in terms of ensuring optimal use of resources from one country. On the other hand, this is a prerequisite for obtaining high quality food at reasonable prices from European consumers.

After public consultation in 2010 on the future Common Agricultural Policy, participants are united around three main objectives: [3]

1. Viable food production;
2. Sustainable management of natural resources and action on climate;

3. Maintaining the territorial balance and diversity of rural areas.

1.APPLICATION OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY THE EUROPEAN UNION IN BULGARIA

The theme of the challenges facing the agricultural sector in Bulgaria in the second decade of the twenty-first century in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union is particularly relevant at present in view of the ongoing cardinal changes in the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector, which require a completely new organization of ongoing agricultural policy in the country.

In negotiations with the European Union Chapter 7 - "Agriculture" was opened for Bulgaria on March 21, 2002 and officially closed on June 4, 2004. From the moment of accession to the Community Bulgaria complies with European legislation.

The main objective of the Bulgarian government is a complete market restructuring of agriculture and increasing the competitiveness of agricultural production, which is able to grow in a strong competitive pressure on the European market. Difficulties being experienced by the agricultural sector in the pre-accession period are caused by the restructuring of the Bulgarian agricultural sector.

Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of 2003 aims to support the agricultural sector and rural development. In this regard, top priority, which is defended by the Bulgarian government is successful absorption of EU funds in the Community (including the European Agricultural Fund for Guarantee Fund, which financed market support and direct payments and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural rural areas, aimed at financing rural development).

The main instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union market support to farmers and direct payments, which form the first pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the politics of rural development (second pillar).

In negotiations with the European Union, Bulgaria is an opportunity as was given to 10 new member states, instead of applying the Single Payment Scheme (SPS - Single Payment Scheme - SPS), to apply the payment per unit area (SPEP - Single Area Payment Scheme - SAPS). It is a basic scheme for farmers. [4]

Programme for Rural Development 2007-2013, reflects the national strategy for rural development through a package of measures, grouped in accordance with the axes defined in the relevant Community regulations. The total budget for the Programme for Development of Rural 2007-2013 is EUR 6 341 million leva (3 242 million €), of which 5089 million leva (2 602 million €) are from the European Union and a 236 million leva (632 million €) - the state budget.

Resources to conduct the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union for the period 2014-2020 amounted to 386.9 billion €(the first pillar - €281.8 billion for the second pillar - 89.9 billion €). Further provided are 15.2 billion €, of which € 2.5 billion from the European Globalisation Adjustment of €3.5 billion crisis fund, €5.1 billion for research and innovation. [5]

There are four key instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy - namely, direct payments, market measures, rural development and horizontal regulation for enhanced content with the general provisions of the two pillars.

Financing of market measures is as follows: The crisis in agriculture - 3.5 billion €(financing of intervention measures, export subsidies and emergency measures), as well as 2.7 billion €/ year from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund - to finance sectoral market marks.

The creation of a single scheme of direct payments (primary payment scheme), which will apply to all Member States since 2014 and will replace the existing Single Payment Scheme of the area and Single Payment Scheme. This will be the basis of entitlements allocated to national or regional level to farmers based on the eligible hectares during their first year of implementation.

So-called. "Green" payments are not subject to gradual reduction and cap. They constitute 30% of the national ceiling for direct payments and supplement payment for eligible hectares under the basic payment. [6]

The European Commission introduced a gradual (progressive) reduction and cap payments to Bulgaria amounts to 11 million € Saving possibility for our country and Romania to provide national co-payments in 2014 and 2015 in addition to the basic payment scheme.

The maximum amount of national co-payments that Bulgaria will be able to provide for 2014 - 150 186 thousand and €71, 024 thousand, €2015 maximum amount of national co-payments for cotton Bulgaria should not exceed 2014 - €556, 523 and for 2015 - 295 687 €

The amount of coupled payment for Bulgaria can not previshava10% of the ceiling.

A direct payment for cotton (Bulgaria, Greece, Spain and Portugal) per hectare of eligible area. The eligible area must be land designated by the Member State for cotton production. For Bulgaria it is a cotton base area - 3342 ha and 661, 79 €/ ha payment for 2016.

Farmers holding payment entitlements allocated in 2014 to meet minimum requirements (pay over 100 €/or 1 ha) may choose to participate watts in a simplified scheme for small farmers.

Small farmers are exempt from the so-called agricultural practices. "Green payments", but must comply with the requirements of cross compliance.

In accordance with the Commission on March 3, 2010 "Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth" - strategy "Europe 2020" policy for rural development should integrate key policy objectives and be compatible the main policy objectives for economic and social cohesion in the Treaty on European Union. [7] Presented are six priorities for rural development, to offer up-to cross-cutting objectives of innovation, environmental mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

CONCLUSION

Everything stated here allows us to deduce the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) of implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union:

Strengths of implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union:

- to ensure the sustainability of food supply;
- production of high quality products;
- provide healthy food to the public and ensure farmers' incomes;
- encouraging the development and preservation of rural holding of free trade within the Community uniform prices;
- protection imports from third countries;
- the implementation of subsidized exports to third countries;
- making the farmers and other entrepreneurs.
- *Weaknesses* of implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union:
 - high costs of conducting the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union
 - support of farmers discourage them,
 - high costs for food, does not provide income for small farmers;
 - intensification of production,
 - there are differences between the EU-12 and the EU-15 in implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union
- need to modernize, simplify and streamline the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union and others.
- *Opportunities* of implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union:

- effective and sustainable agriculture,
- market-oriented agricultural sector,
- improving the competitiveness of agricultural production;
- acceptable standard of living for farmers;
- protection from fluctuations in world prices,
- the elimination of imbalances in supply and demand,
- attracting young farmers, stimulation employment and entrepreneurship in rural areas and other.
- *Threats* of implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union:
 - strong competitive pressure on the European market,
 - ongoing reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union;
 - adapt to changing international trade rules,
 - to regulate the market of agricultural products,
 - the difference in payments in the EU-12 and EU-15 is a prerequisite for uncompetitive;
 - difference in economic and agro-climatic conditions of the various regions and Member States, climate change and others.

Challenges to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union require reform is aimed at making European agriculture more dynamic and competitive sector that contributes to achieving the objectives of the strategy “Europe 2020” - namely, promoting sustainable , smart and inclusive growth. [8]

„The European model of sustainable agriculture” (policy, consistent with cost by agricultural expenditure in the financial framework until 2013, aimed at improving the Common Agricultural Policy) is to achieve sustainable development, high quality health and methods for environmentally sustainable production.

Bulgaria is included in all European support schemes for producers. Joining the Community provides access to the markets of current Member States, while access to funds for rural development. For our country it is not only possible to obtain investments in agriculture and manufacturing, but also the basis for economic growth.

The implementation of European Union legislation, with mandatory higher sanitation will contribute to improving the quality and competitiveness of the Bulgarian agricultural production. European Union membership leads to policy coherence for agriculture.

To meet basic needs and above all to ensure food supplies and required the state to pay special attention to production, export, import, offer the most important food and supply the population with the necessary products

On the one hand, agriculture is a strategic industry that requires government intervention. On the other hand the application of economic instruments and mechanisms to support agricultural market distortion and have a negative impact on consumers. This requires the application of economically sound measures in agriculture.

The global economic crisis requires a review of proposals for conducting future European agricultural policy. From this position may require application of existing mechanisms and instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union.

European agriculture can be defined as a multifunctional activity:

- Modern and competitive agricultural sector, with leading positions in global markets - the main exporter and largest importer of food;
- Sustainable and efficient agricultural sector that uses safe, comply with environmental and production methods providing quality products that meet users' needs;

- The agricultural sector serves rural communities, reflecting their rich tradition and diversity and ensure the survival of the countryside as a place to live, work and visit;

- European agricultural policy includes income support for farmers and encourages them to produce high quality products demanded by the market, help them to develop additional ways to improve their business in harmony with the environment.

EU membership leads to greater predictability and consistency of policy on agriculture and therefore prices. The Common Agricultural Policy is flexible and in tune with reality, which must function, the changes are not surprising or arbitrary, as sometimes happens with national policies.

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LA STRATEGIE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE POUR LA REGION DE LA MER NOIRE: ENTRE LA SYNERGIE PROGRAMMEE ET LA PRUDENCE ASSUMEE

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Résumé

Malgré l'adhésion de deux riveraines de la Mer Noire à l'Union européenne en 2007 et l'adoption par l'Union, dans la même année, de la Synergie de la Mer Noire, initiative européenne destinée à la région pontique, l'impression demeure souvent que l'approche de l'UE quant à la région reste ambiguë et prudente. Le but de cette recherche est tout d'abord d'examiner les raisons de cette prudence, par exemple les attitudes différentes, voire divergentes, des acteurs de la région à l'égard de l'Union européenne et la potentielle concurrence entre différentes initiatives et politiques de l'Union concernant son voisinage oriental. Aussi, la recherche propose une évaluation des conséquences possibles de cette approche sur la région et sur les intérêts de l'Union.

Mots clé: *espace pontique, synergie, rapprochement, politique de voisinage, voisinage orientale, géopolitique*

1. L'élargissement de l'Union européenne et la redécouverte européenne de la région de la Mer Noire

Après la fin de la guerre froide, il a fallu attendre presque deux décennies, trois vagues de l'élargissement de l'Union, quelques conflits gelés et/ou brûlants et le danger de dépendance de gaz russe [1] pour que l'Union européenne prenne la conscience de l'émergence dans son voisinage orientale d'une région distincte – la région de la Mer Noire - qui est particulièrement importante pour protéger et promouvoir les intérêts de l'Union. Ces intérêts ont été bien mis en évidence dans des nombreuses études académiques et non-académiques consacrées aux affaires européennes et pontiques. Une excellente synthèse de ces intérêts ont réussi quatre chercheurs suédois dans une recherche publiée en 2006 [2]. Cette étude a bien relevé quatre aspects d'importance cruciale pour l'Union quant à la région de la Mer Noire: la stabilité régionale et la gestion des conflits; la promotion des institutions démocratiques et de l'Etat de droit; l'assurance de l'approvisionnement avec les ressources énergétiques (notamment les hydrocarbures); et la lutte contre la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme, y compris le contrôle des flux migratoires transfrontaliers.

Mais la prise de conscience relativement tardive [3] de la part des dirigeants de l'Union et des Etats membres quant à l'importance de la région de la Mer Noire a été accompagnée par la découverte d'une réalité géopolitique extrêmement complexe et déconcertante. Ainsi, les Européens ont découvert qu'en dépit de la rhétorique de la coopération régionale utilisée par les acteurs locaux, de l'existence de l'Organisation de la Coopération Economiques de la Mer Noire et d'autres initiatives de coopération régionale, la région de la Mer Noire reste toujours une zone très hétérogène du point de vue économique, cultural, social et politique, marquée par des clivages et tensions chroniques et par des intérêts, approches et options politiques et géopolitiques divergentes des Etats de la région [4].

Dans cette perspective, l'Union a rencontré ici une Fédération de Russie très déterminée à protéger son *voisinage proche*, y compris le monopole de l'acheminement du pétrole et du gaz du bassin caspien et d'Asie centrale vers l'Europe centrale et occidentale et la quasi-hégémonie de la navigation militaire dans la Mer Noire. En ce qui concerne ce dernier aspect la Turquie s'est avéré l'allié naturel de la

Russie, grâce aux réglementations de la *Convention de Montreux relative à la navigation par les détroits de Bosphore et Dardanelles*. D'ailleurs, les deux Etats mentionnés ci-avant par leurs poids économique, politique, militaire et de population détiennent les rôles principaux dans le processus de «régionalisation émergente» de l'espace pontique et dans la gestion des enjeux et des défis de la région. A coté de ces deux acteurs principaux du jeu régional, les autres pays ex-communistes et/ou ex-soviétiques, riveraines ou non à la Mer Noire [5], ont aussi essayé à parcourir leurs chemins indépendants de transition postcommuniste, de modernisation économique et politique, de coopération internationale et d'intégration régionale. Ces Etats, plus ou moins faibles, ont réussi à ajouter beaucoup de complexité au dessein géopolitique de la région pontique à cause de leurs opinions, souvent différentes des options proposées par Moscou. La présence de la Grèce, ancien membre de l'Union européenne, sur la scène pontique donne aussi de nuances au tableau général de la région de la Mer Noire.

De plus, un élément supplémentaire à la complexité du paysage géopolitique pontique est fourni par les approches plutôt différentes, sinon divergentes par rapport à celles des grands acteurs locaux, des grands acteurs extérieurs, comme les Etats Unies, la Chine, et l'Union européenne [6].

D'ailleurs, l'Union européenne même a préféré, en se confrontant avec une situation géopolitique si hétérogène et compliquée, de développer une gamme étendue de modalités de coopération, en fonction des aspirations et des attentes des différents acteurs de la région pontique et, bien sûr, selon ses intérêts. Entre les solutions de coopération, choisis et proposés par l'Union européenne aux pays de la région pontique, ne manquent pas les différentes formules de partenariat, y compris de partenariat stratégique, et de rapprochement, y compris la candidature à l'adhésion et même l'intégration à l'Union, pour certains pays de la région. Le résultat de cette option flexible de l'UE a été une certaine fragmentation ou le moins une perception de fragmentation et de faiblesse de l'approche européenne en ce qui concerne la région de la Mer Noire.

Par conséquent, au moment de l'adhésion à l'Union européenne de deux riveraines de la Mer Noire, la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, en 2007, l'impression demeurait souvent que l'approche de l'UE quant à la région reste fragmentée, ambiguë, faible et insuffisante.

2. La Synergie de la Mer Noire : une non-réponse européenne sage aux défis et aux enjeux de la région

Face aux demandes accrues des deux nouveaux membres riveraines à la Mer Noire – Bulgarie et Roumanie – et au nécessité d'action pour sauvegarder ses intérêts, l'Union a décidé finalement, dans la première partie de 2007, d'agir et de proposer une approche politique officielle à l'égard de la zone pontique.

Mais, malgré le besoin régional d'une stratégie d'action européenne forte, engagée et globale qui devrait prendre en considération toutes les aspects du dossier pontique [7], l'Union a préféré une démarche moins ambitieuse qui pourrait, selon l'analyse présentée au début du document qui a lancé cette démarche, mieux répondre à la complexité géopolitique indéniable de la région.

La formule choisie par l'Union - la Communication de la Commission Européenne au Conseil et au Parlement Européen nommée *La Synergie de la Mer Noire* [8] - a tenté d'harmoniser les attentes minimales ou inexistantes des pays comme la Fédération de Russie à l'égard de la présence et de l'implication de l'Union dans les affaires pontiques, les sollicitations les plus hautes des pays comme la Roumanie ou la Bulgarie et les intérêts à long terme de l'Union quant à la région de la Mer Noire, y compris sa préoccupation de maintenir les meilleurs relations avec tous les pays de la région.

Finalement, au lieu d'une stratégie politique, l'option subtilement contournée par la Commission, i.e. l'Union Européenne [9], l'approche européenne formulée dans *la Synergie* propose une modalité d'implication peu engageante, toujours ambiguë et très flexible.

Pratiquement, malgré les espoirs créés par une initiative tellement généreuse par sa dénomination, la *Synergie de la Mer Noire* est plutôt un inventaire des problématiques, des enjeux, des défis, des initiatives, des actions et des programmes déjà déroulés ou en phase de déroulement par l'Union dans la région, ou par les pays de la région, sans proposer ou avancer aucun nouveau plan d'action ou des nouveaux instruments de soutien financier ou non-financier destinés à appuyer la mise en œuvre de l'initiative.

Même si le texte de la Communication de la Commission, approuvée par le Conseil, le Parlement Européen et le Conseil Européen, a réussi à identifier et à analyser les treize principaux domaines où l'Union peut et doit soutenir la coopération régionale à la Mer Noire (la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, les conflits gelés, l'énergie, le transport, l'environnement, le commerce, la pêche, le développement régional, la recherche et l'enseignement, les sciences et la technologie, la politique maritime, l'emploi et les affaires sociales, la gestion des mouvements de la population) et les initiatives de coopération déjà existantes dans la région, on constate à la fin de la lecture du document et d'après une brève évaluation des actions menés par l'Union sous l'égide de la *Synergie de la Mer Noire* l'absence de l'instrument de suivi et de la mise en pratique de l'initiative¹⁰].

Une simple feuille de route incluse dans le texte de la Communication aurait pu pallier cette absence et mieux stimuler et responsabiliser les structures de l'Union qui ont les compétences en matière de gestion des dossiers de l'action de l'UE dans la région de la Mer Noire.

En conséquence, si l'on tente à dresser un bilan à cinq années d'après le lancement de l'initiative on est contraint à constater que les résultats sont plutôt décevants. Sauf la réunion ministérielle de Kiev de février 2008, à laquelle ont participé les ministres aux affaires étrangères des pays de la région et des pays membres de l'Union européenne, et qui a officiellement ouvert l'initiative, le communiqué de presse de la Commission de 15 mars 2010 [11] qui a essayé de faire un bilan à trois années de la *Synergie* et qui a souligné le soutien de l'UE pour établir des partenariats dans trois domaines vitaux – énergie, transport et environnement – dans la région et à un récent communiqué de presse de la part du Commissaire Maria Damminaki, il faut reconnaître que la *Synergie de la Mer Noire* est restée une simple formule de l'Union d'encourager la coopération régionale par l'approche locale (le fameux *ownership*) et de maintenir une discrétion sage et une flexibilité appropriée quant à son engagement effectif. Le stade de réalisation du projet de gazoduc *Nabucco*, soutenu par l'UE, qui devrait traverser la région, est un bon exemple de la non-efficacité de l'engagement de l'UE. D'ailleurs la préférence de l'Union pour stimuler la coopération régionale par les initiatives des acteurs locaux c'est une option qui est bien réitérée dans le seul document de l'UE, mentionné ci-avant, qui a fait une évaluation de la *Synergie de la Mer Noire*.

Autrement dit, entre les intentions et les attentes des pays membres de l'UE qui ont beaucoup soutenu une implication forte de l'UE dans la région, notamment la Roumanie, la Bulgarie et la Grèce, et les résultats concrets de la *Synergie* est une distance évidente. Mais, il faut admettre que cette distance a été partiellement remplie par d'autres initiatives et politiques de l'UE relatives à son voisinage orientale, y compris à la région de la Mer Noire.

3. Initiatives européennes complémentaires et/ou alternatives à la Synergie

Les faiblesses plus ou moins évidentes de la *Synergie de la Mer Noire* ou la flexibilité de cette démarche, si l'on préfère la perspective officielle assumée à Bruxelles, ont laissé une espace de manœuvre assez large à d'autres politiques, initiatives et projets plus classiques de l'Union concernant la région de la Mer Noire et les Etats de la région.

Tout d'abord la «grande» *Politique Européenne de Voisinage (PEV)*, d'ailleurs la vraie stratégie de l'Union quant à ces alentours où s'inscrit en fait la *Synergie de la Mer Noire* même, a fourni un cadre général assez généreux de coopération, de financement et, finalement, de rapprochement des pays voisins, et une formule assez souple pour être convenable à tous les voisins orientaux de l'Union, y compris aux pays de la région de la Mer Noire qui ont été aussi visés par la *Synergie*.

Tout en ayant à la disposition un instrument propre de financement, un cadre juridique et de négociation très clair avec les partenaires, un plan d'action bilatérale très rigoureux, la *Politique Européenne de Voisinage* fournit aux pays de la région de la Mer Noire les moyens de soutenir leurs politiques de réforme et de modernisation de l'économie et de la gouvernance par une étroite coopération et concertation avec l'Union européenne, y compris par la possibilité d'une association à certaines politiques de l'Union.

De plus, pour mieux répondre aux attentes spécifiques et aux aspirations des certains Etats qui sont visées par la *Politique Européenne de Voisinage*, qui se trouvent dans le voisinage orientale de l'Union et qui veulent une modalité de coopération plus proche avec l'UE, et même la perspective d'intégration européenne, à la proposition commune de la Pologne et de la Suède, l'UE a lancé à plus haut niveau, ensemble avec ses partenaires de l'Europe de l'Est, en 2009 [12], à Prague, le *Partenariat Oriental*. En fait, c'est la dimension orientale de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage, tout comme *l'Union pour la Méditerranée* représente la dimension méridionale de la même politique.

Toutes les Etats de la région de la Mer Noire, sauf la Fédération de Russie, participent au nouveau partenariat qui offre une plateforme d'engagement *commun* et *multilatéral* des pays partenaires de l'Europe de l'Est, y compris du Caucase de Sud, de l'UE et des pays membres de l'Union, pour approfondir effectivement le processus de rapprochement et pour ouvrir le chemin pour le processus d'association à l'UE des partenaires. Contrairement à la *Synergie de la Mer Noire*, le Partenariat Oriental est fondé sur un engagement politique accru de la part des Etats membres et de l'Union européenne entière vis-à-vis de leurs partenaires orientaux, sur des structures de coopération institutionnalisée dans la formule de quatre plateformes thématiques, sur le renforcement du cadre bilatérale par l'ouverture des négociations pour conclure des accords d'association entre l'UE et les pays partenaires et sur l'augmentation des ressources financières de l'Union européenne mises à la disposition pour soutenir l'initiative.

Ainsi, les quatre plateformes thématiques sont focalisées sur les principaux domaines de coopération, qui sont: la démocratie, la bonne gouvernance et la stabilité; l'intégration économique et la convergence avec les politiques sectorielles de l'UE; la sécurité énergétique; et les contacts interpersonnels. Au sein des quatre plateformes, la philosophie du travail est basée sur la participation active de tous les partenaires et des pays membres de l'UE, sur le dialogue multilatéral et sur l'échange d'informations, ce qui permet un réel rapprochement.

De plus, le Partenariat Oriental a établi un calendrier très précis de déroulement de ses actions, planifiées conformément à des feuilles de route assez rigoureuses, ce qui permet un processus politique de suivi et d'évaluation approprié. Trois ans après le lancement de l'initiative, la multitude de réunions au sein des quatre plateformes thématiques, le progrès enregistré dans les négociations pour conclure les accords d'association, le deuxième sommet du Partenariat organisé à Varsovie en septembre 2011 et les rapports annuels élaborés et publiés par la Commission sur la mise en œuvre du Partenariat prouvent un vrai engagement de l'UE quant aux pays partenaires orientaux, y compris de la région pontique.

Ensuite, il faut toujours mettre en évidence une dimension particulière de l'action de l'UE dans la région de la Mer Noire et les initiatives afférentes à cette dimension. Il s'agit de toutes les démarches dans le cadre de la PESC que l'UE développe dans l'espace pontique pour la gestion des dossiers brûlants de la sécurité de la région. La Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité adopté par l'Union en 2003 reconnaît l'importance du voisinage pour la sécurité de l'Union, établissait le soutien de la bonne gouvernance dans son voisinage comme un objectif clé pour la sécurité de l'Europe et assurait un cadre d'action européen dans les régions d'intérêt pour l'UE. Par conséquent, l'Union a démarré relativement lent et avec la prudence caractéristique une gamme large d'initiatives et d'actions dans la région pontique. Ce type d'approche a réussi à placer l'UE parmi les acteurs clé dans le processus de stabilisation de la région.

Tout d'abord, depuis 2003, l'Union a déroulé trois opérations de gestion de crises ou d'assistance dans la région – *EUJUST Themis* en Géorgie, *EUBAM* en Moldavie et Ukraine et *EUMM* en Géorgie [13]. Les deux dernières sont toujours actives à la frontière commune moldo-ukrainienne dans la région de Transnistrie, respectivement à la ligne de démarcation entre les forces armées géorgiennes et les forces sécessionnistes d'Ossétie de Sud. La présence sur le terrain des experts militaires et civils européennes montre une forte détermination de l'Union pour agir concrètement et visiblement dans une région, sans vraiment prendre en considération les «lignes rouges» marquées par la Fédération de Russie dans son voisinage proche.

Ensuite, l'Union est présente et fortement impliquée en qualité de médiateur dans les processus de négociation concernant la solution pacifique des conflits gelés de Géorgie et de République de Moldavie. Ainsi, depuis beaucoup de temps l'UE a envoyé ses émissaires dans la région de la Mer Noire pour faciliter le dialogue entre les parties concernés. Au présent, l'Union a un Représentant Spécial de l'UE pour le Caucase de Sud et la crise de Géorgie, M. Philippe Lefort, qui s'occupe des dossiers de Nagorno-Karabach et de Géorgie [14]. Le mandat du dernier Représentant Spécial de l'UE en République de Moldavie, M. Kalman Mizsei, a expiré en 2011 et n'a pas été prolongé.

Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier et mentionner, même en passant, parce qu'il vaut une étude séparée et plus profonde, le dossier probablement le plus difficile de l'UE quant à la région pontique: le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie.

CONCLUSIONS

Malgré l'énergie avec laquelle les Etats membres de l'UE situées dans la région de la Mer Noire, comme la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, se sont engagés dans l'accélération des démarches européennes à l'égard de l'espace pontique, l'Union a choisi une modalité d'implication plus lente, plus ambiguë, plus prudente et peut-être plus sage.

Même s'il n'y a pas un document ou une approche européenne qui s'appelle *stratégie pontique*, les actions, les initiatives, les projets et les programmes déroulés ou soutenues par l'Union européenne dans la région de la Mer Noire pendant la dernière décennie dans le cadre de la Politique de Voisinage et dans le cadre de la Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune indique un engagement prudent, mais ferme et bien calculé et assumé de l'Union quant à la région.

Certes, *la Synergie de la Mer Noire* ne peut être pas comptée parmi les grands succès de la Politique de Voisinage de l'Union. D'autre part, cette initiative pourrait être considérée comme une espèce de communication publique de l'UE relative à une région très complexe

En conclusion, l'analyse très brève du tableau général des différentes initiatives complémentaires de l'UE visant la région pontique et les pays de la région, y compris la Synergie de la Mer Noire, montre un engagement ferme, forte et tenace, mais en même temps prudent de l'Union, qui veut prendre en considération les particularités et les susceptibilités de tous ces partenaires de la région.

Notes

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- [8] Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen: La Synergie de la Mer Noire – une nouvelle initiative de coopération régionale, *COM (2007), 160*, Commission Européenne, Bruxelles, 2007
- [9] Le texte de la Communication est assez claire quant à la manque d'envie des dirigeants de la Commission de développer une stratégie quant à la Mer Noire “ *La Commission n'a pas l'intention de proposer une stratégie de la Mer Noire distincte, dans la mesure où la politique générale de l'UE vis-à-vis de la région est déjà fixée dans la stratégie de préadhésion de la Turquie, la politique européenne de voisinage (PEV) et le partenariat stratégique avec la Russie*”
- [10] Voir le page web de l'Union Européenne consacré au dossier la Synergie de la Mer Noire, eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/index_en.htm
- [11] Voir le MEMO/10/78, accessible sur l'internet à l'adresse suivante: eeas.europa.eu/blacksea/news/index_en.htm
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THE WRATH OF NATIONS

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Abstract

The paper examines how in the wake of the Cold War a lot of conflicts burst in an area which since WWII was relatively quiet and somehow perceived as marginal in the global conflict between West and East, namely Black Sea region. It is a truism that this specific area grew constantly in importance as the “tectonic” of the security networks changed and as the dynamic shifting of power affected what can be generally described as the balance of powers in the region. What usually was not long ago considered relevant only in military terms, lately became very important in terms of security in general for a significantly higher number of actors (nations-states and non state actors) active in this area. The turbulence paradigm – if one wants to take only this one into account – seems to be insufficient in order to conveniently explain the violent developments in the region in recent times. Historical, political, sociological or even cultural explanations are still unable to offer a credible image of the rapid, often violent, changes in the area. I shall try to underline a common feature offered by the different kind of analysis connected with our topic. It is well known that identity and a plethora of topics strictly intertwined with this issue was permanently seen as an inexhaustible source of conflict during ages. Moreover, in modern times managing collective identity (ethnic, national, confessional etc.) was, and still is, an important instrument in order to control and manipulate relevant groups of people. I shall try to assess in this paper what was the role of nationalism and ethnicity in these last decades as building-blocks for conflicts (open or “frozen” ones) in the geostrategic area of the Black Sea. In order to do this I shall briefly examine the concepts of nationalism and ethnicity defining a theoretical framework. Afterwards I shall set a model of analysis serving as a methodological tool in my analysis. The descriptive part of the paper will cover the main events in the region with a special focus on Georgia. The conclusions will pinpoint what is really relevant when dealing with identity topics in the case of violent conflicts in the Black Sea region.

Keywords: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Modernization, Ethnic Conflict, Multiculturalism, Georgia

DEBATS

It is obvious for any observer that group identity issues concerning confession, nationality, ethnicity, citizenship and so on were during the history of humanity underneath a vast majority of violent conflicts. In the modern times this trend was really accentuated due to the growing number of divisions operated in the society and on international arena alike. The modernization process which started three centuries ago and still accompany us in large geopolitical areas constituted the fertile background on which various form of modern identities were created, established and promoted. How to manage various forms of identity became one of the key topics for the ruling elites in all the corners of the world. Moreover the internal process of social engineering at the level of individual societies and states was doubled on the international arena by the same issues concerning collective identities. A plethora of disciplines investigating the social and political fields were involved in the effort of understanding modern identities in order to create and acknowledge new methods for manipulation. Discrimination, forced assimilation, migration and forced migration, ethnic cleansing etc. were instruments devised in order to ensure internal cohesion, “purity” and “tidiness” of specific ethnic groups. Former taboos regarding “the other” were transformed and coined into political instruments for discrimination. Even science was used and abused in order to produce evidence of the supposed

benefits obtained through homogenisation and assimilation. Having these as background, we have witnessed in the last century total wars, the birth and the disappearance of ideologies and totalitarian regimes, the disappearance of the classic colonialism and the notable multiplication of the international subjects, the massification of the politics and the ascend of some democracy forms, as we know and understand them today, homogenization and assimilation through bureaucratization and social engineering, the ideologization of the human rights and the appearance of their new generations (the third and the fourth) and, finally, the complication of the in-group rapports and relations and also of those between different groups, communities and societies that have and exponential increment of the interdependency. Moreover, the picture was complicated by the situation of the demographic processes, by the rapports with the natural environment and the resources offered by it, rapports that are nowadays misunderstood. Lately, multiculturalism is challenged and marginalised as a real solution to diversity implied by actual societies.

Multiculturalism, which is more and more seen as dying (the recent opposition in the West against this ideology has become common and more widely accepted while the results expected by the followers of multiculturalism have proven to be mere illusions. One by one, The United States, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Holland and France have announced the failure of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is an ideology based on interculturality and mutual understanding, generated by the cultural relativism. It has the role to stop the civilizations considered to be aggressive from assimilating the civilizations and cultures considered to be peaceful that was claimed and promoted in the Western world during the last decades of the past century. Its connection with the structuring of the power relations (D. Brandt, 1993; D. Rieff, 1993), with the movement of the civil and political emancipation of certain ethnic and racial groups, at first over the ocean and later in the rest of the developed capitalist world, its transformation into an cathartic antidote used by the minorities that had been oppressed in order to avoid the stereotype of their so-called inferiority have interfered with its assumed perennality and have eroded its validity and appeal. Multiculturalism is about the existence of multiple cultures that recognize each other and has a tendency towards a massification of the processes regarding the acculturation, trying to transcend the cultural imperatives of a group by attempting to accommodate all of them. Thus, multiculturalism has become a favourite instrument for finding a balance between the rights of the majority and of the minorities in different societies. Multiculturalism excludes *ab initio* nationalism, patriotism and the affective rapport with the national history, proposing a set of values that are potentially accepted worldwide, but which are also “weak” (European citizenship is a good example). This is how certain phenomena appeared: political correctness, positive discrimination, “relativized” rewriting of the history (sometimes integrated) which has to make room for the defeated but which also has to blame the winner, the attacks on the church, on the family and on the school as fundamental sources for the formation and education within a national dimension. The theory of the categorical imperative (what goes around comes around), aside from the influences of the magical thinking, opens the way not necessarily towards egalitarianism and homogenization, but, most likely, towards the idea of an acceptable equity in a certain historic context. In multiculturalism, all cultures have an equal chance to be known and give a chance to whoever may study them to find themselves in one or more of them. In fact, this calls for tolerance in the name of the rational spirit that has to absolutely dominate. The fact that things are not really like that is obvious. On one hand, tolerance is an unequal relation and, on the other hand, the pure rational spirit exists only in theory, we all represent affect, feeling, emotion and thinking, all at the same time. In conclusion, multiculturalism has consumed its fuel and its potential to attract when confronted with the realities that we see in many ethnically inhomogeneous areas, like the large Western capitals (London, Paris, Berlin are clear examples). The “multicultural soup” is not easily digested any further and multiculturalism is not a cure for the diversity of the contemporary world any more.

Nationalism continues to be one the most controversy political nowadays currents. After more than two centuries have passed since its genesis and crystallization, nationalism still is appealing both in the countries with a democratic and liberal tradition, as well as in the post-communist ones, which do not have a lot of experience as far as the Parliament is concerned. In order investigate this complex

concept we must have a distinction between nationalism as ideology, as political movement or as the one manifested as a cultural idea. Although connected with each other, these aspects require a specific analysis which will highlight the fact that there is no unitary phenomenon called *nationalism*. Also, we must approach different types of nationalism and the historic contexts they appeared within, in order to discover which the structure of specific discourses is. Ever since it has appeared in history, there were numerous attempts to define it. It has even been said that the number of definitions is equal to the number of those who dealt with it (Peter F. Sugar, 1981). The debate, beyond the political, diplomatic and geopolitical implications, is a conceptual and normative one.

After the end of the Second World War, many social and human disciplines have tried and managed to develop theories and investigation methods of the nationalism. These are: sociology, the study of the international relations, politology, cultural anthropology, social psychology, geopolitics, political philosophy (normative theories), international law and, last but not least, history. The result of these attempts was the elaboration of a whole set of theories regarding nationalism. In order to better highlight our position, in order to avoid certain confusions, we shall present the main categories that include the theories on nationalism: The normative theory (M. Walzer, 1983); Theories on nationalism seen as political extremism (C. Mudde, 1986); Theories that connect the appearance and development of the nationalism with the process of modernization; The primordialist theories that are against the fact that nation and nationalism are modern historic realities; Theories of the civilization cycles where nationalism is explained as being transitional, perishable as a historic reality; History theories that identify nations as being fundamental – pre-existing - units and which consider nations as being primary elements of development and / or involution; Social integrative theories that regard nationalism as a surrogate of religion; Theories on the formation of the state which explain nationalism as a product of the centralization and uniformization politics; Theories of the global order (K. A. Rasler, W. R. Thompson, 1989) which, usually, do not take into consideration the internal evolution of the states but theorize on nationalism.

One well known scholar (James Goodman, 1996) has realized the following taxonomy regarding the theories on nationalism: the ethno-national perspective, of the modernization, of the state centralization, of the affirmation of the new social class and, finally, of the unequal development. Other authors, we only mention here Daniel Weinstock (2010), operate the distinction civic nationalism - ethnic nationalism (ethnonationalism) and formulate judgments based on it. Philip Gerrans (2010), talks about the offensive and the defensive nationalism. It only takes this short attempt which synthesizes the theories on nationalism to be a good reason for the question: Why all these theories and *thus* definitions of nationalism? The answer can be only one: nationalism is not necessarily a particularism. It is universal as ideology and vision, it is the basis of the present world order and anyone who would try to imagine today a non national world would soon realize how stable the nation states world is, created in the last centuries. Yet, despite being so general, nationalism manifested itself - and still does - in particular forms. That is why it is easier to talk about nationalisms with different determinations, contents and aspects, chronotopically layered at the modern and contemporary history. The concept of nationalism does not have an easily identifiable close class, which would allow only for one definition to exist. It is proteiform and thus difficult to fix within immutable boundaries. Moreover, nationalism has an inner regeneration force which makes it autonomous as a social force and, at the same time, self sufficient. Essentially, nationalism exists by always underlining the national identity that it constantly enhances, giving it an anti-entropic, centripetal, stabilizing force. Still, what is at the basis of this historic form of social agglutination that is the nation and which generated this globalizing vocation of nationalism? The main characteristic of nations, which is to be found in most definitions of the nation, is transgenerationality (Anthony D. Smith, 1990, 1991). The feeling of continuous transgenerationality, common memories and the feeling of sharing the same destiny are, reunited, the image of the purpose of the nation. Nations exist in order to project the past (as it is collectively remembered by the community) into the future. They are continuous future projects and have the right to self determination especially for being able to organize and administrate their future. “The nation is an ideal and a memory at the same time, a history and a prophecy, too, a creative prophecy” wrote Henri Hauser (1916) in the second decade of the past

century. This is the world order which we live in, and which was forged by history. At this level, nationalism is proteic and has always new shapes, changing just to prevent and stop a change at a general worldwide level. We shall draw a conclusion about the concept-term nationalism, underlining, again, its proteic character and its versatility.

Ethnicity became since the '50's of the previous century a highly debated topic. For a long period of time ethnicity was mainly associated with biology, racial dimensions and not with cultural aspects. In the same time the term nation engulfed the politic and civic dimensions. Lately ethnicity was associated with ethnocentrism and finally Walker Connor (1994) coined the term of ethnonationalism. Ethnicity is actually perceived as being a *de dicto* reality rather than *de re*. Ethnicity implies four dimensions: biologic continuity; shared cultural values largely disseminated through the community; a mutual space of communication and interaction; a unique cultural category.

The development of the relations among the great social groups (peoples and nations) after the Second World War was characterized by two continuous processes that seem to go to different directions but in the same time, to be complementary. This is to say that independence growth simultaneously with the differentiation among the social groups (H. Tajfel, 1978). The multiplication of the economic, cultural, political relations and, especially, the communicational ones, brought together the states and nations, previously separated or distant. If the integration tendency is more obvious in the developed states, the differentiation process has its origin in the minority groups, found at a certain cultural and/or historical distance from the other groups. This phenomenon, called "the new ethnicity", appears paradoxically, in the conditions in which the contestant group share many norms and common values with the groups around him, beyond the frustrations that animate both (E. Allardt, C. Starck, 1981). Many of the actions done for the differentiation direction had common claims, based on the minorities' rights to decide to be different and to preserve the specificity defined in their own terms, dictated implicitly or explicitly by majority. Thus, self-categorization and self-identification grew their importance, and the external definitions were often appreciated as an insult to the fundamental human rights (E. Allardt, C. Starck, 1981; H. Tajfel, 1978). I want to underline that regarding our topic the main aspect on which I stress is the fact that the mixture between politics and ethnicity often became an "explosive" one.

When someone approaches the topic of modernization will definitely encounter a plethora of theories and different perspectives on such a succulent subject. What is modernization then? The answer at this question is still not unanimous and actually creates different trends in interpretation. The most general answer is that modernisation represents all the transformations of the society and culture beginning with the European Renaissance and still continuing on a world scale. The modernisation concept and theory are in strong opposition with the cyclic theory in history; it is positivistic and regards human history as a history of progresses. The time for instance is perceived as a coherent matrix of changing. The Nature is seen as having an inherent internal order that can be interpreted by the human mind. The scientific research is ultimately concerned with the penetration of this inherent order and technology has to be developed in order to transform the nature accordingly to the human needs. The role of science and technology is to change the place of the human being through social engineering and work division. If we perceive the modernisation process in this way it seems to us that it is a comprehensive, ethically neutral concept. Unfortunately, the interpretation of the modernisation, its diffusion and uniformity creates large dark areas that constantly generate debates and strong disagreements. For the historians, modernisation was a valuable tool in discussing about the great changes: the Renaissance, the Reform, the Enlightenment and so on. For the economists, modernisation is the path to be followed in order to build the market economy and to industrialise the society. For the law scholars, modernisation means the moment in time when the contract replaced the statutory rights as the principle of social order and discipline. Historians of culture - and not only them - considered that secularisation is the main feature of modernity. Sociologists and social anthropologists talk about the disappearance of the extended family as a sure sign of modernisation. At last, political scientists point out to the bureaucratisation of the societies, to the mass politics, to the disappearance of the empires and the emerging of the nation state when they argue about modernisation. All these aspects are true but in the daily life all of the above mentioned features are mixed in various degrees. As far as I am

concerned modernisation means at least: industrialisation, rationalisation, secularisation, bureaucratisation, homogenisation and assimilation. Nowadays all these aspects could be found in various degrees in the globalization process.

After setting this comprehensive theoretical framework I would like to discuss the Georgian case beginning with aftermath of the WW II. In spite of the fact that Stalin claimed that the nations are nations according to their form but socialist due to their content in the USSR, the field reality was in sharp contrast with his allegations regarding this topic. The general politics of Moscow in South Caucasian area was to diminish the Turkish elements, to change and consolidate borders inside USSR and to extend its influence against the interest of Turkey and Iran. In Moscow's view "Soviet patriotism" was intended to overrule provincial nationalism. The irredentist movements in South Caucasus area were stimulated by different local leaders as Mir Djafar Bagirov (Communist Party Secretary from Azerbaijan) or Kandid Charkviani (his homologue from Georgia) strongly supported by the fierce Beria (Georges Mamoulia, 2011). The failure of their plans to gain new territories perceived as being "national" unleashed a wave of discontent amidst their communities and a sensible rise in Russian chauvinism. Arrogance and contempt was reserved by Russians for the small nations in South Caucasus. A symbolic date for Georgians was 26-th of May 1947, the 19-th anniversary of Georgian Republic Independence. The standard of living in Georgia was a little bit higher than in other regions of the USSR and the popular wisdom of the Russians was that Georgians are merely market speculants and therefore pure profiteers. Furthermore Russian troops stationed in Georgia were dismissive regarding their Georgian fellows and a mutual mistrust and animosity was evolving. Georgian pride meant also a hate feeling towards Russians. In short the "imperial" and chauvinistic Russian nationalism strongly collided with Georgian nationalism and pride. There wasn't definitely a melting pot endorsed by communist ideology in this area. From 1949 and up to Stalin's death Georgia like other soviet republics suffered a lot because of deportations, purges and forced migrations. In the late '50's politics of desalinization implied a sensible loss of loyalty showed to Moscow. March 1956 demonstrations in Georgia were clear signs of Georgian rebellion against Russian chauvinism. Interethnic relations in Georgia were severely damaged and the myth of the USSR being a heaven of mutual national understanding destroyed. In this specific period lie the seeds of the future conflicts in the area. By the end of the Cold War and after the collapse of the USSR a new wave of conflicts occurred in South Caucasus involving Georgia of course. The conflict in Abkhazia erupted in 1992 (Liana Kvarchelia, 1998). The cease fire agreement signed in 3-rd of September 1992 was never fully implemented and the tension became persistent in the region. In November 1992 a new interethnic conflict erupted in North Caucasus region of Russia ending with a severe blow on Georgian troops in September 1993. Similar events occurred in Republic of Moldova in 1992. A belt of so called "frozen conflicts" established itself in the Black Sea region. The end result of these developments during the '90's was a new wave of violence and instability in spite of U.N. involvement. New entities like Abkhazia and South Ossetia appeared on the political map of the region illustrating once more the undeniable force of nationalism and ethnicity when mixed with aggressive politics. Seventeen years of U.N. presence in Georgia (up to June 2009) proved that international efforts are doomed if the veto system in the Security Council is still in place preserving a *primus inter pares* reality. The recent conflict between Russian Federation and Georgia is still fresh in our memories and there is no need to evoke it here in the context of our paper. To wrap it up: as a new tectonic of power structure begins to affect an important geostrategic area dormant forces are awakened and identity issues are called upon in order to settle strategic power disputes.

Few conclusions are more than necessary regarding our topic:

Among the factors which are usually considered when we talk about violent conflicts in the Black Sea region - and not only - crucial are the ethnic and nationalist ones. As Stephen van Evera (1994) argued we have to deal with direct factors and distant ones. Nationalism and Ethnicity can be considered building blocks for violent conflicts in this area. The so called ancestral animosities refereed strictly in our context at ethnic conflicts during *la long durée* and it is obvious the latent potential of conflict which is implied. The factors which triggered ethnic conflicts can be divided in two main categories: a) group identity and group cohesion; b) action capacity (Michael Brown, 1997).

Ethnic mobilization proved to be a very effective tool in the hands of ruling elite used in order to gain internal cohesion and suppress dissent inside the group. When the cultural differences are exploited for political reasons the action capacity of the group is enhanced. Another important ingredient of violent conflict is political discrimination. One can establish a feed-back relation between discrimination and the growing chances for open conflict. When sovietisation implied russification – such was the case with Georgia and not only – under the totalitarian umbrella, were the ethnic marker and nationalist activities are superseded by the fight for democracy the potential for conflict is constantly growing.

A long lasting peace can be achieved only when politics ceased to be intentionally mingled with ethnicity and when the fight for democracy – in its liberal form – is cleansed of nationalistic demands.

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UKRAINE – REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA – ROMANIA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION AND REGIONAL EXPERIENCE OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD AND PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT REALIZATION

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Abstract

Interregional, and most of all, cross-border cooperation is a significant element of the relations between Ukraine, Romania and Republic of Moldova. Since 2006 we can note the increasing pace of cross-border cooperation at the level of project activity. Projects with cross-border effects in the three countries were carried out with the financial support of many programmes and funds. An extremely important role in this process was played by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, primarily the EU neighbourhood programme “PHARE CBC Romania Ukraine 2004-2006.” Its implementation started only in 2007 and lasted until early 2010. The programme was aimed at stimulating economic and social development in the border regions to address common problems that exist in the field of environmental protection, health care, to ensure efficient and secure borders, to support the democratization of local communities, and preserving the common cultural heritage. In parallel with this programme, where applicants could be only from Romania, (funding was also distributed solely on the Romanian side), TACIS CBC programme was being implemented. It was shorter in time, less flexible in terms of funding and had fewer applicants. European strategic document Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for 2007-2013 has offered for Ukraine and Romania three programmes of cross-border cooperation in the frameworks of ENPI: “Ukraine – Hungary – Slovakia – Romania”; “Black sea”; “Romania – Ukraine – Republic of Moldova”. The Joint Operational Programme “Ukraine-Romania-Moldova 2007-2013” was recently launched. Funding of the programme financed not only from the ENPI programme, but also from national funds. Its peculiarity is that the same procedures are established for all participating countries. The implementation phase has already begun for the projects that received funding under the first tranche; the estimation of the projects for the second tranche continues. Cross-border cooperation contributes to strengthening the principles of good and effective regional cooperation in all forms of its manifestation, creating real possibilities of practical realization of Ukraine's European aspirations.

Keywords: *cross-border cooperation, projects, Neighbourhood Programme PHARE CBC, Joint Operational Programme*

DEBATS

Proclamation of approximation to EU membership among the foreign policy priorities of Ukrainian state and the establishment of common borders with EU countries in a result of the Eastern enlargement of European Union created fundamentally new geopolitical situation. This, in its turn, creates the necessity to investigate all the aspects of integration of Ukraine and, first of all, those, which refer to multilevel relations with the nearest countries. In this context cross-border cooperation and particularly Euroregions acquired a special significance. Experience exchange in the frameworks of cross-border cooperation with Romanian partners, who had become the European Union members not long ago, is especially valuable not only in the context of different social and economic directions of development of our countries but also in the context of European integration.

Integration to the civilized European community determines active neighbourhood policy conduction. Regional cooperation, which accents its attention on the mechanisms of neighbourhood relations strengthening, is called to fill these relations with the constantly increasing potential of interaction and interdependency. In the conditions of acceleration of economic and social transformations, which are directed at the fastest completion of the transition period in Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and also Romania, and overcoming of the gap with the “old” European community, cross-border cooperation becomes the useful instrument of European integration, economic and social development, and, at the same time – a component of the neighbourhood relations of three countries.

The problem of cross-border cooperation and regional aspects of international relations are analyzed in the works of Ukrainian authors: Z.Broide, M.Lendiel, A.Kruglashov, N.Rotar, I.Studennikov, J.Dudcenko, Ja. Kyrpusha, V.Burdiak, Romanian researchers: B.Aurescu, K.Coka, Sh.Purici and Moldavian scientists: V.Bruter and V. Moshniaga. The author of this research had also devoted the series of scientific articles to different aspects of cross-border cooperation [1]. But the issue of cross-border cooperation of regional state institutions, bodies of local self-government, municipal institutions and non-governmental organizations on different sides of the border, especially on the level of project activity, between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova are still almost unexplored.

The analysis of cross-border cooperation of local authorities, territorial communities and other institutions of civil society on different sides of the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania border on the level of Euroregions activity and realization of cross-border projects, study of the factors, which assist in economic and humanitarian relations, transformation of frontier tension into the cooperation energy is the aim of our research.

As it is known, regional cooperation in the contemporary international relations, serves to European integration in general and to economic development of separate regions of the country in particular, including the territories, depressive, firstly, by their potential and because of their frontier location. Euroregions have the highest level of institutionalization among all the forms of cross-border cooperation, by which the concrete steps to approve the principals of neighbourhood and fruitful regional cooperation in all the variety of its demonstrations are conducted.

The first Euroregion, which included administrative and territorial units of Ukraine and Romania, was the Carpathian Euroregion, which united frontier administrative and territorial units of five countries – Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine (Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Chernivtsi oblasts). It was created in February 14, 1993 in Debrecen (Hungary), by signing of corresponding declaration by the ministers of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Poland and Hungary. Its founders were the representatives of the regions of Ukraine, Poland and Hungary, who had signed the programme and statute documents [2]. Romanian counties (“judet”) only achieved the status of observers in 1993, which was caused by the imperfection of national legislation, which appoints the privileges of the region including the sphere of relations establishment with the regions on the other side of the border. Only after the regional reform in Romania in 1997 and ratification by it the Convention on cross-border cooperation (according to the documents of its practical use, the area of the realization of this type of cooperation can be extended to 25 km inland from the border, excluding the cases, which concern frontier counties), 5 Romanian counties had become the full members of this Association.

Other Euroregions, which include administrative and territorial units of Ukraine and Romania, include also the territories from republic of Moldova. The Euroregion “Lower Danube” had become the first organization of such kind. In August 14, 1998 in the Romanian city Galatsi was signed the agreement on forming the Euroregion, which included Odessa oblast, Vulkaneshty (Vulcănești), Kahul (Cahul) and Kantemir (Cantemir) districts of Republic of Moldova and Braila, Galatsi (Galați) and Tulcha (Tulcea) counties of Romania. In a result of two-phase administrative reform conduction in Republic of Moldova, this country was represented by three districts, then one county and again three districts. These districts according to the Statute clauses became the assignees of the previous territorial organizations in the structures of the Euroregion “Lower Danube” [3].

After the rather complicated negotiation process, which had lasted for almost 3 years [4], in September 22, 2000 in the Romanian city Botoșani the Euroregion “Upper Prut” was created. Chernivtsi oblast of Ukraine, Bălți and Edineț counties of Moldova, and also Botoșani and Suceava counties of Romania had become its members [5]. In October 2003, after the conduction of the administrative and territorial reform reverse in the neighbour country, Briceni, Glodeni, Edineț, Ocnîța, Rîșcani, Sângereni, Fălești districts, municipality Bălți and Ivano-Frankivsk oblast of Ukraine joined the Euroregion, instead of the mentioned Moldavian counties.

It is worth noting, that Chernivtsi oblast, Botoșani and Suceava counties are simultaneously the members of the Carpathian Euroregion.

The history of creation of two last Euroregions is also interesting. Particularly, the Romanian diplomats, taking into consideration existence of the considerable Romanian ethnic group in the territory of Ukraine, decided to use the institution of Euroregions as the instrument for protection of Romanian minority rights, initiated the inclusion of the clause on creation of two Euroregions “Upper Prut” and “Lower Danube” to the text of the basic Ukraine-Romania political treaty [6].

In such a way, the treaty on neighbourhood relations and cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova, signed in June, 1997 had created an important instrument of regional cross-border cooperation, which besides the including of bilateral forms of cooperation, had assumed the character of evident contemporaneity, adding it, from a legal standpoint, into the new generation of the political treaties [7]. By creating Euroregions, basic political treaty between Ukraine and Romania submits novelty, which is uncharacteristic for such type of treaties. The treaty had created a legal basis for this type of cross-border cooperation, on condition that in future the concrete, specific elements will be established on the level of local communities and authorities, but with the help and assistance of the central authorities [8].

So, Euroregions “Upper Prut” and “Lower Danube” were initiated by the central authorities as Ukraine-Romania bilateral organizations. But, sometime later it was decided to make it trilateral and to include also administrative and territorial units of Republic of Moldova. It was announced in the frameworks of the two-day’s meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania in Ismail, in July 3-4, 1997 and confirmed by the Kishinev statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania on trilateral cooperation of October 22, 1998 [9].

Structures of Euroregions “Upper Prut”, “Lower Danube” and Carpathian Euroregion are very similar and differ, mainly, by the quantity of commissions and their field direction. They are mainly created according to the interests of regional authorities and almost unable to function as independent mediator for average citizens, who want to take part in cross-border cooperation. But the idea of cross-border fund, on the base of Carpathian Euroregion appeared. Its aim is to support the initiative of nongovernmental organizations and bodies of local self-government. It was realized in the project of the institute East-West, by creating the Fund of Carpathian Euroregion (since 2000 – Carpathian Foundation) in 1995. This Fund functions as a mediator between big international funds, interested in the development of civil society, cross-border cooperation, interethnic cooperation, rebirth of rural communities of the region interaction, local nongovernmental organizations and bodies of local self-government, which propose innovative approach to the mentioned problems [10].

Carpathian Euroregion is also remarkable for the biggest territory, the biggest international support, funds, including those, which attract EU countries resources, much bigger amount of cross-border projects. But all of this is not always efficient because of its big territory.

Euroregion “Upper Prut” is one of the smallest and, at the same time, one of the most interesting because of the permanent experimentations in different directions of its activity. At the same time, it is not too much bureaucratic. It is short of consistency in solving of declared aims and tasks (It is also peculiar to Euroregions “Bug” and “Lower Danube”).

Rather interesting is the presence in its structure of EcoEuroregion (ecological Euroregion), which is a peculiar know-how in the theory and practice of cross-border cooperation. The main aim of EcoEuroregion creation is to define the mutual interest of state and local authorities and entrepreneurs of three countries in implementation of modern mechanisms of the technogeneous and ecological safety management at all the levels of life-cycle of the production and consumption for production competitiveness improvement, successful privatization, investment and reconstruction with the simultaneous provision of stable social and economic development of the region in general [11].

The novelty becomes also the fact, that the Statute of the Euroregion “Upper Prut”, except for membership, permits also new category – partner of the Euroregion. According to the clauses of the Statute “a partner of the Euroregion can become an administrative and territorial unit of the European Union member-country or other country, which has partnership agreement, cooperation or partnership protocols with the similar administrative and territorial units from the structure of Euroregion “Upper Prut”¹[12]. For that, its authorities must make an official announcement to the Council of Euroregion about its intention to cooperate in the frameworks of Euroregion, following the contractual provision of the Agreement on Euroregion creation and it’s Statute. Partners of the Euroregion gain the right to take part in the work of the governing and working bodies, but only with the right of deliberative vote. At the same time, the partner of one of the Euroregion members becomes, if it is desired, a partner of all the other members. It promotes expansion of cooperation possibilities, unification of efforts of cross-border and inter-territorial cooperation.

It is worth noting, that after signing the Agreement on Creation of the Euroregion “Upper Prut” [13] the forming of the systems, common with the countries of Central-East Europe of cross-border countries along western border of Ukraine was finished. They consist of the regions “Bug”, “Upper Prut”, “Lower Danube”, and also the “Carpathian Euroregion” [14].

At the beginning of Euroregions creation, parties tried to improve the cooperation conditions. For example, according to the decision of the Council of the Euroregion “Upper Prut” and with the support of bodies of local self-government in July, 2001 were cancelled the local dues and payments during the state borders crossing for the inhabitants and legal entities, registered in the territory of the Euroregion [15]. At the beginning of its activity the Council of Euroregion has approved general priorities and mechanisms of its functioning and the list of priority projects [16]. With the aim to popularize the cross-border economic cooperation, the conduction of the Days of Euroregion in all the administrative and territorial units of its area was initiated [17]. After some time similar activities were organized in Suceava (Romania) and in Bălți (Republic of Moldova) [18].

At the same time, essential changes in economic cooperation, which could increase the income to state and local budgets, didn't happen. Such changes didn't happen in administrative and territorial units of two countries, which affiliate the Euroregions “Lower Danube” and Carpathian Euroregion either. Tax system of goods and services, complicated systems of border procedure, absence of mutual recognition system of certificates, necessity of big amount of permission documents in different structures drawing up, had made the development of commodity exchange and cooperation within the Euroregions unprofitable, as well as the internal and foreign investments involvement.

So, the potential of cross-border cooperation of Ukraine and Romania is not used to the full extent neither through the cooperation line in the frameworks of Euroregions, nor inside other institutionalized structures, for different reasons. In some circles of our countries dominate cautions, connected with the mutual negative image in collective consciousness in both regional and central/national levels. All three countries still have difficulties in civil society creation, which prevent from success in efforts of bi- and multilateral cooperation. There are also domestic problems on the both sides of the border, connected with the cross-border cooperation actions organizers’ insufficient foreign languages knowledge (state structures, nongovernmental organizations etc.), law management possibility and insufficient knowledge of standards and procedures on projects development according to single European requirements, negative stereotypes and cautions [19].

Taking into consideration, that overcoming of the mentioned above problems, which are common for all the Euroregions of this part of Europe, and that their solving is out of regional authorities competence, the Council of the Euroregion “Upper Prut” repeatedly appealed to the Presidents, Governments, Prime-ministers of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania with the aim to pay attention of the central authorities to these problems and to propose joint mechanisms of their solving.

In this context it is worth noting that the Government of Ukraine had granted the status of pilot to the Euroregion “Upper Prut” with the aim to work off the elements of the new Concept of the State Regional Politics, in a part, typical for 19 frontier regions of Ukraine and also the elements of the development of partnership connections of oblasts and cities of Ukraine with corresponding structures in EU countries, as a new subregional mechanism of integration of our country. It would be reasonable to use the pilot status of Euroregion “Upper Prut” for spreading on the territory of Ukraine at least some rules of support of regional projects, which act in depressive regions of EU members and candidate members.

Even though mentioned above Euroregions differ by peculiarities of their creation, sizes of their territories and structures, but they have common problems and difficulties which prevent from realization of cross-border cooperation, projects with attraction of technical and financial assistance from the regional partners from EU countries and influential international structures. Euroregions “Upper Prut”, “Lower Danube” and Carpathian Euroregion, members of which are the frontier administrative and territorial units of Ukraine and Romania, have some peculiarities:

The process of creation of Euroregions, as it was mentioned above, was initiated from the top, i.e. by the central authorities. Though, it has positive moments, as on the one hand, it testifies that on the level of superior authority bodies there is understanding of the necessity of more active participation in Euroregional projects. It is immensely important both for the adjustment of decentralization of the process of public administration in these countries and for the adjustment of neighbourhood relations between neighbouring countries. At the same time, it has become the positive and essential impulse, as fears of initiative still remain among local authorities, and especially central bureaucracy outrage, which, in their turn, feel the fears concerning authorities decentralizations and local authorities independence. Of course, it has a negative aspect, as well, because local authorities are involved to this process from above, without inner understanding of importance of such actions.

Euroregions contain the features of cooperating frontier regions, in which the groups of other nations, which include the main part of their ethnos or “Historical Motherland”, where they come out as title nations, are represented.

If Western Europe Euroregions are created on the territory 10-15 kilometres inland of each country, in our case the depth of Euroregions is much bigger.

In the EU member-countries the main aim of Euroregions was only in economic development of the territories, while the aim of Euroregions, created on the post-socialist space is more multifaceted. It involves economic, ecological, financial, national and cultural, social and psychological spheres.

Ukrainian, Moldavian and Romanian territories are short of the experience on cross-border cooperation, as the appropriate practice of socialistic period is difficult to be used in modern conditions [20].

One more peculiarity of all the Euroregions with participation of administrative and territorial units of Ukraine and Romania is that their measures and activities practically don't involve nongovernmental organizations and other institutions of civil society. Concerning the last feature of the Euroregions we'd like to notice, that the institutes of civil society of frontier territories are trying to change the situation.

In October 11, 2008 during the international seminar in Suceava, Romania, organized by Chernivtsi oblast civil union “Bukovinian perspectives”, Chernivtsi regional centre of retraining and professional

development of the workers of the bodies of state authorities, bodies of local self-government, state enterprises, organizations and institutions (Ukraine), International association of small- and middle-scale business “Small Euro Business” (Republic of Moldova), National association of lobbying and negotiations, and unofficial partner “Charity Foundation “Ana” (Romania) in the frameworks of realization of trilateral Ukraine-Moldova-Romania project “Public monitoring of the executive activity of local self-government of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania concerning their adaptation to EU requirements”, with financial support of the Programme “East-East: partnership without borders” International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine), Soros Foundation Moldova and Soros Foundation Romania, was expressed the initiative on creation of the Union of nongovernmental organizations of Euroregion “Upper Prut”. By sharing common European values, standing for democratic control of society over the local authorities, bodies of local self-government, disaffiliating with the necessity of permanent dialogue of civil society with the authority institutions, representatives of nongovernmental organizations of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania had created the initiative group on the issues of union organization. Thanks to the efforts of the Ukrainian part of the initiative group in January 2009 was created the Chernivtsi Association of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Euroregion “Upper Prut” [21]. Members of the Association appealed to the authorities of Chernivtsi region with the proposals concerning the candidatures of non-governmental organizations to the structure of the working bodies of the Euroregion “Upper Prut” during the next rotation. But these proposals were not noticed during the regular sitting of the Council of Euroregion “Upper Prut” in Suceava, Romania (May 28, 2010). It made members of the Association to organize the cross-border platform of non-governmental organizations with the participation of representatives of civil sector of frontier territories of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania.

In 2010 – early 2011 Charity Foundation “Public Resources and Initiatives” (Chernivtsi, Ukraine) conducted a project “Expansion of the influence of nongovernmental organizations and mass media on the level of authorities transparency in Ukraine-Romania-Moldova cross border region”. Partners of the Project realization were: International association of small- and middle-scale business “Small Euro Business” (Bălți, Republic of Moldova), Charity Foundation “Ana” (Romania), Chernivtsi oblast civil union “Bukovinian perspectives”. During the project realization, in January 22, 2011 the representatives of nongovernmental organizations of frontier regions of three countries created a Cross-border Platform of Nongovernmental Organizations on Interregional Cooperation, aimed to strengthen the public influence on the process of authorities’ answerability and transparency, assistance in stable development of regions and communities [22]. The first step towards reviving of the participation of general public in cross-border cooperation had become the appeal of the Platform members with the concrete proposals to include the NGO’s representatives into the working bodies of Euroregion “Upper Prut”. In case of the authorities’ positive reaction on it, the influence of nongovernmental organizations will be much strengthened.

Starting from 2007 one can notice the increasing temp of cross-border cooperation on the level of project activity, and as a result – relatively fast temp of correction and Europeanization of the mentality of the actors, who make efforts to interregional cooperation. In this process of cross-border cooperation of administrative and territory units of Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania, an important role was played by the programmes of neighbourhood and frontier cooperation in the frameworks of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) [23].

The implementation of the programmes of development of EU relations with neighbouring countries (neighbouring programmes), foresee two stages. The first stage had to last since 2004 to 2006 (EU Neighbourhood Programmes PHARE CBC 2004-2006) and presumed conduction of pragmatic and dynamic search of the possibilities to improve the current effectiveness increase and cooperation publicity procedures between frontier regions. At this stage Ukraine took part in 4 Neighbourhood Programmes out of 12. Among them there was the Neighbourhood Programme “Romania-Ukraine”. At this stage common for frontier regions problems had been solving. Among them: stimulation of stable economic and social development in frontier regions, cooperation in joint solving of problems which exist in such spheres as environment protection, health protection, organized crime protection

and fighting, securing of effective and reliable border control, activities support on the level of local communities.

In the frameworks of the Neighbourhood Programme PHARE CBC Romania-Ukraine were implemented 147 projects by 80 applicants with the support of 95 partners from Ukraine, including 38 from Chernivtsi oblast, 33 from Zakarpattia oblast, 13 from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast and 11 from Odessa oblast [24]. The biggest amount of the Projects was realized in Suceava county (50 grants) [25].

For the realization of the projects of the Programme PHARE CBC 2004-2006 was provided more than 18.857 thousand euro (25%), PHARE CBC 2005 – more than 7489 thousand euro (40%), PHARE CBC 2006 – more than 6647 thousand euro (35%). The biggest amount of the conducted projects was realized in the frameworks of PHARE CBC 2005 – 61 projects [26].

By the field direction was spend more than 19.605 thousand euro, including 18.857 thousand euro, spent by the beneficiaries, including funds, spent on the expansion and strengthening of the tourist sector – more than 4728 thousand euro (24%); on the cross-border economic cooperation – more then 3 396 thousand euro (17%); on the development of cross-border transport and infrastructure of the border – almost 5 002 thousand euro (26 %); on the improvement of the activity concerning the environmental management in frontier regions – more then 3 393 thousand euro (17%); on the measures of the common fund of small projects of the priority “People to people” – more then 2 338 thousand euro (12%); on the technical support activities, concerning commercial and programme evaluation – more than 448 thousand euro (4%) [27]. By mutual efforts of Ukraine and Romania more than 1200 common activities (seminars, trainings, meetings) were conducted, 550 works with documents (creation of databases, reference books, researches conduction, scientific exploring) were done, 40 resource centres were created (regional economic centres, ecocenters, infocenters), 14 cross-border networks were created, 280 protocols on cooperation between Ukrainian and Romanian organizations were signed, 48 instruments and points of tourist informing were created, 63 tourist routs were actualized, 35 km of roads were repaired, 12 instruments on environment monitoring (towers for environment parameters determining, movable laboratories) were created, more than 1000 information and marketing activities were conducted [28].

Among the cross-border projects, in our opinion, the most successful were the projects of humanitarian direction, a lot of which had been realizing by the direct participation of the partners from Chernivtsi oblast. Particularly, Chernivtsi regional centre of retraining and professional development of the workers of the bodies of state authorities, bodies of local self-government, state enterprises, organizations and institutions had become a partner in 4 cross-border projects in the frameworks of this Programme.

Two projects were realized by the Center together with the Suceava department of the Association of implementers and publishers of book patronage (Romania). In 2007 a project “Popularization of cross-border cooperation by book – cinema – commercial” (2007), in the frameworks of which three round tables in Chernivtsi and Suceava were conducted, and cross-border festival of documentary film “Following the ways of legend” (October 29-31, Suceava, Romania) [29] was organized. In 2008 – a project together with the Suceava department of the Association of implementers and publishers of book patronage (Romania) – “Common frameworks of the relationships and informing through television “on-line”, e-book, direct and virtual meetings” (2008), in the frameworks of which 4 international seminars were conducted: 2 in Chernivtsi, 2 in Suceava [30].

Two projects were realized by the Centre together with the Suceava department of the Association “Centre of European Resources and Consulting” (CERC). In the frameworks of the first project (2007) “Cross-border Resources Centre” for the workers of the authority bodies and nongovernmental organizations leaders from both sides of the border, two informational seminars in Suceava (Romania) and Chernivtsi (Ukraine) were organized and three educational seminars were conducted: “Management of Cross-border Projects” (Suceava, Romania), “Civil Society and European

Citizenship: Intercultural and Traditional Methods of Communication” (Dorogoi, Botoshany County), “Cross-border Cooperation of Territorial Communities and Authorities in the Context of European Integration” (Chernivtsi). In the frameworks of the second joint project – “Quality Standards in the Management in Cross-border Region” (2008-2009), in the frameworks of which two informational seminars were organized and two educational seminars were conducted in Chernivtsi (Ukraine) and Suceava (Romania) [31].

The work on cross-border cooperation was continued by the Chernivtsi oblast civil union “Bukovinian perspectives”, which with the expert support of the mentioned Centre of professional development, in the frameworks of the indicated Programme, had realized two cross-border projects: joint project with the Suceava humanitarian foundation “Klopot” – “Bukovina: spiritual wealth” (2009) [32] and with the Suceava department of the Association of realizers and publishers, book patronage (Romania) – “Cross-border Business Centre – book, cinema, commercial” (2008-2009) [33]. These projects were the logical continuation of the idea of studying of cultural values of two bordering nations, preservation of common cultural heritage, experience exchange in popularization of folklore and national customs.

Parallel with the programme PHARE CBC, applicants of which in the context of our research could be only the representatives of Romania (financing also was spread exceptionally to the Romanian side), TACIS CBC Programme was launched. TACIS Programme was shorter in time and less flexible in financing issues. So, the minimal size of project financing from European donor for the 1 and 2 priorities (problems of economic development and environmental protection) assumed 500 thousand euro, for the 3 priority (humanitarian problems) – 250 thousand euro. The condition of achieving funds by the applicant was co-financing in the amount of minimum 10% of the project cost by the applicant itself. In addition, during the project realization applicant achieved only 90% of the sum of European financial support, and 10% of this sum – only after the report (including financial) approval. A sum, needed to VAT payment during each financial operation also must be added. Taking into consideration general percent from rather big size of donor co-financing, the sum, which project implementers had to obtain, became backbreaking for the big amount of potential applicants, especially for the nongovernmental organizations [34].

But yet, among the projects of this Programme it is worth to admit the project “Popularization of common cultural heritage in Chernivtsi-Suceava cross-border region”, worth a total of 290 thousand euro. It was realized by the Chernivtsi City Council, Kympulung-Moldovonesk City Council, Suceava municipality and other partners during the period: July 2008 – February 2010. In the frameworks of the project a number of activities with participation of Ukrainian and Romanian national masters, tourist business representatives and mass media were held. The project team had also recorded and translated a number of TV-shows for local TV, in which was told about the Bucovina cultural heritage preservation, priceless treasure of national art, left to us by ancestors and necessity of its preservation. The prepared material became the foundation of the film and book “Bukovina: common cultural heritage”, and a film “Bukovina without borders” [35].

The other project “Creation of integral tourist product for the development of cultural tourism in Bukovina” with the general budget of 701 651 euro had been realized since July 2008 till July 2010. The implementers of the project were: The National Historical and Architecture Reserved Area “Khotyn Fortress”, Tourism department in Chernivtsi Oblast State Administration, Trade and Commerce Chamber of Suceava and other partners. The project was mainly directed at the preservation of cultural heritage, development of infrastructure and tourist attractiveness of Khotyn fortress promotion. Besides the humanitarian projects it is worth to notice “Cross-border cooperation on investment development of rural areas”, with the general budget of: 738 574 euro, which was conducted during the period: July 2008 – December 2009 by the Bukovynian Centre of reconstruction and Development (main partner), Chernivtsi Regional State Administration, Suceava Trade and Commerce Chamber and other partners and the project “Bukovina innovation centre” with the general budget 820 840 euro, which was conducted during the period: July 2008 – July 2010 by the

Bukovinian State Finance Academy, Chernivtsi Regional State administration, “Ștefan cel Mare” University (Suceava, Romania) and other partners [36].

It is worth noting that parallel with the mentioned programmes the projects on transnational cooperation programme “South-East Europe” are realized. In April 28, 2011 the first stage of the 3rd Call of Application started. Recently Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpatska and Odessa oblasts of Ukraine had become the full members of Programme realization. The budget of the indicated Call of Proposals for Ukraine and Republic of Moldova is 1 million euro (budget of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) with the necessary 10% co-financing [37].

Projects of the cross-border influence are also conducted by the network Programme East-East: Partnership without borders. With the aim of democratic values promotion and strengthening of the principles of the stable development of the region, the special direction “Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova” was launched. In 2007 the special contest “Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova” was announced. During 2005-2007, in the frameworks of trilateral contests, 26 projects with the general amount of 800 thousand US dollars were supported. In the frameworks of this programme the projects were financed by the International Renaissance Foundation, Soros Foundation of Moldova and Soros Foundation of Romania during 2008-2011 [38].

Since 2007 the new budget cycle of EU was launched. The strategic Document of ENPI 2007-2013 (general budget is approximately 1.1 billion euro) proposed a new approach to the programme. According to it the Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 between Romania and Ukraine, Romania and Republic of Moldova were regrouped into the new – “Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova”. Besides, PHARE and TACIS financial instruments were transformed into the single European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – ENPI, which, undoubtedly, will simplify the cross-border projects management and will assist in closer involvement of the partners from different countries. In the frameworks of ENPI Programme the Joint Operational Programme Romania – Ukraine – Republic of Moldova 2007-2013 was established. The financing of the Operational Programme is 126.72 million euro and it is financed not only by the ENPI Programme, but also by the national Funds. Ukraine is the participant of the three more cross-border cooperation programmes in the frameworks of ENPI: “Ukraine-Poland-Belarus” (Project budget – 186, 201 million euro), “Ukraine-Hungary-Slovakia-Romania” (Project budget – 68, 638 million euro), “Black Sea” (Project Budget-17, 306 million euro) [39].

Peculiarity of these programmes is the absence of annual action procedures and the unified procedures for all the participants (financing, accountability) during its implementation. Programme member-states developed joint operational programmes for the whole term of ENPI implementation. Before the Programme “Romania-Ukraine-Moldova” adoption, the cooperation of three countries were conducted in trilateral format: between cross-border regions of Ukraine and Romania and also Romania and the whole territory of Republic of Moldova in the frameworks Neighbourhood Programme 2004-2006. As it is known, in the frameworks of these programmes different rules for the member-countries acted, as well as different budgets were available for the applicants in the frameworks of PHARE instrument for Romania and TACIS for Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Consolidation into the single ENPI will simplify the cross-border management and will assist in tighter involvement of partners from different countries [40].

The territory of the Programme covers the following regions: in Romania – Suceava, Botoșani, Iași, Vaslui, Galați and Tulcea counties; in Ukraine – Odessa and Chernivtsi regions; in Republic of Moldova – the whole territory. Besides, a few adjoining regions are included to the Programme. They can positively influence the cooperation on the cross-border territory and to be involved into the projects implementation as partners with the possibility to achieve up to 20% of the general budget of the programme: in Romania – Braila county; in Ukraine – Vinnitsa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil (12 districts) and Khmelnytskyi oblasts (10 districts) [41].

The strategy of the Operational Programme is based on four key tasks of the Strategic Document ENPI CCP, namely: assistance in economic and social development of the regions on both sides of the common border; solving of common problems; provision of effective and protected borders; assistance in local frontier activities in the format “from people to people”.

According to the variety and complicity of the activity, which is required by the execution of each priority tasks, the main typology of the potential beneficiaries was defined. It includes: state authorities, local, regional and central administrations, universities, nongovernmental organizations, trade and commerce chambers etc.

The applications deadline for the 1 and 2 priorities was October 28, 2009 for the third priority – September 28, 2009. 266 applications got to the contest in time, among which 134 applicants were from Romania, 87 – from Republic of Moldova and 45 from Ukraine.

The process of applications estimation lasted for two years (there is still no final solutions for some of the projects). After this process finishing, 62 projects only by the 3rd priority - Assistance in activities of “people to people” type were chosen, among which 48 applicants from Romania, 9 from the Republic of Moldova and 5 from Ukraine. The Joint monitoring Committee of the Programme had decided to add to the appointed budget of this priority nearly 2, 6 million euro. So the general budget of the priority is 7.6 million euro [42].

In October 14, 2011 the Second Call of the project proposals of the Joint Operational Programme “Romania – Ukraine – Republic of Moldova 2007-2013” launched. 26 135 879 euro was assigned for this project realization. The Joint Technical Secretariat achieved 1063 Concept Notes of project proposals, including 362 on first priority (Towards a more competitive border economy), 230 - on the second priority (Environmental challenges and emergency preparedness) and 471 – on the third (People to People Cooperation) [43].

But, now can be already seen the problems which don’t allow using the possibilities, given by the mentioned above Programme to the full extent, and namely:

- The low level of potential beneficiaries’ awareness concerning the existing cross-border programmes. Although the information spreading is conducted by different conferences, seminars and round tables, the level of mass media involvement in public informing concerning the operational programme participation is insufficient. It considerably narrows the circle of experts and organizations, which could have become partners in the planned cross-border projects;

- The limitedness of the regional authorities and local self-government bodies privileges in the sphere of foreign economic activity and cross-border cooperation. The improvement of legislation in this sphere is being late;

- Almost complete absence of coordination of project applications, which are submitted for consideration with regional priorities. Their combination with the existing budgets of regional programmes can significantly increase the positive influence from their realization and to reach additional results, which are impossible in the existing conditions;

- The difficulty of the EU visas obtaining procedure, which hampers the cross-border development of Ukraine with neighbouring countries, restrains the activation of business relationships in frontier territories¹ (unfortunately, the Ukraine-Romania treaty on small frontier movement is not signed yet).

In a conclusion it is worth noting that Euroregions on the borders of Ukraine and Romania had taken concrete measures concerning the approval of the neighbouring principals and effective regional cooperation in all forms of its manifestation diversity. The EU Neighbourhood Programmes PHARE and TACIS and other programmes, directed on the interregional dialogue and society democratization assisted in cross-border cooperation very much. In future Joint Operational Programme “Romania – Ukraine – Republic of Moldova 2007-2013” will assist in this cooperation. It creates a real possibility of practical realization of European integration aspirations of Ukraine. The idea of regional cooperation, the search of mutually beneficial decisions becomes the new foundation of future

relations between countries and positively influences the domestic processes in our countries. Active participation in EU projects assist in Ukraine-Romania closer-relations, arrangement of cooperation between two countries, development of bilateral relations according to the principals of mutual respect and trust, and also approximation of Ukraine in general and its separate regions to European standards.

For the further development of cross-border cooperation and activisation of project activity, to our mind, for example, a number of measures must be conducted:

- to involve the experts of cross-border cooperation for organization of scientific and methodical support of cross-border programmes realization by regional and local authorities;
- to organize special scientific programmes and seminars for government officials, employees of the local self-government bodies, leaders of nongovernmental organizations and other potential applicants on the topic of cross-border cooperation, projects preparation and management;
- to form a system of nongovernmental organizations, local authorities, institutions of culture and education encouragement to take part in cross-border projects;
- to strive for creation of a special mechanism for visa support of the cross-border activity with the support of consular offices of neighbouring European countries;
- to strive for support of the nongovernmental organizations in cross-border cooperation from the authorities of administrative and territorial member-units, by providing their appropriate representation in all working bodies of the region.

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GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract

At the beginning of 2011, the attention of the international community, mass-media and worldwide specialists was kept by the popular uprisings from the Northern Africa and the Middle East, whose stated purpose was the change of the authoritarian regimes ruling those states. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria were the scene of these events. The main cause of all these uprisings, with a great impact on the security state of the concerned countries, but also on the regions in which they are included, is represented by the deficient management of the domestic affairs by authoritarian, oppressive, restrictive regimes and by the consequences of this faulty management on human security. These events have been often presented as the Arab ‘democratic wave’ and they have been compared with the revolutions from the ex-Soviet states which took place in 1989, not only because of the political violence, of street protests, of their results which consisted in casting away regimes which ceased to be legitimate, but also because of the role played by bad governance, by the authorities’ failure to meet the expectations of their citizens.

Keywords: *good governance, bad governance, security, uprising, authoritarian regime, totalitarian regime.*

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

After the end of the Cold War in the 90s, the international community has become increasingly concerned with the individual security. Thus, different world meetings have been conducted on this topic and practical actions have started to take place to ensure human security of some collectivities which had lost their peace and stability. On the other hand, the classical concept of security, concept which overlapped completely the states’ security where military dimension was dominant, has been replaced with a new approach of security that of human security. Now, the *pièce de résistance* is no longer the state but the individuals belonging to human communities; the state must guarantee and ensure a good climate for life and personal activities, in dignity and without fearing tomorrow.

Actually, today, the definition of human security is necessary for the following reasons: the conflicts are less inter-state and more internal in the nation/states, often expressing crisis that affect them and question the social contract and wider, the individual will of coexisting. On the other hand, at present, there are profound mutations in the world such as: distance has been abolished; the increasing interdependencies between countries on all levels; the military dimension is not alone anymore, there are also other security dimensions; peace depends more and more on development, personal security, environmental protection, the observance of human rights where their violation generates injustice and tensions, unpredictabilities and instability, thus, international insecurity [1].

In fact, the concept of human security is based on the principles of individual emancipation (without any fears or needs) and social justice. This change alters the approach and orientation of the security analysis and policies emphasizing, above all, the threats for human existence at the expense of

pursuing only state stability. Thus, according to the concept focused on 'human security', the security threats and challenges transcend national security, the respect for law and order in order to include the political, economic and social dimensions which allow the human beings to live without any risks or fears. The attention shifts from state security to person security but these two concerns don't exclude each other. Security can be considered 'a public good' meeting the strategic need to favor a lasting human development and promoting national, regional and global peace and stability.

The concept of human security has three fundamental elements: *human security realm; the importance of causal links among its different components; the stress on what is vital for people*. This approach is illustrated in the concept of human security of the UN Development Program and the Commission on Human Security.

According to the Human Development Report (1994) entitled "New Dimensions of Human Security" – considered to be the first important initiative aiming at human security – this has "two main aspects: on one hand, protection against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and, on the other hand, protection against any brutal event disturbing the daily life". In this definition of the UN Development Program, human security is related to seven dimensions with specific types of threats. These are: **economic security**, that is the access to work and resources, it is threatened by poverty; **food security**, that is the material and economic access to food for everybody, it is threatened by hunger; **health security and the access to health care** and better health conditions, it must face the wounds and diseases; **environmental security** is confronted with pollution and environmental degradation endangering the people's survival and the exhaustion of resources; **personal security** is affected by different types of threats: threats exercised by the state, foreign states, other groups of people (ethnic tensions), threats to women and children because of their vulnerability and dependence; **community security** meaning that the security of most people derives from their belonging to a social group (family, community, organization, political and ethnic group), it can be threatened by the tensions between these groups caused by the competition for limited access to opportunities and resources; **political security** which must guarantee the observance of fundamental rights and liberties, it is threatened by arbitrary and repression.

In this context, the governance issue regards all the components of human security. However, due to the multidimensional character of human dimension, we cannot ignore the link between good governance and the economic and social development. This is the reason why the concept of 'good governance' has been developed not only by international political organizations (UN, EU) but also by the international economic organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), this becoming an essential condition for development assistance provided by the international agencies.

In order to see more clearly the link between 'good governance' and human security, a conceptual clarification of the term 'governance' is important. Roughly, this refers to the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented) [2]. Governance per se is an extremely complex process in an ongoing development. However, its quality – good or bad – can be considered depending on its results. Often, the 'good governance' syntagm is used to differentiate ineffective political economies and organs from viable political organs [3]. In order to decide whether, in a certain state, there is 'good governance' or 'bad governance', certain indicators have been established. Thus, several economic, political and social specialists [4] suggested eight characteristics of good governance: a) participation – both men and women participate at governance in an organized and informed way, which suggests freedom of expression and association and also the existence of civil society; b) the rule of law – the existence of a correct legal framework impartially applied and it suggests the protection of human rights and the minorities and also a fair justice and an impartial and incorruptible police force; c) transparency – the decision making and their implementation are achieved in accordance with the established rules and regulations and information is accessible to those directly affected by the respective decision; d) responsiveness – the decisions serve the interested parties and are made in time; e) consensus oriented – achieving a consensus between different existing points of view so that the decisions aim at common good and includes also a perspective on sustainable human development; f) equity and inclusion – all social groups including

the vulnerable ones, must have the opportunity to improve or maintain their well being; g) efficiency – the results of processes and institutions meet the society needs and optimally use the resources at their disposal including the sustainable use of natural resources and the environmental protection; h) responsibility – the degree to which public officials assume responsibility for their actions and meet the population requirements.

We notice thus that the idea of good governance refers to the relationship between the institutions managing the state's public affairs, between those and the citizens and the degree they meet the citizens' needs and expectations. At the same time, we must remember the fact that few countries meet the requirements of an ideal governance meeting most of the characteristics mentioned above [5].

At the same time, the link between human security and good governance is revealed by the implications of the concept of legitimacy. This is 'a collective sentiment according to which the governance is just and requires obedience' [6], the legal and psychological way of governing. A government's legitimacy is maintained through: providing security for the citizens, good governance, a correct governmental structure adapted to the internal reality. Also, another characteristic of legitimacy is that it is not given but needs to be gained – before having the feeling that they must obey a regime which has the right to rule, the citizens must gain confidence in it and see positive results. At the same time, legitimacy is not for ever – it can erode, be lost when the regime doesn't meet the population's expectations. Implicitly, the citizens' feeling that they must be subordinated to a regime entitled to lead them tends to disappear, they tend to turn to political violence [7] and then to revolution. Therefore, bad governance, the repeated violation of the principles of good governance, the government's failure to meet the population's expectations leads to the deterioration of security internally through crisis leading to armed violent acts. Bad governance will determine large groups of individuals to violate the laws in order to change the leaders, motivated either by own convictions or a state of despair. Good governance leads to a state of safety and security resulting from the rule of law whereas bad governance will generate injustice, fear and discord. Good governance is equivalent to the governance legitimacy. Bad governance is equivalent to losing the governance legitimacy and implicitly, the legal and psychological right to rule the respective people.

Therefore, the link between good governance and human security, respectively, bad governance and human insecurity is two-way. By working to meet the citizens' expectations and guarantying a stable security environment, the government ensures its own security, maintains its legitimate right to rule and is not threatened by being replaced with another one and vice-versa, by creating insecurity, a regime characterized by bad governance will increase the degree of insecurity by maintaining the possibility of political violent acts or revolutions. Also, it will be useful to mention that, there is generally the tendency to link the syntagm 'good governance' with the term liberal democracy. This is because this political regime has proved to be more viable than other regimes, especially after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. However, there still are countries organized in accordance with the principles of liberal democracy where the citizens reclaim their right to good governance or where the specialists identify a number of deficiencies. But we can state that, generally, the totalitarian or authoritarian regimes don't meet their citizens' requirements; for instance, a faulty economic management will not provide an economic development which affects security and implicitly the human development. There are a lot of examples illustrating this interdependence between a state's security and good governance. However, we will only discuss about some of them – Romania under Ceausescu regime and the countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East.

ROMANIA UNDER CEAUSESCU REGIME

For almost half a century, Romania was under a communist totalitarian regime (1945-1989) [8] which was translated into a communist dictatorship culminating with Nicolae Ceausescu dictatorship. Throughout this period, our country was led by one party where the law of class struggle became the state's ultimate law. Although, during that period, there were times when the regime's control was somewhat softer, though the western world considered Romania to have a special type of

communism (due to the lack of complete acceptance the Soviet position and politics, fact that made possible that Romania become part of some international organizations – World Bank, International Monetary Fund – in a period when the membership status wasn't accessible to any other country within the Soviet block), the Romanian communist regime violated the principles of good governance. Thus, even from the first decade of communism, participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity and inclusion were ignored through a series of measures taken by the communist government. We can mention for instance depriving the peasants or the townsmen of proprieties through direct confiscation, changes of monetary rates or punitive taxes; the members of the old elite were thrown out of their houses; the bourgeoisie was deprived of its status, this term had negative connotations during the regime.

Moreover, after the 90s, evidence was discovered showing the fact that the Peasants Party, led then by Iuliu Maniu, had more votes at the elections on 19 November 1946 than the official results had shown [9]. Furthermore, Iuliu Maniu was sentenced to life in prison. Thus, the legitimacy of the communist regime didn't exist from the beginning for the simple fact that, by falsifying the elections in 1946, it arrogate to itself the right which wasn't given by the citizens. The communist totalitarian regime was established and consolidated during the period when Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej led Romania and the regime led by Ceausescu established on a terrain already prepared and augmented the state of insecurity based on bad governance.

We are talking thus about serious violations of the human rights. Political prisons, forced labor on different sites in the country (the Danube-Black Sea channel is the best known), the religious, cultural or sexual persecution and that of ethnical minorities, the oppressing of the church, repression against culture, the eradication of national values, censorship, imposing absurd laws (rationalized feeding), starving people, lack of heat are all violations of the human fundamental rights. Moreover, in 1966, Ceausescu issued Decree no. 770 which forbade women to make abortions and contraceptives were not imported anymore. Beyond psychological effects, thousands of women died following clandestine abortions. More impressive was the fact that this decision came following the belief that a rapid growth of the population was a necessity for achieving N. Ceausescu's objective, that of making Romania a great regional power [10]. Reviewing these violations, we can easily see the fact that human security was minimum during that period. Guarantying the access to food (food security), protecting people's health (health security), protecting people against the degradation of traditional relations and values (community security) [11] were almost absent in Romania led by Nicolae Ceausescu.

To all these are added obvious deficiencies regarding the economic security. Its correspondent in the theory of good governance is in the principles of efficiency, equity and inclusion and consensus oriented. The communism is said to have been undermined by the catastrophic economic failures [12] and, in our opinion, this is true as there is a close interdependence between security and economy. The faulty economic management was one of the most serious signs of bad governance which, in the end, led Romania's population to poverty. After 1971 (when Ceausescu visited North Korea), the dictator's wish to change Romania into a country with an economy based on heavy industry increased and materialized into decisions unfit for our country's economy. The high technology sector was ignored despite the great number of specialists in this field but more attention was paid to the creation of a huge oil industry even though Romania had few oil reserves which meant that our country didn't have notable performances in this field. All these caused Romania to have large external debts which in just four years increased from 3.6 billion dollars to 10.2 billion dollars [13], debt which Ceausescu wanted to pay by 1990; that meant huge costs for our country's economy and for the Romanian people.

Other violations of the human rights in Romania under Ceausescu's regime were political determined by the nature of the system itself. Throughout that period, Romania was led by one party – the Romanian Communist Party – which didn't want to promote national interests but the Soviet interests. In Romania's case, the communist dictatorship overlapped Ceausescu's personal dictatorship.

Thus, despite an apparent economic and political opening to the west, Ion Pacepa, head of Foreign Intelligence Department, after defecting to the USA (1978), stated that, in fact, Romania played a double role towards the Western world with the Soviet Union's acceptance. He stated that, between certain limits, Bucharest was allowed to have different opinions from Moscow, with the purpose of getting advanced technology and loans in order to develop the communist system [14].

Moreover, the regime's lack of legitimacy is revealed by the reinterpretation of our traditional values and historic past which justify the communist dictatorship and that of Ceausescu. Censorship, arresting and humiliating the intellectuals who didn't approve the party, rejecting western art and culture, destroying our historic and cultural patrimony by the demolitions in the 80s, all were consequences of the dictator's policy. Here, there was also a subordination of the public interests to the private ones, they undermined the very values that were the basis of national identity. In the case of Ceausescu regime, we can speak about an attempt of brainwashing and of idolizing the leader and the Party. Also, all these cannot be done without a total control of the population, control that, in time, became a form of organized and systematic terror on the citizens. We are referring of course at the *Securitate*, as a police force which was the main tool of repression for the Communist Party on Romania's population. The existence of this institution is a clear sign of bad governance and implicitly of the lack of legitimacy because, if the governance of the Communist Party and of Ceausescu had been legitimate, that is if they had enjoyed the legal and psychological right to govern, they wouldn't have needed a so virulent a coercion tool. Thus, this fear of population marked the entire existence of the Romanian communism which made it violate any fundamental rights. At the same time, it's equally important the violent repression of the students' protests (1956), of the workers in Valea Jiului (1977), in Brasov (1987) and of other strikes. The same thing happened to the political opponents and dissidents who, in order to escape the political prisons, conducted their actions from abroad. There is, thus, within the conceptual framework of human security a political insecurity – the lack of a way of living based on the observance of human rights. Also, the participation, transparency and responsiveness – characteristics of good governance – were non existent.

All this led in December 1989 to the fall of the communist regime and the Ceausescu were sentenced to death. The case of this sad experience of our country clearly illustrates the fact that bad governance generates human insecurity through a wide range of direct and indirect threats. Because of this insecurity determining an extremely low quality of life, the citizens turn to acts of violence and, eventually to revolution which is a rapid and dramatic act to change the regime together with its elites [15]. The violence of this action is again a risk to national security. Therefore, human security is the key link between good governance and national security.

THE UPRISINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD

The recent events in Northern Africa and the Middle East materialized in mass uprisings against the totalitarian regimes at power is a good example of the fact that the fight for good governance didn't end with the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. With these states, we must take into account that, unlike Romania's communist regime which was a totalitarian one (a political system where the state tries to totally control the citizens), the countries in this region are organized in an authoritarian way (it implies the existence of a non democratic government but not necessarily totalitarian). Therefore, the restrictions, oppression and failure to meet the citizens' expectations are less serious but they shouldn't be ignored. All the states with this "democratic wave" (name given by the Western media), were classified under the name of Authoritarian Regimes (unlike total Democracies) by the annual report established by The Economist Intelligence Unit – Democracy Index 2010 – Democracy in Retreat [16]. Thus, the countries with uprisings at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 were on the 144th (Tunisia), 138th (Egypt), 158th (Libya), 122nd (Bahrain), 146th (Yemen) and 152nd (Syria) places.

The countries governed by authoritarian regimes are led by a small group – a party, army, dictator – who reduces the popular participation at the country's governance without trying though to control everything. Many of the social, religious, family, cultural aspects are left at the disposal of the

individuals which means that there is a less degree of incidence on human and national security. However, these aren't the same as the existence of good governance and meeting the citizens' needs in an acceptable way. The individual liberties aren't canceled but they are limited to a hierarchical organization of the leaders, obedience and order. Furthermore, as we will next see, there are traces of democracy in these states or an apparent democracy meant to create the illusion of legitimacy.

Tunisia

Tunisia is a country led by an authoritarian regime ever since the proclamation of independence in 1956. Its first president – Habib Bourguiba – established a one-party system and led the country for 31 years. Bourguiba was replaced, by a coup d'état, by Zine al Abidine Ben Ali who led the country until the events in December 2010-January 2011 when he dissolved the government and left the country. Under Ben Ali, Tunisia became formally a democracy with a multi-party system but, in fact, the Constitutional Democratic Assembly, Ben Ali's party, led the country as one of the most repressive authoritarian regimes in the Arab world [17]. Thus, Tunisia is a relevant example of the authoritarian regimes in terms of their effort to maintain an apparent democracy. In fact, the fundamental human rights and the political ones were constantly violated by the leaders. One of the most obvious examples of human rights violation is the freedom of expression. Although, officially, it is guaranteed by the constitution, the press is often restricted (especially when it's about the problem of reporting about controversial events [18]) and the internet access is also restricted – there is one internet server in the country, controlled by the government.

At the same time, politically, the Tunisian atmosphere was dominated by restrictions on citizens' rights. Ben Ali led the country from 1987 although presidential elections were organized regularly which he won by at least 94%. Under an apparent democratic system, Ben Ali remained the chief of state, being supported by ADC which held 152 seats out of 189 in the Tunisian parliament. Moreover, in 2008, the Constitution was changed and beyond several liberalizations of the past rules, Tunisia president ensured his continuity by harshening the election conditions (the candidates for presidency had to gain the support of 30 members of the parliament or mayors which was very difficult to do due to the large number of ADC members in the parliament) [19]. Due to generalized corruption, nepotism, lack of freedom for the press, restrictions of association, the emergence of viable counter candidates for Ben Ali was almost impossible. The elections in 2009 had three candidates – Ben Ali and two other ADC representatives. This shows that, in fact, Ben Ali didn't have opponents in the presidential race which explains the large percentage.

To all this add other aspects of human security threatened by violating the principles of good governance. Beyond the lack of transparency, of civil and political individual liberties, of participation, of the rule of law etc, the Tunisian citizens faced food and economic shortages. Amid rising unemployment (from 13.3% in 2009 to 14% in 2010 [20]), generalized poverty, corruption and high prices for food, the Tunisian citizens were in street protests culminating in December 2010 with the overturn of the president.

If we take into consideration the fact that good governance implies the responsible civic participation, equality, rule of law and that it refers to the political leaders, bureaucracy, civil society and other local leaders, then we can see that bad governance visible by the absence or low performance of the above indicators generate the emergence of insecurity through protests and open violence between citizens and the forces of order.

Egypt

Egypt is another famous case which held the attention of the media at the beginning of this year. The causes and effects of protests and of street violence are somewhat similar to those in Tunisia. The popular uprisings in Cairo were influenced by those in Tunisia, these being a catalyst of the Egyptian events, an example of the fact that an authoritarian leader may be overturned. Similarly to Tunisia, Egypt was governed, before the events in January-February 2011, by an apparent democratic regime. In fact, the situation was much more serious, tense and repressive. Egypt has been

a republic ever since it gained its independence in 1953. But, except for 18 months at the beginning of the 80s, Egypt has been under the incidence of the Law of the State of Emergency since 1967. The prerogatives of the state leaders were the biggest threats to human security and good governance despite the fact that Egypt is one of the most developed countries in the Arab world.

Theoretically, Egypt was organized in accordance with a semi-presidential multi-party system where power was divided between the president and the prime-minister. In fact, it was the president who owned the executive power. Thus, we should remember the fact that Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was the president of Egypt until 2011. Here, too, there is an apparent democratic system – Mubarak was systematically elected president following elections where he was the only candidate. Equally important is the fact that all three presidents of Egypt were former army men.

In our opinion, considering the huge gap between the process and results of governance on one hand and the citizens' needs and expectations on the other, the uprisings in Egypt were caused by the erosion of legitimacy due to poor governance. If we analyze the characteristics of good governance during the period when Mubarak led this country and if we consider the threats to human security, we can build a clear picture of the causes of the violent events which marked Egypt for almost three weeks.

As we have already said before, Egypt was under the incidence of the state of emergency since 1967. This gives the authorities a series of prerogatives which don't allow for the observance of the principles of good governance. Among these rights derived from the state of emergency, we can enumerate the following: restrictions to associate, move and resist; the right to retain suspects or persons considered to be dangerous; the right to investigate individuals and locations without respecting the Penal Code provisions; the right to establish exceptional Courts of justice to hear the crimes committed against the president or his deputy; the right to include army men in these courts; the right to monitor the newspapers and other publications ; the right to confiscate and stop them; the president's right to address the National Security Emergency Court to judge the accused in accordance with the common law [21]. Thus, despite the fact that the Egyptian constitution stipulates the observance of the fundamental human rights, the separation of powers, the existence of an impartial justice, the citizens' right to be judged by competent courts impartially, the provisions of the Emergency State cancel all the democratic elements of the fundamental law and this can be considered an authoritarian state. Equity and inclusion, transparency, the rule of law and responsibility were not characteristics of Mubarak's governance in terms of citizens' equality or their chances for better life conditions.

Also, the number and prerogatives of the security forces represent another proof of the fact that the Egyptian authoritarian regime doesn't allow good governance and human security. There are researchers [22] who state that their number can be an indicator of a state's legitimacy and of good governance – the less these forces the more legitimate the regime because the leaders doesn't need physical force to determine the citizens to obey the rules which means that legitimacy is not only legal but also psychological (the citizens consider them to be correct). The violence of the Egyptian police force is well-known. Analyzing their interventions and, especially, the motivation of these interventions, we can say that they wanted to stop any attempt or possibility to contradict, contest or even criticize the leaders particularly Mubarak. At the same time, the police force was often accused by the human right organizations, of ill treatment (torture) on the accused, suspects and prisoners in the Egyptian prisons or police precincts. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights drafted a report in 2009 reflecting this phenomenon. The results are very clear – from 1993 to 2009, there were no more than 460 tortured persons and 167 dead because of the ill treatment or torture. An alarm signal represents the fact that their number was greater and greater; if in 1993, there were 29 cases of torture and 6 dead, in 2008, there were 46 tortured and 17 dead [23]. Moreover, according to this document, not only the arrested were subject to this treatment but also their families in order to get information or make the suspect surrender. The causes of this phenomenon can be found both in the incomplete provisions of the legislation, depriving the citizens of their right to a fair trial and also the prerogatives wrongly extended of the police forces.

A bad economic management added to the repressive character of Mubarak's regime. Egypt was not the poorest Arab country but the population's living standard was not high, according to international standards [24] given the fact that the income had constantly increased and the developments in terms of child mortality, education, life expectancy and other economic indicators were impressive [25] although nobody denies the fact that this country has been facing an economic crisis lately. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the uprising in Egypt wasn't determined only because the citizens wanted to overthrow Mubarak's oppressive regime but also by the fact that he didn't succeed in managing efficiently issues like the unemployment among young people in cities.

Furthermore, we can identify a complex link between good governance and human security. Bad governance created human insecurity for decades and also it led to the events in January-February 2011 which were in themselves a destabilization of national security. During that period, the crime rate increased considerably and street violence resulted in over 300 dead and 6000 injured. The fact that downtown Cairo was described 'a war zone' [26] can create a real picture on the link between bad governance and national security.

At the same time, we must notice that the general insecurity generated by the Egyptian bad governance didn't end with the removal of Mubarak's regime. A military council led the country which looked very much like the situation during Mubarak's regime [27]; moreover, the strikes continue and the protesters are still able to mobilize large crowds [28]. Furthermore, if we generally associate the political dimension of security to good governance, we can state that the situation in Egypt is still far from this ideal. Mubarak's regime didn't allow the formation or affirmation of other potential leaders. The protesters were solidary in their wish to overthrow the existent regime for social, ideological, economic reasons, without having a clear plan, a program. Also, if we consider the economic dimension of security or good governance we couldn't speak about a positive and stable climate. The strikes continue and changing the institutional profile will be a challenge for the economic management problems – reducing unemployment, population's poverty etc.

Libya

Libya is perhaps the best example of the link between bad governance and national insecurity because, what initially seemed a popular move, similar to that in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen or Bahrain, became a security crisis; its escalation ultimately determined an armed intervention to protect the civilians protesting against Muammar Gaddafi's regime. As in Egypt, the analysts, researchers and specialists didn't reach a consensus on the causes of the Libyan events but as the above situation, bad governance may not be the only reason of the uprisings or the international armed intervention but we can't ignore its contribution to the crisis escalation.

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been leading the country since 1969, after a coup d'etat. Right after that, he abolished the Constitution and created his own political system based on the Green Book, a document adopted in 1970. This established a political system which was a combination of socialism and Islamic precepts partially derived from the tribal practices and it was implemented by the people under the name of 'direct democracy' [29]. However, similarly to the other countries studied here, power is concentrated in the hands of the chief of state and a small group of relatives and loyal members in key positions in the government and army which made Gaddafi's position a strong one without the direct threat of other political leaders. Moreover, the colonel's dissidents were publicly executed and the executions were broadcasted by several TV channels. At the same time, Gaddafi hired diplomats and recruits who killed dozens of refugees criticizing his regime abroad. Equity and inclusion, the rule of law and the responsibility were non existent in Gaddafi's Libya. Another example is the 'Code of Honor' of March 1997 which institutes a system of collective punishment for wrongdoing, whereby families, towns and municipalities are held responsible for the actions of individuals in their midst and are subject to punishment such as the dissolution of the local People's Congress or the denial of government services, including utilities, water, infrastructure projects [30].

Despite the fact that the citizens rule Libya through local councils, it is Gaddafi who has executive power leading an authoritarian state as a true dictator. Exercising this power is not controlled by any internal body (Libya doesn't have a parliament or parties to express different political opinions or directions [31]). Moreover, we can identify a sole organization system in Libya – on one hand, Jamahiriya (people's state), where people supposedly directly govern Libya's internal affairs and, on the other hand, there is 'the revolutionary sector' led directly by Colonel Gaddafi together with several 'revolutionary committees' whose purpose is 'the absolute revolutionary surveillance of the people's power'. In fact, these committees make Gaddafi's political system look very much like the communist ones, Libya being, in our opinion, a state between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. This is because the purpose of these 'revolutionary committees' is to observe the population and repress any attempt of political opposition. At the same time, the fact that 10-20% of Libya's population work for these surveillance committees [32] provides a clear picture of the control exercised by Gaddafi on the population and also of the loss of his government's legitimacy and implicitly of the quality of governance. The regime maintains a complex and large security apparatus made of police and military units, numerous intelligence services, revolutionary committees and 'purge' committees'. The need to control the population generally shows that the leaders are afraid it will disobey the established rules which denote a faulty management of problems, resources, aspects on the citizens' quality of life. Moreover, the fact that Gaddafi's regime knew a series of attempted coups d'etat, attempt on president's life and aroused public opprobrium [33] reveals the same reality.

Despite the fact that, theoretically, the citizens govern directly, through the control of the 'revolutionary committees' by restricting several rights and civil liberties, the emergence of other political leaders with different opinions is not possible. The citizens' equal participation in governance is therefore an illusion. Since his 'Five Point Speech' [34] in 1973, Muammar Gaddafi tried to consolidate his position by establishing a repressive system. The numerous security forces have the right to impose sentences without any trials; these forces are known for their numerous and serious violations of human rights. Moreover, many prisoners were detained for years without any trial. The lack of expression, of the press, meetings, associations and religion were ample restricted. The forbidden Islamic groups were repressed and there were discriminations between the ethnical and tribal minorities. The right to work is also restricted – the strikes are forbidden and all negotiations between different associations had to be approved by the government. Furthermore, foreign workers aren't allowed to participate in these associations.

The numerous violations of human fundamental and political rights made impossible the emergence of independent organizations.

Libya's economy is centralized although there are developments in its private sector. Also, characteristic for Libya's economy is that it relies mainly on oil production and export, resource completely controlled by the government. In this context, corruption became constant in the economic and political environment. In terms of the citizens' quality of life, the studies show an improvement – literacy is now nearly universal among schoolchildren, life expectancy has gone up by 20 years, and infant mortality has fallen to less than a tenth of the level it was at the time of the revolution. However, welfare is only for Gaddafi and his friends – salaries are extremely low and the unemployment rate stands at 30% especially among young people [35]. We can then paraphrase *The Economist* and state that, given considerable oil resources and substantial incomes, the fact that the vast majority of the population is poor denotes that 'Libya is a country where something has gone very wrong' [36]. This state has been systemically mismanaged for a generation, at virtually every level of government. The citizens' needs and expectations were not respected or even considered, their obedience being guaranteed by a systematically stopping any attempts to suggest or bring changes.

Not even on the international level, Libya didn't bring many benefits to its citizens. Financing terrorism or the acts of terrorism admitted by Gaddafi have brought about international sanctions which ultimately have effects on the citizens.

All this together with the urge from the Egyptian and Tunisians, led to protests against Gaddafi first in Tripoli then in Benghazi, Libya's vital port. Here resistance forces were organized against the regime in a functional government. Moreover, there were armed forces established against Gaddafi which led to a real civil war in Libya. Gaddafi's security forces tried to brutally stifle the protests; he stated that he will 'purge' each house until the protests stop saying that 'those who don't love me do not deserve to live' [37]. All this provide a clear and relevant picture of the way Libya was governed and the terror inflicted upon its citizens despite of a so called democratic system. The attempts to stop the dissident move led to the increase of restrictions, the Libyans' human security worsened dramatically which finally led to UN sanctions and a military intervention of a coalition led by France. Also, the humanitarian situation became very serious – the medical, fuel and food supplies decreased dramatically, violence led to the emergence of a wave of refugees who crossed the Tunisian border and refugee camps were established and there are over 8000 dead.

Yemen and Bahrain

The protests in Yemen took place at the same time as those in Tunisia and Egypt, with similar causes. As in the other cases, the same leader was leading the country for over 20 years, the country being a republic though. The main factors leading to the protests at the beginning of this year were the faulty management of the social and economic problems. Yemen has the less human development in the Arab world as a UN report said [38] occupying the 133rd rank out of the 169 cited. The main cause is the faulty management of resources. Its economy depends heavily on the oil reserves which are decreasing fact that led the leaders begin a program of economic reforms (2006) which should diversify its sectors and attract foreign investments. However, in 2010, the international community decided to establish a group meant to assist this country economically and politically [39]. Moreover, the decreased water resources and the population's high growth rate are other challenges that must be dealt with by the leaders of this country. All this made the unemployment stand at 35% while more than 45% of the population live below the poverty line [40].

Thus, in this case, there is human insecurity in almost all its dimensions – medical, food, economic and community. Furthermore, we can speak here of another fact that led to the events in January-February 2011 – separatist tendencies in the south of the country where they ask for the re-establishment of South Yemen (here there were the most violent confrontations). This was because, until 1990, Yemen was divided in two – the north under the influence of South Arabia and the south. These were peacefully united in 1990 but in 1994, a civil war broke out between the two, war won by North Yemen. There were constant tensions between the two parties and strong anti-government feelings in the south. There are other separatist tendencies in North-Eastern Yemen where in January 2010, the al-Houthi rebels tried to lead a war of secession with the government. Then, the government proved incapable to meet this crisis in an adequate way and the Saudi Arabia military intervention was necessary.

Moreover, the reports on human right don't show an agreement between Yemen practices and good governance – we are talking here about abuses and discriminations with religious causes [41]; to this, we can add aspects regarding women and children rights and liberties, freedom of expression and of the press and also human right violations by the government and the security forces, violations translated into torture, inhuman treatments, executions without any trial. Corruption and inefficiency are other characteristics of the government and the security forces. Also, Yemen's current situation is not new, the state is divided and the leaders were often faced with challenges. The civil was in 1994 is another example.

Another faulty management of the social aspects by the government is the relationship between the authorities and the tribes. The president had their approval for a while but, in time, the tribes gained more influence than Saleh himself. The tribes enjoyed a high degree of independence and governed large areas without a governmental control; this control has now become stronger. Furthermore, many of the leaders of these tribes joined the opposition movement and want the removal of Saleh from office. Their influence in Saleh potential removal and in the deterioration of the

security environment at national, regional and even international level is generated by the fact that the president used these tribes and the Jihad to control the secession movements. For this reason, there are voices saying that, within Yemen's security system there are Jihad people, which makes the identification of these movements very difficult.

Similarly, the repercussions of bad governance go beyond the protests. The president Ali Abdullah Saleh wasn't removed from office but the state's institutions were divided in two parties – one asking for his resignation and the other one supporting him. At the same time, the focus of security forces on the tensions still existing in Sanaa made that these didn't focus on other areas in the country. Moreover, even before this crisis, there were, in Yemen, areas that the government was still controlling and the current crisis favored the exacerbation of this 'vacuum of authority' [42]. Due to the existence of several Al Qaeda factions in Yemen, this phenomenon could favor Jihad development.

Bahrain is another state in the Middle East which has experienced popular protests lately. Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy; King Sheikh Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has been leading this country since 1999 when he instituted political reforms that replaced the state's restrictive security laws, women had the right to vote, the political prisoners were released and parliamentary elections were established. However, unlike Yemen poor economy, Bahrain's economy is very developed. As Yemen, a large part is based on oil production and refining (60%) but, additionally, there are several economic sectors where Bahrain had remarkable performances – communications, transportation and the banking system. But the youth unemployment (15%) [43] characterizes this country as well and the global economic and financial crises exacerbated these problems.

However, the religious discrimination was the factor that led to the escalation of the crisis in 2011. The Shiites in Bahrain often complained about discrimination compared to the Sunnis regarding employment, houses or infrastructure. Moreover, these don't have the right to have important political or military positions.

Also, significant for Bahrain's faulty governance are the youth requests which started the protests. These were: establishing a constitution written by the people; establishing a body to investigate and consider the economic, political and social abuses, including the theft of national wealth, political naturalization, arrests, torture and other oppressive security measures, institutional and economic corruption [44]. Thus, from all this, we can notice that Bahrain faced problems similar to those of the other Arab states, the conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnis being the only difference.

Syria

The street protests, political violence and the authorities' attempts to stifle them have developed in Syria as well, following the same pattern as the other states above. The causes that determined the popular uprising are also similar, despite the fact that Bashar Assad had time to study the development of this type of movements in the other countries in the region and of the fact that he instituted several reforms or measures that created the picture of an oppressive system with an ongoing democratization and that prevented popular uprisings. These measures were gifts of money, salary increases, reduction of taxes, changing the law on municipal elections etc [45]. However, despite the attempts to meet the citizens' needs, the pre-emptive security measures and the time at its disposal to analyze the causes and development of the uprisings in the other countries, Bashar Assad's regime met with the same reaction from the citizens due to the increase of their awareness, the regime's illegitimate character and the faulty management of Syria's internal affairs. Corruption, unjustified violence and propaganda were practices the Syrian people was used to but, due to a liberalization of the access to information and the experience of the neighboring countries, this regime contested the at the beginning of 2011. We can identify the causes if we study briefly the quality of Syria's governance.

Officially, Syria is a parliamentary republic, but the state of emergency was declared in 1963 which allowed for the suspension of most constitutional rights and liberties of the Syrian people. The

democratic institutions were valid until the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party came to power in 1963 when Syria turned into a state led by one party under the state of emergency. In fact, Syria is an authoritarian regime, apparently democratic, the Syrians don't have the right to change the government. The state of emergency is justified by the war with Israel and the terrorist threat. In the 60s, civilian ideologists and military officers were in power, most of them came from the Syrian minority of the Alawites. This period culminated in the takeover of General Hafez al-Assad in 1970. After his death in 2000, his son Bashar al Assad came to power.

Syria is not an elective democracy. According to the 1973 constitution, the president is appointed by the Party in power, the Ba'ath Party and approved through a referendum. According to a Freedom House report [46], these referenda are orchestrated by the government, because they represent elections for the parliament which had little democratic independent and legitimate legislative power. Moreover, according to the same report, the state of emergency declared in 1963 and maintained until today gives, theoretically, the security agencies the unlimited right to make arrests and prolong the detention without telling the reasons. Most of the Syrian political prisoners have never been judged. The security agencies operate independently from the judicial power and the Syrian Human Rights Committee reported often about hundreds of informers forced to write reports on family or friends suspected of involvement in activities against the regime.

The state of emergency allows for the violation of many citizens' universal rights and liberties such as the freedom of expression which is restricted in Syria. Vague articles in the penal code, in documents establishing the state of emergency and in a Law of publications (2001) mention, among serious crimes, publishing material that affects national unity, tarnishes the state's image or threatens the 'revolution's purposes'. Many journalists, writers and intellectuals were arrested in virtue of these provisions. Public demonstrations are forbidden without having the official permission which is generally given only to groups in favor of the regime. The freedom of association is also violated. All non governmental organizations must be recorded by the government which generally refuses to record the reform groups or those who militate for the human rights. The press law in 2001 requires that all editors and owners of publications should be Arabs. Furthermore, the Kurd minority, women and children are subject to serious violations of the human rights, despite the fact that the government has promoted gender equality by appointing women in leading positions including that of vice-president. Syria's parliament has the largest number of women compared to the Arab world and the government guarantees the women's right to education. However, many discriminating laws remain in force.

Thus, we can notice that Syria had a poor quality of governance as we cannot identify the characteristics of good governance such as the rule of law, transparency, receptivity, consensus orientation, efficiency, equity and inclusion. Moreover, the events in 2001 are not the only ones in Bashar al-Assad's governance. In the 70s, the fundamentalist Sunni Muslims denied the legitimacy of the secular regime imposed by the Ba'ath Party; there was a conservatory Sunni structure – the Muslim Brotherhood – that started an armed insurgency against the government until 1982 when the opposition was massacred. In the summer of 2000, they were faced with 'the Damascus Spring' – movement of democratic activists, stifled in the autumn of 2001 when all its leaders were arrested. In fact, Syria is known for the large number of political prisoners, detained without any trial. We can also speak here about an intelligence service very developed and influent both in the political and economic field. According to several sources, Syria has four security agencies which helped Hafez al-Assad to maintain a strict control on the population and which supported Bashar al-Assad to take over the power [47]. At the same time, the same agencies have a very important role in maintaining a strict control over the population not only deterring and removing any types of movements but also regarding the human rights.

To all this, we can add the economic dimension of human security – in Syria, 12% of the population live below the poverty level [48]. Adding to this the citizens' inequality to their changes to improve and maintain their living standard, the serious violation of the human rights, the high level of corruption, the fact that the laws don't allow the change of the government or the subordination of the

executive authority to any real control of the population, we can state that, from the economic point of view, the Syrians do not have a satisfactory level of human security. Moreover, if we consider their requests during the uprisings in 2011 – the end of the state of emergency, the change of the government, freedom etc – it's obvious that a poor quality of governance led to the deterioration of national security at the beginning of this year.

Also, the authorities' attempts to control or put an end to these uprisings with the help of the security forces determined the aggravation of human and national security. The street fights generated dozens of dead and hundreds of injured.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of recent events in Northern Africa and the Middle East reveals the fact that the focus on good governance is totally justified. In the era of globalization, of the triumph of democracy in most parts of the world, there are still countries where the citizens' life is seriously affected by bad governance. Its impact on human security is undeniable. So long as totalitarian or authoritarian regimes are in power, there are numerous direct and indirect threats on human security. Within these regimes, the instruments of national power are not capitalized for defending or promoting national interests [49] but are operational only to satisfy the private interests of the leaders or of a small group leading the state. Furthermore, we can notice in the case of all these countries the fact that but for the uprisings, the citizens wouldn't have had real chance of changing the quality of life. Except for Syria, where we can already speak about a hereditary dictatorship, all the other countries fighting for democracy in 2011 had been led by authoritarian regimes whose leaders were succeeded by their own sons. This generates the deterioration of national security by the emergence of political violence, protests and uprisings often brutally stifled by the political leaders who, despite the fact that they lost any legitimacy, any moral right to rule the respective nation, try to stay in power. Moreover, the state of national insecurity has regional and even international repercussions. The dissemination of uprisings in the Arab world is an eloquent example in itself and the range of events may not be over yet.

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[7] Ibidem, p. 337-346. Political violence means uprisings, mass strikes, terrorist attacks, political assassinations, but doesn't mean a revolution which is a rapid and dramatic overturn of a government together with its elites.

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[9] Tom Gallagher, *Theft of a nation. Romania since communism*, Humanitas Publishing, Bucharest, 2004, p.65.

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[16] The report can be accessed on http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf . It makes a classification of the world states depending on the democratic level of development, taking into consideration factors such as: election process and pluralism, civil liberties, government activities, political participation and political culture; depending on these, the states are placed in a top where Norway occupies the 1st place (the most developed democracy of the world and North Korea occupies the 167th place as the most authoritarian system.

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FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

Freedom, security and justice are key values, major components defining the present European society. They are cornerstones of the European integration framework. The European Union has already established for its citizens a single market, an economic and monetary union, the ability to cope with global economic and political challenges, and with the threats to border security of the member states.

Keywords: *security, justice, strategies, multiannual programme, information*

ELEMENTS PROVING THE UNITY OF THE EUROPEAN STATES

European history has recorded the idea of unity since Greco-Roman Antiquity. Written sources show that, at the beginning, the first signs of political organization emerged in small areas, and only later throughout increasingly larger areas. A telling example from that period was the unified military structure in Ellada, where the Greek cities were united in the so-called *amphiktyony* (a union of Greek cities having the same religious and political institutions) that analyzed and solved the matters of mutual interest, or decided on certain disputes between them through their elected representatives, members of the Amphiktyony Council. In Ancient Rome, Roman conquests spread throughout Europe, forming *Mundus romanus*. The Roman Empire adopted a unique law applied on its whole territory - *Pax Romana*. According to the law, free people of the Empire became Roman citizens with a juridical status, being protected by a single army and having joint administration; similarly, a unique currency was used throughout the empire.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, political unity of a significant part of Europe was achieved for a short period of time during Charlemagne’s reign, but it did not last long because his very descendants divided the Carolingian Empire, establishing borders for the first time. Therefore, on the European continent, new state structures appeared, which were ultimately controlled by church from a moral, legal and social point of view, yet attempting to maintain unity among Europeans. But the absence of a unifying political power, the invasions of migratory populations, the dissolution of provinces, rivalries between Pope and kings (the emperors), between the West and the Byzantine East that marked the entire Middle Ages, led to the dissolution of the European political unity and the appearance of two principles of European unification - *the papal and imperial unity*, both proving incapable of being brought into agreement.

For nearly a thousand years, European political unity has not been reached, but there has been spiritual unity, well preserved through the Christian religion of the feudal society, religious

terminology and the Latin language. However, the differences between the Western Europe and the Eastern part belonging to the Byzantine Empire got even greater after the 1054 schism.

In spite of political inconsistency on the European continent, Renaissance emerged rapidly, spreading Renaissance ideas of unity, as well as a variety of intellectual and moral beliefs, resulting in the appearance of the unifying and enlightened man, who does not belong to one country, but to Europe, an heir of the ancient culture, who adapts it to the new historical, political, social and cultural conditions.

The idea of European unity is strongly rooted in human history. No matter the period they belong to, ideologists have been interested in unifying Europe. Examples are numerous starting with Sully and Henry IV, The Abbot of Saint-Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, G. Leibniz, continuing with Jan Amos Comenius, Ch. de Montesquieu and Pierre Dubois. Before the Congress of Vienna (October 1814), Saint-Simon published his prophetic study: *Reorganisation de la société européenne, ou de la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale* (The reorganization of the European society and the necessity and methods to unite peoples in Europe into one political body, preserving the national independence of each of them). One can sum up Saint-Simon's study by means of the reasoning: Europe is a human continent, a spiritual creation, a splendid example of will and thinking. Thus, according to the aforementioned, Europe is not a territory, but a socio-spiritual idea, it is the society of European peoples, which, on ancient and Christian grounds have built a civilization, bringing about the glory of Humanity. Subsequently, the idea of unifying Europe was just a dream for philosophers, writers and visionaries such as Victor Hugo, who, inspired by humanistic ideals, advanced first the idea of European unity, the United States of Europe. Dante, Voltaire, J.J. Rousseau, Imm. Kant also had major contributions.

In these circumstances, sovereign states emerged on the European territory, announcing a division of the political, economic, as well as religious beliefs leading to the establishment of the borders between European states which later on became the basis of the geographical linguistic, economic and social separation criteria, which created deep rivalries and conflicts of interest. Despite this clear separation of the European states, as well as their obvious rivalries, there have been some ideas of European organization and unification in order to ensure peace in Europe, such as:

- According to Dante, the great poet, universal peace can be achieved by federalizing monarchies and their rule under a single king;
- In 1795 Immanuel Kant drafted a project of a federal Europe with a republican constitution;
- Voltaire and J.J. Rousseau also had projects of European unification;
- After the Congress of 1849 held in Paris, which brought the idea of federalist European unification, embodied in the *European United States* project, Victor Hugo and Garibaldi created a magazine of *the European United States*, making different suggestions of peaceful unification.

The innovating ideas of European unification could not be put into practice because of rivalries between great powers did not create the proper conditions. Their dream was shattered by the two world wars that ravaged the continent.

In the nineteenth-century, the European continent was divided into countries showing economic decline. Furthermore, by the end of the century, some countries had experienced scientific and technical development that contributed to their segregation. In addition, there were also some conflicts related to the division of colonial territories that led to the two world wars from early and mid twentieth century.

After World War I, peace treaties completely reshaped the map of Europe by the emergence of new national states, with new borders, showing the triumph of the principle of nationality whose father was Thomas Woodrow Wilson (U.S. President), Chair of the Peace Conference in Paris (1919-1920) and creator

of the principle of self-determination of nations emerged from peoples' struggle for freedom. After the establishment of national states, important ideas and projects of European unity arose because of some unsolved ethnic problems, the dissatisfaction of former empires, or the danger of extreme nationalism and communism according to some opinions.

The unrest and mistrust within the European states could be balanced only by means of a European organization. Such ideas, projects, actions aiming at ensuring European unity and providing the conditions for the future unity are:

- the idea of a *European federation*, the Pan-American type, which was considered effective by the *yielding of some elements of sovereignty* to international bodies. This idea belongs to Richard Nikolaus Coudeuhove-Kalergi who, in *PanEuropa* journal in 1923 and in three volumes of his work *Kampf um PanEuropa* (1925 - 1928), explains that a European union was necessary in order to *prevent Russian Bolshevism from conquering the continent and the economic domination of the Americans*. Coudeuhove Kalergi founded a movement aiming at creating the Pan-European Union, but with no success, (it was thought to have a Governing Board consisting of Member States representatives, representatives of national parliaments as well as a Court of Justice). The Congress in Vienna in 1929 involved two thousand representatives from 24 Member States (it had national sections in all countries on the continent) who created a Pan-European Programme which had established the vectors of European confederations as follows: ensuring equality, security and confederate sovereignty, creating military alliances, the implementation of the customs union, the establishment of a common currency, common enhancement of Member States' colonies, respecting the states' civilization individuality, protecting national minorities as well as international cooperation with other states in the League of Nations. After the war, Coudeuhove Kalergi returned to France from the United States, creating the European Parliamentary Union. His speech on the Union event on 8 -12 September 1947 shows that the means which Europe can use in order to reinforce its potential and regain its rightful place among other nations refer to the setting of a large market, equipped with a stable currency.

- There are some records of initiatives to create unique European institutions: European Economic and Customs Union, and the Federation for European Cooperation, which aimed at promoting the idea of European economic unification in the business environment;

- on September 8, 1929 in Geneva in the League of Nations, Aristide Briand, the first statesman and honorary president of the Pan-European Union made a formal proposal regarding the creation of the European Federal Union (his speech promoted the free movement of people, goods and capital within a European common market, which was Coudeuhove's shared idea);

- there have been numerous books proving the need for European countries union based on the freely consented acceptance of the national states such as: Gaston Riou's *Europe, my country* (1928), Count Sforza's *United States of Europe* (1929), Bertrand de Jouvenel's *Towards the United States of Europe*, Edouard Herriot's *Europe* (1930).

These initiatives to unify European countries did not convince the masses and some European countries were unwilling to yield their sovereignty, then they were blocked by the economic crisis in 1929 - 1930, but they enjoy the merit of having created community terminology using such terms: *common market, customs union, movement of goods, capital and people*, which later proved very useful in the European Union organization.

The creation of a more humanitarian and more rightful Europe has been a permanent concern for the European states, their leaders, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, professors, economists, lawyers and for researchers from all the social-economic domains on the continent.

In 1930, professor Dimitrie Gusti provided a short historical description of the European unity, and he optimistically stated: *on the long road over the centuries, the idea of European unity has suffered many changes and took different shapes, meaning that Europe has been created many times and in various ways. It was first created in the Ancient Greece by Alexander the Great, then Rome created the second Europe*

through Julius Caesar and pax romana. The third Europe was created by the German Charlemagne - the king of the Franks. The fourth Europe was built due to the papal reign, whose leader was Innocentius the Third. The creation of the fifth Europe was Napoleon's dream. And the list goes on.

Nicolae Titulescu had numerous ideas that served the outlining of the European unity, starting from 1921, when he worked as a permanent delegate of Romania at the League of Nations in Geneva (being elected president of this organization twice in 1930 and 1931); one of his ideas was that of a United Europe through *the spiritualization of borders*. As a president of the League of Nations in the 1930s, he mentioned *a spiritualization of borders that would involve people's spiritualization*. The system of ideas about Europe, which gives Titulescu's reasoning great value, refers to: *peace, the organization and the dynamism of peace, illegitimacy of war, the European Union, the economic union, the association of states, the incrimination of aggression, the European nation and the spiritualization of borders*.

At the end of the World War II, the European population and territory were economically and socially ruined, a fact that easily allowed the implementation of the European unity ideas so that the general crisis situation would be overcome. These ideas were revived through Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill's statement, on 19th September 1946, at Zurich University, when he proposed the creation of the United States of Europe¹: *We have to pay respect to a European family in a regional setting, which may be called the United States of Europe, and the first political step should be the creation of a Council of Europe*. This initiative determined the forming of groups and movements that promoted the idea of European unity, such as *The European Union of Federalists, the Parliamentary European Union, the Free Movement for the United Europe, the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe and the New International Teams*.

The first action was made by the European Union of Federalists together with the European Parliamentary Union, which organized the Montreaux Congress between 27-31 August 1947, supporting the federalist idea. Then, the Free Movement for the United Europe initiated in December 1947 the establishment of the International Committee for the Coordination of the Free Movements for the United Europe, supporting the unionist idea. This Committee organized the Europe's Congress at Hague between 7-10 May 1948 (there were over 800 public figures), where the European Movement was established. It later became the basis of the Cultural European Centre and of the Council of Europe, institutions that made the first steps in creating the European Communities. The European Movement had a coordinating and gathering role for the other movements so that the idea of European unity was transmitted to the national parliaments and governments. This Movement had the following honorific presidents: Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paul Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and it was coordinated through the Congress and an International Committee of the representatives of the national councils.

The negative consequences of the world wars in the economic and social life of the western states and the positive effects of the European movements made a great contribution to the establishment of many international institutions which have strengthened the basis of the European Communities.

The first action for European unity had a defensive military nature, and consisted in the creation of the European Military Organization through the Brussels Treaty, on 17th March 1948, joined by the following states: France, England, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. In 1949, these states became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established through the Washington Treaty.

The second action for European Unity consisted in the creation of the Organization for the European Economic Co-operation (which was later renamed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) through the Paris Treaty of 16th April 1948, in order to distribute the monetary support offered by the United States of America through the Marshall Plan (launched in the summer of 1947, and having as its main objective the reconstruction of the economies of the western European states, ruined at the end of World War II). This organization made regional cooperation possible, whose target goals were to rebuild the economic and technical capacity so that European productivity and standard of living rise. This

regional cooperation led to the development of a common market, which was hindered in the beginning by the borders between states and the monetary, fiscal and environmental provisions.

The third action for European unity, of a political nature, is represented by the creation of the Council of Europe. The CE proposed the signing of the European Convention for Human Rights, which is based on the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th December 1948, which resumed the principles stated two centuries before in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789*. The European Convention for Human Rights represents a step forward towards the achievement of the *promotion of the ideas and principles that form the common patrimony* of the European people, which are sources of individual and political liberties and of the preeminence of the law that is *the basis of a true democracy*.

The first person who promoted a Pact for a Union of European States was Michel Debre, in December 1949, in the Council of Europe; his project set forth a management and organization system, which was *presidential and federalist, and had an arbitrator elected for five years through universal vote and commissioners appointed by him, a Senate of national ministers, a Court of judges and a European Assembly of national delegates*.

In the early 1950s, Jean Monnet, former deputy general secretary of the League of Nations, in the interwar period, made a proposal to the French foreign affairs minister, Robert Schumann, consisting in a plan for resolving the French-German conflicts, by the fusion of the production of coal and steel of the both countries.

Robert Schumann agreed with Jean Monnet regarding the feasibility of the project, including the part stating that he would be, as a result of his position, the father of the institution that was due to be created and that would be based on a simple but pragmatic principle: a united Europe, that would not be accomplished at once, but that would be created gradually, by achieving a *de facto* solidarity between the western European states. The commissioner of the French Plan had already thought about the institution that was appropriate for achieving this goal, and that would become a true engine of European integration: the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, whose job was to abolish the customs barriers for the two products, having an extreme importance from a political, strategic and economic point of view.

Robert Schumann made some amendments to the plan presented by Jean Monnet, and on the 9th of May 1950, he got the compliance of the French government. Actually, the French government proposed that the entire French and German production of coal and steel be controlled by a High Authority, through an organization open to other European states. *The union of the production of coal and steel would immediately offer a common basis for the economic development of Europe and would be a first step towards its federalization*, the French government stated. The production solidarity would make any war between France and Germany impossible from a material point of view. Constructing a powerful production unity, open to other states under the same conditions, would set the ground for their future economic unification.

Michel Debré's proposal was reinforced in Paris by French Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schumann's statement on 9th of May 1950, supported by Jean Monnet, voicing views imbued with humanism and ominous realism.

The construction of the European people unity was achieved through conciliation, materialized in the creation of European institutions and organizations: the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community, and, subsequently, THE EUROPEAN UNION. The activity of these European bodies consisted in actions and measures enforcing democratic stability inside internationally acknowledged borders, and the economic cross-border cooperation stimulating the workability of the economies on safe markets, the only ones that can guarantee a decent standard of living.

Europe has been built every day for more than 60 years, and today it represents an achievement of the 20th century, a great historical achievement in peace, unity and a great hope for the new century.

Europe appears to be a visionary and generous project of the founding states, emerged in war conditions and animated by the wish to create the conditions for sustainable peace for the European people. The project is continuously renewed out of the wish of the European people to live together.

The rise of the united Europe, has reached the point that Europeans do not have borders between them anymore, share the same currency and they guarantee for their economic interests within common institutions regulated by common laws, a fact that has led to the rise of the standard of living. Eastern European states have pursued this beneficial project, and they have rapidly implemented the European *acquis* in their national legislation.

It is obvious today that the European Union is unique. It is not a federal state, as it is the case with the United States of America, because the member states of the European Union remain free independent nations. The European Union is not an intergovernmental organization either, as is the case with the United Nations Organization, because the member states unite a part of their sovereign powers, obtaining a collective power and a worldwide influence that none of them could individually attain.

Practically, the integration of the sovereign powers means that the member states delegate some of their decision-making powers to the joint institutions that they have created, so that the decisions regarding specific issues that are of common interest be taken democratically, at a European level.

The EU is one of the most important economic and financial areas of the world, where the approximately 500 million European citizens benefited from an annual budget of 141.9 billion Euro in 2011.

Despite the negative aspects of the crisis, the European unity of Member States has become the most important actor in the international trade in goods, accounting for 18.6% of the total world trade, the largest export market for more than 100 countries. The economic success of the European Union would not have been possible without the existence of *a single market*, without borders where there are over 20 million companies, and which ensures the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital.

In just half a century, the European Union has brought peace and prosperity on the continent and a single European currency (euro) shared by about 331 million people every day. It is the world's second largest reserve currency after the U.S. dollar. Around 26% of worldwide reserves are now held in euro. The euro is the second most actively traded currency in the world, used in around 40% of daily transactions on exchange markets.

In this community area, the European Union citizen has the fundamental right to move freely together with his family to another EU country for economic reasons or other purposes, enjoying a short or long term stay or even permanent residence, being deemed the right to choose the place where they want to work or live without any restriction from any Member State. It is a unique right in the world now and any other form of international cooperation between states does not ensure comparable rights.

For these reasons, freedom, security and justice are key values, asserting major elements of the European society model. These values are cornerstones of the European Union integration model.

The European Union has already established a single market, an economic and monetary union for its citizens and it is able to meet global political and economic challenges.

Ensuring a space of freedom, security and justice to every citizen within EU countries required the establishment of some community institutions in charge of coordination, support, information exchange and protection, which should ascertain accurate, safe, reliable and effective activities of police and judicial cooperation in each Member State in order to tackle serious cross-border crimes.

It is a well-known fact that the 60-year-old EU area, has enlarged during the last decade by means of the 12 Eastern European countries integration, reaching a total of 28 Member States (five states do not yet apply the provisions of the Schengen acquis), states which also wanted to join this area of freedom, security and justice, called Schengen. The enlargement of the 20 year-old Schengen area, now consisting in 26 states (four are non-EU countries), which Romania also wants to join, has caused a spread of threats to borders and to the security of Member States, known as cross-border very serious crime. This crime is precisely facilitated by key elements which describe globalization, namely: the development of free movement of people, the economic and trade relations, the information technology together with the opening of European borders of the recently integrated states.

EUROPEAN FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

The Member States of the European Union have become aware of the fact that in order to efficiently fight on a long term against the threats and in order to protect the area of freedom, security and justice, they would have to establish a different domain encompassing policies, strategies, institutions, legislation and pragmatic management guidelines, which will be detailed hereinafter.

Thus, the Maastricht Treaty² *represented the genesis of the justice and home affairs* concept, at European level, being unique in the world and the legal basis for creating a new field of interest for the European Communities.

The gradual establishment of the *area of freedom, security and justice* concept began with the Amsterdam Treaty³. This new concept replaced the justice and home affairs concept implemented by the Maastricht Treaty, and its purpose was that of harmonizing the free movement of people, goods and services within the European Union, whilst offering a high level of protection and legal guarantees to all the citizens.

The important progress made in establishing the area of freedom, security and justice are measured through the multiannual European programmes, their priority being that of placing the citizen in the center of these projects.

An important step, resulted from putting into effect the three multiannual strategic programmes, established at the European Councils from Tampere⁴ (1999-2004), Haga (2004-2009) and Stockholm (2010-2015), shows that every aspect related to the home affairs field is implemented so that it can better serve the European citizen.

The multiannual programmes in the freedom, security and justice domain come into force in a European context which creates integrated systems in order to solve real problems of the European area of security.

Based on the achievements resulted from carrying out the Tampere and Haga programmes⁵, there have been recorded significant advancements hitherto. Controls at the internal borders have been eliminated in the Schengen Area, and at present the external borders of the European Union are managed in a more coherent way. By developing a global approach on migration, the external dimension of the European Union policy regarding migration focuses on dialogue and partnerships with third countries based on mutual interests. Significant measures have been enforced in order to create a European asylum system. European agencies such as Europol, Eurojust, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Agency for the Management of External Borders (Frontex) have all reached the operational maturity in their domain of activity. Cooperation in civil law matters makes citizens' every day life easier, while law enforcement cooperation ensures that citizens benefit of higher security.

Despite these achievements and other important advancements in the freedom, security and justice domain, Europe confronts new challenges hereinafter. These challenges should be approached in a broad manner.

Therefore, new plans are to be accomplished in order to improve the coherence between the policies of different domains and, moreover, the cooperation between the member states should be intensified.

It is obvious that a new agenda was necessary, one that would allow the European Union and its member states to consolidate its success and to be able to cope with future challenges. To this effect, the European Council has adopted a new multiannual programme for the 2010-2014 period, known as the Stockholm programme.

The Stockholm programme⁶, whose purpose is to define a European security guide so that the European citizens live safely and enjoy their rights, allowed the launching of *the European Union strategy for internal security*, which will be further described.

The Stockholm programme for justice and internal affairs, supported by the European Parliament in November 2009 and adopted next month on December summit, defines the priorities of the freedom, security and justice domain for the following five years, 2010-2014, regarding citizens' rights and the protection and the facilitation of a more integrated society.

STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME

Stockholm programme, also named *An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens* restates the priority it grants to the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, in response to a common concern of people living in the European Union.

Its objective is to strengthen security and the rule of law in order to promote individual rights. This program envisages more effective police cooperation through Europol and a more carefully prepared plan for the future information exchange.

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty⁷, the European Union joined the *European Convention on Human Rights* and the convention compliance will be rigorously and systematically monitored. The *Roadmap* (adopted during the Swedish Presidency) in order to strengthen the defendants' rights in criminal cases will require parallel implementation, increasing attention to the rights of victims to criminality.

A solid system of data and information protection at community level will be established.

Cooperation with origin and transit countries in migration cases should be strengthened and the European Union should facilitate a correspondence between the contribution of migrants' skills and the needs of labor markets, providing the same rights to immigrants. Enhanced measures are needed to prevent and combat illegal immigration.

The common policy on immigration, asylum and border security has recorded considerable progress, except for legal migration and employment matters, on which the Council must still decide unanimously.

Policies on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters used an intergovernmental logic, in a context of obvious distrust and the unanimity principle, which significantly hindered the adoption of common European legislation.

The stages that lead to the adoption of the Stockholm Programme had been already fuelled by numerous contributions, including the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, the reports of the advisory group concerning the future of the European policy in the field of justice and internal affairs, and also the contributions received by the European Commission, in September and November 2008, during the public consultation on the future of *Freedom, security, justice – consultation on the priorities for the next five years*.

In June 2009, the Commission published its communication entitled *An area of freedom, security and justice for citizens - A wider freedom in a safer environment*, opinion, designed to provide CESE's views and recommendations concerning Stockholm Programme.

Moreover, the committee established an own-initiative opinion in which it suggests that European Union policies and legislation regarding immigration and borders should duly respect human rights and should mainly approach freedom and security matters. Furthermore, the opinion is part of CESE contribution to the establishment of Stockholm programme.

A directive adopted by the Committee introduces simpler and more attractive conditions for the EU entry of third countries *highly qualified citizens*. It creates the *EU Blue Card*, which offers an accelerated procedure and common criteria for issuing a special residence and work permit. This blue card is valid for a maximum four year-period, it aims at helping its holder to get a job and it ensures him/her the rights such as: family reunification or movement around the European Union.

The council also adopted a directive which introduced penalties for employers of illegally staying third- country nationals.

There were also proposals regarding a system for coordinating the resettlement of refugees on the EU territory and for practical cooperation between Member States, which aimed at facilitating a common share of the 203, 000 refugees accepted in 2010, among which there were children, single women and people with serious illnesses who need resettlement.

The establishment of a European Asylum Support Office came to support the Member States facing an influx of asylum seekers. The Council of Justice and Home Affairs has agreed that the office be located in Malta. The European Union has committed to establish a viable common system, based on solidarity and full enforcement of Geneva Convention.

The European Commission had proposed periodical on site inspections and unannounced visits to help build mutual trust and safeguard the freedoms of the Schengen area. Travel documents will be better protected against fraud, under a regulation adopted by the Council, which sets standards for security features and biometric elements for passports and travel documents issued by Member States, which are considered essential to ensuring a safe and simple border control. Thus, border crossings will be simplified and security will be improved.

The European Commission proposed the establishment of a single agency which, from 2012 on, aims at managing, large-scale information systems, including the Schengen Information System, the Information system regarding visas and the Eurodac fingerprint data, underlying the effective EU border management systems. People who often enter Schengen area for short periods - for example, for professional reasons or to visit family – now benefit from a regulation on common procedures and conditions for issuing multiple-entry visitor visas with validity between six months and five years.

The European Commission adopted a proposal regarding better assistance provided to victims and harsher penalties against offenders guilty of abuse against women and children by means of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. The proposal also deals with police procedures such as wiretapping, providing accommodation, care and legal advice to victims and stricter sanctions against those who practice sex tourism.

The European Commission also proposed that, in order to combat terrorism and serious crime, law enforcement authorities should have access to the Eurodac fingerprint database, established as part of the EU policy on asylum. A series of accompanying measures will ensure the protection of personal data and will tutelage the right to asylum.

Combating terrorism was also the subject of an agreement on providing data on EU financial transactions to the U.S. authorities. The negotiations focused on the protection of personal data and Commission's review of the procedures governing the handling, use and dissemination of financial transactions records by U.S. Department of Treasury confirmed that the U.S. has been vigilant from the outset in respecting the safeguards in the handling of personal data .

To manage data flow on border crossing, the Stockholm Program stipulates the establishment of an Administrative department under the control of Europol and FRONTEX, so that *interoperability of IT systems* should be carried out *in full compliance with data protection standards*. Police and authorities ensuring the security to all member states will have access to the Schengen Information

System (SIS), the Visa Information System and fingerprints database of European Union asylum seekers (Eurodac). These measures are absolutely necessary to prevent and manage domestic and international imminent dangers of the Union both in terms of population and territorial integrity, being adopted exclusively for the people.

The Stockholm Program assumed the request made by the German EU Presidency for the surveillance of the Internet, and the cooperation with the security departments of the Member States, in order to allow better control of the Internet regarding “terrorist activities” within the European Union .

Stockholm Program regulates the transfer of Gendarmes forces according to EU legal framework. It would mean that Gendarmes would operate on the whole European territory. European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has 3000 employees with civil tasks that can and should be deployed to crisis areas within and outside Europe. The paramilitary group works closely with FRONTEX, for example in the use of coast guard boats, helicopters and airplanes to prevent the immigrants’ boats approaching the shore of Mediterranean and to send them offshore. Although German police forces are not part of this body, they already cooperate with police and military units of other countries - for example in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

According to the European Council, the Gendarmerie supports NATO missions in Afghanistan in the Hindu Kush and the development of the police organisation. The principles underlying these peacekeeping missions and post-conflict reconstruction aim exactly at what they literally mean. However peaceful a certain society may be, the image of the public authority should be implemented. Its immediate role is not repressive or coercive, but preventive and useful in promptly solving conflicts that exceed the humanitarian mission of the non-governmental organizations. Military presence is necessary even in peaceful areas, their role being to anticipate conflicts and negotiate the layout of constructive discussion in all areas.

In accordance with the European preventive logic, together policies on terrorism and migration, Stockholm action plan program also focuses on criminal proceeding. To improve cooperation in combating organized crime across borders the following measures were adopted: the expansion of *the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)*, creating a *European Index of third countries Convicts*, a European Police Records Index System (EPRIS) and a European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN). EUCPN is an observation center for crime prevention, where information regarding criminal matters within the European Union are compiled and processed in statistics.

In November 2009 the European Commission formally agreed on the green card used for obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one member state to another, which decided on the establishment of a system for obtaining evidence during investigations.

The Stockholm Program *emphasizes on the horizontal importance* of the already existing electronic links between national criminal records (e-Justice) used in combating border crime. European Union plans to simplify the regulations for criminal investigations when they are conducted on the territory of another sovereign state. Agreements have so far regulated what information can be exchanged between member states and under what conditions. However, the *principle of availability*, now gaining ground, assumes that all data should be used freely for solving problems related to citizens’ public safety and European Union’s security.

Ministries of Interior of the member states within the European Union plan the establishment of a strategy based on the Prüm Treaty, in order to facilitate the information exchange between member states’ police forces. Prüm Treaty stipulates that police and forensics departments can have direct access to certain databases managed by the authorities in other signatory states.

This decision authorizes personal data exchange across borders, the transfer of DNA test results, vehicles registration data and communications.

The Prüm Treaty also stipulates the organization of joint police patrols and their cross-border intervention in order to prevent risk situations and the transfer of competence to the signatory countries' police forces.

Given the fact that the Prüm Treaty provisions are enforced only by a group of states and not by all the states of the Union, its signatories deliberately act outside the European legal framework. These states are thus accused that, by signing an agreement, they ignore the formal structures and the legal principles of the European Union, so as the principle of unanimity at ministerial level within the EU.

In order to strengthen Europol, Stockholm Programme aims at creating investigative groups, with civilian employees from many Member States and at providing Europol and Eurojust with national database. In addition, an ad hoc network is to be created in order to facilitate the cooperation of different police forces. Data could be accessed directly through portable devices like mobile phones or laptops without other overall infrastructure. Data from surveillance cameras and sensors could be transmitted through this network.

Stockholm Programme aims at the achievement of European integration: mobility right to EU citizens. It is a right enshrined in the Schengen Agreement, which involves at the same time "more freedom and more security".

Schengen Agreement really facilitated border crossings for EU citizens, especially by eliminating the time-consuming passport control. However, Schengen Information System (SIS) has ceased to be a simple database, and now focuses on *preventing and identifying threats to public order and citizens' safety*.

Moreover, the introduction of a European registration system for travelers is also assessed. Information on travelers will be electronically stored and the system will immediately detect expired visas. Consequently, the department in charge will be alerted. According to such development, conventional passports with stamps and pictures will soon become obsolete.

CONCLUSIONS

Finally, it is interesting to note that Tampere program focused on the freedom of movement, migration, asylum and border security, moving security and justice on the second and third level of priority, while Stockholm program, changes priorities bringing the fundamental rights to the fore policy and leaving the migration related rights on last place in the list of chapters enumerated in the Stockholm program.

EU must strike a balance between freedom and security. EU countries should strengthen cooperation, without compromising national traditions and fundamental rights.

External dimension emphasized in the Stockholm program is extremely important, because freedom, security and justice are not only internal guiding principles, but viable tools used in exporting some values that led to the European present-day framework.

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A CENTURY OF GEOPOLITICS AT THE BLACK SEA. CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN THE DYNAMICS OF INTEREST AND POWER RIVALRIES IN THE REGION

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Abstract

During the history of the 20th century, the Black Sea has had a contradictory role and status by the way in which, at global level, the interest and power relations have evolved at a certain moment within the geopolitical and geo-strategic equation. The area's stability and security alternated with periods of crises and conflicts generated by the dispute between great powers in order to control or dominate the region. The opening and closing years of the 20th centuries were characterized both by lines of continuity but also of profound discontinuities from a geopolitical point of view. The study proposes to emphasize both factors generating such evolutions and the features of each separate stage.

Keywords: *Black Sea geopolitics, interests, balance of power, oil, gas, risks, threats*

1. INTRODUCTION

The Black Sea region was, historically, a place of intersection, of confluences and of confrontations of interests between various civilizations and peoples. During Antiquity, this was the “meeting point” of the *south*, embodied by the great powers of the Hittites, Persians or Greeks, with the *north* of some Indo-European peoples [1]. During the Middle Ages, this was one of the major point of convergence and confrontation between Islam and Christendom [2] and during the Modern and Contemporary Ages it was the region where *East* met *West* [3]. Strategic actors or players, as geopolitical writings designate them, changed from an era to another, interests and the balance of power also suffered sometimes essential changes but *Something* permanently remained a geopolitical constant: The geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of the area.

The historical analysis of political, commercial or spiritual and religious evolutions seems to disprove the opinion of experts considering that the region has become an area of geopolitical interest and dispute *very recently* – *after the fall of the USSR and the subsequent dissolution of its enormous sphere of influence. Under the conditions of the post-bipolar world, the Black Sea basin and the South Caucasus began to acquire the traits of a special subsystem within the system of international relations – the area as a whole began to take on the character of an identifiable geopolitical region.* [4] American analysts Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson also consider that a “*series of historically unprecedented events have brought the attention of the West to the wider Black Sea region. (...) These events have begun to push the Black Sea from the periphery to the center of Western attention.*” [5] The attention of politicians or analysts for the Black Sea area can have intensities and fluctuations in the evolution of international relations but this does not mean that the geopolitical value of this space is decreasing. We consider that Nicolae Iorga, although he was not a geopolitician in the widely accepted present meaning of the term [6], was right when he stated that, during the history of peoples certain constants, among which geography, are influencing their evolution. He was referring to what he called, at the beginning of the 20th century, the *Rhine Issue* [7], but we can also say about the Black Sea area that in this region “Peoples change, state structures acquire another form, the ideas dominating the world are not the same; in spite of all these, geographic needs always impose a Black Sea issue”.

From this perspective, we consider that the 20th century is typical for increases and decreases of the political interest of some great powers and the foreign affairs and diplomacy experts. The reason? Historical events that make the area a simultaneous actor of diplomacy and media. During the first and the last two decades of the 20th century the political and geo-strategic map of the area is marked by spectacular overturns in the border architecture and the power distribution. During the second decade, three of the great powers which have disputed for almost three centuries the primacy and dominance in the region disappeared – the Tsarist, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. New political actors emerged and the geopolitical map essentially changed [8]. During the last decade of the last century similar events happen with those taking place at the beginning of the century. The Soviet empire and the communist countries disappear and new great actors emerge in the area – EU and NATO. Two constants seem to link in an arch over time between the two moments: economy and security. From an economic point of view, at the beginning of the 20th century, the ports of Constantza and those from the mouths of the Danube were real gates for raw materials covering the needs of industrialized countries of the west, but also for industrial products going towards markets from the Far East [9]. From a strategic point of view, this is the starting area for three of the four main strategic corridors over which the West confronted the East and the East confronted the West in the European and the Eurasian space, for supremacy during the 20th century [10]. Regional conflicts, including the two world wars, had major operational theatres across these corridors. Those controlling / dominating these strategic corridors had a decisive advantage in the dispute of interests.

These assertions, specific to the 20th century, originate from Halford Mackinder's vision that dominated the thought and also, to a great extent, the political practice on the area. According to Mackinderian theory [11] concerning concentric areas, the Black Sea could be considered a part of the internal belt. According to Mackinder's thesis, the one controlling the internal belt (or *rimland*, according to Spykman) dominates the central area (*heartland*), the one dominating the central area also dominates the World Island and the whole world. If we take into account that Mackinder identifies the *central area* as being Eurasia, and the internal belt as Eastern Europe, it is obvious that the Black Sea is a constituent part of the internal belt, and evolutions in this area directly or indirectly influence the adjacent spaces [12].

The geopolitical landscape of the 21st century in this part of the world has essentially changed. The Black Sea area has turned, according to some authors, from a "closed sea" dominated by a single power (former USSR) into an "open sea" allowing multilateral cooperation [13]. According to others, *the region has fallen into the eastern tier of the buffer zone between post-Soviet Russia and the victorious Western Alliance* [14] or *a function of rising or declining hegemonies or as a localism-oriented gathering against the pressures of globalization* [15]. These apprehensions determine the emergence of interrogations with epistemic and pragmatic value. The first, but not necessarily the most important, would be that concerning the thesis of the famous geopolitician Halford Mackinder. Is this relevant today anymore, taking into account fundamental changes happening within the power and interest equation in the area? What type of international relations will dominate the wider Black Sea area? Is it going to be a *land of cooperation* in which established cooperation organizations and bilateral and multilateral agreements will be able to replace rivalries or an *uncertain end battlefield* in the dispute for strategic supremacy and control concerning energy transport corridors? How can a political and strategic interests' unity space emerge in such a culturally, politically, spiritually-religious and mentality diverse region?

2. CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY – THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE BLACK SEA AREA

Understanding the geopolitical continuity and discontinuity of the Black Sea area during the 20th century cannot be achieved without a basic analysis of its geography. From a geographical point of view the area includes the coastal waters of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine, and it is an area with densely populated shores, significant natural resources, and a tiny strait connecting it to the Mediterranean. Neal Ascherson noted that *on the atlas, the Black Sea appears as a kidney-shaped pond, connected to the outer oceans by the thread-like channel of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. And yet it is a sea, not a fresh-water lake: a saltwater mass some 630*

miles across from east to west and 330 miles from north to south. [16] On the other hand, from a political point of view, this area is even larger. According to Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson *The wider Black Sea region must also include all three Southern Caucasus states — Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In referring to the region, we implicitly refer to the Euro-Asian energy corridor linking the Euro-Atlantic system with Caspian energy supplies and the states of Central Asia. Moreover, we are also making some claim to the projection of a Black Sea system northward from Transnistria, Odessa and Sokhumi because a stable system would require both the resolution of “frozen conflicts” along a northeast arc and access to the great commercial rivers that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, Dniester, and Dnieper. Conceptually, then, the wider Black Sea region is as broad and variegated a region as the North German Plain or the Baltic/Nordic zone* [17]. This definition is put into equation together with the evolution of interests the strategic player type of actors have in the area. It is not by chance that analysts and experts from the Euro-Atlantic space launched this concept and it is also not by chance that it is rejected by Russian analysts. Russia defines its economic, political, and security interests in the region in a manner that is in many instances incompatible with the emerging strategy of the western countries. Therefore, increasing and deepening western countries involvement in the region will likely give rise to increasing competition with Russia over soft power and influence in the regional states [18].

These geopolitical concepts appear / disappear according to the interests that actors have at a certain time in the region [19]. Some of them have a sort of continuity degree provided by geographical position itself, as Gheorghe I. Bratianu also noticed over a century ago. In his opinion *the theatre offered by the Black Sea basin favours, more than others, considerations that go beyond regional problems and that are related to forces acting over the universal history field. Due to the great rivers, coming from the depths of the steppe or from the mountains of Central Europe, that flow into it, due to the multiple network of continental roads that reach its ports, the Black Sea deserves to be called a leading junction of the great traffic and international exchanges. This feature of transition and crossroads area between Europe and Asia is transferred to the states and peoples living on its shores.*” [20]

The apprehensions of the Romanian historian were confirmed by foreign historians that demonstrate that countries of the Black Sea area, especially Romania and Turkey, were strong points of negotiation in delimitating interest spheres between great powers in the interwar period, during the Second World War and the first following years. Therefore the status of the Black Sea Straits, which link this largely landlocked body of water to the world’s seaways, was tightly linked to the balance of power in Europe. When Russia and the Ottoman Turkish Empire, at times, established their own power-condominium over the Black Sea, they would effectively close off the region to other European powers. When they were at war, the Straits were open so that European powers could intervene to re-balance the regional distribution of power. The Montreux Convention of 1936 was an effort by Great Britain and France to re-negotiate the traditional Turkish-Russian condominium and to simultaneously counter the growth of Nazi Germany’s power in the region. Referring to the negotiations on spheres of influence in the Black Sea region, British historian Geoffrey Roberts wrote in a recent issue that during the second plenary session on 29 November 1943, Churchill said that *if Turkey does not accept the proposal to enter the war this could have serious political consequences for Turkey and affect her rights in relation to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles*. Stalin did not comment, but at lunch the next day he was drawn by Churchill into a discussion of the Straits issue, which began with the British premier remarking that Russia needed access to an ice-free port. Stalin agreed, but said the question required further discussion. Churchill continued that *earlier the English were against the Russians having access to warm waters, but now they had no such objections*. Stalin replied: If now there were no objections it was necessary to re-examine the regime of the Turkish Straits. A big country such as Russia found itself locked in the Black Sea, with no means of exit. The Straits regime was first regulated by the Sevres agreement [of 1920], then the Lausanne agreement [of 1923], and finally the convention concluded in Montreux [1936]. All this time the English wanted to strangle Russia and if now the English did not want to strangle Russia any more then it was necessary to alleviate the Straits regime. Churchill responded that, while he agreed with Stalin, the immediate issue was Turkey’s entry

into the war. Stalin concurred and said there would be time in the future to consider the question of ports and the Straits. [21]

The area continued to present an interest for some time also after the end of the Second World War and the rivalry concerning control of the region was one of the causes of the beginning of the Cold War. According to Azeri historian Jamil Hasanli, which is quoted by British historian Geoffrey Roberts, [22] the *Cold War began with the crises in Iran and Turkey, contending that it was in these countries that the Soviets suffered their first defeats in the post-war conflict with the West*. After the explicit or implicit demarcation of influence spheres among superpowers, *the Black Sea never played a significant role in Cold War conflicts, remaining a peripheral region* [23]. After the end of the Cold war, the area became a huge *chessboard* on which regional strategic players and important pawns are disputing vital interests for supremacy, security and prosperity.

As a consequence, we can conclude that the geopolitical continuity elements characterizing this *leading junction* are given by some *key positions*, which make it specific and confer to it special virtues, but most of all decisively contribute to the geo-strategic value and importance of this space. These *key positions* are [24]:

◆ The Straits system (Bosporus, Dardanelles – linked by the Marmara Sea) allows and ensures navigation from a “closed” sea towards the Planetary Ocean. Turkey holds the control of the Straits, as they are currently the only strong path for external sea transport, pretty handy to all riverside countries, pretty cheap and with permanent perspectives. Turkey’s control over the Straits confers to it a privileged status among riverside countries. The Regime of the Straits becomes a major interest in the area, especially during crises and conflicts, such as the Russian-Georgian War in the summer of 2008 [25]. This conflict brought in to the public discussion, according to some experts, at the least three questions: Can the Montreux Convention satisfy current requirements? Should the Montreux Convention be revised? If modifications in the Montreux Convention are necessary, what modifications are appropriate and how might they affect stability in the Black Sea? [26] The answer to these questions can be found after a geopolitical analysis of the place the strategic players have in the region’s balance of power but also after uncovering their interests in the area. Not least, one should acknowledge the relations between strategic layers – US, NATO, EU, China – and the states aspiring to the hegemon status of the area, as is the case of the Russian Federation, Turkey or even Ukraine.

◆ The Crimean peninsula – **an advanced marine** bastion, a true carrier, “well anchored”, with multiple facilities, surrounded by sufficient naval forces, ready to act. It has a strong strategic position, but also great weaknesses, due to the fact that through the demographic and political evolutions of the peninsula’s population, the latter can be a weak spot for security and stability in the area. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine, concerning the affiliation of the peninsula, are not all gone and, on the other hand, the return of Tartars, who wish the peninsula to become their motherland, can bring to the fore interethnic tensions. The Crimean peninsula had been largely settled over the previous 50 years by Russians and, by the 1990s, there were 1.6 million Russians in Crimea and 620, 000 largely Russified Ukrainians. Since their mass return, the political situation of Crimean Tartars has had three characteristics. Although their numbers reached around 250, 000-260, 000 (10 percent of local population), there were too many Tatars to be ignored but too few to seriously challenge the power of the Russophone majority of Crimea [27].

◆ The Danube-Black Sea Canal – Sulina Canal-Mouths of the Danube system – The Mouths of the Danube, although they do not play anymore the strategic and economic role they had during the 19th and 20th centuries [28], continue to have a geopolitical and geo-strategic value for the security and stability of the wider Black Sea area, due to the emergence on the geographic map of Romania of two navigation arteries built during the last years: the Danube-Black Sea Canal and the Sulina Canal [29]. **According to Romanian scholars** both canals, the Sulina Canal and Danube-Black Sea Canal (Cernavoda – Constantza), became first after the completion of work and commissioning in 1992 of Main-Danube Canal (between Bamberg and Kelheim, also called the Europe Canal), conducted parts of the artery Rhine-Main-Danube, then the eastern part of pan-European corridor Transport 7 - the

Danube (Fig. 1), or the end of it considered in the flowing direction of the river; using the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal between Galati and Rotterdam the distance was reduced from a 6, 500 km route at sea to only 3, 600 km of waterway [30]. The geopolitical value of this infrastructural complex is also provided by the possibility to reunite Central Europe and Eastern Europe.

◆ Snake Island – during the last years the island returned into the attention sphere of international diplomacy as a result of discovering important oil and natural gas reserves. [31] The international statute of this island was forcefully imposed by the former hegemon, the USSR, which regulated its situation without taking into account international law. Ten negotiation rounds between Romania and the former Soviet Union, which took place during two decades (1967-1987) did not come to any results and its statute could not be clarified with Ukraine either, a country which practically took over the island after 1991. The situation was regulated by the International Court of Justice in the Hague [32]. Taking into account the military and strategic facilities that are/can be deployed on this island, its geopolitical importance could increase if Ukraine will become member of the Euro-Atlantic security structures.

◆ **The emergence of an energy axis** that connects, across the Black Sea, the Central Asian and Caspian gas and oil with the Balkans and the European Union. This axis can be geopolitically marked by crises and instability risks in two cases. The first can emerge in the context of the current economic crisis, by reviving economic nationalism, especially on the market of the main energy producers such as Russia; the second can emerge by a growing temptation to militarize energy transport corridors [33].

Following the above mentioned facts, some elements can thus be acknowledged, which show why the Black Sea area was so important during the 20th century and why it will also continue to play a prominent geopolitical role during the 21st century:

- The Black Sea is situated at the confluence of three regions of a great geopolitical relevance: the Balkan Peninsula, Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, and is also close to the hot area of the Middle East;
- It is the exit place towards the Planetary Ocean for the riverside and Trans-Caucasian countries;
- It is situated along the itinerary of the trading routes and energy corridors for the Caspian and Central Asian oil towards Western consumers;
- It has important marine and submarine resources;
- It is the shortest way towards the Western and North African coasts, being the single water route to the “warm seas”;
- It coagulates a selling market of approximately 350 million consumers;
- It keeps alive the constant interest manifested by the great actors of the world geopolitical scene (traditional and newly emerging actors) due to its direct link to Central and South East Asia.

One should not exclude the fact that, apart from the geopolitical actors and the specific institution created by them, the region is inhabited by people belonging to different cultures and civilizations, with different mentalities. From this perspective, we believe that the most important element for the geopolitical definition of the area is “a meeting space of largely diverse cultures and of the three monotheistic religions, which successively determine dialogue and unity or breakup” [34]. These two essential but also antithetic features are intermingled, as the history of the region during the 20th century demonstrated, according to the evolution of the interest relations and the balance of power between actors present within this space.

3. THE EVOLUTION OF INTEREST AND POWER RELATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AT THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY

The space connected to the Black Sea region has known an interesting dynamics in what regards the evolution of power and interest distribution in the area, with specific features and resemblances at the extremes of the 20th century, generated by elements of continuity or discontinuity.

Cooperation or interest dispute between the region's actors or between outside actors was generated by three elements that proved to be constant: oil, as this was the key element for the evolution of every society during the 20th century; trade, as the region was always seen by western industrialized powers as an enormous consumption and very profitable business opportunities market; paradoxically, the conflict potential generated by interethnic, inter-confessional tensions and by historical psycho-fixations.

Discontinuity appears in the change of roles played by classic actors, which by the end of the 20th century seem to increasingly give up in favour of non/classic actors, be they oil or gas corporations, security organizations, such as NATO, cooperation organizations (BSEC), commercial and financial companies [35].

At the beginning of the 20th century, in what we now call the wider Black sea region, competition was dominated by the dispute for oil, market and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits' control which linked the industrial and the consumption markets. The British quickly understood this aspect and sent, towards the end of the First World War, Sir Halford Mackinder to South Russia. He arrived in a civil war torn Russia on January 1st, 1920. He met with British representatives at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and then travelled to Tikhoretsk to meet White Russian commander Anton Denikin. He quickly assessed that Denikin's forces were losing and that Denikin was an unsavoury sort on whom Britain should not depend. Still, he feared *Bolshevism sweeping forward like a prairie fire*. So he returned to London to present his own plan to the British Government [36]. British interests had to be redefined in the context of a critical situation in the Black Sea area. Turkey had started a national liberation war and on the ruins of the former Tsarist Empire a civil war was unfolding between Bolsheviks and the Whites led by General Denikin. The 1915 Constantinople agreement, by which Russia gained control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, the sole waterways from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, had fallen [37]. As concerns the political evolution in Black Sea region Halford Mackinder's opinion was that the Bolsheviks would not be defeated by Denikin or by any piecemeal policy, an entire policy was needed. Great Britain would have to block the Bolshevik drive to the Black Sea by a British force to control the South Caucasian East-West Corridor. Once it had checked the Bolshevik advance, Britain could negotiate with Soviet Russia. Mackinder advocated a string of middle tier states in addition to those created by the Versailles Treaty that ended the First World War: White Russia, Ukraine, South Russia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Britain would assume control of Denikin's fleet on the Caspian Sea and secure the Batumi-Baku railroad [38]. After the stepping down from the cabinet of Sir Halford Mackinder and Winston Churchill, a change of perception took place over the priority of Great Britain's interests in the extra-European world. British military forces leave the Black Sea area in the summer of 1920 and the Soviets successively conquer Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, taking hold of the Eurasian heartland for seventy years.

On the other side an 8, 000-man force of French troops along with a unit of Polish troops formed on the Western front, landed in the Black Sea port of Odessa on 18 December 1918. This did not happen until over a month after the First World War ended, due to the Black Sea being closed at the Bosphorus by German ally Turkey. They were joined in January 1919 by 24, 000 Greek soldiers of the two-division Army Corps "A" and elements of the British Royal Navy. Losing men to typhus, lack of mission, and the myriad of hostile forces in the area led to the rapid withdrawal of these units. Most had left by April 1919 when the Red Army threatened Odessa [39]. France would attempt to come back and materialize its interests in the Black Sea and the adjacent area by the *French Committee of Degermanization of the Balkans and the East and for propaganda of the French idea by trade and industry (Comité français de dégermanisation des Balkans et de l'Orient et de la propagande de l'idée française par le commerce et l'industrie)*. The purpose was that *French industry and trade want to*

replace outlets previously held by German trade that dominated these countries before the war [40]. This plan would also remain just a project without being able to balance Soviet domination in the Black Sea area.

The end of the 20th century also meant the end of the Cold War. This event led to a geopolitical redrawing of the Black Sea area, by the involvement of strategic players in the resolution of the serious political and military crises emerging in the context of the Soviet empire's fall and for securing the transit of energy routes transiting the Black Sea area. The situation is more complicated today because of the Russian policy to mix the nations that it has conquered. To maintain its influence in the zone, Russia has tried to manage independence movements of the provinces and also to support minorities or peripheral nationalities, as a continuation of the imperial policy — *divide and impera*. These policies can easily be seen in the North Caucasus and in the Black Sea, especially in Transnistria and Crimea. Within this space, from the perspective of classic actors, two groups of states seem to be in a favourable position: oil and gas producers, with Russia, Azerbaijan and other countries form the Caspian Sea region as major suppliers; countries which host on their territory the transit of these resources, with Turkey as an important energy hub. The latter gathers, by means of oil and gas pipelines, about 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas coming from Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan and it is possible that it would increase in volume if the pipeline from Turkmenistan will become a reality. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline is already operational, with a capacity of 50 million tones, which ensures the outlet of the Azerbaijan's oil to the Mediterranean [41].

Additionally, Turkey holds the control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, through which over 45 million tons of oil are passing each year, coming from Russia and Kazakhstan. The game in evolution refers to how much of the natural gas existing in Turkey would find its outlet towards the West and through which “corridors” or routes. Moreover, in what way would find a sure outlet to the Mediterranean the increasing natural gas quantities of Russia and Kazakhstan which are reaching to the Black Sea ports?

In this game, which has a clear geopolitical character, mainly the US and secondly the EU are trying to have the “upper hand”. Anglo-American companies (*Chevron* and *BP*) are at the forefront of the joint ventures companies exporting oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the big European companies such as *ENI*, *Total*, *Statoil* and others, are members of these ventures. These companies took the burden of the costs for transport pipelines such as Tengiz-Novorossiysk and Baku-Ceyhan. During the last years, Greece is trying to overcome the anguishes of the past and offer safe passage towards Europe for natural gas coming from Azerbaijan, which in a few years will come to Turkey and offer an outlet to the Mediterranean for oil coming from Russia and Kazakhstan, which will sooner or later reach into the Black Sea, by avoiding the worn down Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. This is a so-called “southern corridor of natural gas” on which the Turkish-Greek-Italian pipeline is based on. The latter starts from Karacabe, on the eastern shore of the Bosphorus, crosses Greece, passes on the bottom of the Adriatic Sea and ends near Lecce, in Southern Italy. This project is favoured by the EU and the US. The EU, in order to expand its supplies, as it currently depends in a 25% amount on Russian gas, and the US, in order to prevent the EU's increasing dependency on Russia, as this energy dependency could turn into a political dependency [42].

The area could also become interesting by the competition between major non-classic actors from the energy field for exploiting own resources of energy – oil and natural gas. The domination of such actors backed by major military and financial powers could be the key element that would lead to a new geopolitical landscape. The former cannot be analysed and understood anymore in classic terms, in which analysis is centred on the rivalry-cooperation couple between states. Cooperation interests of such energy giants could lead to strategic and politico-diplomatic alliances between actors in the area that are hard to predict now. Several specialized companies announced their intention to exploit oil and gas from this area, the *Chevron* case being a notorious one by the investments it envisages in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. But what draws the attention is an alliance between *Exxon Mobil* and *Rosneft*. They signed a protocol to extract offshore oil and gas from the Russian Arctic and from the Black Sea. Thus, the American company has won access to substantial Russian oil supplies, offered by

one of the biggest oil producers of the world. On the other hand, *Rosneft* got the support of one of the few companies capable to extract oil and gas in the harsh conditions of the Arctic area. *Rosneft* will hold 66.7% of shares and *Exxon* will have the control of the rest.

The partners in the agreement will invest 3.2 billion US dollars for developing three bloc in the Kara Sea and a bloc in the Black Sea [43]. The agreement includes an oil exploration and production in the Tuapse Trough, an 11, 200 sq km deepwater offshore area along the Black Sea coast of the Krasnodar region [44]. Recently, the Ukrainian Energy Minister Yuriy Boiko told the media that Ukrainian authorities want to engage US based *Exxon Mobil Corp.*, *Texaco* and *Chevron Corp.*, to join efforts for the development of the Black Sea shelf. A corresponding program has been drafted, with the goal to engage US *Exxon Mobil*, *Chevron* and *Texaco*, due to their relevant experience with great water depths. Ukraine and the US companies are currently negotiating the establishment of an international consortium to solve these challenging efforts in the Black Sea.

In conclusion, during the 20th century, all countries in the region had different dynamics, but there was only one common denominator for both fostering cooperation and catalysing conflict in the Black Sea basin - energy. However, energy has become more of a controversial issue rather than a uniting one. Whether they like it or not, all countries in the region are involved in energy politics. And the controversy over the transport of Caspian oil and gas, involving all the major actors across the region, will continue into the future due to competing interests.

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A MULTIFOLD PERSPECTIVE ON ENERGY SECURITY IN EUROPE

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Abstract

In the current global outlook, energy security is one of the main factors influencing political and economic cooperation. The European Union is the world's largest regional energy market, whose well-functioning is closely related to the concept of security. This paper aims to provide a multifold overview of some of the most important EU policies having a direct impact on the energy security topic: energy efficiency, liberalization of the gas market, diversification of gas supply and electricity pricing.

Keywords: *energy security, efficiency, market liberalization, gas supply, electricity pricing.*

INTRODUCTION

Energy security is a multifaceted subject of primary interest for the global society where energy is the backbone of economic development. Because of its complex meaning and interdependence with other areas of study, it can provide discussion opportunities on other “hot” issues as well, like energy resources, environmental degradation or climate change.

According to some authors, the energy security relies on the association between national security and availability of natural resources for energy. [1] Statistics show that world's conventional energy resources are highly concentrated: 80% of the world's oil can be found in nine countries that have only 5% of the world's population, 80% of the world's natural gas is in 13 countries and 80% of the world's coal is in six countries. Many of the same countries are also the ones that control more than 80% of the world's uranium. [2]

Therefore, in the era of globalization and mutual interdependence, Europe's energy security challenges reflect at a smaller scale the worldwide ones. According to the Energy Commissioner, Mr. Günther Oettinger “*the EU has the world's largest regional energy market – 500 million people and accounts for one-fifth of the world's energy use. Europe needs to coordinate its efforts and liaise in a coherent manner with its main partners*”. [3] Predictions were made that the European Union would largely surpass the United States as an energy importer by 2015. [4]

The definition of the energy security concept raises multiple challenges. [5] Contracting most of what it has been written on the subject, it may be seen as mix of availability, affordability and safety of energy fuels and services. [6] The paper will approach this concept from a multifold perspective: energy efficiency, liberalization of the gas market, diversification of gas supply and electricity pricing.

TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT EUROPE

The European energy efficiency policy faces the challenge of covering approximately 20 million companies that provide energy products and services to around 500 million inhabitants in 27 Member States subject to different political, social and economic backgrounds.

As far as targets are concerned, under the so-called Energy Strategy for Europe policy, 20% energy savings must be reached by 2020. To that end, Member States have to adopt national energy efficiency plans subject to Commission review.

One of the central legal instruments for reaching the above target is the Energy Efficiency Directive, currently subject to a controversial review process. The Commission proposed some new ambitious targets: adoption of legal obligations to set forth energy saving schemes in all Member States, public sector to lead by example (public buildings to be subject to high efficiency targets) and establishment of energy savings targets for end consumers (with a direct impact on the retail energy market). Political negotiations carried until now significantly reduced the initial aims, taking a rather lax approach.

According to a document of the Commission issued in April 2012, some important amendments were made. For example, only buildings owned and occupied by the central government were subject to such targets, under certain conditions, as compared to the initially proposed inclusion of all public buildings; the binding obligation of public authorities to buy only products having a high level of energy efficiency was transformed into a non-binding one and the targets of energy retailers and energy distributors to achieve energy savings equaling 1.5% of their energy sales among final customers was reduced up to 1%, with the exclusion of 40% of ETS' industries energy consumption being reduced. All in all, Council's version of the Directive is estimated to achieve a reduction in energy consumption of 51.8 Mtoe while the Commission initial proposal established a reduction of 151.5 Mtoe, necessary for covering the gap to achieve the 20% target. [7]

Consequently, the new Directive may become a rather weak instrument, with few binding obligations on Member States and subject to many exclusions and qualifications. This attitude has been vastly criticized by the public opinion and the Commission itself.

The current Danish EU presidency announced its intention to reach an agreement on the new Directive by the end of July this year. Therefore, voiced concerns fear that the EU legislator will give up a strong negotiation position in order to pass the act as soon as possible. [8]

EU energy efficiency policies use many mechanisms closely interrelated with economic, social and environmental policies. Some of the most important are the regulations concerning energy using products, buildings' energy performance, energy efficiency in transport or efficient cities and communities. [9]

Energy labelling is designed to act as consumer information, accompanied by Eco design standards that limit the energy consumption of household appliances and promotes cost-effective, energy efficient technologies in the manufacturing industry sector. These technologies usually require up-front investment compensated after a certain time by savings in energy consumption. [10]

The building sector is highly energy intensive and accounts for major energy consumptions in Europe (almost 40% of the total consumption). The numbers are so high because they include energy used in heating, cooling, hot water and electricity in buildings. In order to increase energy efficiency, the main proposed mechanisms and related financing refer to building insulation, energy efficiency certificates reflecting buildings' energy performance (having the role of influencing buyers/tenants behaviors in the real estate market, since there are no effective sanction in practice for owners failing to provide such certificates), use of cogeneration and renewables, environmental sustainable construction procedures, smart metering. [11]

One of the most important issues that could suffer further regulation is the use of renewables in building heating and cooling. Although Europe has promoted aggressive policies encouraging the use of renewables in electricity generation, the heating and cooling industry (largely owned by the public sector) received little support (e.g., according to DG Energy, in Romania's 2011 energy matrix, renewables were used in proportion of 27% for electricity generation and only 1% for gross heating generation). [12]

The transport sector accounts for one third of the European final energy consumption, which is nearly entirely based on fossil fuels. Some of the main tools for addressing fuel efficiency consisted of

voluntary agreements with the car industry, car emissions, use of biofuels (10% target by 2020), tyre labelling, national fiscal measures for better fuel efficiency [13]

AMBITIONS FOR A LIBERALIZED GAS MARKET

EU goals of market liberalization in energy have been in the cards over the past 20 years, especially with the adoption of the three energy liberalization packages. They seek to encourage competition and market access and to limit anti competition behavior as unfair discrimination, illegal subsidies or abuse of market power. Some central concepts are: independency of energy regulators, de-integration of national monopolies by separation of network ownership from service delivery (i.e., unbundling), third party access and investment in infrastructure. Also, Commission encouraged the European banks (EIB and EBRD) to give funding priority to energy interconnections.

The major transformation of the gas industry in the EU countries under the liberalization packages aims at providing greater competition among suppliers. Therefore, some points may determine a clash of interests between EU and Russia – e.g., the situation of long term supply contracts, which represented the backbone of the gas market and Gazprom policy to seek greater participation in downstream activities, penetrating at least as far as the wholesale trade sector.

Under the former system, long-term take-or-pay contracts (usually concluded for a period of 30 years), where the risk related to prices and volumes was shared between the buyer and the seller (e.g., the buyer had to pay for the entire agreed quantities even if the gas was taken or not), were at the core of gas supply industry.

The new principles governing the market liberalization entail under certain conditions, the re-examination of these contracts or amendments to some of their clauses (e.g., duration, price indexation formula, flexibility of quantities the buyer must acquire).

However, up to this moment, Russia's national gas company, Gazprom, still has a handful of long term agreement with National energy companies in the Member States for the supply of gas – e.g., Gaz de France (2030), Ruhrgas (2035) or ENI (2035). [14]

It also adopted a number of strategies to deal with the increasingly uncertain EU environment by increasing export routes to Europe and diversifying its export markets to Asia and the United States.

The other friction point generated by EU's liberalization policy (i.e., unbundling standards) relates to Gazprom's aims of acquiring a foothold in the European downstream gas market (which began in fact in 1980s). Commission's main concern is the increase of the company's opportunity to sell gas resources without having to face real competition.

Gazprom currently has participation in the gas companies of most Member States (e.g., Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, France, UK, Austria, Germany, Finland). It started the process by setting up joint ventures in transmission and trading with incumbent operators and then went on to create marketing subsidiaries and/or to acquire minority or majority stakes in local companies. [15]

Recently, as part of its announced EU market penetration plans, Gazprom has initiated proceedings for acquiring participation in Greece's national company Depa (55%). [16]

Consequently, the provisions in the liberalization packages are now getting in the way of company's business strategies causing high-level political frictions between EU and Russia. The controversy was further intensified at some point by the so-called "third country clause" (named by the literature as the "anti-Gazprom clause"), whereby if non-EU energy companies wish to operate in the EU, they must demonstrate that they do not pose any threat to EU energy security. [17]

TOWARDS A LARGER PALLET OF GAS SUPPLIERS

Accounting for 40% of the total gas imports, Russia is one of EU's main gas suppliers and a strategic partner for energy security (other important shares in gas imports are held by Norway 30% and Algeria 15%). [18]

This interdependence can generate mutual benefit or mutual threat situations. An interesting example is the gas trade between the USSR and Western Europe during the cold war: on the one hand Soviets were highly dependent on the currency income from the trade and had large investment locked down in gas infrastructure, and at the same time the western Europeans were dependent on the Soviets as a main supplier of gas. As a consequence, there were no significant, politically motivated disruptions in gas trade between the USSR and Europe, despite the intense tensions between the two parties. [19]

However, the EU has failed to adopt a consistent approach towards Russia until now in terms of supply policy. One of the main reasons for that is the insufficient infrastructure interconnections between national markets, which generates isolation of Member States and makes them view energy issues in terms of their own national security (e.g., Spain had a negative attitude towards EON bid for its largest natural gas provider, whilst France adopted a negative approach in connection with ENEL's bid for GDF Suez). [20]

In the aftermath of the repeated gas cutoffs of Belarus and Ukraine (in 2005, 2007, and 2009) causing important gas shortages (e.g., in Germany, Poland, Austria, Italy) the need for a coordinated action became evident. Therefore, EU put together a policy for diversification of gas suppliers by inter alia finding alternative sources in the Caspian region, Middle East and Central Asia through the so-called Southern Corridor.

One of the central projects of the Southern Corridor is the Nabucco pipeline, where Turkey acts as a hub to allow gas from the Caspian Sea to be brought to Europe. Authors highlighted that Turkey will play an increasing role for the future of energy security in Europe as most of the pipelines from the producers in the East to the consumer countries in the West will pass the Turkish territory. [21]

In a demonstration of political support for the project, the Nabucco transit countries, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement on 20 June 2009 in Ankara. [22] The project company is formed by the main gas companies of every participating country (including Germany), each holding a share of 16.67%. Construction is scheduled to start in 2013 and operation to commence in 2017. However, some political frictions with gas suppliers, as well as with the participating Member States cast a shadow on the viability of this project.

Maintaining the inconsistent political approach, EU Member States have also supported pipelines which are designed to enhance Russian gas supply share in Europe like the Nord Stream and South Stream by acquiring shares in the project companies. [23]

The Nord Stream and the South Stream pipelines are a vital part of Russia's strategy to secure its exports to the European markets, being the reflection of the opposite "security of demand" political approach.

Passing under the Baltic Sea, the Nord Stream is the first gas pipeline to link Russia with the natural gas markets of Western Europe. [24] It has five shareholders: Gazprom (51%), Wintershall Holding GmbH (15.5%), E.ON Ruhrgas AG (15.5%), N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (9%) and GDF SUEZ (9%) and links Russia (Vyborg) to Germany (Greifswald).

All permits necessary to begin construction were received by February 2010, and construction of Line 1 was completed in June 2011. Gas transport through this line began in November 2011. Line 2 is scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of 2012 and to operate by the fourth quarter of

2012. When fully operational, the twin pipelines will have the capacity to satisfy the energy demand of more than 26 million European households and are designed to operate for at least 50 years. [25]

On the other hand, the South Stream pipeline is designed to diversify Russian gas supply to South and Central Europe via the Black Sea and started as a partnership between Gazprom and ENI. EDF joined the consortium last year, Gazprom retaining the majority participation. According to the latest news, construction is set to begin in December 2012. [26]

Up to this moment, the alternative shipment of gas in the form of LNG (liquefied natural gas) did not prove to be a sufficiently viable alternative. The positive effects of supply diversification have been offset by other factors like the growing gas demand (due to the replacement of coal combustion power plants), the depletion of North Sea gas sources, as well as EU enlargement. [27].

Therefore, in this policy context, EU is expected to remain relatively dependent on imported Russian gas for the coming period. The challenge may be increased by Member States plans to reconsider their energy mix, like Germany having decided to phase-out its nuclear sector after the recent Fukushima events. [28] The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union expressly allows Member States to decide on the composition of the national energy matrix.

A USER APPROACH: ELECTRICITY PRICING

From the end-consumer perspective, electricity pricing is an important feature of energy security. Cheap and stable access to electricity has become a sine qua non condition for the comfort of the European citizen as well as for the industry development. However, electricity deprivation or energy poverty are one of the main problems around the Globe – worldwide, nearly 2.4 billion people use wood, charcoal and other such traditional biomass fuels for cooking and heating and 1.6 billion do not have access to electricity. [29]

There are many factors which influence price formation in electricity markets, both national, European and international (e.g., resource prices on the international markets).

Under the liberalization packages, one of the main rules requires the separate accounting of the costs for production, transmission and distribution of electricity. Based on this, the former aggregated power product (electricity) is divided and becomes subject to free negotiations and contracting between consumers and suppliers.

As a consequence, invoices should contain separate information on the amounts payable for the quantity of electricity received and for the transmission of the same electricity. The main factors influencing prices are capital and operation expenses of the TSOs, infrastructure costs and electric losses, network security costs and system services. [30]

In an ideal scenario, electricity pricing should be low and stable in order to sustain the continuously developing needs of the society. However, some authors highlighted shortcomings of this fact, arguing that low cost of electricity reduces the demand for energy efficiency innovation.

They further argue that if the variable cost of electricity production is low (e.g., like in the case of nuclear and hydropower generation), national prices are not sensitive to fluctuations in international markets.

If inexpensive electricity is available, there will be less strong incentives to pay the high cost of energy efficiency innovation (e.g., international patent data indicates that France and Belgium, both major nuclear electricity producers, are producing few international patents for energy efficiency relative to countries as Germany or the Netherlands, which are less reliant on nuclear electricity). [31]

Demand for electricity is price inelastic, in part because electricity does not have short run substitutes and in part because few consumers receive real time prices that match supply costs. [32]

As far as State intervention in price formation is concerned, the Court of Justice considered that, although the principle of liberalization implies that the price of energy products be determined by the forces of supply and demand, the European energy directives do, in principle, allow state intervention in the determination of energy prices on an exceptional basis (Case C-265/08, Apr. 20, 2010, *Federutility and others v. Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas*). Such state measures must therefore meet strict conditions: they must be justified in the general economic interest and be proportionate to the general economic interest pursued. [33].

However, in spite of the adopted policies, according to Eurostat, between the first half of 2010 and the first half of 2011, electricity prices for households went down only in two Member States (Luxembourg and Hungary) and increased in 24 of the EU Member States, with prices staying roughly the same in one EU Member State (Estonia). On average, the price of electricity for households in the EU-27 rose by 6.9 %.

According to the same source, between the first half of 2010 and the first half of 2011 prices for industrial consumers in the EU increased on average by 5.0 % for electricity. Electricity prices during the first half of 2011 were highest in Malta, Cyprus and Italy, while the lowest prices were found in Bulgaria, Finland and Estonia: the price of electricity for industrial consumers in Malta was 2.6 times as high as that in Bulgaria.

CONCLUSIONS

Energy security is a multifold subject, which is closely dependent on topics like energy efficiency, market liberalization, security of supply and affordability for the end users. Energy efficiency is an important instrument for reducing energy consumption and thus the dependence on energy imports. In an effort to achieve the 2020 targets, the Commission proposed a new Energy Efficiency Directive setting new obligations related to energy savings for the private and public sectors. The Member States seem to be reluctant to accept higher burdens in connection with the subject and have significantly cut the objectives in the proposal. Currently, the debates have an unclear outcome.

Another big step closely related to energy security is the adoption of the liberalization packages and EU targets concerning diversification of gas supply. A new European gas (and electricity) market, is at the heart of European integration. A unique, single market binds all players to the same rules on competition and security of supply and determines a more secure economic growth. However, this has generated (and will continue to do so) political frictions with Russia and Gazprom.

On the one hand, the new rules in the liberalization packages represent an obstacle for Gazprom from two perspectives. They affect the long term take or pay supply agreements concluded by the company with most of the Member States gas incumbents and the unbundling requirements interfere with Gazprom's aims of acquiring a foothold in the European downstream gas market. A political consensus was not reached until now, even if negotiations are carried out.

On the other hand, EU's ambitions to diversify the gas suppliers by looking at the Caspian and Asian region clashed with Russia's plans to improve infrastructure gas routs towards Europe, from a "security of demand" perspective. Until now, the EU did not succeed all the time to promote a consistent policy with the Member States on these matters. Therefore, gas pipelines projects initiated by Russia through Gazprom (e.g., South and Nord Stream) arguably received more support from the Member States than the EU initiated projects (e.g., Nabucco). A more coordinated approach on these matters is rated as a top-priority on Commission's agenda.

As far as electricity pricing is concerned, cheap and stable access to electricity has become a sine qua non condition for the comfort of the European citizen and for industry development. Consequently, the EU has adopted a number of policies (especially in the liberalization packages) to increase access to affordable electricity for the end consumer. However, according to Eurostat, in the

electricity prices have seen an increase in the last period. An enhanced competition and consumer protection policy could have an impact on the affordability of energy.

According to the Energy Commissioner, Mr. Günther Oettinger Europe needs to coordinate its efforts and liaise in a coherent manner with all its strategic energy partners. He also highlighted that cooperation is crucial for a “*brighter future of the energy market*”, as “*every time the EU speaks with one voice, it is heard*”. [34]

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POST- EUROPE AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract

The post-Europe concept represents the tendency of Europe to re-position itself both in Eurasia and globally. Last but not least, it is imperative for post - Europe to have the response to consistent interrogations, regarding “sensitive thresholds” of EU integration, including response to the already open to the public debate regarding, the opportunity and the chances of building the United States of Europe . In essence, Europe has a chance to be “the eye of the storm” compared with the world. Exactly the same role would have the Black Sea region, in relation to Europe. Contrary to the most opinions, the Black Sea region could become the source of stability for the Post-Europe.

Keywords: *post-Europe; Europe of differences; Europe of convergences; crisis of convergences; Europe of performance; Europe of equilibrium*

The term “Post-Europe” is both a metaphor and a reality. It is a metaphor, in the sense that the concept virtually does not yet exist. But is about to be born. The new reality of Europe evolves in this direction. At first glance, post-Europe means the separation from the traditional Europe, both in political and institutional sense and in economic terms and social behavior. Also, the post-Europe concept represents the tendency of Europe to re-position itself both in Eurasia and globally. Last but not least, it is imperative for post - Europe to have the response to consistent interrogations, regarding “sensitive thresholds” of EU integration, including response to the already open to the public debate regarding, the opportunity and the chances of building the United States of Europe . In this context, questions on the relationship between the EU and Europe as a whole cannot be ignored. In other words, Post - Europe outlines the conceptual and methodological horizon of a New Europe.

Our hypothesis is very simple. In the post-bipolar Europe the Europe itself will continue to exist, but it will be different than historical Europe. Problems that are looming again are simple: what is the profile of Europe in the global world? What is the background of the global world?, Which is the impact of the global world of Europe?, Which are the known resources and how Europe can generate new resources to respond adequately to the “global turbulence”? [Forberg, 2006; Jackson, 2007; Zedillo, 2008] In particular, we must observe the involvement of “natural” Romania and the Black Sea Region in the institutional, public and media debate, on the “dilemmas” and “challenges” posed by European integration and the dynamic relationship between Europe, Eurasia and the Global World [Bargaouanu, 2009; Nicolescu, 2008; Dobrescu, 2008]

Naturally, the problems set out above are complex and difficult; so answers and solutions cannot be easy and fast to find. Our study aims to detect trends and issues regarding the global world and to make a first estimate on how the Black Sea region is functionally “positioned” in the Europe, Eurasia and global world [Iacob, 2010]

The “Triple triad” - A Form of Global Geo-strategic Balance

Nearly twenty years ago, shortly after the historical rupture produced in the '90s, the world was anxiously wondering what could be the organizational model of the geopolitical world. This is the question that we would also ask now. A question that I attempted to give an answer to [Iacob, 1996]], a response that, reread now, after Romania's NATO and EU adhesion, retain its credibility. We state the problem briefly.

Who could take the geopolitical role of the Soviet Union and how to build the post-bipolar?

In essence, after the collapse of Soviet-American the bi-polarism as a form of achieving global geopolitical balance, could have had several possible outcomes that could have affected the re-balancing process (the idea that disequilibrium cannot be accepted and may not be conducive to international life and development of states and national communities):

- Bi-polarism maintains its functionality as the overall form of existence that generates balance, so our discussion will focus on detecting the force (the force of a state, coalition of states...) that could establish the bi-polar equation, in the place of the disaggregating Soviet Union. In a famous paper, Alvin Toffler tries [Toffler, 1995] to detect the group of forces that could replace the Soviet Union, and establish a bi-polar relationship with the U.S. Both in Toffler's analysis and other tests that could be conducted is hard to detect an absolutely formidable candidate in the re-construction of bi-polar equation of global equilibrium. From the observation above, we must concentrate on "the new transnational forces" (finance, planetary networked traffic regarding weapons, drugs, human beings, terrorist networks, computer networks, etc.)


- If the bi-polar equation becomes invalid, as a global balance equation, it becomes imperative to investigate alternatives, first of which is a possible mono-polar equation. A candidate that can be imagined to generate a mono-polar balance could be the USA – and many agree to that. But, the facts show that this response, if we do not take into account the natural resistance of the other great powers would not be approved first by the North American. And the disadvantages of such "geopolitical solutions" are too high. It's mostly about costs. Maintaining a uni-polar world would involve costs that would be too high; there are economic costs, financial and, last but not least, symbolic costs related to one's image. Americans will be the first to create a dissipated/ divided cost formula to be able to maintain such power, and consequently, it is logical to detect other possible solutions that are both logically and practically credible;

- If the bi-polarism revival is unlikely and the solution represented by the above mentioned mono-polarism is impractical, and therefore unlikely to be implemented the logical conclusion is to formulate another solution, that could only be represented by a triad, a "tri-polar" equation based on which the overall balance of the planet would be built. The triad is logically consistent and extremely convenient in practice, and can actually operate by balancing the forces, acting between the centers of power in the world. Imagine, a triadic construction of the global equilibrium which can be represented by an equation involving $A / B / C$, an equation in which A and B together can control the inconvenient development of the third party represented by C, establishing a relation between A and C versus B and also a new relation between B and C versus A. In fact, the triad consists of three bipolar variables, which influence the dynamic balance through a constant game of balancing and counter-balancing. Logically and operationally the triad is consistent, credible and, thus, very tempting. Moreover, in European and World history there were significant and clear situations when organizations formed triads. The above statement may be sufficient to say that the post-bipolar world would be structured in a triad.

The fact is however that this solution poses a very serious inconvenience. It does not pass the test posed by real facts. In the real world the equation does not match the background, it is too narrow. Simply put the number of power centers that may submit their candidacy to occupy one of three positions in the equation of force is slightly higher than three, there are also fewer opportunities to make modifications, associations and groupings. In this context, what can we do next? We can seek a solution other than the bi-polarism and the triad or we can observe more closely the complex relationship that can exist between the triad and facts from the real world.

For us, the latter equation was tempting and also fertile. We originally had the suspicion that on the field worked not one but several triads, in fact – in order to save the elegance and operational power of triadic equation we expected that three triads operated in the field... But such a formula represented by 3×3 led to too many centers of power, which prove difficult to cover number of viable candidates with comparable potential. So a new hypothesis was born. Between the three triads we expected to find real and substantial connection. And the "hard" connection may be represented by a common denominator. It was expected that one of the powers to be part of all triads - the common denominator as their focus. Such a situation existed in the mid '90s, when there was a "triple triad".

Figuratively, a triple-triad looks as follows:



In essence, the triple triad model is based on simple empirical observation and hypotheses:

- The potentiality of a steady triadic structure is both empirically verifiable both by the immediate reality and the political tendencies;
- The internal balance results from the permanent balancing game plaid by triad units, the balance is forming because of the perpetual renewal of the “couples” within the triad;
- Beyond the methodological suggestion given by the triadic balance of forces, triple the triad model is articulated by observing current geostrategic trends and by trying to introduce “explanatory rationality” regarding the earthquakes that shook and shake the geopolitical planet of the millennium;
- Finally, high flexibility and functional ability of triple triad must be observed, it has something from the simple mono-polar equation, since it forms a central point of equilibrium, present within all “arms” of the triple triad, simultaneously, which works, as already shown in dyadic links within each triad, with high operational efficiency, showing a high-capacity of balancing power relations, as verified in history.

Networked World

Taking into account this assumption, the next “geostrategic vectors” (geostrategic areas, covering every branch of the triple triad: ABC, ADE, AFG) are detectable:

a) Euro-Atlantic vector (ABC), based upon the triad consisting of US-European Union - Russia. Regarding this triad some observations are required:

- U.S. is traditionally present in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Alliance mechanisms and there is also a consistent U.S. economic involvement. US were allied with Western Europe and are now with European Union to effectively counter Soviet pressure during the Cold War and Russian energy dominance in the post-Cold War;
- At the same time, European states have requested and have received constant support from America in relation to potential conflict with the Soviet Union, but have grown and cultivated an open relationship with Russia as an effective way to prevent pressure from North American hegemony in Europe;
- After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia was re-built as part of the Euro-Atlantic global geopolitical space but also as a counter factor of U.S. and EU first feel it was necessary to establish a mutual relationship between them, if Russia did not exist they would invented it which, beyond its natural geo strategic characteristics was basically what happened.

Each geo-political space of the triple-triad incorporates a “hot area”, a “problematic space “which allows estimations on... the zone temperature, the practical nature of trends of the area. It's as if we could be opened the furnaces and se we might be able to notice the burning fire. Observing this angle, the space throughout the euro-atlantic area is populated by issues, situations and processes such as

Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine and the situation at the border between the EU and Russia, pipes through which the energy runs, and the evolution of the European currency. All these can say a lot about the nature and especially about possible trends in relations between the US, the EU and Russia.

b) The trans-oriental vector brings together into a truly planetary diagonal USA, Israel and the Arabic World; we admit, this alignment is a little ...orthodox, but it stands since it is sustained by geopolitical facts.

Some observations are required:

- The tendential logic regarding relations between forces seems to be similar to that present in the Euro-Atlantic area, geostrategic area which plays the same game of dynamic balance between the counter-swinging couples and in the triad with few differences and specifics, the main vector, expressing same orientation and modeler function as the U.S.;

- The stake of the geostrategic trend seems to be given by the new horizon of the "Palestinian problem" and the chances of an existing Palestinian state; of course, the context is more complex since it includes the manner in which post-war Iraq and..." pre-war" Iran... are managed.

c) Pan-Pacific geostrategic vector correlates both sides of the largest ocean: U.S., Japan, China.

Again, without specifying now the spheres of interest and political-military, economic, scientific and demographic potential of the three competitors, otherwise known and hardly questionable, we must take into account:

- the same type of dynamic balance within the triad is probably more pronounced and more obvious in the future, with the consequences affecting its geostrategic orientation and its impact outside the area;

- the stakes, both pragmatic and of value, seems to focus around China, since it seems to be growing following a developing model, which is not associated with traditional violent expansion, if the Chinese experience will succeed - and we do not think that is going to succeed - it will be attractive and beneficial to other existing or about to be born centers of power.

So, the pragmatic reality of the present time and the tendential outline may seem to develop on the correlation structure of the three geo-strategic vectors: U.S., EU, Russia, U.S., Israel, Arab World, U.S., Japan, China. This is the emerging global power network at the end of the 20th century and early 21st century.

Some general observations:

- Triple-triad has two features that are essential and interrelated, it is able to generate dynamic balance relationships between its partners and it is also a global network of power of planetary size, in this context we must understand the current geostrategic and geopolitical processes as the new role of NATO which must be present to generate and manage the global security network of the world;

- Inside the triple-triad there are complex interacting actors, each actor being a significant presence beyond its "natural space", for example, EU presence in East Europe can be envisaged also involving Japan, China's strong presence in Africa or Russia to be a Eurasian country with strategic interests to the Pacific and the Middle East;

- Above all the U.S. is present in all three geostrategic vectors, US is their common denominator, which generates some cardinal questions: will U.S. have multiple availability - economic, technological, scientific and military - to assume and perform the core role in the new global geopolitical structure? Will U.S. have to respond adequately to "opposition" from the other actors in the triple triad?

This is a true “historic challenge” which the U.S. and global world is facing [Dobrescu, 2010]. The positive outlook of triple-triad model might embody the conditions in which the U.S., avoiding the risk of choking under divergent pressure of triad would be the core value and perform function of the global geopolitical structure, based on a “competitive balance”.

1.3. Black Sea and the World as a Network

Looking to Romania and Black Sea region from the global world, organized as a network we can make some critical observations on “valences” positioning Romania and the Black Sea region in this context. In general, is extremely relevant the positioning as an interference and interface. Undoubtedly, interference and interface positioning are active positioning situations, judged by contrast with autarky and marginality. Active position, the interference and the interface is positive than when actors (states, organizations) are able to manage all interference effects, to restrain the discharge of their territory in the proximity of polluting processes and use neighborhood resource as a growth resource.

Otherwise, the interference becomes inhibiting and counterproductive. On that basis, it can be seen that the main interference situations include Romania and Black Sea Region:

a) Romania holds an interface position within Europe, located in the area of interference between Eastern and Western continent, between North and South. Simultaneously, Romania is located on the border of “European” Europe and “Asian” Europe. When asked: “what kind of country is Russia, European or Asian?, The answer cannot bypass Romania’s opinion. According to its history, Romania will say that Russia is both a European and an Asian country, which opens a horizon of synthesis in the global world and new opportunities for Romania’s foreign policy.

b) Romania as an interface performs a role in the cross-eastern area (US-Israel-Arab world), both being in its geographic proximity and Romania having political and cultural ties with the traditional Eastern world.

c) At the same time, Romania has the chance of positioning as the interface in the pan-Pacific space (U.S., Japan - China), taking into the account especially the still existing tradition of close relations with China and active relations with Japan.

In essence, the analysis of Romania and Black Sea Region positioning in the global world leads to an idea, at least at first sight surprising: if we seeks a place for the World’s Global Operational Headquarters (with the Headquarters located in the central area, USA), which would be the most appropriate for the functional sense? From our analysis the most appropriate place could be Romania and Black Sea region...

2. War of Differences and the Black Sea

2.1 “The Cultural Beast” and War of Differences

The Man has his roots in the animal form and according to the biological background, he is still an animal. The Animal, is still within him, is visible in the acts of the beast - actions guided only by instinct, as is violence and killing others as a way to live.

The animal is removed from the Men by culture. The animal becomes human through culture, through the values that it shares. The animal becomes man able to establish what is good and evil and establishes their behavior by discerning between good and evil. The value is accomplished by building a community. The Man communicates and lives in the community.

In the above words are concentrated a few millennia of human evolution. But things cannot be seen only from one side. Watching them from another perspective we see that the beast is not fully and permanently removed from the man. The beast can always return and often it just is. Human evolution

is hesitant, sinuous, contradictory, with many bifurcations and difficult choices with losses and backtracking.

In general, two lines of evolution can be found: the man goes back (relapse) in beast form, but is not a simple beast that kills to feed, man kills using the culture resources, especially new materials, new tools and the man as a “cultural beast” is a monstrous thing since he can embody both the beast and culture. The Cultural beast is detectable not only by the huge number of casualties they cause but also by triggering and maintaining a permanent war.

In the world of the cultural beast, war is pushed to become the primary part of social life and is extended so the whole society becomes included. So the most complex and large form of war appears – the war of differences. The logic of this war is always represented by “the others” because they show us our shortcomings and therefore they are our enemies. The other are... everyone else on the ... the other side of the river, those with another culture, another faith, with different skin color, with other habits, etc.

On the other hand, we must observe the animal effort to humanize itself by culture, man becomes human, more human and he is less at risk of relapsing into an animal by submitting to a cultural design, the cultural beast is defeated by culture, by increasing assimilation of culture, and making the culture part of behavior, in civilization. The War of Differences is counteracted by a culture that allows differences. From the War of Differences one can emerge in principle in two ways. The war can end ... with the extinction differences, in fact the disappearance of entities expressing differences, after the disappearance of the world... But one can end the war and by accepting differences as natural fact of life, by nurturing differences, or - more simply – accepting them as cultural differences.

War of differences versus cultural differences, this is the great dilemma of our world. We will try to express the issue through a brief case study on the dichotomy of terrorism - terrorism in the today world.

2.2. 9/11 - Or What Happened and Especially What Was Supposed to Happen?

After September 11th, 2001, we can formulate questions and these we ought to put are the following [Iacob, 2010, Hobebawn, 2009]:

Why is that happening?

According to a very brief analysis, some possible answers that we can give to the above question are extremely complex:

The post-Cold War world bears the effects of the suspension of the bi-polar clamp, the bi-polarism can generate terror but it may lead, paradoxically, to peace and stability ..., abandoning the old geopolitical and geostrategic balance, planet is heading, as shown above, to a new equilibrium. The road to the new balance presents high turbulences (such are these from the Middle East). In such areas zonal vectors acting to promote turbulent solutions to the chronic problems are highly visible in the “area”. Such vectors are these who use terrorism as a belligerent instrument.

In this context, the characteristics of terrorism have become more obvious: the extremely violent nonconventional action, the use of violence in public space and everyday life against people unrelated to the issues in dispute, the public impact and maximum emotional effect.

During the Cold War, balance spring, as we already noted, from terror it was a balance of terror. Terror, although real (because there are weapons that if used are likely to destroy the planet), it was perceived in an abstract way. The atomic bomb was threatening, but was unlikely to explode soon ... Terror was an abstract concept, that ordinary people rather ignored. Life developed normally, with joy, with sorrow... It was a normal a life...

Post-cold war and terrorism make life evolve in the worst conditions ever. Seemingly endless wars or pandemics, or barbarian invasions had failed to produce the same effects that can be generated by terrorism. If during the Cold War, a bomb could explode at one time killing large numbers of people in the area in post-Cold War bombs are exploding all the time and everywhere, killing all in their path. This is because, beyond improvised exploding devices that explode in public transport vehicles and on roads... there are terrorist bombs exploding every moment, and have irreversible effects. Bombs explode in the minds and hearts of the people - the fear bomb. Fear is the most harmful bomb that was ever used. It is a fact that terrorists know it very well...!

a) What was supposed to happen?

Observing its evolution, of course is extremely difficult, and we should consider:

Development in the logic of war, conventional and unconventional war, targets in natural way, to defeating an opponent by destroying said opponent, the “new war” target is represented by partial derivative destruction of the enemy. In fact, witnessing the changing epistemic assumptions of the war, we have to change the reference system. We should not forget that, during the Cold War “communist states” were not defeated by war directly but by “changing the world”. The new war is rather epistemic and cultural. It is a different kind of war is a war of values.

Beyond its explicit (traditional) military dimension, which remains visible in no way circumvented, terrorism can be defeated only by the offensive and reconstruction values of the world.

b) Can be imagined a long-term response of the U.S. and those in solidarity with the U.S.?

The U.S. response was immediately visible. Based on “good morals”, the U.S. committed against evil, using a strategy built by the convergence of vectors such as armed struggle against terrorism, good relations between great powers, encouraging free and open societies.

America's long-term answer is, of course, difficult to estimate. A fertile suggestion may come even from the mixed and significant history of this fabulous country. Luis Menand [72], in a book published in the first year of the new century, reconstructs changes in American life after the civil war, as a result of the change in assumptions intellectual underlying the facts. In the troubled years of the 19th century and the 20th century, American intellectuals and simple people understood that “clamming” the certainty leads to violence, and the truth is social, arising from social interaction of people. In fact, we know too well, they are the key values of pragmatism as a philosophy and lifestyle.

Less obvious at first sight the cultural history presented above offers the main idea of the social role of thinkers, the intellectuals. American intellectuals did their duty then. Not by applauding, but by being critical, innovative...

3. War and Culture of Differences in Black Sea Region

And this assumption proves the ambivalence of the Black Sea region. Everything has to take into account that the life of people and institutions must pulsate not only on one facet of ... one coin, one that comes from history full of wars and crises. It is essential that the medal be turned on the other side. In the historical sense, these situations are obvious [Pieterse, 2009]

a) The War of Differences is ancient in Europe. It was a war over territory, cultural patterns, religions and political ideologies. Last Cold War is formally recorded. Formally, the Cold War ended two decades ago, with the disaggregation of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Humanity and the Europeans appear to have reached the Promised Land. Communism, the only impediment to universal happiness was gone. Yet, it was not so easy! The Cold War was not followed by the Universal Peace, but by the War of Differences. An atrocious war. A war with no winners, only victims! The evidence in this regard can be found in former Yugoslavia, in intra and inter-regional tensions in Europe. War

of Differences in the Black Sea region seems to have had a higher intensity on a European scale. Yet, it is possible to avoid or escape the war of differences? Basically speaking, there is only one way. It's about culture differences [Kottlak, 2009; Mayo, 2000].

b) Cultural differences mean wisdom and ability to transform a “disjunction” in “conjunction” to build bridges over crevasses, over precipices. In principle, differences in culture requires the ability to avoid turning the differences into a conflict but in source strength by using space as an opportunity for dialogue as a way to create a new world ... The Black Sea region is undoubtedly an excellent space both for war and culture of differences. In the last five or six millennia, for which we have evidence, Black Sea region was the area where civilizations were born and where they clashed. Today things changed. New there is the idea of cultural differences. This idea could help Europe to evolve in the future; it could help the construction of the New Europe, in other words, the Post-Europe [McKelvey, 2006; Miozzo, 2006]

3.1. Post - Europe and Black Sea Region - The Eye of the Storm

The concept of Post - Europe express natural tendency of the contemporary civilization to find responses to turbulent processes of post-Cold War World that can give birth the global world. Why are these processes more “visible” and more “hot” here than in other areas of the planet? For a very simple reason, because Berlin is in Europe and - as a consequence - the Berlin Wall could not be in other place than in Europe ... Obviously, the collapse of the Berlin Wall could not remain without consequences for Europe and the world [Judt, 2008; Murgescu, 2010].

In last years, Europe has expressed almost simultaneously several facets:

a) Even in the early 90s EUROPE OF DIFFERENCES became visible. The War of differences could not leave Europe untouched. The turbulence was strong, was visible especially in the Balkans and Black Sea area and is far from being concluded. The policies regarding CULTURE of DIFFERENCES were triggered, are being implemented. Results may not manifest soon and they accumulate only slowly.

b) In the same year EUROPE OF CONVERGENCES was introduced, the first institutional convergence, which is visible through the policies of expansion, in waves, is the European Union. In this context the Black Sea region is the closest neighborhood of the European Union since Romania and Bulgaria EU adhesion. EUROPE OF CONVERGENCES gets a strategic pillar of support through the adoption by most EU countries of a single currency. Inevitably, the first set of problems appeared generating a crisis of economic competitiveness. The first answer seems to be the institutional and fiscal policy that leads to an unique and to increasing institutional integration. The political program of the United States of Europe seems to be working.

c) The CRISIS OF CONVERGENCE brings forward another Europe insufficient envisaged in recent years, EUROPE OF PERFORMANCE. Performance is about institutions, but mostly about management and work performance. There are already estimates that say the future Europe will exist only if performance will generate social behavior. Europe has enough cultural combustion to achieve such a goal. Achieving this goal will require active and stimulating cultural convergence that can a religious culture of the Europeans, and social productive behavior. The faith imperative but it should meet with the need for labor. Surely, here is one of the most troubling issues that will debated and will require new solutions in Europe.

d) The EUROPE new chance could come from the EUROPE OF EQUILIBRIUM, represented by the balance between political, institutional, economic and cultural factors. In this context we can establish the new role of Europe in the global world. The detachment from the violent history of Europe should be energetic and final. From a territory that has seen wars, Europe would become a land and a force of balance in Eurasia and in the world.

In essence, Europe has a chance to be “the eye of the storm” compared with the world. Exactly the same role would have the Black Sea region, in relation to Europe. Contrary to the most opinions, the Black Sea region could become the source of stability for the Post-Europe. In Romanian there is an extremely plastic expression - “to be the cat's whiskers “, when something or someone is “the cat's whiskers” it is suggested that there are in a very important position. Black Sea region, has a history that begins 4-5000 years ago and sequels after the introduction of Christianity, and it was the cat's whiskers”. Here are the beginnings of civilization, here have been built and proven models States, urban constructions etc. The known world of the ancient time included the Black Sea Region. A historical cycle of about five thousand years seems to end, the Black Sea region has a chance to become ... “the cat's whiskers’ again! This time, for the globalized world!

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THE DYNAMICS OF BRITISH INTERESTS: FROM THE BLACK SEA TO THE SUEZ CANAL (THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY)

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Abstract

In the early twentieth century, there is a gradual shift in the British geopolitical interests from Constantinople to Cairo / Suez Canal. What are the reasons that stayed behind this change of interests? The unfavorable changing balance of power in the Black Sea, its colonial interests in Africa, the need to protect the road to India?

Keywords: *Black Sea, Europe, Africa, colonial interests.*

INTRODUCTION

The Oriental problem was a constant presence in the international relations of the nineteenth century. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles regime often produced dissonances in the *European concert*. In this period of time, Great Britain was an active diplomatic and military presence in the Black Sea area, considering Constantinople as the main pivot of security in the Mediterranean Sea. In the early twentieth century, there is a gradual shift in the British geopolitical interests from Constantinople to Cairo / Suez Canal. What are the reasons that stayed behind this change of interests? The unfavorable changing balance of power in the Black Sea, its colonial interests in Africa, the need to protect the road to India or all together?

DEBATES

Historians, who were concerned with international relations and the evolution of the Oriental problem, favor diplomatic and strategic issues that changed the balance of forces in the area. A.J.P. Taylor [1] considered that the French–Russian alliance “made it impossible for the British to act at the Straits and pushed them deep into Egypt”. Barbara Jelavich stated that the British diminishing interest in the Straits was due to the opening of the Suez Canal because it considerably shortened the distance to India, Britain’s crown jewel [2]. Camil Muresan [3] established a causal relationship among the Egypt problem, the Suez Canal, the path to India, and the whole British Empire, whose economic and strategic axis became the route London - Gibraltar - Malta - Suez - Aden - Bombay - Singapore - Sydney. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins [4] have a contrary view, sustaining that the Admiralty “based its strategy on the Cape route until the 1890s”, and “the Canal did not become an issue in the public mind until two weeks before the bombardment of Alexandria”.

G.N. Sanderson [5], quoting the words of Lord Salisbury, said that the Ottoman Empire's strong transformation in the 1880s, into “the gatekeeper of Russia at the Straits, determines Britain to reconsider its position in Egypt. R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, Anne Denis, in *Africa and the Victorians. The official mind of imperialism* [6], argue that the British occupation of Egypt, a result of strategic interests related to the Suez Canal, are the origin of the *scramble for Africa*, the action of 1882 that caused a chain reaction, dividing the continent between colonial powers.

The controversial nature of the problem mentioned above is more than obvious and we could continue listing the works of historians and adopt a position or another, but this is not the purpose of our work. We believe that the origin of Britain's changing position are both the specific colonial

interests in Egypt, which led to the subsequent successive actions in the Nilotic Sudan and the strategic issues related to the Oriental Mediterranean, which required the creation of a naval base that would keep an eye over Russia or any other power which could control the Straits. The Romanian diplomatic correspondence had an important role in supporting this point of view. The Romanian ambassadors stationed in the capitals of Great Powers observed the dynamic of events, but also the clashing interests in the area.

Victorian England was the European state with the greatest influence over the world in the nineteenth century, given the economic and technical superiority, and its colossal colonial empire, covering all seas and continents. Since its power was based on trade, the control of the main sea routes and strategic points was a vital issue and a constant of the foreign policy. Britain was keen to maintain its advantages obtained since the eighteenth century and to protect its roads to the guaranteed markets in India, China, Australia, and New Zealand. Consequently, the permanent concern of Britain was to occupy strategically located areas on these routes, particularly to India, taking advantage of the indifference of Europe. In 1878, during the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury cynically presented the fait accompli policy carried out by England: “*When Europe's interest was focused on conflicts in Spain, Britain took Gibraltar, when Europe's interest was focused on conflicts in Italy, England took Malta. Now, when Europe's interest manifests itself in Asia Minor and Egypt, England occupied Cyprus*” [7].

The international status of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in the nineteenth century, was the result of the balance of power between Britain and Russia, the first intended to stop any access to the “free sea”, while the last wanted to control the entry of any naval power in the Black Sea, transformed into a “Russian lake” [8]. Russia felt invincible on the ground after the disaster suffered by Bonaparte in 1812, but vulnerable on the sea. The Crimean War left it wanting to avoid such disastrous defeats.

The British interest for the Straits was based on permanent strategic superiority through alliances and by maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which allowed their neutralization. When Great Britain was isolated diplomatically, following the occupation of Egypt, it would have to abandon the strategy based on naval superiority and involve in land battles to occupy the Dardanelles, a thing unacceptable in this context. The Franco - Russian Alliance and especially the Russian - Austria-Hungarian Agreement - in May 5, 1897, have blocked the problem of the Straits for the next 10 years [9]. It is the background that moved the center of strategic interest to Egypt, with its consequences over the Nilotic Sudan and East Africa, because it was known that the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is Nile.

After 1870, England becomes a great power among other great powers, due to the emergence of rivals, some of whom (especially Germany and the U.S.), will soon surpass it economically. Fear, reactions to an affected national prestige, the result of increased international tensions or economic interests, all together have led the public to look favorably to the English theories supporting the enhancement of the Empire, by building an economic, political and military unit in order to reject the other Powers with imperial aspirations [10]. Disraeli, who used to consider “these wretched colonies (...) millstones tied on our necks”, through his memorable speech on June 24, 1872, blew up the spirit of resignation and taught the British the “imperial way”. “It is a miracle that England is still an empire, after 40 years of anti-colonial politics. And this Empire resisted the British hostility towards expansion and benevolence with which the metropolis had proclaimed ready to lose colonies. It is something that liberals have neglected: a community of culture, a community of race, much stronger than the community of material interests” [11].

Great Britain rebuilt the world after its image and, we would say, after its interest. In its case, the marriage of public and private interests was made because of the growing income due to the foreign investments and because the state and the financial institutions were ruled by members of the same elite that shared the same values and spoke the language of policy makers. Simply put, the overseas expansion and accompanying imperialism had a vital role in maintaining the national properties and privileges in an era of social unrest and revolution. The elite diaspora was the link of

the imperial strategy between the mainland and overseas, which was in fact perfectly placed to facilitate the transition from expansionism to imperialism by developing the ideology of its mission in a patriotic sense. It is no coincidence that the most persuasive images of empire and imperialism were those that projected the nobility (the elite) more than the industry; the meetings for the five o'clock tea in the clubs of the colonies became a living presence in the British colonial imagination. The imperialism was an integral part of the British society [12]. In other words, the British expansion was an expansion of the society [13]. Moreover, British colonial expansion follows the exacerbation of nationalism and the emergence of local nationalism, as a result of foreign presence, which requires abandonment of informal empire and annexation of territory, as happened in Egypt [14].

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Egypt was an autonomous Ottoman province governed by a hereditary pasha (khedive), status directed by the London Convention in 1841 [15]. In April 1876, Egypt stated that it was unable to pay its debts and is obliged to accept European financial control. Egyptian State had to waive a part of the income, administered by the International Debt Commission, composed of seven members (two French, two British, one Italian, one Austrian and one Egyptian). Ferdinand Lesseps was its president. Moreover, there were named two controllers for the overall budget. The British representative supervised the incomes and the French representative the expenses; without their consent, no monetary transaction could take place. The imposed European financial regime led to extreme budget cuts, the most affected sectors being the public administration and especially the army [16].

This situation started a broad Egyptian movement with obvious xenophobic, fundamentalist Islamic and liberal features, head by the Colonel Ahmed Urabi (1839-1911) [17]. Around him gathered all those unhappy of the European guardianship, the privileges of foreigners (protected by mixed courts) [18], the activity of the khedive considered “the foreigners’ slave”, but also of the negative role of the local aristocracy in ruining Egypt’s economy. Analyzing events, Sir Archibald Colvin, the English General controller, wrote that “the Egyptian movement was partly the result of the emancipation of Egyptian conceptions following close contact with Europeans and partly the result of reaction to the Ottoman oppression and European dictatorship” [19].

The situation in Egypt evolved towards irreconcilable positions. The national movement led by Urabi became more determined to gain full control of power against foreigners, while the great powers gradually realized that, despite initial reluctance, it required direct involvement in defending their interests in Egypt [20]. The existence of an explosive situation in Egypt is reported in late 1881 by the Romanian representative in Berlin, Liteanu, who noticed the European preoccupation to address possible concerns of the crisis. “There is fear of a rise, of a revolution, and the cabinets/offices already discussed about the manner in which they have to proceed in case of crisis, to restore order and increase khedive’s authority” [21].

Liteanu further indicated that all powers agreed on the need to stop a dangerous condition for this country and European interests but there are big differences in the solutions proposed. England and France were prepared to send an effective support to the khedive, but Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia suggested an occupation of Egypt by the Ottoman Empire to avoid the exclusivity of the first two powers in the region [22]. The report said that these different positions did not result in a conflict between the Great Powers, but Liteanu, who knew the importance of the area and the subtleties of the international political game, wondered in conclusion if “this simple difference would not be aggravated if Egypt would actually need protection” [23].

During the months of March-April 1882, the conflict between the new nationalist government and the khedive increased in scale. The new government wanted his removal and proclamation of the republic [24]. It granted the Assembly of Notables the right to pass the budget, thus suppressing foreign financial tutelage and decides to ensure the necessary military conditions to resist foreign intervention [25]. Consequently, England and France once again called on Bismarck's opinion on what measures should be taken to “restore order in the Nile Valley”. German Chancellor’s response was encouraging: if the problem of Egypt concerned Europe, it particularly interested the two powers,

which must agree to jointly propose a solution to end such difficulties [26]. The solution found by the French was to carry an Anglo-French naval demonstration in front of Alexandria [27] and convene a Conference of Ambassadors in Constantinople [28], proposals accepted immediately by England.

The response of the Great Powers to the notification of the naval demonstration was reserved, except the Ottoman Empire, which protested and Berlin which had a favorable view. In this context, Litanu explained Bismarck's balance policy between the Western governments and other powers, including the Ottoman Empire, as the desire was not to contribute "through a hostile attitude to the tightening of links between France and England" [29]. Meanwhile, the Romanian diplomat pointed to the apparent nature of Franco-British union, because the two powers had conflicting interests on the Nile, even aspiring to a preponderant influence. Although the outbreak of conflict was considered unlikely, Litanu warned about the repercussions of tensioning to the maximum the Egyptian problem that "could lead to eventual consequences in the Balkans, which would soon lead to the rebirth of all Oriental complications" [30].

On June 11, 1882, serious xenophobic disturbances broke out in Alexandria. The consuls of England, Italy and Greece were attacked, 60 Europeans were massacred, fires and looting covering the entire city [31]. The army and police intervened six hours later, when the riots were at their peak. The causes of the disturbances were put either on account of Urabi, which was paid by the British [32], or on the khedive [33], who wanted a European intervention.

The main result of the bloody events of Alexandria was that all powers, "without exception", agreed to organizing together a Conference of Ambassadors to Constantinople in order "to regulate the difficulties through the European concert" [34]. Concerning its objective, Litanu thought it "would be to achieve a final settlement of the political condition of Egypt, arrangement that should maintain a certain balance between the jealous powers and would reconcile the different opinions" [35].

The Ambassadors Conference opened under the patronage of Count Corti, the Italian Ambassador and dean of the diplomatic unit. The Count told the Romanian representative that "powers are gathered and will gather regularly to convene about Egypt", even without the Turkish delegation [36]. The Porte's obstructions caused a sui generis solution: instead of Turkish delegation to attend debates, each ambassador was forced to go and "discuss with the Turkish Foreign Minister or Prime Minister" [37]. In this way, the Turks hoped to extend talks indefinitely. The obstructionist attitude of the Porte, the foreign exodus from Egypt, which continued despite Urabi Pasha's assurances that the army assures the wealth and life of foreign subjects, the unsafely route to India, threatened by armed Bedouins that Urabi sent across the Canal [38], made the need of military intervention of England more certain, in the eyes of Romanian diplomats. This imminent decisive action is announced since the beginning of July, by the Romanian ministers in Constantinople (D. Ollănescu), London (Ion Ghica) and Vienna (Ion Balaceanu).

The situation becomes more complicated. D. Ollănescu informed on 25 June/7 July and on 28 June/10 July 1882 that Urabi Pasha, with all his declarations of allegiance, refused to come to Constantinople, despite the express orders of the sultan, responding that the circumstances do not permit "to leave his official position of trust and honor, awarded to him" [39]. The tension increased due to intense fortification work done during nighttime at Alexandria and Abukir, despite Urabi's statements and English warnings. For this reason, Admiral Seymour, the English fleet commander, addressed an ultimatum of 36 hours to surrender the forts of Alexandria, threatening to bomb it in case of a refusal [40]. Pressed by his cabinet, "Gladstone is forced to take vigorous actions" [41]. After the French refusal to join a bombardment of Alexandria forts and the ignoring of the ultimatum addressed to the Egyptian government by Admiral Seymour, on July 11, 1882, the city is bombed and occupied two days later [42]. To delineate the action of the British, the French fleet is ordered to withdraw from Alexandria (July 10), and the government declared that "faithful to its peaceful policy over the Nile, it would not engage in any activity outside the European concert." Meanwhile, the Government of the Republic was willing to participate, with the consent of other powers, to the military intervention in Egypt" [43].

Pending resolution of diplomatic difficulties, Britain landed troops to Alexandria “to prevent an offensive return of Urabi Pasha” and continued military preparations to occupy the Suez Canal. Liteanu warns, since 7/19 July 1882, that the Queen’s ambassadors were commissioned to draw the attention of all governments to the dangers posed by crossing the Suez and the means to be used for not interrupting the navigation through the Canal. It was a sign for the Romanian diplomat that “Britain was determined to act with or without the participation of other countries, and it was possible that a further blow of force could end the insurgency in Egypt” [44]. The same warnings arrived from Vienna [45] and Constantinople [46].

The Romanian diplomats forecasts were accurate; on 22 of July, the British Prime Minister, Lord Gladstone said that England would act alone if necessary [47], and on 26 of July, the British ambassador conveyed the French government a protocol that specified the basis and common intervention goals in the Canal area (the British would occupy Port Said and El-Kantara, the French Ismailia and Suez) [48]. On July 25, the Freycinet government requested loans to participate in the proposed expedition, but the Chamber rejected the request after heated discussions (July 29). The negative vote is put mainly on account of the ambiguity of Bismarck's position [49], but also on the lack of pressure from the financial circles, opinion which we consider erroneous while the revolution of Urabi affected only the interests of French bankers and no vital interests of France” [50]. In conclusion, in Egypt, the French national interests were not affected, only the English ones.

On September 13, the army of General Garnet Wolseley, landed at Ismailia on 20 August, crushed the troops of Urabi at Tell el Kebir [51]. The victory was so fast that it was thought that Urabi was bought by the British [52]; in our opinion, it is unlikely, given that the British dominated in discipline, weapons, training and number.

The British victory, the capture and trial of Urabi [53] brought joy and concern in diplomatic circles caused by the new state of affairs in Egypt [54]. On 7/19 October 1882, the Romanian Legation informed about the British ambassador’s meeting with the Sultan (September 5), in which he congratulated His Majesty for the success of the British campaign in Egypt “that made sovereignty to be saved in a battle with rebels” while stating that “any negotiations for a military agreement no longer served any purpose” [55]. The Turkish answer given on 13/25 September requested the withdrawal of British troops arguing that their purpose was achieved, implying that the restoration is an attribute of the suzerain state [56]. To avoid any confusion over the British presence in Egypt, Lord Dufferin Gate was authorized to declare to the Porte on September 26 / October 8 that British troops would occupy Egypt “until an order was restored and it would establish a system of safeguards against attempts of any rebellions similar to Urabi’s” [57]. At the same time, the British Government assured the Ottoman government of its true friendship” [58]. After several days of talks, the Turks replied in a note to the English ambassador, insisting in “achieving an understanding over the retreat and the implementation of an effective cooperation between both governments to ensure the future order in Egypt” [59].

The perseverance of the Turks made Great Britain to react, by insisting that the Ottoman government should begin the reforms contained in the Treaty of Berlin and in particular to deal with the problem posed by Article 61 in respect of Armenia and to exclude any influence of the Sultan over the settlement issues related to the powers of ministers [60]. It was a real blackmail, in which the Turks gave in the matter of Egypt, but it would solve the Armenian problem à la Turque, by killing a good part of them in 1894, 1895 and 1896.

Generally, the Great Powers have been satisfied with restoring the order and the “extent of the privileges of European governments in Egypt [61] except France which sought to restore the previous situation since September 1882. England refused to reinstate the condominium, arguing that recent events have shown that English and French controllers’ system is not without serious errors and dangers and send Lord Dufferin on a mission of inquiry to propose Egypt a viable exit from the crisis situation. His instructions stated that the British occupation would be as short as possible, the withdrawal [62] being possible only after “creating conditions to ensure peace, order and prosperity in

Egypt, the stability of the khedive's authority, the judicious development of self-governance and fulfilling the obligations to foreign powers" [63].

The French dissatisfaction manifested by refusing to accept the fact, led England to present Europe, by the circular note of January 3, 1883, the terms under which it would leave Egypt: ensuring free movement through the Canal and maintaining British ruling in Egypt. Affected that England avoided stating the period of its occupation, France warned, also in January 1883, "that it would take full freedom of action" [64]. Beyond bellicose statements, the French had few effective means to obstruct British politics, but it obstinately used them for 15 years. The policy of coups d'épingle, promoted by the French government, was based mainly on the financial arm - its active presence in the Egyptian Debt Committee often managing to hinder British politics.

While the government prepared to retreat the troops from Cairo, and Baring, future Lord Cromer, general consul between 1883 and 1907, was concerned with the healthy restoring of Egypt, the khedive's authority in Sudan succumbed due to the mahdiste revolt. Military failures and the threat the dervishes represented for Egypt and the Canal, forced the British government "to become the protector of Egypt" [65] and to constrain the Egyptian government to abandon Sudan.

The temporary occupation of Egypt by the British favored Germany. Bismarck was encouraging the protests of France, while still approving the British presence and the reorganization of Egypt [66], in order to worsen the French-English relations. Thus, the purpose of isolating France was fulfilled and called on a rapprochement with Germany in order to meet the colonial objectives, collaboration noticeable during the second Ferry government (1883-1885).

British occupation of Egypt brought England into a dangerous isolation, determining Salisbury to improve ties with Berlin "through a set of wise concessions in East Africa and the Pacific Ocean", [67] and then, by joining the Mediterranean Agreements [68]. In this way, he acquired German support at Constantinople and the German vote in Cairo, managing to gain maneuvering space for the British foreign policy [69]. Egypt was the place where this space had become vital, given that Egypt remained a European problem. The military presence in Cairo became a serious political obstacle for the British foreign policy; therefore, in August 1885 negotiations with the Turks were resumed [70]. The offer made by Sir Drummond Wolff was that the sultan, as suzerain of the country, sent troops to the Red Sea, where they could disturb only the dervishes. Salisbury reached two objectives: secure shipping route through the Red Sea and terminated the British single occupation. The Turks declined the offer, by the Convention of October 24, 1885, the sultan accepting only to send a commissioner to investigate the Egyptian problems [71].

In January 1887, Drummond Wolff starts negotiations for a second agreement with the Gate, the main objective at stake being the evacuation of Egypt, but still maintaining the right of reoccupation if this was required. On July 15, 1887, Drummond Wolff interrupted talks with the Ottoman Empire, failing ratification of the Convention. Salisbury's proposals for withdrawal have failed completely despite the attempts of the Gate or France [72]. If Salisbury would agree with a possible withdrawal, he could not accept to give up the leadership in Egypt. In any case, with an indefinite reoccupation right when deemed necessary, with the guarantee that no other power could represent a substitute and that the discharge will not start as long as other Powers would not allow it, Great Britain showed clearly its intent to rule Egypt, no matter if its troops remained on the Nile or stationed in Cyprus.

The failure of negotiations in 1887 had important consequences for the balance of powers in Europe and on Africa, marking the end of the Franco-British understanding and paving the road for the Franco-Russian Alliance [73]. The deliberate action of France to use every opportunity to reopen the Egyptian question would cause permanent opposition to the British initiatives in Egypt and would get it involved in the Nile issue, in order to force a renegotiation. Unfortunately, French Foreign Minister, Gabriel Hanoteaux did not realize that Britain could not accept the presence of another European power around the Nile, leading to extreme strained relations with England when the

Marchand expedition will be faced with British troops led by General Kitchener at Fachoda (1898) [74].

CONCLUSIONS

Also, this real battle of prestige between the two groups of countries demonstrated the relativity of their influence on the Ottoman Empire and especially how much the British influence had diminished compared with 1878 [75]. This situation forces England to sign the Second Mediterranean Agreement with Austria and Italy, in order to ensure that the Straits will be protected against Russia, especially with the German support [76].

The most important consequence was that the occupation of Egypt, which had long been an improvisation model for peacekeeping interventions, became gradually a permanent occupation, to ensure financial and commercial interests of British nationals from Egypt and India. It marked a new approach to the colonial problem, through the state's intervention to protect the interests of subjects of the British Crown.

We need to add to this view the strategic dimension, the considerations over the balance of power in the Black Sea - Oriental Mediterranean, since the occupation of Egypt became a necessary insurance against the decline of British influence over the Porte. Increasingly more, Salisbury begins to consider Cairo and not Constantinople, "the keystone of security in the Mediterranean" [77]. The focus of British interests to African shores of the Mediterranean had as main result the future expansion in East Africa [78] and especially in the Nilotic Sudan. From this perspective, abandoning Egypt became more dangerous to British interests than to keep the occupation, taking into consideration all the unwanted diplomatic effects.

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INTELLIGENCE AND DISINFORMATION DURING THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

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Abstract

Communications means have become very important in today's world, including the field of armed conflicts. One of the examples illustrating this thesis is the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008. Although Russia has achieved a strategic victory on the ground, the media war was more balanced and, some say, even won by Georgia. However, the results on the ground demonstrate that the impact of the media war on the final outcome of the conflict was only marginal, as it was not accompanied by comparable adequate military means.

Keywords: media, war, PR, information, Georgia, Russia

1. INTRODUCTION

Today, war in its plenitude as a phenomenon, has essentially changed its unfolding under the impact of the communication revolution, but, most of all, of the action vectors. From this perspective, some experts claim that *“Information has become a viable weapon of war that can be used to strategic, operational and tactical advantage by both enemy and friendly forces. Mass media is the agent by which military information is collected, interpreted and transmitted to worldwide audiences and therefore, has tremendous potential to affect the outcome of military operations. The commander who embraces the inevitability of media presence in the theatre of operations and plans accordingly can achieve significant operational advantages. In short, mass media has become a high stakes player in the military planning equation and, for better or worse, will play a major role in formulating the way future wars are fought”* [1]. In these conditions, wars began to be broadcasted “live” by television channels. Communication experts used by belligerents have become information providers of television, the latter taking over, most often, the already “prepared” news in order to provide them to media consumers. That is why, a legitimate question emerged if these news are really objective and to what extent are they affected by the need to protect strategic information from the enemy’s “ears” [2]. Many of the analysts of the phenomenon believe that, in what concerns war journalism, during the seventh and the eighth decades of the 20th century, we witnessed a shift of the gravity centre, from the traditional journalistic distance and detachment, from the so-called *by-standards journalism* to engaged journalism [3]. The central element in this discussion is the PR institution which has become omnipresent in all activity fields of contemporary society, from marketing to war, to cover only the extremes. In the economic field, for example, *“Corporate public relations professionals were instructed to keep companies out of the news and, therefore, out of trouble. Yet this all changed in the past few years as communications professionals took an aggressive outbound approach to media relations, turning PR from support function into a strategic weapon that helped companies establish a positive brand, presence and consumer mindshare”*. [4] The business world uses a mix of tools to sell products and promote companies. This is known as marketing. Marketing is the battle for the hearts and minds of consumers and it applies to goods, services or ideas. Marketing battles are won with communications. The military has the same set of goals. It needs the American public to support a peacetime budget. It needs to keep up morale among active, reserve and retired personnel. It needs to drive public and Congressional opinion and support during a time of conflict. And it needs to erode an enemy’s will to fight, thus saving lives on a battlefield. These assertions are valid not only in the case of American society. It is not by accident that the phrase “war must sell good” emerged at the

beginning of the new century [5] and several analysts believe that *“The techniques being used to sell a war in Iraq are familiar PR strategies. The message is developed to resonate with the targeted audiences through the use of focus groups and other types of market research and media monitoring. The delivery of the message is tightly controlled. Relevant information flows to the media and the public through a limited number of well-trained messengers, including seemingly independent third parties.”* [6] The war between Georgia and Russia did not oppose this tendency which occurred in the relation between media and public opinion during the last years.

2. SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

In the summer of 2008, one of the frozen conflicts consecutive to the period following the end of the Cold War, that between Georgia and the separatist province of South Ossetia, escalated into fully-fledged war. It was chronologically the third conflict between the separatist region and the central government in Tbilisi, from Georgia’s independence in 1991. But this war was totally different than the preceding two, by the direct involvement of the Russian army and the direct and indirect involvement of some great powers with interests in the area, especially the United States and the European Union. [7]

The fact that Russia decided to intervene in Georgia somehow took the international community by surprise and the shock-wave reverberated in the ex-Soviet space and then all over the world [8]. Until this date, starting from 1979, when Moscow intervened in Afghanistan, the Kremlin leader did not undertake a war against a neighbouring country. It was a special situation in the context in which the conflict took place among to UN and OSCE member states, organisations in which they committed to promote peace, security and stability [9].

The causes of this conflict are both political but most of all geopolitical and derive from the interests of great powers to control the energy transit corridor linking energy producers with great consumers. Other causes are related with the evolution of state building in this part of the former Soviet Empire after the latter’s implosion. Some experts consider that *“When we try to clarify the basic facts of the war, we discover that virtually everything about it is contested, especially the question of who started it. But an abundance of published evidence disconfirms Georgian propaganda and indicates that Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili provoked the war with encouragement and material support from the Bush administration. Years earlier, Saakashvili’s regime had drawn up plans for invading South Ossetia, which had been seeking independence from Georgia ever since 1920. He was emboldened to implement those plans (in the midst of the Beijing summer Olympics) because he expected aid from American and NATO allies, whose Afghanistan and Iraq wars he was supporting with 2, 000 Georgian troops”* [10].

On the other hand, Moscow used the policy of separatism in order to preserve its political control in the area, the case of the South Ossetian separatism being notorious. Tbilisi authorities tried to counterbalance such a policy and in the 2004-2006 interval they adopted a series of documents by which they considered Russia’s actions in South Ossetia as an “undisguised annexation” [11]. The fears of the Tbilisi government were somehow justified, if we take into account the fact that Russians took a series of diplomatic and even military measures perceived as threats by Georgians. We can exemplify only by the presidential decree of 16 April 2008, when Moscow established official relations with authorities of the two separatist regions, but also the high number of Russian passports issued to South Ossetians and Abkhazians. [12] According to analysts David J. Smith and Khatuna Mshvidobadze, Russian intervention in Georgia had been prepared long ago. From May until July a series of preliminary actions were undertaken: *“heavily armed ‘peacekeepers’ deployed (with artillery, ant-aircraft weapons and modern armoured personnel carriers); Railroad Troops deployed to repair the rail line between Sukhumi and Ochamchire, which would figure prominently in invasion logistics; Improvements at Gudauta air base, which Moscow claimed to have quit in accordance with its 1999 Istanbul commitments; June-July—military exercises simulating an invasion of Georgia and moving forces into position; July—Overt airspace violations; July-August—Cyber-attacks”* [13].

At the beginning of August 2008, violent confrontations took place between the separatist forces and the pro-Tbilisi militias. In these conditions, on 7 August 2008, Mikheil Saakashvili decided it was time to cut the Gordian knot and launched an attack over South Ossetia's capital Tskhinvali [14]. After the Georgian army took control of the capital and some villages in the area it bombed the road linking Tskhinvali and the Roki tunnel, in order to prevent an advancement of Russian troops [15]. Following the bombing, hundreds of civilians were killed, but also Russian soldiers from peacekeeping troops. The next day, Russian troops launched a land and air-borne attack against Georgian troops which, after three days of fighting, completely withdrew from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and on 12 August a ceasefire agreement was signed between Dmitri Medvedev and Mikheil Saakashvili, mediated by the European Union represented by Nicolas Sarkozy.

The short war, lasting only five days, left behind thousands of refugees, hundreds of victims and brought the US-Russian relations to the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. [16] Georgian and Russian chronicles of the event are very different and much politicized, [17] which also indicates the existence of another kind of "war" unfolding between the two parties, one undertaken with and by means of classic mass media but also by means of non-classic channels. The campaign, which had been carried out on a grand scale and was extremely aggressive, was aiming precise propaganda messages at both the foreign and domestic audience. The main task for the Russian media was to emphasize the rebirth of Russia as a powerful country, which was strong, assertive, had clearly defined interests and was determined to defend them. Another simultaneous purpose of the propaganda was to show the weakness of the Western world and to emphasize the divides existing there. One more temporary, albeit important, goal was the complete discrediting of Georgia and demonstration of the failure of its pro-Western ambitions. [18] The analysis of the main propaganda ideas and themes shows the objectives aimed at in this media war, both internally and most of all internationally.

3. MEDIA, PR AND THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR

Each of the belligerents' media vectors insisted on the moment when hostilities started. Indirectly, each side wanted to show it was the victim of an aggression and, thus, to diplomatically and internationally legitimize its action. Georgian authorities claim the attack was undertaken only after Russia started its moves through the Roki tunnel towards the Georgian territory. [19] Moscow's side was that Russian troops did not cross the border but when peacekeeping forces were in an imminent danger and insisted that it was a defensive action, a response to Georgia's attack that turned into a conflict "which was not wanted nor provoked by Russia", according to a declaration of the Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov. Russia offered various justifications for the military intervention from South Ossetia, including arguments based on the international law used by western countries for the Balkan intervention [20]. Media from the Russian Federation presented the events as being an attack against the Russian Federation and a case of illegal use of military force against peacekeeping troops, invoking self-defence stipulated in chapter 51 of the UN Charter, as shown in the letter addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the UN on 11 August 2008 [21].

A temporary goal, for the Russian media, was the complete discrediting and isolation of the Georgian government (also inside Georgia). The country was presented as a puppet aggressor which was subservient to US interests and had violated both international law and human rights. At the beginning of the conflict, the Russian media totally denied the Georgian state and its policy. However, some time later, the distinction was made in Russia between the regime of the 'political corpse Saakashvili' (as President Medvedev called him on 3 September), which Russia disregarded and did not intend to negotiate with, and the Georgian nation to whom Moscow started addressing positive messages (on 7 September, Medvedev announced, "*our attitude towards the Georgian nation has not changed and is still warm and brotherly*"). This propaganda strategy fitted in with the goal which Russia had pursued since the beginning of the conflict, namely the abolition of the government in Tbilisi, which was unfavourably disposed to Moscow. Now that Saakashvili has to give an account of his actions, Russia seems to have intensified such propaganda efforts and appears to be giving signs of a desire to reach an understanding with potential rivals of the Georgian president [22].

In this media war, Russian forces used both classic and non-classic means. Among the most often used audiovisual methods was unilateral information. Russian TV Channels showed only the suffering of the Ossetian people and shocked the audience with atrocities committed by Georgian troops. All the information was skilfully ‘filtered’ by refusing access to the conflict area for non-Russian journalists. This problem coincided with the Russian-backed blockade of many Georgian servers (government institutions and news agencies, among others). Another technique was the fact deformation or their concealment. Russian media also manipulated the numbers of human casualties caused by the ‘Georgian aggression’; figures for the number of civilians killed in South Ossetia were constantly changing, reaching as high as two thousand people, although this was not confirmed by other (non-Russian) sources and silently passing over events inconvenient for Russia (e.g. real ethnic cleansing in South Ossetian villages inhabited by Georgians and mass looting committed there by Ossetians) [23].

Two reputable experts in media and international conflicts, Hans-Georg Heinrich, professor of political science at the University of Vienna, Austria, specialized in empirical methodology and post-Soviet studies and Kirill Tanaev, a Moscow-based journalist (Program Director, “CIS News/Vesti.SNG”, *Vesti TV*), who specializes in post-Soviet political systems undertook an interesting comparative study concerning the manner in which the international press covered the Russian-Georgian conflict [24]. According to both analysts as concerning the Official Narratives of the war “*Unsurprisingly, both presidents justify the war with the necessity to re-establish peace and security*”. Saakashvili’s references to NATO imply that Georgian NATO membership would have prevented the war; Medvedev mentions NATO as a factor contributing to the tensions in the region (“*regrettably, our proposals to conclude an agreement banning the use of force went unheard by NATO...*”). Since both are lawyers, there is a high frequency of references to international law. The Russian president chose a more moderate tone than his Georgian counterpart [25].

On the other side, according to some analysts, “*In the ensuing war, Georgia dominated on the PR front. Within hours of the Russian intervention, the Georgian government began sending hourly e-mail updates to foreign journalists*” [26]. An interesting aspect of this was the tendency by the journalists to claim that Georgia won the PR war. Indeed, there seems to be widespread consensus on Georgia being a winner of the PR war. The defeat was acknowledged by Russia’s military thinkers and even Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has been reported to have congratulated “the organizers of the Western propaganda machine” shortly after the war [27].

The affirmation the former premier and current president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, is supported by studies undertaken by various analysts that dealt with public relations used as a weapon during the Russian-Georgian conflict. Artur Jugaste notes: “*The conflict was widely covered by the international media from 8 August, but ‘The Times’ was the first to write about a PR war between Georgia and Russia on 13 August. The newspaper ran an article titled ‘Georgia loses the fight with Russia, but manages to win the PR war’. The story described how the Georgians had launched ‘a slick operation’ to keep the journalists updated with events and stated that the Russians had largely neglected the international media.*” [28]

There are also opinions indicating that, in fact, it was not Georgia but Russia who won this media war unfolded by means of PR. Cordula Nitsch and Dennis Lichtenstein from the German Augsburg University studied the coverage of the war in eight European and Russian newspapers [29]. Their study produced a result that contradicts the claim that Georgia won the PR war. Their analysis deals with two comparisons: it investigates international differences and differences between the types of media. Due to the potential reach of the media content under study we chose countries that are home to the three most spoken languages in Europe: Great Britain, Germany/Austria and France. For each language two news magazines and two political weblogs were analyzed over a period of eight weeks (July 15th to September 15th 2008). Counting the sources in each article they found that Russian sources were cited more frequently than Georgian ones. This was so in both, Russian and European media.

When a media war is considered, we must find out who won it. Usually, arguments are found for both sides of the story. Our belief is that, in fact, there was not a media battle between Georgia and Russia, but a dispute between Russia and big PR corporations which acted on behalf of the Georgian state. It is known the fact that even as early as November 2007 the Tbilisi government signed a collaboration contract with *Aspect Consulting*, an international PR company based in Brussels and “two U.S. lobbyist groups: Orion Strategies LLC received \$120, 000 to push the government’s bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Squire Sanders Public Advocacy LLC helped with media outreach. Both groups are based in Washington” [30]. Having such logistics at hand, the Georgian government sent through *Aspect Consulting* over 200 e-mails to major news agencies in order to inform them concerning the situation in Georgia, of course from the perspective of the interest Georgians had in the dispute with Moscow. On the other hand, “*Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, 40, has logged in five hours of air time in 20 appearances on CNN, the BBC, Sky News, Bloomberg News and other outlets since the war with Russia began on Aug. 8*”. [31]

Speaking about the PR activity undertaken during those days by the Tbilisi government, Artur Jugaste considers that the Georgian information campaign had these main elements:

1. A government media centre was spontaneously set up in a hotel lobby in central Tbilisi. There, military maps were put up and troop movements and other events that might interest journalists were marked on them. Patrick Worms said he spent several hours each day in front of the maps briefing ignorant (i.e. lacking knowledge about the conflict) reporters and diplomats. He did this in three languages. The atmosphere at the media centre was rather informal as the briefings were held in the hotel lobby and sometimes in the bar. Everything was done to meet the journalists’ needs, as described by the Italian journalist Pio d’Emilia: “*With every journalist’s first name memorized, Worms was there to greet us in the morning and buy us beers at night. He would summon up whatever was needed: interpreters, drivers, interviews and briefings*”.

2. The journalists in Tbilisi were briefed several times a day. Early in the morning, Patrick Worms would appear at the media centre and provide the journalists with the latest information before they departed for the day. In the afternoons he would brief newly arrived reporters. “*Briefings would last from 15 minutes to 45 minutes depending on the importance of the briefee and the level of their ignorance. [...] The content of the briefing depended on the briefee – it could go from a general history of Georgian/Abkhaz/Soviet relations all the way to detailed military briefings about the current situation in particular valleys or even villages*”. One example of Worms’ brief has been put up on the Internet by an American journalist. For reporters covering the war from their editorial offices outside Georgia, international telephone conferences with Georgian officials were held.

3. A team of 60 people was quickly put together and distributed into teams so that work could be done 24 hours a day. One of the most important jobs for them was to collect information from all sources (military, police, government, diplomats, and civilians) about what was happening and process it so that it could be forwarded to the media. According to one of the interviewees, this meant writing the reports into “decent” and “journalistic” English and, if possible, send them to Georgian officials for confirmation. The team tried to make a difference between confirmed and unconfirmed reports when sending them out. The team members were also going around hotels in Tbilisi trying to register foreign journalists so that information could be sent to them. The interviewees noted that this was hardly a team of professional propaganda warriors, many people were volunteers who were included in the team simply because they could speak at least one Western language. One person who joined had a daily job at a Georgian restaurant.

4. The collected information was sent out via a media alert system. The alerts went out via two channels: SMS messages and e-mails. The SMS messages were meant primarily for the reporters in Georgia, who were moving around and who did not always have access to Internet. For this, their cell-phone numbers had been collected earlier. By e-mail, media alerts were sent mainly to journalists and important editorial offices outside Georgia. The media alerts included concise factual information

about events on the ground – movements of Russian troops, bombardments, attacks against civilians etc. – as well as information about upcoming press conferences.

5. All information that the PR team managed to collect during the day was collected and distributed the next day in the form of *Georgia Update*, the government's newsletter that existed already before the war. The daily editions of the *Georgia Update* summarized the media alerts but the newsletter also included references to the international media coverage of the war, which were chosen so as to reflect the Western support [32].

CONCLUSIONS

The true significance of the Caucasus crisis is that Russia adopted a new policy of force in its foreign relations, showing small confidence in international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE, in which it nonetheless exercising considerable influence. [33] It is also significant that Russia has modernized, has adapted to new techniques and means to carry a conflict. In this way, Russians tried and succeeded to short-circuit traditional means of conflict resolution and unilaterally modified borders of a UN member state [34]. A general look over the conflict suggests that Moscow used all political, economic, military and media resources that it had in order to alter the political map of Eurasia. Russia counted on the fact that NATO was not ready to intervene militarily for state like Georgia or Ukraine, unless they had been members of the Euro-Atlantic organization. On the other hand, Russia knew that the energy resources it holds make it immune to the economic sanctions the West might impose [35]. All these were parts of the arsenal used by Moscow to attempt a balancing of Georgia's media war, supported by strong international PR institutions. The fact that Georgia's strong media support did not materialize into direct military and logistic support can lead to some conclusions that would influence Moscow's policy in the area in the long term. For lack of a concrete Western reaction that would sanction Russia's policy, it is possible that Moscow concludes the use of force to attain foreign affairs objectives in Eurasia can be a solution [36].

The war in Georgia revealed that new strategic realities emerged in the South Caucasus area, which was determined by Russia's ambitious policy of becoming a great power again. Russia's intervention in Georgia is the climax of Russia's return in the East European and Central Asian affairs, in the context of a high energy price on the markets [37]. The Russian-Georgian conflict showed, on one hand, that military force accompanied by an efficient PR design has become once again a major factor in Russia's foreign policy, [38] and, on the other hand, that a media campaign no matter how successful cannot replace military force in managing a conflict between two states.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) IN HEALTH SECTOR BETWEEN TWO BLACK SEA REGIONS: GREECE AND ROMANIA

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Abstract

The paper deals with the main issues on the management of human resources in the medical system between two black sea regions (Greece and Romania). During the last period of time, many significant changes took place in the structures of public and private systems at the level of each European state. In the health system, the changes are large with a long term impact. Any decision regarding human resources influence the long term system, because the human resources of the health system cannot be drawn or rejected in a rhythm desired by the system, this because the human resource in the health system needs very many years to be formed. This work paper contributes to the improvement of knowledge in the human resources domain in health by the synthesis of certain general information of interest in the health system.

Keywords: *Human Resource Management (HRM), Greek health system, Black sea regions, Health care system, Romanian health system.*

1. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH SECTOR IN BSEC

1.1. Introduction

The cooperation of BSEC (Black Sea economic cooperation) countries has been increasing rapidly during the last years. Public health has been one of the areas of concern for the BSEC. The macroeconomic contains has a considerable influence upon to the health services, social and economic crisis worsened the health situation in the BSEC Member countries. According to WHO reports to the health sector most BSEC countries faces serious problems (Gasik Tadevosian, 2000).Shortened life expectancy increased death rate and declining birth rate, re-emergence of diseases like tuberculosis and poverty are some of the big risk factors for ill health ((Gasik Tadevosian, 2000). In response to political economical and social challenges, countries of the BSEC region have developed strategies of reforming their health system.

Development of the strategy in the health care system cannot be done without granting special attention over human resources. These are an important component in any system and influence the evolution and actual situations by their subjective dimensioning. HR management should actively participate in drafting the strategy, having in consideration the relatively long time stamp of the strategy. This participation is determined by the time needed to ensure appropriate and adjustable human resources to the strategy considered. The activities specific to the planning, organization, coordination, training and evaluating human resources are expensive activities which impose a special attention, particularly because it affects directly the achievement of the proposed objectives.

1.1.1. General Aspects of HR (Human Resources) in health sector in BSEC

Table 1 presents the evolution the number of practicing physicians in BSEC per 1000 inhabitants.

Armenia	3.58
Azerbaijan	3.6
Bulgaria	3.5
Romania	1.9
Georgia	4.4.
Greece	4.5
Moldova	2.7
Russian Federation	4.3
Turkey	1.4
Ukraine	3.0
EU average	3.5

Table 1 .The number of *practicing physicians per 1000 inhabitants* Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe health for all database, January 2004.Note: CIS: Commonwealth of independent states; CSEC: Central and south-eastern European Countries; EU: European Union.

In 2004 the highest number of practicing physicians per 1000 inhabitants was recorded in Greece (4.5), followed by Georgia (4.4), while Russian Federation (4.3), Azerbaijan (3.6) and Armenia (3.58) also recorded relatively high ratios of practicing physicians per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest number of practicing physicians was recorded in Romania (2.0) and Turkey (1.4).

Table 2 presents the evolution the number nurses in BSEC per 1000 inhabitants

Armenia	4.3
Azerbaijan	7.2
Bulgaria	3.6
Romania	4.2
Georgia	4.1
Greece	2.6
Moldova	6.3
Russian Federation	8.1
Turkey	2.4
Ukraine	7.8
EU average	6.8

Table 2.*Number of nurses per 1000 inhabitant's* .Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe health for all databases, January 2004. Note: CIS: Commonwealth of independent states; CSEC: Central and south-eastern European countries; EU: European Union.

In 2004 the highest number of nurses per 1000 inhabitants was recorded in Russian Federation (8.1), followed by Ukraine (7.8), while Azerbaijan (7.2) and Moldova (6.3) and Armenia (3.58) also recorded relatively high ratios of nurses per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest number of practicing physicians was recorded in Greece (2.6) and Turkey (2.4).

Workforce supply is a pervasive challenge facing policy-makers who must seek both to align the health care workforce with health system goals and to sustain changes that are needed for improving the organization and the delivery of health care. An adequate supply means not only sufficient numbers of all types of health care workers but also an equitably balanced distribution: geographically, by category or type of worker, by specialty, across health care institutions and by gender. fundamental weaknesses in planning the workforce in Black sea regions in the past are manifest through a legion of difficulties: cyclical shortages of many health professionals; widespread

vacancies, especially in isolated rural areas; and maldistribution of the workforce, creating difficulties in ensuring an equitable provision of care (Bemd, R., Dubois, A., Mckee, M., 2006)

These difficulties are more likely to be exacerbated rather than attenuated in the future. Demographic changes in Black Sea Regions, especially the on-going process of population ageing, increase demands for health services while simultaneously shrinking the pool of workers available to offer these services. (Bemd, R., Dubois, A., Mckee, M., 2006)

Beyond the issue of numbers, many activities relevant to the planning of the health care workforce, such as changing the scope of practices, redesigning jobs, and transforming skills and roles of professional groups, are prerequisites to progress on major reforms of health systems. While processes of planning the supply of the health care workforce have traditionally been either absent or narrowly focused, more sophisticated and integrated models of workforce planning that cut across different professional groups and take account of a greater number of factors, such as skill mix, skill substitution, technologies, and working practices, seem to offer a better prospect of contributing to the mission of the health system. Among the key requirements for human resource planning in the health sector are accurate and comprehensive information systems on the actual number of health care workers and their distribution in the health system.

The paper deals with the main issues on the management of human resources in the medical system between two black sea regions (Greece and Romania).

Particularities of HRM in the health sector in Greece

In the case of Greece there has been a significant increase in the size of the health care labour force, from 2.6 % of the total workforce at the beginning of the 1980s to 4% in 2004. (OECD, 2007) . In 2004, health services employed 174 693 people, a figure that had increased by 101% compared to 1980 (86 911 employees) and by 28% compared to 1990 (136 700 employees). According to more recent data, in 2007 the total employment in health and social services was 240 854 employees, accounting for 5.3% of total civilian employment. (OECD, 2009&Economou 2010)

Compared to other OECD countries, the number of physicians appears to be extremely high. Greece has the highest number of physicians per 1000 people. In addition, while the number of specialists per 1000 inhabitants is the highest in the OECD .Similar comments can be made about dentists given that Greece has the highest number per 1000 population. On the other hand, although the ratio of nurses to inhabitants has increased at a moderate rate, Greece has the third lowest density (3.21) nurses per 1000 population) in OECD countries, coming above Turkey (2.0) nurses per 1000 population) and Mexico (2.35). (OECD, 2009 & Economou Ch. 2010)

Considering the allocation of physicians in the different geographical regions of the country, there appear to be great inequalities in their distribution. The concentration of doctors in the area of greater Athens (Attica) is remarkable. The regions of Central Greece, Western Macedonia and the South Aegean Islands display the largest scarcities. The distribution of dentists across geographical regions displays a similar trend to that of doctors, with approximately 50% of all dentists employed in the greater Athens area. Greece faces significant numerical and distributional imbalances in health care personnel. “Numerical imbalances” refers to the contradictory situation where an oversupply of doctors and dentists coexists with the medical understaffing of ESY services. (Economou Ch. 2010)

On the other hand there is a distributional mismatch in the geographical allocation and the specialty mix of health care resources. Doctors are concentrated in large urban areas and there are shortages in specialties such as general medicine. This results in a failure to cover the needs of the population in remote areas as well as to develop an integrated primary health care network. Furthermore, there is an oversupply for some medical specialties and an undersupply for some others, with doctors facing an increasing rate of underemployment and unemployment. Although there are excessive numbers of specialized physicians and shortages of General Practitioners (GPs), and medical unemployment and underemployment has risen to 25%, no specific measures such as quotas for medical specialties have

been adopted. The only interventions to limit the number of doctors are the result of Ministry of Education policy rather than planning by the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. During the last decade the Ministry of Education has stabilized the number of new entrants in medical schools. The absence of a policy that encourages the medical staff to work in the areas where there are deficits of staff, coupled to a low capacity of staff management at the level of health authorities led to marking inequities in the access to health services. (Economou Ch and Giorno C, 2009).

The labour conditions under the European medium level, the absence of adequate stimulants and the professional promotion system lead to a discouraging labour force, an important percent, especially among youth, wishing to leave the system having other destinations. (Kyriopoulos J, Gregory S, Economou Ch, 2003). All these, associated with a non-reformed education system, lead to a system that takes into account in a small measure the population's needs.

Basic problems of HRM in Greece

The main problems of HRM in the health sector are:

- i. There is no clear human resources policy;
- ii. There are important gaps in terms of total number of health professionals;
- iii. There are imbalances in the territorial distribution of health personnel, as well as in the distribution between specializations;
- iv. Lack of an adequate system of motivation of health personnel, leading first to decreased attractiveness for entry into the system and, secondly, increasing the number of those leaving the system;

5. Hospital Directors have no power or authority to effectively organize and manage staff resources in line with changes demanded by the population's health needs. As things currently stand, hospital managers cannot make transfers of staff between hospitals, staff reductions under the strategy, redirecting personnel to other care programs, requiring reorientation of the Institute in order to adapt to new roles.

Particularities of HRM in the health sector in Romania

In Romania there are major problems with the health system's human resources, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The capacity of health personnel to meet the health needs of the population depends on the training of health personnel. Although it can be appreciated that, at least formally, the programs in Romania meet EU criteria, at least in terms of specialties and duration of training, in practice there are serious problems with the content of this training. During the process of training health workers - particularly doctors - receive summary information about issues with major impact on patients, such as the quality of health services or economic implications of medical decisions. (OECD 2007&OECD 2010&Vlădescu et al, 2008) . The current system of medical education focuses primarily on storage capacity; reducing capacity to develop skills of critical analysis that could lead to the formation of skills of evidence based medical practice (Evidence Based Medicine). (OECD 2007&OECD 2010) Current training system rather inhibits teamwork and interdisciplinary cooperation, with limited direct effect in the range of services to patients and population .Since 1978 the training of midwives has ceased to exist. It was resumed only once the process of Romania's EU accession, through the establishment of colleges of midwifery. We can consider that the lack of midwives has also contributed to high maternal and infant mortality in Romania. In terms of earnings, is considered a decent average income of a physician should be about three times the national average earnings. In the year 2008 in Romania this report is for practitioners about 1.5 to 2 compared to average wage earnings in the economy. Similarly it is accepted that the average income of nurses is about 1/3 - 1/2 of

physician income. In every profession there are significant differences, however, such as the income of resident physicians is usually about one third of the income of a specialist, which can add various nonwage incentives, specific personal status in the process of education. (OECD 2007&OECD 2010 & Vlădescu et al., 2008).

In 2007 the average gross wage in the health sector (all staff included in the system) was about 86% of the gross national average wage, according to the National Institute of Statistics, the lowest income recorded in the non-medical staff. (WHO, 2007)At the primary health authorities and the Ministry of Public Health is not defined a coherent policy on human resources in health, yet there is no published a policy document on health human resources. Current planning is based primarily on the ability of educational institutions education and less on health needs of the population. Decisions to increase the number of places in a specialization are taken ad hoc. Romania is faced with a paradox: although it has a small number of doctors, specializing only a small percentage of the number of medical graduates. Every year the number of residency places is only about 48% of graduates of medicine Graduates from the faculties of medicine, who didn't pass residency, may carry only three years' supervised / assisted in public health units. Thus, a graduate with a bachelor's degree in medical school has no right to free practice without a certificate as a specialist. At the same time the formation of the faculty of medicine does not prepare the young graduate for general practice, as such there is a big waste of resources: after six years of study only a small part of a promotion graduates can enter a specialization course affording them the right to practice. (Vlădescu C, Scîntee G, Olsavszky V, Allin, 2008)

Comparative analysis

Similarities between health systems in Romania and Greece

- Interest and intention of launching common strategies with the European Union;
- Work group for the strategy and inter-operation capacity with the similar services of E.U.;
- The very well trained family doctors;
- Absence of an appropriate endowment of the hospitals;
- Frequent changes in the staff structure at the level of the Ministry of Health;
- Lack of an appropriate budgetary support;
- Insufficient level of endowment with computers in the hospitals;
- Low lasting of the results from the previous projects;
- Lack of a standardization frame, lack of cooperation between the main actors in the field;
- Lack of updated information for the management and making the decisions at all the management levels;
- A continuous decrease in the price of necessary technologies;
- Increased quality and availability of technology;
- A low degree of familiarization of medical staff with informatics applications;
- An insufficient support from central and local authorities;
- Budgetary restrictions and limitations;
- Higher wage in labor market than those provided in the public health system in Greece for certain specialties, usually deficient.

- Well-structured internal rules for the development of human resources;
- Human resource planning process has low reliability, especially medium and long term planning;
- Some human resource procedures not provide publicity, transparency and discrimination necessary for the career management of staff;

Differences between health systems in Romania and Greece:

Romania	Greece
<p>Hospitals and other health care providers with extensive experience in the field;</p> <p>The long tradition in the activity of data collection and keeping;</p> <p>Insufficient level of endowment with computers in the hospitals</p> <p>Low lasting of the results from the previous projects;</p> <p>Lack of a standardization frame, lack of cooperation between the main actors in the field;</p> <p>Lack of updated information for the management and making the decisions at all the management levels;</p> <p>Low level of the process automation, both at the level of health services providers and at the administration level. At the administration level, the lack of system for the clinic and management decision process;</p> <p>At the administration level, the lack of system for the clinic and management decision process (Theodorou M, 2002);</p> <p>Insufficient information support for clients - citizens and patients</p> <p>European member state and the possibility of using the European financing programs;</p> <p>The possibility of using the experience of other EU member states;</p> <p>International cooperation taking into account the belonging of Romania to several profile bodies.</p> <p>Lack of financial resources</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriate training of medical personal; • Functioning of Specialized in Human Resources Management Department; • Social protection system, relatively developed compared to the one they have access other categories of state; • clear-cut provisions on discipline of personnel; • has not been made adequate professionalization of staff who manage human resources management activities; • Role of practical training in Basic studies (Bachelor) of medical stuff is not fully emerged. <p>The training of personnel management is not properly developed;</p> <p>Management information system is underdeveloped</p>

A Promotion of cooperation in the field of public health among the BSEC Member Countries will facilitate exchange of experience, harmonization of legislation, coordination of efforts in solving common problems. Mutually beneficial cooperation can be developed in different ways (Tadevosian, G., 2000):

i. exchange of information on health care legislation, in order to improve and to harmonize the legal basis and organizational principles of health care development;

ii. conclusion of bilateral, as well as multilateral agreements in the field of health care among the BSEC Member Countries;

iii. elaboration of a legislative basis for interaction between the medical and insurance agencies;

iv. exchange visits among the representatives of ministries of health, universities, medical establishments with a view to enrich their experience;

v. setting up regional medical centres, specialised in specific diseases;

vi. cooperation among the BSEC Member States within the framework of WHO's European events in order to present a common stand on health problems of regional importance

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we can say that a change in health management in BSEC countries is a necessity. The appropriate changes will ensure the sustainability of the system. The adoption of a conservative management which avoids the application of changes and that prevents the system to be adapted faster to the needs of the society, does nothing more than to seriously affect the long term sustainability of the system. In this sense management aims to monitor environmental trends continuously, to monitor the symptoms of the health system, to prepare adaptation measures and to be adapted to the new system requirements. The main objective is the creation of basic conditions for the use of IT solutions, the harmonization of legislation, and the creation of a common technical infrastructure. Future changes require a number of commitments of the actors involved at national and local level, in the provision of health services at the European level.

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION (1940-1948)

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Abstract

In World War II, Romania had a performance intelligence structure that could respond to strategic leaders needs at that time. Special Intelligence Service (SIS) was headed by Eugen Cristescu, who report matters of interest to Ion Antonescu to use that information to make strategic decisions the Black Sea region until the Caspian Sea. SIS's had specific responsibility intelligence (secrets) both domestically and internationally.

Keywords: *Black Sea, World War II, Romanian intelligence*

INITIAL LANDMARKS

On August 23, 1939 Germany and the USSR signed a pact, whose secret protocol dividing Poland and Romania provided between the two powers. From Romania, the USSR claim Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In September, Poland was invaded and divided, according to that pact. Romania officially remained neutral country, but the Polish refugees housed and transported especially the army, the Polish government and bank vaults.

In September 1940, General Ion Antonescu was appointed by decree by King Charles II, Prime Minister, in charge of forming a national unity government. General Antonescu was proposed to Peasant Party and Liberals to work in government, but they refused. After the abdication of Charles II, at Antonescu's request, both parties continued to refuse to engage directly with their leaders, only referring to some “experts” from among its members, to “advise” the government formed by Antonescu.

During the Antonescu regime, Romania Germany's war economy fuelled by oil, grain and industrial products. Romania became a target of Allied bombing, especially on August 1, 1943, when they were attacked oil fields and refineries at Ploesti (Operation “Tidal Wave”).

Though Romania and Hungary were allies of Germany, the Antonescu regime continued diplomatic hostility to Hungary, because the problem of Transylvania. In September 1942, the beginning of the offensive and encirclement of Stalingrad convinced Antonescu that the war is lost, in alliance with Germany.

On 23 August 1944, King Michael of Romania has agreed to remove by force if he refuses Antonescu signing the United Nations. Following the refusal of Antonescu's net on 23 August 1944, King Michael deposed and arrested. Immediately, he called Prime Minister General Constantin Sănătescu, the head of a government composed of military representatives of the National Democratic Bloc, as ministers without portfolio. The same day, evening, at 22:00, King released “Proclamation to the country” by announcing a return to a democratic regime, the war with the United Nations and the return of weapons against Germany.

Immediately after taking power, after the successful coup against King Carol II, Antonescu on the head removed Michael Moruzov Secret Intelligence Service, and appointed in his place on Eugen Cristescu (as of November 15, 1940). Moruzov was imprisoned at Jilava prison and arrest shortly after he was assassinated by a team of Legionnaires on the night of November 26 to 27, 1940.

During this period, SIS was concerned with information aimed at the Black Sea region as there are many interests focused Allies (USSR being the nearest) but was also a way to facilitate access of origin Soviet communism.

Cristescu, the new head of Special Intelligence Service (SIS), a graduate of the Theological Seminary of Science and the Faculty of Law, began his career in the department of information (Safety of State) of the General Directorate of Police, where he was promoted gradually to the position of Director. He noted by way of the Legionary Movement fought. He was dismissed from his position by King Charles II as gather information on Elena Lupescu, mistress of that King (and future wife), a fact revealed by Moruzov.

FROM ROMANIA TO THE BLACK SEA REGION

One of the rules, on which the activity information, stipulates that: no allies or enemies, in the absolute sense of time. There are fundamental interests of the State, in promoting which the act regardless of context at a time. Eugen Cristescu knew this, as the Germans too.

In order to deceive German vigilance, Cristescu sought to cultivate as much as possible relationships with many officials from the German Legation in Bucharest, the most important being Manfred von Killinger, Major Stransky (liaison officer with the Abwehr), Gustav Richter (feared SS officer who met the head of the Gestapo in Romania), Colonel Rodler (German Secret Service chief in Romania).

As was natural, were documented information and actions of the Hungarian intelligence service. Of these cases has been established that were put in place (so to reveal a note of 30 September 1943) with the "German Intelligence Service" [1].

SIS was concerned about the activities of the legionaries, leading, as was predictable, "and to follow the German elements, official or not supporting the work of Legionnaires Guard" [2].

To this, add and supervision of German ethnic group. Summary information about its activities (the only political organization in Romania officially active period) have been accumulated in special records by the Head Office 4 – "Nationalities, Irredentism, different" from the Counterintelligence Division II, Petrașcu Nicolae (who had *Petre Agronomu* conspiratorial name) [3]. Concern constantly to identify the activities of Germans in Romania is revealed and another document of utmost importance that the only written by Eugen Cristescu, which Mrs. Theodora Cristescu stated that handed to Iuliu Maniu (National Peasant Party leader) in order to save her husband. [4]. The fact that SIS head develop this synthesis results also from statements of Nicholas Trohani (Head of Studies and Research Office of the SIS), which argued that Cristescu came from Joița twice a week and work both at the office of the headquarters of both "and home, on Lirei street, no. 5" [5].

Looking Cristescu concern to develop the document without the knowledge of someone we can conclude that the Director of SIS refers to the work outstanding and Germans in Romania and had taken steps that they do not know the content of that material. It is possible that the information "sensitive" to be drawn mainly from what is called the language specialist white notes (notes whose content was so important that they were prepared on single sheets without header information institution. Author's Note).

A very important aspect to consider is the following. From the perspective of business intelligence SIS appreciate the Black Sea countries differently. Otherwise Bulgaria was considered very close to Germany. Turkey was ranked as a path that would foster ties with Western allies. USSR was the most important geostrategic adversary.

We can better understand the efforts we are making special information Special Intelligence Service to protect the national interests of Romania, if we analyze data to counteract the activity of the eleven German services, specializing in business information that working in our country, presented by Eugene Cristescu the interrogation of 15 April 1946. The public prosecutor asked Dumitru Zelea

Săracu on the work of Germans in Romania, Eugen Cristescu said that in our country during the Second World War, there were “many German intelligence services”, which he summarized [6].

“Abwehr” site, led by Colonel Maroni, work with the Special Intelligence Service and the General Staff military matters (the service counter had three groups, led by Rohrscheid, von Gregori and Pettermann, and two groups of information, under the Tesler leadership and Marcel Popescu) [7].

The second service is under the command of police attaché Richter (who was also the representative of the SS site), be located in Hotel Splendid and intake information was based on a large number of ethnic Germans [8].

The third service lines have political skills and connections that were known which initiated at Gigurtu Engineer, General Dragalina, Secretary of State Lecca and Pamfil Şeicaru [9].

Germans relied on more work and Legionaries groups, such as that of the newspaper “Annunciation” which provided information from Romanian political life.

Another German intelligence service who operates very well covered was *Sicherheitsdienst*, under the command of Kurt Auer, based in German Economic Office, then the Banking Society.

In Romania still act “block Germans from the Reich”, composed of professionals who often came to our country in various coatings, interested in political information. Their mistake, which led to the identification of the entire team (the domino principle), was that the Hotel Athenée Palace is legitimate documents containing names differed.

The seventh instrument of Cristescu said information was Gestapo site, which covered work before coming economic mission in Bucharest, with strong links with the Legionnaires. After the Legionary rebellion, the head of this body, Geissler, and others were forced to leave Romania.

In our country work hard and “SS” site (as I mentioned, led by Richter). Among his most famous teaching was the lawyer Fuss, as assessed by challenging Cristescu, identified as concerned and to denounce Security informers of the German authorities.

Another German intelligence service was “the Vienna Awehr’s” working “the head of the Bucharest Awehr’s”, meaning that information obtained through its own sources and comments “Abwehr” from Berlin's Bucureşti [10].

The tenth body was informative *Geheime Feldpolizei*, which apparently had discipline German soldiers powers line in Romania, but which has been established for information that have a number of agents whose information is centralized intake Richter (“SS”).

The eleventh German information service work in Romania was established in the German ethnic group, and driving him to Andreas Schmidt was being concerned about information in rural politic [11].

An interesting aspect is that concern about the public prosecutor Săracu (orientation of Soviet origin) to opinion of Eugen Cristescu about Major Horia Giurescu (brother of historian Academician Dinu C. Giurescu) work, in terms of a possible pro-German orientation. Proof of professional balance, from a deep knowledge of reality, is the Director SIS response: “It is *for* and *against*”. And there was little work that his grade level, Cristescu know so well the situation Major Horia Giurescu, that was *Horia Grinţescu* conspiracy name and was Head of Office 3 - Economic and Industrial, in the Division II Counterintelligence [12].

Săracu’s next remark was: “I think his brother was agent” (Professor Constantin C. Giurescu. Author’s Note) and the response of Cristescu was as wise as in the previous situation, “His brother had been sent by Mihai Antonescu to form a center of propaganda” [13].

An important aspect is that we appreciate that Professor Constantine had two diplomatic missions Giurescu, with an obvious confidential in Ankara and Istanbul. Their aim was to try to negotiate better conditions for Romania if it had planted an armistice with the allied powers. It is noted that the Black Sea region was considered in those moments of the World War II one of the most important geostrategic and geopolitical terms. Not coincidentally an Allied landing in the region has been eagerly awaited especially by the Romans. They believed that the only way they could avoid expanding the USSR in the area and the only way they could to protect him from the communist threat.

It is not insignificant and that the Germans were interested and strongly on the orientations of the Romanian military affinity to any British perspective. The German thoroughness is recognized as the service involved, "Geheime Feldpolizei", ordered the preparation of the tables were covered "names and addresses <Romanian officers> that would foster feelings anglophile" [14]. This information, revealed by a note of the SIS / Dobrogea Agentur, 16 January 1944, is confirmed by the 9th Infantry Division, who was billeted in Constanta, Ion Șerban soldier remembering that a German agent (deducted after accent) trying to provoke a group of three officers of that unit (located at a restaurant) to confess admiration for Britannic [15].

A note by the Department of Central 2-nd Counterintelligence SIS, dated May 18, 1944, pointed out that data on the mood of the population and Romanian troops will be reported weekly, "and in more serious cases that will be found will be reported immediately by courier" [16] (attempt to protect such information from interception possible because the system was very vulnerable TFF or radio in that strategic context. Author's Note).

There was also a view of enabling surveillance of German and Italy Legations buildings, located in the Street Victor Emmanuel III, the numbers 1-3, respective 7. Established position in the building was hidden from no. 8, the same street [17].

Most important objectives to be met by the three agents of SIS, who worked in rotation, were: "Knowledge of official duties and coverage bound" and "Supervision suspects who visit and work related and establishing links them" [18].

Focus attention SIS staff to oversee all intelligence activities of the Germans, Italians, Hungarians and the Bulgarians.

It is not insignificant and that the Germans watched by their own means and activities Romanian political leaders, whom they suspected of affinity with the British or Americans. An example is the case Maniu's supervision, so to reveal a note of the Special Intelligence Service, of 09 February 1944, addressed to the German Legation, directly Sturmbannfuhrer SS Richter [19].

This is relevant to understand the mistrust, the normal work plan information with which the Germans regarded the alliance with Romania.

Besides this, the SIS had intelligence interests in the domestic political reality. Political leaders who settled political contacts with the Allies (to end the alliance with Germany) were carefully informative monitored.

It is known if AUTONOMUS (Special Operations Executive / SOE) team led by Ivor Porter was parachuted into Romania in December 1943 to instigate resistance against the Nazis at "any cost". They were held as well-treated prisoners of war at the Gendarmerie headquarters in Bucharest under the care of General Constantin Tobescu. Although the Germans called imperative to receive prisoners British Cristescu (in order of Ion Antonescu) acted for the physical protection of parachute team.

It was a typical SIS effort in World War II, to inform the state leader, because they can make informed decisions.

Activity information is much more facets, including virtually the entire social spectrum. And this, not because it was an uncontrollable escalation of travel information (note M.Ş.), and escalating arms race, but that any decision the political level should be based on better information. As in time of war is necessary to know the intentions of the enemy, so must know as much information and at peace, especially that now, the relativity of time alone is very high.

1944 was one of those turning points in the Romanian intelligence services, which occur once in several generations, the impact of events is all the greater as the system was overthrown national values. If anything that was Soviet impact (military and ideology) to a point was a particular danger since 23 August 1944 geo-political coordinates have changed and most feared enemies became allies.

It is remarkable that the Special Intelligence Service did not give any special pressure now coming from the East, and when policy makers decided frames of information and fulfill their professional attributes high standard.

The main steps

An item of interest in terms of research work of the Special Intelligence Service in 1944-1948, is the sheer number of professionals who have managed the head of this structure. This highlights the implementation of the Service turmoil Romanian society marked by a clear institutional dissolution was the first step to impose the Soviet model, deeply anti-Romanian.

Decree - Law no. 157, 357 in the Official Gazette no. 266/12.11.1940/Part I, Ion Antonescu appointed Head of the Special Intelligence Cristescu (which is replacing the Col. John Nicolaid). This does not immediately lead to the conclusion that it was automatically mystery man of the Head of the Romanian state, I think that would be more accurate (both in the deep semantics and the reality) "The eyes and ears" of Antonescu.

As we detailed earlier this research material Cristescu leaving Bucharest, then on August 24, 1944, at 13.00, call (from Joița, which had deployed and was part of SSI. Author's Note) headquarters of the Special Intelligence Service and communicate Lt. Col. Traian Borcescu (which ran in the capital structure) that will give management of the institution Col. Victor Siminel (Head of Section I Information). One such is delegated to management in Bucharest on August 26 [20].

In some documents is information that Becescu Florin (conspiratorial "Georgescu") Section IV counterintelligence chief, was appointed by General George Liteanu (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) to lead SSI at August 28, 1944. But soon resigned at the urging of Lt. Col. Traian Borcescu, so Siminel Service is in charge [21]. Other archival documents show that comes to leadership SSI Florin Becescu on August 26, 1944 [22] and replaced by Col. Victor Siminel on August 29, 1944 [23]. In this second aspect is that general information is required on Florin Becescu Liteanu to September 6, 1944, for 48 hours [24].

The fact is that Victor Siminel is followed by Col. John Lissievici management (Head of Mobile echelon on the Eastern Front), called the September 12, which actually took powers to September 19, 1944 and ruled until December 24, 1944. And in this situation is unnatural appearance of a bill retroactive, meaning that no ministerial decision 2.077, 24 October, is referred to the appointment of Lissievici as of September 19, 1944.

By Royal Decree no. 2.485/20.12.1944, head S.S.I. is General George Săvoiu (relative to General Sănătescu), effectively taking over the function being performed on 24 December.

After the establishment of the Groza government is appointed to head the SSI Nicholas D. Stănescu (conspiratorial "Dumbravă P.", many years' head of the Political Group / Counterintelligence Division II, with responsibilities in line criminal even communists) on April 27, 1945 [25]. Stănescu's been recommended by Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Bodnăraș.

Between July 12, 1945 - January 9, 1947 Director of Special Intelligence Service was Lucian Stupineanu (conspiratorial "Ilarion Stănescu"). Once activated in the patriotic combat (October 1944-April 1945), is recommended by Dr. Luke's Bodnăraș, becoming secretary of the latter. From April 1945 to reach the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, running Bodnăraș guidelines for restructuring the Special Intelligence Service. The work of establishing link structure Stupineanu PCR of S.S.I.

One of the characters that were noted by the aggressiveness with which they supported the imposition of institutions consistent information was Sergei Nikanov Soviet model (known as Sergiu Nicolau, the management imposed by Moscow. Convicted of espionage in the 30's, Sergey Nikanov Doftana and was closed after the earthquake of 1940, was moved to Caransebeș with Bodnăraș, Pantelei Bondarenko, Georgescu and Miron Constantinescu. Issued on 23 August 1944, he will continue to work directly for INU - Department of external information NKGB In 1948, Nikanov his wife, Nina Nikonov, was secretary of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Author's Note) [26].

Proof of "importance" to identify the operative aspects of the work of Lucian Stupineanu (contrary to ordre public) is the appointment of the leadership who replaced SSI, the command team that is investigating. Is at least unusual for the head of such institutions to investigate the predecessor.

Archival Fund allowed me to identify the approximate time of his appointment as successor to Stupineanu Nikanov, namely immediately after Easter in 1947. Applying the formula to celebrate that data (using the constants established, *crug* of month and *crug* of year) allowed me to set the date of Easter on April 27 that year.

Sergei had Nikanov Gonciaruk advisor and Piotr (Peter Petrescu alias. SSI was supervised by the Communist Party and the NKGB Cișinevschi Joseph's Soviet advisers, Demetrius Grigorovici Fedicikin, Nicolai Petrovici Zudov and Piotr Gonciaruk who participated in staging destruction of traditional parties. Author's Note).

Piotr Gonciaruk after developing Decree no. 264/02.04.1951 (on the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate) led one of the security structures taken from SSI, namely Directorate Take - Information (who had called Section A - Intelligence). Section B - Counterintelligence Directorate was transformed into the Security II.

Gradually disappeared-Romanian traditional institutional traces of intelligence, the Soviets impose its own model (General Directorate of Security of the People), unwanted tool dramatically effective in the establishment of the communist state.

CONCLUSIONS

During the Second World War SIS said information needs of the Romanian state leader, Ion Antonescu of which an important were those of the Black Sea Region. He sustained campaign led by Germany against the USSR in the hope of recovering lost territories Romanians in 1940.

SIS intelligence was in the interests not only the Soviet line but even against Germany, Italy and Hungary. Foreign policy of Romania, Ion Antonescu was guaranteed set of oil (which supported the German war machine) but with troops (even which have reached Stalingrad).

Because many Roman leaders did not want a forced alliance with Germany, Antonescu took advantage of their international contacts to develop links in order for proper exit from the war Romania.

Since the military and ideological roller (after launch of "unconditional surrender" at Casablanca ended January 24, 1943) could not be stopped, King Michael of Romania decided Antonescu's arrest on 23 August 1944. Since then, officially, Romania came out of the Axis Powers and continued campaign together to the Allies, to defeat Germany.

On 24 September 1944, Antonescu group (to which it belongs and Cristescu) was taken and investigated in the USSR, then was returned in Romania.

On 17 May 1946, the sentence People's Court, were sentenced to death 11 defendants, including Ion Antonescu and Eugen Cristescu. There is information that would be Eugen Cristescu negotiated commutation of the sentence to death by offering list of British secret agents who activating in Romania. He died on 12 June 1950, the Prison Văcărești, the act of death is nr. 607 of June 13, 1950.

Surely, Cristescu is considered one of the most known intelligence professionals of Romanian history.

All these prove that particular threat from SIS fears coming from the Black Sea region (especially from the USSR) was much grounded and well documented. Axis known as the Wider Black Sea / Caspian was very important in World War II not only for its energy resources but also because it was an entry way of communism in Europe.

Act of August 23, 1944 produced no immediate change; visible as in the Army strategy to search for information (only beneficiaries were the others). Professional inertia in this field was higher, especially because many data were obtained prior to the event to which we refer, the Soviets showed concern to impose its political system.

In the armistice was imposed changes in regulatory acts aimed mutations in the unit (to institutions that coordinate the Special Intelligence Service, that the War Ministry and the Presidency Council of Ministers).

Rules aimed at cleaning the administrative changes have the staff (reduction, followed by appointments on political grounds), all followed by inevitable decline of informative contribution.

The fact that the Romanian society overwhelmingly rejected the communist model was one of the explanations establishment of the special, fully conspired structure (hidden) Special Intelligence Service. This included staff reliable information, especially among those who worked on the Eastern front, knowing the issues on this line.

We want to emphasize a very important idea: in the Black Sea, in the period to which we refer, SIS was one very effective intelligence services. The human intelligence sources and analysts using special value (which elaborated anticipatory analysis which confirmed time) SIS was a very useful tool since legal beneficiaries. However, as a result of international agreements that transcend borders, the fate of this country could be protected very effectively, no matter how professional they were teaching SIS. He remained but the idea that professionalism does not take account of certain circumstances.

References

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[4] RIS – A, CF, Folder No. 40.010, Tome 56, f. 12;

[5] Folder No. 48.163, f. 219-220;

[6] Folder No. 48.167, f. 141-144;

[7] *Ibidem*;

[8] *Ibidem*;

[9] *Ibidem*;

[10] *Idem*, f. 143;

[11] *Idem*, f. 144; In a note prepared in February 1944, SIS analyzes the German ethnic group, concluding that the Germans wanted to defend the Romanian, Hebrew and a possible Anglo-American landing (*Ibidem*, Folder no. 4703, f. 152-154);

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LINGUISTIC FRONTIER AND CLARIFYING EUROPEAN UNITY

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Abstract

The article analyzes to what extent (if any) the process of European integration resembles processes of nation-building with their linguistic consequences, whether the obstacles encountered in the process of European integration are somehow related to the language issue and to that of the linguistic border, what are the reactions to this process of/in member states: whether European integration is perceived as a protection or a threat to national and ethno-regional identities and languages; whether the linguistic border is a bridge or a distinct limit between nations.

Key words: *language; linguistic policy; linguistic border; integration; globalization; EU*

The frontier phenomenon has been a subject of reflection for many scientists, belonging to an extremely wide and diversified spectrum. This complex reality of the social and political life has been researched and analyzed by philosophers [1], sociologists [2], political and geopolitical [3] scientists. Although the reality that people call “frontiere” (the English call it “border”, the French call it “frontiere”, the Russians call it “granița”) is unique from an ontic perspective, the way it is perceived differs. More often than not we are dealing with a political representation of the border. From Antiquity to modern times the stake of wars has been to draw or redraw borders, those boundaries that divide people and states from one another. It should be mentioned that, actually, borders divide political, religious, economic or ideological entities alike, or areas of civilization and culture [4].

The perception people have of these realities is different and mediated by beliefs, culture or ideologies. The representations they have built are extremely diverse. At an academic level they have crystallized in theories and doctrines, and at the level of public opinion, in mentalities and even mythologies deeply rooted in the collective consciousness. Therefore, the meaning that people attributed to the border has not been the same throughout the ages.

Nicolae Iorga took notice of this and concluded that “The border has had a different connotation from one age to another and, in the past, was far more natural, more connected to geography, far more in sympathy with people’s needs than this artificial and cruel border, for which and around which so many battles are fought” [5].

The historicity of the meaning given to boundaries that separate people and nations has been noticed by Constantin Noica as well: “The border between people, between patches of land and between countries – this is, perhaps, the history of people and man” [6]. What is worthy is that the Romanian philosopher made a distinction between the demotic (popular) representation/perception of the border and the academic one. In demotic expression the border/frontier is replaced with “răzor” – baulk, where “according to our people is the home of the devil... There is nobody there, it’s no man’s land, and the devil too can stay there without apparently bothering us... But the problems these baulks make! For trespassing a baulk people would kill one another” [7].

It is natural to ask ourselves why there are so many representations of this reality in time and space, and, therefore, multiple perceptions of the border; it is also natural to ask ourselves why the political border between states was the most visible, most negotiated in the political-diplomatic

environment, and, over time, the most claimed, violated, defended. Does this variety of representations and perceptions of the frontier leads to a better understanding or to confusions and errors? Although the answer may be ambivalent, we believe that a multidimensional representation can lead to a better understanding of what the border represents nowadays.

One can notice that, in present times, due to the globalization and regionalization of the political environment, the issue of the border tends to get different representations that cannot be clarified only through a geographical approach. Lately one can hear increasing talks about the border-process, which, in its turn, has multiple interpretations, and it is mandatory for its nuances to be used [8]. The border can have peculiarities and special formulations, according to the type of “reality” being bounded by another “reality”. Nowadays, the most known and most often represented type of border is the *political border*. This type of border separates two human communities, politically organized in a certain territory that is recognized by another community through the existence of the state, symbolically marked starting from cartographic representations to institutional, historical or mythological ones. If this separates two civilizations and cultural areas, we are dealing with the *linguistic border*. [9] Chloé Dubois believes that: “Les frontières qui délimitent les langues, doivent donc être comprises comme des frontières *sociolinguistiques*, des constructions qui résultent du choix et de l'intervention des acteurs sociaux (locuteurs, institutions, pouvoirs politiques etc.) et qui ne représentent pas une réalité « naturelle ».” [10]

This type of border is a special one, as it has no concrete, material representations, like the political border does. For example, a citizen leaving from Romania to the Republic of Moldavia, at a certain time comes across a patch of land symbolically lined out, a crossing point, border/customs with individuals specifically equipped/border guard that asks for his passport, meaning that he is about to enter another state. He will “see” nothing of what the linguistic border between the two states should mean, as he will receive the information in the same language – Romanian – and will find that most of the habits, customs, mentality, spirituality have the same representations as the ones “back home”. However, he might have the surprise of being told that he has entered a space of *Moldavian* culture and *language*, due to the fact that the political authorities of this state decided to name the official language “Moldavian” and this led to the creation of a linguistic border. This social official reality can be accepted by some and rejected by others. Referring to this issue, academician Eugeniu Coseriu said: “To promote in any way a Moldavian language different from the Romanian language is, strictly from a linguistic point of view, either a naïve mistake, or a scientific fraud; from a historical and practical point of view, it is absurd and utopian and, from a political point of view, it is an annulment of the ethnic and cultural identity of a people and, therefore, an act of ethnic and cultural genocide”. [11] The same reality is analyzed by Russian linguist V. F. Sismarev, who, in 1952 wrote a study that was translated in 1960 by O. Cerbjanu at Chisinau, under the title “*Limbile romanice din Sud – Estul Europei și limba națională a R.S.S. Moldovenești*” [12] (“*Romanic languages from South-Eastern Europe and national language of Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic*”), in which he “scientifically” explained the existence of a Moldavian language and, implicitly, the existence of a linguistic border between the two shores of the river Pruth that materialized the existence of a political border!

From this perspective, French experts are right in saying that this type of reality appears “soit instituée soit négociée, et peut alors être le résultat d'une action glottopolitique. Non seulement les frontières interlinguistiques sont socialement construites, mais elles sont perpétuellement soumises à une réinterprétation, elles sont en permanence repensées, reformulées, renégociées; elles fluctuent, englobant tantôt des entités restreintes, tantôt des entités plus larges, elles sont tantôt nettes, tantôt floues, tantôt imperceptibles. Et ce, en fonction des circonstances: en fonction des points de vue, en fonction du temps, en fonction des situations, des interlocuteurs.” [13]

In Europe, the linguistic border appears as a reality in the social space built when the nation state appeared, when the dominant language from a society is decreed as a national and official language of the state, and is mutually accepted by all languages from the international system. The emergence of economic and then political integration processes, after the adoption of the Maastricht treaty, has brought up the issue of linguistic border. Political borders have disappeared in the European

Union, and, as a result, the goods, the capital and people move around freely without being questioned at the border. For the first time in the history of the European continent, the political border no longer divides communities and geographical regions; however, as some experts notice, the border, even open and permeable, remains a limit [14]. An administrative limit between states, limit in terms of space security, justice, tax and mental space. The term *stranger/the other* given to people coming from different areas of culture and language is still present in the mind of every person, whether he lives in the unified space of the European Union/Schengen or not. [15]

European integration, which involves association in the same framework of very different countries, including in terms of language, has put and still puts – more and more acute as it grows bigger – aside from political, economic, social problems, cultural and linguistic problems as well, problems that are no less difficult. Languages have always been vehicles helping people share life experiences, values, habits, attitudes, partially different beliefs of reality, which can lead to a closeness, or, on the contrary, to a distancing of human communities. Disregarding this aspect involves the risk of missing a real integration of the countries at issue. This was also underlined by Sandală Maria Ardeleanu in a conference held on the 6th of June of 2006 in the Art Room of Library of Bukovina, in the second gathering of the Conferences of Library of Bukovina, under the title “Bukovina – Romanian Brand for the European Union” [16].

The distinguished teacher said that “For each of us, in a first stage of existence, we identify the words we pronounce/articulate with things, with objects of the surrounding environment. Our mother tongue gives us an overlap of language and reality. With the first grammar lessons, the individual develops the consciousness of distinct language identity in the context of the world that is being depicted, of the existence of language, under its written or oral form, beyond the real things. Even later, we still learn that our mother tongue is a foundation, but also a means of accessing culture. Finally, there comes the learning of one or more foreign languages, all of them representing different ways of understanding the world, of understanding the same objects and the reality that surrounds us” [17]. This led to the adoption of a number of laws and decisions to be taken in the process of European accession, laws and decisions meant to establish multilingualism – considered a bridge between cultures and people [18], although there were also opinions expressing the possibility to proclaim a sole language of the European Union.

While in the Western part of the European continent this phenomenon of integration and new ways of applying linguistic policies were emerging, in the East certain languages tended to dominate the scene. Where the people of the former Russian Soviet Socialist Republic are concerned, linguistic borders have never equalled the administrative ones, those being imposed by Moscow. The Kremlin leaders’ intention to create a soviet people failed because the non-Slavic people, and not only them, perceived the obtrusion of Russian as an official language of the “soviet people” as a vector through which the Russian imperialism expressed itself [19].

Moreover, it is known that the implosion of the soviet empire was also determined by losing the “linguistic battle” by the communist leaders from Kremlin. Helene Carrere d’Encausse noticed that the first effect of Gorbachev’s Glasnost was that “the entire periphery of the Empire plunges with full force into the linguistic battle” [20]. Actually, between 1985 and 1990 there was a linguistic revolution with deadly political effects on the frontiers of the former soviet empire. First of all, certain soviet borders acquired a certain linguistic “porosity”, and people that were artificially divided will draw near. For instance, back to using Latin writing, the Moldavians have come back to the Romanian linguistic community. It should be noted that in the 24th of June of 1990 Romanians from both sides of the Pruth, separated by a political border, held a day of the “Open borders” in order to mark the 50th anniversary since Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were annexed to the Soviet Union.

In order to start the “decolonization” process of the social, cultural and political life, most ex-Soviet states took the path of nationalization, following the state-nation pattern, by placing the nation in the centre of the state building process and by promoting its language and culture as symbols of national identity. The linguistic border served as main instrument for building non-Russian national

identities in the process of creating ex-Soviet states and of defining new political borders on the ruins of the former Soviet Empire. It is interesting to mention that this “linguistic revolution” that began during the Glasnost and the Perestroika, did not stop with the disappearance of the USSR and the emergence of new state entities. This led to the appearance of some trouble spots in the new states, precisely by challenging the political borders by the Russian or Russian-speaking minorities. The linguistic border no longer played a positive part in the political development of these countries, due to the confusion arising between the linguistic border generated by national languages and the linguistic limits of some ethnic minorities. The phenomenon is interesting as it can be found across the entire European continent. Enlightening, in this respect, are the states that seceded from the former Soviet Empire and those that appeared after Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early years of the last decade. Therefore, in the Republic of Moldavia, despite the compromise of the linguistic policy adopted by Moldavian authorities and their attempt to lay the foundations of an autonomous state – in accordance with international standards – the ethnic and linguistic problems served as grounds for launching a double secession process in the Eastern and Southern regions, process that culminated in the outbreak of an armed conflict on the left bank of the Dnestr river. The view according to which “at the core of the Transnistrian conflict there are ethnic dissensions, as well as the violation of the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities” was challenged by the Moldavian parliament, who voiced the conviction that these “internal pseudo-problems” come to justify “an attack on the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldavia”. [21] In this case, the linguistic border was a pretext, a vector to manipulate public opinion in order to modify the political border. This approach has also been used in the case of the so-called Gagauz Republic; but due to the fact that the Gagauz community is located within the Moldavian state, and not at “one of its peripheries”, the scenario was unsuccessful, unlike the Transnistrian case. This is an important problem in the evolution of the architecture of the political borders throughout the European continent. The Republic of Moldavia announces its increasingly stronger aspiration to accede to European structures. [22] This was not a singular case for this space of political sovereignty emerging after the ending of the Cold War, because it was also reported in other geographical areas of the former Soviet Empire – the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is a convincing example – or that from the former Yugoslavia. These are but a few of the considerations showing us that today, under the impact of the double globalization-regionalization process, the issue of the political and linguistic border is one of high interest. The linguistic border is the one that gave consistency to the identitarian matrix and to the state’s political borders, at least in Europe. The European Union will not expand to the east, including the Black Sea area, as long as the linguistic border will be a vector manipulating public opinion to change political borders recognized by the international community.

This requires a very thorough analysis of the impact that not only the shifting of political borders, but also of linguistic borders have on the collective mentality. Patrick Seriot noticed an indubitable relation between a people’s language and the existence of its linguistic borders, but wondered if this relationship is always biunivocal? [23] He noticed that the phenomenon exists only in the case of nation-like state structure and is not to be found in the classic multinational state. In order to understand this phenomenon in terms of strengthening of some complex processes – like that of globalization and nationalization – when borders undergo multiple demographic, cultural and linguistic pressures, it is necessary to specify the meaning and especially the changes in the linguistic practice.

On the European continent, people whom, for centuries, have built their political identity *also* on a linguistic border are nowadays living accession/integration frenzy. The expansion of EU’s political border is a process that essentially has a double political decision, that of the integrator and that of the integrated, but it is not enough. Can the identitarian matrix of the new political construction be built without taking into consideration the issue of the linguistic border? And if so, what will that be? Will it be English or French? Might there be a rivalry between these two linguistic borders? From the second half of the last century American English has become an important vector of globalization; therefore, especially in the francophone territories, there are not few those who speak of “linguistic neoimperialism – *made in USA*” [24].

A similar situation can be found throughout the European continent. A statistics drawn up in the spring of 2005 [25] in EU member states, in states undergoing accession (Romania and Bulgaria) or in candidate states (Turkey and Croatia) shows that the mother tongue of most EU citizens is the official language of their country; however, in most of these states there is also a second language being talked, one that does not belong to the minorities belonging to the same state. English is the most spoken language throughout the European continent. According to the aforementioned Euro barometer, in 16 European countries citizens reported that this is the first foreign language being spoken. Slovakia is the only country in which English is not mentioned among the three most spoken foreign languages; it only ranked fourth place. [26] In Great Britain and Luxembourg, French is the most common language, except for the mother tongue, and in Hungary and the Czech Republic it is German.

These are only a few aspects showing that a language can lead to situations in which interest and power rivalry between two or more parties can also materialize due to the perception (be it a wrong one) of linguistic domination. However, linguistic domination in itself may not mean much unless the language is used as a carrier-vector to the “target” of some political, economic etc interests. Through language one can pave “the way” to achieving political or economic goals in a certain space. Analyst Robert de Beaugrande believes that through language, “actors” with interests in a certain space can “build” another reality convenient to them and that might also convince their opponents/parteners on the fairness/legitimacy of their action. [27] This assertion stands true/valid only for the nation-like state, which is not the case of the EU. In this case, as in others, what is highly important is the political decision that will regulate the recognition of a language and confer an official status to it; nonetheless, “one cannot impose an official language by its intrinsic strength alone. Politics is the one giving it geographical and demographic limits, these marked borders that political borders help come to life.” [28]

However, at the same time, this reality must also be attractive and useful for the “dominated actor”. It is our belief that those analysts who think that “democratic and liberal values have conquered the world” are somewhat exaggerated. [29] If most of the works devoted to the contemporary military phenomenon, in general, and to revolution in military affairs, in particular, have nowadays won over the journalistic scenery of the last years, to give but an example, this is not because of the English “linguistic imperialism”, but rather to the research level reached in this field in the USA – which is the undisputed military leader, both in terms of technology and in terms of strategy and military action. The real issue is, indeed, in terms of geopolitics, as English could become a denationalization vector that might replace mother tongues in some spaces. We can speak of linguistic rivalry among “actors” solely in the history of battles between powerful colonial powers, when one substituted the other in a colony. The French imposed their language at the expense of the German language, when, after World War One, took possession over territories that once belonging to the German colonial empire. We come across similar occurrences in Central Asia of the XIXth century, when the Tsarist Empire replaced the Ottoman Empire. Nowadays, the process presents itself as one of natural development and not one of imposed global politics. The European continent has a common cultural consciousness that can give consistency and existential harmony to linguistic borders. Linguistic border and nationality, aspects which embellished Europe in the XIXth century and throughout the first half of the next, have nowadays lost their power to give an impulse and project into the future – as Jose Ortega y Gasset said decades ago [30]. The political border of the new European structure should not inevitably be based on the existence of a linguistic border, as in past centuries. This does not necessarily mean giving up a common identitarian matrix for the European space, due to the fact that a “universal type of identity will appear, one that will transcend the national type of identity” [31]; however, this does not mean that the battle for linguistic borders is history through the world and the European continent.

Noteworthy is the fact that in France there are people who share the idea of defending national language from the expansionism of the English language [32]. The proposal submitted from practical and pragmatic reasons to Francois Fillon (the Minister of Education) by the *Claude Thélot* parliamentary Commission, which stated that the English language should appear as a compulsory subject, “as in the case of Mathematics or Spelling”, from primary education and in all the schools,

elicited vehement reactions from a certain segment of the academia. They believe that “American imperialism imposes itself not only through the material factor (military and scientific capabilities, production of goods and services, energy flows and monetary control, etc), but also through spirit domination with the help of cultural and linguistic values.

Analyst Bernard Cassen believes that “the English language is at the heart of a global system where it plays a similar part to that of the dollar in the international financial system. Borrowing the model and image from astrophysics, this system is based on the existence of a supreme star (English as a *hypercentral language*) around which a dozen of *planet-languages* gravitate , which, in turn, are surrounded by some 200 *moon-languages*, around which other 6000 *star-languages* gravitate.” Just as in the monetary system the dollar gives the US considerable financial benefits, the fact that English is a *hypercentral language* in the international system offers them a formidable *position annuity*” [33].

This assertion may find support in the role English plays in the international environment for standardising dialogue in communications and transport. We already hear talks on *Airspeak* for English spoken in international air shipments, *Seaspeak* for the maritime ones. Standardization through English can also be found in other professions, such as those from hotel and tourism services or those related to finance or the banking system. Note that we are only dealing with standardization that does not imply in any way political interests, but financial and economic efficiency. Therefore it is our belief that talks on geopolitical and geolinguistic rivalries are exaggerated. English speakers in international transport or those using the internet are connected not only by other political entities, but also by distinct political interests. it should be noted that we are dealing with a process of political integration, and not one of assimilation. Hence we can speak of integration of linguistic borders, but, on no account, of their assimilation. The *integration* process, through which units ar elements of a society reach an agreement concerning the activities and objectives of other societies, must be differentiated and set apart from the process of *assimilation*, that involves the adoption of the cultural practices of the dominant society [34]. At the same time, it is impossible to integrate in the nationalized state without *linguistic assimilation* of minorities, as they do not want to take part in state activities unless they are able to speak the national language. [35] In European construction, the idea of dominant states or societies does not exist, at least at the level of current political projections. Could linguistic borders have consistency in the future at the level of multipolar power centers that seem to take shape in coming years?

There are beliefs according to which around the year 2025, in terms of population and language, a Chinese “block” of over 1500 million people is shaping up, another made up of nationals of Anglophone countries with over 1040 million, and one of about 500 million for Spanish and French-speakers [36]. Some experts consider tht the rivalry between the linguistic borders of the future will occur between the first three large linguistic blocks [37]. This assertion might stand true should French or English-speakers from a geographical space, but belonging to distinct political entities/states, have the same geopolitical interests. Older or more recent history of European nations refute the opinion that English or German-speakers, to refer only to these two, have made common political causes during times of crisis. In the XVIIIth century German principalities fought each other, and in the next century there were fiery battles for supremacy between the Habsburg Empire and Prussia. In the XXth century, between the English-speaking Catholics from Northern Ireland and those of England, violent confrontations broke – confrontations that remain unsolved to this day. Globalization/regionalization will not mean annihilating the identity matrix of human communities. Linguistic borders may exist and coexist. However, the perception that people will have on the place and role these will have on the construction and administration of political power will certainly change.

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AROUND BLACK SEA IN PREHISTORY: NEOLITHIC AND COPPER AGE ADORNMENTS DISCOVERED IN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE

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Abstract

The aim of the article is to compare some Neolithic and Copper Age adornments discovered in two areas: Transylvania, Romania and Northern Black Sea Region, Ukraine. Made of bone, antler, shell, stone or clay, the adornments are an important part of socio-symbolic human behaviour. On this occasion, we present some osseous materials artefacts as shell plates, perforated teeth, various pendants or beads that represent the subject of our analysis. These could have been used as jewellery or adornments sewn on cloths. The approach benefits from the advantages offered by the materials recovered from the undisturbed funerary contexts (Ukraine). The comparison of the situations from the two cultural distinct regions allowed us to highlight some similarities related to raw materials, typology and functionality of these special objects.

Keywords: *adornments, Aeneolithic, Neolithic, osseous materials industry, Transylvania, Ukrainian steppe.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Among others, economic human behaviour includes subsistence strategies, the species selection and human feeding. By studying the osseous materials industry in these contexts, we can establish the characteristics of the human behaviour in a precise cultural/chronological sequence, and define the innovations that appear at a certain moment. This particular kind of industry is remarkably illustrated by the content of the inventories dating from the Upper Paleolithic to the Bronze Age.

The osseous materials industry is an important research domain of the Neo-Aeneolithic archaeology because its systematic study is an approach that can offer clues in the analysis of prehistoric economy and technology as well in spiritual manifestations.

The osseous materials industry represents all preconceived artefacts obtained after the application of well-defined operative schemes (these include the process of raw material acquisition, débitage, shaping, finishing) and the specific use-wear traces.

The adornments are a component of the symbolic manifestations and they offer important clues about the spiritual life of the communities that possessed these objects, specific for a certain culture or period.

In the history of the South-Eastern Europe, Black Sea represented an important axis for commercial exchanges and spiritual interferences. The adornments are just one of the proofs in this respect.

II. OBJECTIVES

Starting from the idea that osseous materials artefacts are the result of the interaction between several elements like the species, skeletal elements, anatomic morphology and morphometry, the specific choice of the raw material, technical procedures applied during the manufacturing chain (adapted according to the way of using it) and functionality, our approach was focused on (1) establishing a typological code for each studied artefact according to the Beldiman 2007 Typological

List, (2) identifying the species and the skeletal element used for each artefact, (3) examining the morphology of the piece, (4) taking the specific morphometrical parameters for each artefact, (5) studying the artefacts' surfaces in order to define the main technical procedures applied during the "manufacturing chain", (6) studying the artefacts' surfaces in order to identify the main use-wear traces, and (7) compare the data obtained from our approach with the ones obtained by the Ukrainian specialists.

III. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The aim of the article is to present some Neolithic and Copper Age adornments discovered in two areas: Transylvania, Romania and Northern Black Sea Region, Ukraine. The ornaments from Transylvania were studied according to recent methodology and using latest technology in the domain. The Ukrainian artefacts that were also taken into account are dated from Dnieper-Donets culture, but these could not have been directly studied. Data regarding these were collected from the literature [1].

Our approach aims to present some data issued from the analysis of the adornments made from osseous materials taking into account the coordinates of the recent methodology in the field. The methodology applied in order to study the Transylvanian Neo-Aeneolithic adornments is the one proposed by Beldiman 2007 methodology. In order to explore the information exhaustively, the methodology was adapted according to the rules proposed by the *Commission de Nomenclature sur l'industrie préhistorique de l'os de l'U.I.S.P.P.*, France [2]. The Typological List used in order to analyse the skeletal materials artefacts is Beldiman 2007 one.

The study is focused on registration and study of all the essential data regarding: the artefacts' identification using a code for each item, the creation of a catalogue which lays out the dataset regarding the specific code for each piece, the discovery context, the raw material, the conservation status, the type and sub-type, and the complete description and the manufacturing chain.

The stages of the direct analysis are: the examination of the artefacts using macro- and microscopic instruments in order to identify the traces generated by the manufacturing chain, the use-wear traces and the taphonomic ones. After this, a typological code is established. An important part of our study is constituted by the computerised analysis: the input of data, the application of the queries, and the preparation of the reports (with structured data, charts and pictures). The statistical approach, performed using an MS Access database, forms the main part of our conclusions regarding the specificity of the investigated osseous materials industry. This allows us to establish the characteristics of a culture or of a cultural phase.

Using the typological code and the use-wear traces we drew some conclusions regarding the functionality of the objects. We may also distinguish the main characteristics for each culture; to identify the "chrono-cultural markers", to observe the diffusion of influences [3]. This is the base where from we started our comparison.

The adornments of the Dnieper-Don cultures offered us clues related to the functionality of the certain types of adornments because of their funeral context of discovery.

The hoard from Ariuşd – Tyszk Hill and the cemetery of Mariupol are two main assemblages that comprise a large number of ornaments of the same type. From this point of view, their comparison is very important.

IV. TYPOLOGICAL CATALOGUE

According to the Beldiman 2007 Typological List, the adornments made from osseous materials are included in the 3rd typological category (Adornments). This is subdivided into eleven typological groups, from which nine are present in the Transylvanian assemblages that have been studied. The most frequent typological groups are: perforated plates, followed by pendants, perforated shell discs, beads, perforated teeth and their bone imitations, perforated shells and bracelets.

From a cultural point of view, most of the artefacts belong to the Cucuteni-Ariuşd culture, followed by the ones dating from the Starčevo-Criş and Coţofeni cultures. The adornments dating from the Vinča, Turdaş and Decea Mureşului cultures are represented only by few artefacts for each of the mentioned culture. From the Decea Mureşului cultural group there is only a finished object (III E4

type-perforated *Unio* shell disc), but there are also raw materials (*Unio* shells) that have traces of manufacturing, and which were included in the 5th typological category (*Varia*), as raw materials or debris from perforated shell discs.




Chart no. 1. Adornments distribution by types.

V. RAW MATERIALS AND SOME TECHNOLOGICAL REMARKS

The 3rd typological category, adornments, highlights the preponderance of using *Unio* sp. and *Spondylus* sp. shells in the Neolithic and Copper Age. Also, the teeth are frequently used in order to obtain ornaments. The red deer residual canines, the wild-boar tusks and the carp pharyngeal teeth were preferred as raw materials.

We have to mention a special kind of archaeological assemblages: hoards. These were discovered at Ariușd – Tyszk Hill (Covasna County) and Călnic – În Vii (Alba County). The first one was recovered at the beginning of the 20th century in the 4th level of digging [4]. According to Vladimir Dumitrescu, the Ariușd hoard was dated from A – B phase of Ariușd-Cucuteni-Tripoliije culture [5]. Regarding the context of discovery, Ferencz László mentioned that the pot, containing the ornaments, was placed in an area with an approximate surface of 1 m². In an article from 1911, the author of the discovery wrote that “*a collection of adornments was discovered containing objects made of stone, bone, antler, animal teeth and copper*”. At that moment, pendants made of residual canines, copper beads, plates with perforated extremities made from wild-boar tusks and shells were identified [6]. In addition, a series of copper spirals were mentioned. According to S. Sztáncsuj, these could have been used as raw materials or as large bracelets [7]. In a letter sent to V. G. Childe in 1924, F. László also mentioned a golden spiral that was discovered in the hoard [8]. During the Second World War an important part of the hoard was lost. The ones that were preserved in the collections of the Székely National Museum of Sfântu Gheorghe were studied by us according to above mentioned methodology. Besides the adornments discovered in the pots, F. László mentions, in an article from 1911, the discovery of 42 perforated *Unio* shell discs [9], but in the collections were identified only 5 of them. These were broken in the old times and now they are restored. Related to the hoard, we must highlight the presence of the perforated carp pharyngeal teeth (III A5 type – new introduced in the list). These were identified for the first time in an Aeneolithic context on the Romanian territory. In the Ariușd hoard, 37 pieces were discovered and were initially considered as teeth of small mammals.

They were associated with plates made from shells and wild-boar tusks, beads made of copper, bone, shell etc. [10].



Figure 1. Hoard of Ariuşd.

The issue of pharyngeal teeth as raw material for adornments has not been known until recently in the Romanian archaeology. Their identification in a large number in the graves from Iron Gates Mesolithic was the only one of this type done in our area [11].

In the necropolises from Dnieper and Don area, we identified a large number of analogies for this type. The perforated teeth of fish from *Cyprinidae* family are quite frequent [12]. The use of carp and rudd pharyngeal teeth as raw materials for pendants or ornaments sewn on cloths is a characteristic of the cemeteries from the Northern part of the Black Sea. Their presence in such a large number attests an important occupation: fishing.

Another species that offered raw materials for Neolithic and Aeneolithic adornments is red deer. The use of residual canines represents another similarity between the two analysed spaces. It seems that this raw material was very appreciated during the Aeneolithic time. They are widely-spread in graves and hoards dated from these times [13].



Figure 2. Red deer residual canines and their imitations made from bone and antler.

For the burials from the Dnieper-Don area, the researches revealed the presence of a large quantity of osseous materials artefacts as funerary inventories. In this context, we should remark the situations in which a few individuals' graves contained rare prestige goods like gold and copper adornments, polished stone maces, and perforated wild boar tusks plates [14] that present the same characteristics as the ones from Transylvanian area.

Regarding the technological aspects, the manufacturing chain follows *débitage* and shaping stages. Well-defined techniques and procedures are applied in order to obtain specific types of artefacts. For the Transylvanian artefacts, these were identified using macroscopic and microscopic observations. Their quantitative analysis revealed the following situation: only a small number of adornments preserved the *débitage* traces. This fact is due to the raw materials used (in some cases, this stage of manufacture was useless – for example, teeth: their *débitage* stage consists in their extraction from the mandible or maxilla, procedure that does not leave any traces on the piece) or to the intense procedures applied during the shaping stage. According to quantitative distribution of *débitage* traces, we observed the following situation: most of the artefacts preserve traces of grooving procedure; followed by percussion and fracture which were used in combination with groove and splinter technique; percussion or chopping. Traces of transversal cutting and abrasion are found in a small number of cases, on 3 and 2 artefacts, respectively.

For shaping the adornments, the abrasion procedure was mostly used. The multi-directional one appears also frequently. In some cases, it is associated with transversal cutting, but most of the time it was the only procedure used for shaping the artefacts. Transversal, axial and oblique abrasions are the other variants of the abrasion technique attested in this assemblage of adornments. Transversal cutting was present in 10 cases. The percussion technique is present only in two cases where it was used in order to perforate the shells. The scraping operation was observed only on the surface of an imitation of a red-deer canine made of antler, discovered at Păuleni-Ciuc – *Dâmbul Cetății* (dated from Cucuteni-Ariuşd culture). The grooving technique is also rarely used (2 artefacts). In order to perforate the adornments made of antler, the operation of carving was used.

VI. FUNCTIONALITY AND SYMBOLISM. CONCLUSIONS.

In order to establish the functionality of the artefacts, a traceological study was done. In this respect, the analysis of use-wear traces offered us essential clues. The quantitative distribution of the use-wear traces revealed the fact that an important part of the artefacts does not display traces of use (17%). On the other hand, 37% of the analysed artefacts have traces of functional polish. The bluntness is present on the surfaces of 33% of the artefacts. The functional fractures were identified on 13% of adornments; in most of the cases the fractures were identified at the level of suspension holes.

The discoveries from necropolises are very important because they help us to formulate conclusions regarding the functionality of the artefacts,. In this respect, the comparison with the Dniiper-Don area was very useful. „*At the cemetery of Mariupol, one male was buried wearing forty tusk plaques sewn to his thighs and shirt, and numerous strings of shell and mother-of-pearl beads. He also had a polished porphyry four-knobbed mace-head, a bull figurine carved from bone, and seven bird-bone tubes. A child, one of the few buried at Mariupol, wore 41 boar's-tusk plaques and a cap armored with 11 whole boar's tusks. The exceptional wealth of this child, and of others, hints at the inheritance of status. An elite seems to have emerged in the Dnieper-Azov steppes during DDII.*”[15]. From this point of view, we may consider the traces placed around the holes of the shells or wild-boar tusks plates as proofs for a functional role of ornaments sewn on clothes. In the same cemetery a large number of adornments were discovered: perforated sea shells, perforated red deer canines, perforated pharyngeal teeth of carp, bone beads, pendants made from various mammalian teeth (badger, fox, wolf, wild-boar). N. Kotova states the hypothesis of some certain rules related to the connection between the adornments placed in the graves and the orientation of the skeletons. She mentioned that in the west orientated graves, the burial clothes were mainly decorated with red deer canines and wild-boar tusks while in graves with an eastern orientation, the burial cloths were ornamented by beads and plates made of wild-boar tusks [16]. In Transylvania, the plates made from *Spondylus* shell and wild-boar tusks are attested for the first time in the hoard of Ariuşd, Cucuteni A culture. The use of bones and as raw materials for ornaments could represent a symbol for the connection with the ancestors. The teeth, especially those of red deer and carp were important for the protection and for the power that they transmitted to the person that wore them.



Figure 3. Spondylus shell plates discovered in the hoard of Ariuşd, Covasna County.




Figure no. 4. Possible use of plates. Reconstruction of burial cloths, according to the discoveries from Mariupol necropolis. (apud Kotova 2010, figs. no. 6, 7).




Figure no. 5. Possible use for perforated teeth and small beads. Reconstruction of caps according to the funerary discoveries dated from Azov-Dnieper culture (apud Kotova 2010, fig. 9).

Another interesting discovery is related to an assemblage comprising 256 *Unio* shell discs. Their mention in funerary contexts allowed us to formulate the functional role. In the necropolis from Decea Mureşului these beads were in a large number (about 1817, according to our estimations) and they were used in composite ornaments as: bracelets, belts, necklaces [17]. This type of ornament appears exclusively in the graves, so we may consider them funerary ornaments. Provided that the shell is the symbol of the rebirth, regeneration, we could state that the use of shells in burial contexts could be related to this idea.




Figure 6. *Unio* shell discs discovered in Transylvania. Cemetery of Decea Mureşului (Apud Kovács 1932, fig. 12, 5, 15). b. Ritual pit from Ariuşd (Apud Sztancs 2011, fig. 141).

From an economical point of view, the adornments offer us clues regarding the economy of the Prehistoric communities that are analysed. The raw materials used in order to produce certain ornaments, attest specific occupations, such as: hunting, fishing, gathering shells, trades etc. The presence in a large number of red deer residual canines and wild-boar tusks is linked with the hunting strategy of the community; the pharyngeal teeth of carp are related to fishing habit; the presence of *Unio* shells attests the preoccupation for gathering them from the natural environment; the use of bones coming from domestic mammals provide us information related to breeding practice. A special mention should be done for the use of the Mediterranean shell *Spondylus*. Its presence both in our area as in the Northern part the Black Sea Region attests currents long distance trades.

In conclusion, the systematic study of the adornments assemblage that we presented in this paper leads us to identify some similarities between two historical and geographical regions – Transylvania and Dnieper-Don area. These are: the use of the same raw materials (red deer residual canines, carp pharyngeal teeth, wild-boar tusks); the presence of specific types of adornments with well-defined functionality (pendants, bracelets, discs, perforated plates and teeth etc.); similar economical activities attested by the raw materials (gathering shells, fishing, hunting, long distance trades etc.).

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AROUND BLACK SEA IN ANTIQUITY: METALWORKING AND SKELETAL TECHNOLOGIES REFLECTED BY ANCIENT BONE AND ANTLER ANVILS DISCOVERED IN ROMANIA, REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE

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Abstract

The paper presents the results of recent analyses of data regarding a special category of artefacts worked on cattle and horse bones as well as red deer antlers used as anvils for manufacturing the toothed iron sickles and largely dated in the Vth century B.C. and Vth century A.D. These controversial objects discovered in the last century in the Black Sea basin – territories of Romania, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine seems to be the oldest known suggesting their origin in the regions near the Black Sea. The repertory includes discoveries from Romania (Histria, Durostorum, Chitila) that are discussed in parallel with those from Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the perspective of raw materials, technology of manufacturing, use wear and function. The artefacts reflect a unique and complex interface of the crafts, the ancient technology and economy in the regions around the Black Sea.

Keywords: *agriculture, ancient anvil, ancient sickle, iron technology, osseous materials industry, Romania.*

INTRODUCTION

On this occasion we are going to discuss a category of osseous materials artefacts which are generally called “anvils”. In most of the cases, they were made of long bones (especially cattle and equid metapodials), but there are also cases when there have been used flat bones (like mandible) and red-deer antler fragments. These pieces have one or more active parts shaped by chopping. They present specific triangular impressions in parallel or curved rows resulting from the operation of shaping active part of serrated sickles blades. In case of the metapodials, the surfaces of diaphysis were whittled down and smoothed. On this prepared surfaces, there are rows of triangular shaped dents. The artefacts may have one to four active parts where the smiths sharpened the serrated teeth of the sickles. The traces left by this procedure are represented by rows of triangular wholes. These rows are disposed parallel while others diverged, converged or they are crossed. The length the rows depended on the number of dents and the separation between them. There are some cases where the diaphysis was whittled and re-smoothed for more times with the purpose of reusing the artefact [1].

The most ancient artefacts were discovered in Greek cities from the Black Sea Basin (Olbia, Neapolis, Thanagoria etc.), as well as in Scythian-Greek and Getic settlements, where they are dated in Vth century B.C. – Vth century A.D. – fig. 1 [2]. Also, in the Chora of Metaponto, Southern Italy is mentioned recently an isolated anvil made of cattle metacarpus (2nd century B.C. – 1st century A.D.) [3]. The bone anvils is more frequent quoted in the literature regarding Middle Age and are dated between VIIIth and XVIIIth centuries. There are important discoveries in Mediterranean Basin (France, Spain, Portugal, some countries from Northern Africa) [4]. Very recently were published some pieces coming from Hungarian Medieval sites (Xth – XIIIth centuries A.D.) [5].

The article presents the results of analysis of recent data regarding a special assemblage discovered in Romania and composed by 43 artefacts worked on cattle and horse bones as well as

segments of red-deer antlers used as anvils for manufacturing the toothed iron sickles. The artefacts are dated in the IInd – IIIrd centuries A.D.

The artefacts have been discovered in recent researches from three archaeological sites: the Greek ancient city from Histria, Constanța County, placed on the western slope of Black Sea (the sector *Basilica extra muros*, 2001-2004 (see fig. 2); the sector *Basilica with crypt* – “*Florescu*”, 2003 and 2008); the Roman ancient city Durostorum, today Ostrov, Constanța County, at Lower Danube (2000); the Geto-Dacian settlement from Chitila-“*Fermă*”, Ilfov County, from The Romanian Plain, near Bucharest, the capital of Romania (2001 and 2004) – see the table and fig. 1 [6].

In this context, we should mention the unique artefact HST/2002-BFL 6, the biggest one until now (a yoke? – reused as an anvil) which, so far, doesn't have analogies in the archaeological literature consulted. Red deer antler artefacts were initially manufactured and used like anvils and are also (but rarely) published in Romanian literature. There is another piece made of a segment of an antler's beam in Romania at Durostorum [7] and in Republic of Moldova at Saharna Nouă – a piece made of a segment of antler tine [8].

METHODOLOGY

The artefacts are preserved entirely and broken, illustrating all phases of “manufacturing chain” and all types of wear traces. The raw material is: cattle metapodia (mostly), horse metapodia, horse mandibles, segments of red deer antler. A special case has been provided by the biggest piece, made from red deer antler and discovered at HST-BFL in 2003; she has been made on a disaffected piece (probably a shoulder support for carrying weights?).

We can point out also the fact that invariably the context of discovery of the artefacts is related to the area of iron working or reducing iron minerals. Thus, the artefacts from HST-BEM were discovered abandoned in secondary contexts. They come from structures, pits and from the vicinity of some complexes used for reducing the iron ore, connected to the craft area from Section I (the western extremity, about 15.80 m) belonging to the Early Roman period (probably, 1st-7th decades of the IInd century A.D.) [9].

Taking into consideration firstly the analysis of different traces of manufacture and use, we propose the reconstitution of phases of the standard manufacturing chain of the anvils on cattle metapodia (no debitage; *façonnage* in two moments: intensive chopping and abrasion/intense scrapping using a metallic blade (a knife?) – for obtaining a flat and smooth surface. The smoothed surface has been made on one-two-three or four bone's anatomical faces.

The methodology applied during the study takes into account the registration and the analysis of all essential data regarding: the artefacts' identification using a code (which is made up of the site's code, the discovery year, the sector's code and a serial number – for example: HST/2001-BEM 3); the realization of the repertoire (which lays out the dataset regarding the code of the piece, discovery context, raw material, conservation status, subtype, description), morphometry (the total length/the preserved length; width/diameter of the edges and of the middle part; the length of active part on each side; maximal/minimal width of active part on each side – dimensions are given in millimeters).

Artefacts that are generically called anvils were set in a special wooden installation, on a workbench and were used in the *façonnage*/shaping of iron sickles (striking the serrated edges – using the technique of indirect percussion with a triangular section chisel/*poinçon*). This operation was applied at the initial shaping of the sickles' blades, and also at the sickles' repairs.

TYOLOGY

The typological classification adopts conventional criteria which reflect the usage stage at the moment that the artefacts were abandoned. Taking into consideration the number of anvils' shaped anatomical faces/sides (which become active/smoothed parts) we may conventionally distinguish the

next subtypes: simple anvils (with one active side), double anvils (with two active sides), triple anvils (with three active sides), quadruple anvils (with four active sides), undetermined subtypes (fragments) and raw material. As we already mentioned, the subtypes reflect the stage of shaping and usage of the artefacts [10].

Generally the raw materials used for these kinds of anvils were various: most of them are skeletal elements from large domestic mammals (cattle horse, camel etc.): long bones (metapodials, tibia), mandibles, coxal bone. We also have some special cases when segments of red deer antler beams and tines were used.

Artefacts from HST-BEM are made only of cattle metapodials (metacarpal and metatarsal bones). There is one exception at HST-BFL where an artefact is made of cattle metapodial and another of a red deer antler.

The aim of artefacts' analysis is to record all contextual, morphological, typological and technological data and to highlight the "manufacturing chain" and use wear. In this way, we may reconstruct "the technological biography" of each artefact. We currently use low power optical microscopy (4x – 40x) with the aim of recording exhaustive data of the artefacts' traces of manufacture and use.

MANUFACTURE AND USE

Bone and antler anvils are made of cattle metapodials (*Bos taurus*) and a segment of antler beam (*Cervus elaphus*).

Firstly, we take into consideration the analysis of different traces of manufacture and use, so that we may propose the reconstitution of the phases of the standard "manufacturing chain" of the anvils on cattle metapodials: no débitage; façonnage/shaping in two stages: intensive chopping and abrasion/intense scrapping using a metal blade (a knife?) – so obtaining a flat and smooth surface. This smooth surface was made on one-two-three or four bone's anatomical faces.

Wear traces are surprisingly uniform; the aim of using such pieces (anvils) was to shape (sawing-toothed) the iron sickle's active part (blade) or to reshape it. After all active parts/faces of the anvils were used and entirely covered by small triangular dents/hollows. There are often situations where the smooth surfaces are reshaped – including the fragments of pieces fractured on the middle part.

Wear traces were produced while the "sickle's teeth" were shaped. The dents produced have a length of 2-3 mm and were obtained by indirect striking with hammer - with a narrow active part - the cutting edge of the sickle's blade using an iron chisel/poinçon, probably one having a triangular section. The rows of around 5-10 dents are parallel, divergent, convergent or even crossed.

Covering the whole anvil's surface with rows of dents supposed: a) the preparation and the usage of another active part of anvil; there are cases when a single piece had four active parts which corresponded to the four anatomical bone's faces; those were prepared and used successively; b) unique or double reshaping of used surface by chopping, abrasion or scrapping using a metal tool, as in the first stage of shaping. All these conclusions are based on observations of microscopic traces preserved on surfaces' anvils.

Because of the renewed shaping of the anvils, the compact tissue of metapodial got thinner and very often, the artefacts broke in the middle part. This break was due to the high pressure that was applied during use. In this case, the artefact was abandoned or, if the preserved length was sufficient, it was reused/reshaped.

The "technological biographies" of the anvils are various and generally implies several stages: 1. the preparation of the active part on an anatomical face/side of the bone; 2. using and covering it

entirely with dents/hollows; 3. reshaping the side; 4. reusing and covering it entirely with dents/hollows; 5. preparing the active part on the second side; 6. using and covering it entirely with dents/hollows; 7. preparing the active part on the third side; 8. using and covering it entirely with dents/hollows; 9. establishing the active part on the fourth side; 10. using and covering it entirely with dents/hollows; 11. reshaping the side; 12. reusing; 13. abandoning. There are situations when probably at least two active sides were prepared from the first stage of shaping; but this hypothesis, ethnographically supported, is difficult to argue [11].

For other European regions and for Northern Africa, the archaeological literature mentions many such artefacts dated from the Hellenistic and the Roman period (Vth century B.C. – Vth century A.D.). These artefacts were discovered in Greek cities from the Black Sea Basin (Olbia, Neapolis, Thanagoria etc.), as well as in Scythian-Greek and Getic settlements [12]. Others are largely dated between the VIIth-XVIIIth centuries and were retrieved in settlements from the Western Mediterranean Basin (France, Spain, Portugal, some countries from Northern Africa) [13].

Actually, we may distinguish the area of diffusion of artefacts (considered “puzzling” for decades) around the Mediterranean Basin having its origins, probably, in East Mediterranean and Northern Black Sea regions. The presence of bone anvils in Early Medieval Central Europe is a problem to solve. Over the years, early mentioned artefacts discovered in the Northern part of the Black Sea were wrongly considered to be polishing tools used for finishing textiles, hides, stone or wood. This is the case of first such pieces published by S. A. Semenov [14]. Due probably to the lack of recent international data, some authors still sustain such a functional interpretation decades after the assertions of “Father of Traseology” [15]. There is a special case where the rows of triangular hollows made during usage of anvils were interpreted as “an unknown type of Getic writing” – the case of the artefacts from Chitila [16].

Quite recently, “the riddle was solved”: the functional role of those artefacts benefited from the observations of technological behaviour in the Iberian ethnography. In this way, and also by using experimental studies, the “manufacturing chain” of anvils and the way of using them has been established [17].

Wear traces that are preserved on these artefacts are identical or very similar to those observed on the pieces from Histria and other sites in Romania because of their use as anvils for shaping the sawing-toothed sickles.

ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMY. CONCLUSION

The bone and antler anvils discovered in Romania are very important finds which add to discoveries (the oldest known until now) from other Central-Eastern European sites, i.e. those from Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Also, they are important as they provide precise data for craft activities during the IInd century A.D. The presence of “Histrian anvils” provides supplementary and specific arguments for the existence of metal-working workshops in the area. The existence of bone/antler workshops are also attested in the same area by the artefacts (associated in pits with anvils), like bone and horn waste. This is why we can presume that the anvils were shaped in the workshops too. As we know, sickles were frequently used in the harvesting of cereals in many agrarian regions of the Western Pontic shore as well. Such worked bone and antler finds are not yet systematically published by the authors of excavations or by the archeozoologists; thus, the idea about spread in time and space of manufacture and use of these artefacts is still very partial for proto-historic and historic sites in Romania or other regions of Europe and Africa. For this reason anvils have been occasionally analyzed. The artefacts under discussion show the specific and unique connections between different activities (in our case, iron smelting and the manufacture of agrarian tools, the bone and antler industry and harvesting techniques). The analysis of the bone and antler pieces and also the anvils shed light on the complex problem regarding the antique economy and iron and bone and antler technology in the region of the Lower Danube.

Apart the relatively rarity of these pieces the study of antique bone and antler anvils from Romania has the advantage of an extended, unitary research and brings an important documentary contribution to the presence of these controversial artefacts in Central-Eastern regions of Europe; in the same time they offer new data for clarifying the topics of ancient anvils worked on skeletal materials.

The artefacts discussed illustrate a complex interface of long traditions, ancient crafts and agrarian economy, at the contact between bone and antler processing and reusing, the iron technology and the large cultivation of cereals during Antiquity in the regions beyond Black Sea.

Site	Excavations	Assemblage	Raw material
Histria – Basilica extra muros, Constanța County (HST-BEM)	2001-2004	24	Cattle metapodia
Histria – Basilica cu cripta („Florescu”), Constanța County (HST-BFL)	2003, 2008	2	Cattle metapod, red-deer antler
Ostrov (Durostorum) – “Ferma nr. 4”, Constanța County (DRS-FR)	2000	4	Cattle metapod, red-deer antler
Chitila-”Fermă”, Ilfov County (CHF)	2001, 2004	13	Cattle metapodia, horse metapodia, horse mandibles

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- [2] Arnăuț 2007; Peters 1986; Semenov 1970.
- [3] Gál 2010:79.
- [4] Briois et al. 1997; Esteban Nadal and Carbonell Roure 2004; Moreno-Garcia et al. 2005, 2007; Poplin 2007a, 2007b; Rodet-Belarbi et al. 2007.
- [5] Gál et al. 2010:117; Bartosiewicz 2010:338, Fig. 16; Beldiman, Sztancs et al. 2011.
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- [7] Beldiman et al. 2010, fig. 4.
- [8] Arnăuț 2007:302, fig. 1, 3.
- [9] Rusu-Bolindeț et al. 2009; Rusu-Bolindeț et al. 2010.

[10] Beldiman et al. 2008:50-61.

[11] Esteban Nadal & Carbonell Roure 2004:640-4; Moreno-Garcia et al. 2005:623-4; Rodet-Belarbi et al. 2007:160.

[12] Arnăuț 2007:298-300; Peters 1986:162-3, pl. III/1-11; Semenov 1970:186-8, fig. 100-102 – with bibliography.

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[14] Semenov 1970:186-8, fig. 100-102.

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


Fig. 1. Discoveries of osseous materials antique anvils in Romania (A Histria; B Durostorum; C Chitila), Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (1-16).




Fig. 2. Histria – Sector Basilica extra muros. Anvils on cattle metapodials – details of specific use-wear: 1 HST/2003-BEM 4 (raw material); 2 HST/2003-BEM 1 (anvil with one smooth surface); 3 HST/2003-BEM 6 (anvil with one smooth surface); 4 HST/2003-BEM 5 (anvil with two smooth surfaces); 5 HST/2001-BEM 1 (anvil with three smooth surfaces); 6 HST/2003-BEM 2 (anvil with two smooth surfaces); 7 HST/2003-BEM 2 (anvil with four smooth surfaces).

THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE BLACK SEA BETWEEN GEOECONOMICAL CHALLENGES AND GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES

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Abstract

The process of globalization that has distinguished the last five years has profoundly marked the way of studying and working within the economic system. Countries that time ago seemed unattainable and out of any contact, nowadays, due to a mighty inclusion of high-tech, is a very close and incisive reality, not only for economic purpose but also for cultural exchanges and comparison. The study of geopolitics has become a resource for economic scientists - and not only – that can't do without it. Through this interdisciplinary study, intended as a pile of variables in interdependence, we will have the possibility to realize an overall picture of the continuous economic changes, sometimes being able to trace also expectations on the future trends. All that being said, it will be easy to understand the importance of a geopolitical and geo-economic analysis upon the European Union choices and policies with regard to the Black Sea area; an undervalued zone for the various historical vicissitudes that have marked for a long time this area, but that is now asserting its role within the international setting. Challenges of not small extent, however, expect the European Union, given the political and economic settings that are profiled in the world. The proposed subject allows therefore to deal with issues concerning the European Union in an area that is becoming increasingly important on the international chessboard, but also provides us the opportunity to propose traditional topics in strategic and contingent needs key. The long-time supported arguments, now corroborated and strengthened by the presence of strong youth, are the concern for the economy as a strictly social science, re-proposing the study in an interdisciplinary perspective. This will be the starting point to develop our brief analysis of an important and fascinating topic.

Keywords: *Geopolitics, Geo-economics, European Integration, Globalization, Economics and Policy Development*

1. THE ECONOMY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDY IN AN INTERDISCIPLINARY KEY

On the assumption the economy is a social science, in this way we do not think there can be many doubts to be expressed.

Yet under the pressures of success that science and technology have shown over the past two centuries, much of the economics literature has been led to believe that our science can be studied with tools and approaches typical of the natural or exact sciences. The use of mathematics and statistics has been massive but - wanting express our self with clarity and transparency - very often the use of them

has been favored more than the necessity of professors to find recognition and confirmation by real needs for academic study and research.

The famous classical economists Smith, Ricardo and Marx, as well as JM Keynes did not use math models and muddled results as a consequence to give clear, plausible and practical explanations to the economic phenomenon that from time to time they went to review. Later, the same J. Robinson was forced to take notice and realize that even valiant colleagues of her used to hide themselves behind “algebra hedges” to cover certain fragility of assumptions and arguments in academic economics. The truth, as well as represented by that authoritative academician G. Myrdal - now unfortunately forgotten because of fashions change - perhaps is in the fact that the object of social science is the study of human behavior and the latter can be seen only from the natural sciences point of view. We, for the most part, can not rely on rules or laws universally applied in time and space, just because our studies does not prevent this kind of constants. As we argue for a long time, the economic laws can be considered in the most cases also as social laws, the necessary relations arising from the nature of things themselves, or if we like we can annotate with A. Marshall, who in his time argued that – *“economic laws are those social laws which concerns types of behavior in which the strength of the main reasons can be measured by a price in currency. There is, thus, no sharp line between those social laws which should be and those which should not be considered economic laws.”* (1)

There is no contraindication to the study of the economy with the help of mathematics and statistics, those are formidable tools of analysis; but when mathematics is formulated to provide a result aim to obtain a certain credibility to arguments which contrary do not have one, we can fig the truth. And of these dangerous assumptions, adopted by institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, we have unfortunately sensitive cognizance. Some recipes, considered certain, absolute and unequivocal, supported by the mainstream neoclassical theory, created obligations for some application, which then turned out to be harmful when not too disastrous to countries, whole social and productive classes and in some way reduced the lower classes to situations of despair and hopelessness. The vision of the world of economy that works like a machine, in the same way the doctrines and brilliant experiments of the natural sciences work, cannot be accepted. To all this, we can consider that even quantum physics, natural science par excellence seems to have taken note that the uncertainty is an unavoidable fact. To support all above, an authoritative stance taken by the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century: *“now, we know that even the most reliable knowledge in the meaning of the natural science, does not represent a knowledge in the traditional sense This leads to a revolution of the concept of knowledge: even knowledge in the natural science of meaning is a circumstantial knowledge, means to hazard a guess”* (2)

If we are right to support the above statement, so has it to be necessarily used for the study of our economic science? We propose an interdisciplinary approach. From a while it is claimed not to understand why many of economists have difficulty to sustain or are almost ashamed to use the economic geography to clarify some aspects of the international economy or to a better understanding of the international economy. Or, why the economists cannot use of the approaches coming from the non-economic determinants such as the history. (3) Or, for what reason we have to be inflexible in following a methodology of study that provides first an economic theory and then reserves us the possibility to consider purely non-economic facts such as the political, institutional and sometimes religious and sociological component and so on. For a long time, we were convinced that to study a social science we need to research the causes of phenomena that we are going to see using all possible techniques and compare all results to which we can draw from other collateral and similar disciplines, making surely courageous choices, unafraid to explore the new, going against - where appropriate - the current thinking represented by a dominant theory. And what is the economy if not a social science? It seems to be in perfect harmony to our thoughts the affirmation of A. Sen: *“traditional economic theory has a too weak structure”*. (4)

Because we fully agree with those who argue that the economy “has become progressively more restricted in the very moment when the problems required it larger, more political and able to grasp social phenomena”. (5)

Recently we have also felt compelled to say that the Economics and Politics represent two sides of the same coin. (6)

Taking a careful look at the economic, socio-politics reality of nowadays, we can easily realize that the process of economic development is fortified by its spread in some regions than in others, as well as, there are certain concentrations of economic activities in certain locations and this is systematically a constant in the evolution of the global economic process. This process shows the unequal production and distribution of wealth in the world, favoring some regions instead of others, some social classes instead of other. It shows also rich countries getting richer to detriment of others who fail to grow and bridge the gap that gradually differentiates them from richer countries. None of us can deny that the forces of free market, which today has become unique and global, get a central position in the process of growth and development worldwide. However, we have to underline the obligation that other people are worried on scene and they are important actors. (7)

We want to allude to the National States - although their role is diminishing - or to the concentration of states at regional level (see our European Union) or the powerful multinational companies now called transnational, the international economic institutions - financial or political (UN , World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization) and last but not least, the powerful Worlds Sovereign investment. These players often borrow guide lines from dominant economic theories - essentially strangers in law and fact to the market - but interacting and having influence on the global distribution of different economic activities, in other words promoting national, area, corporate or biased interests.

They have an appreciable effect on the development of know how and shall also be decisive in on the changing of the political structures and institutions around the world. In this work, emphasizing the necessity to study economics in an interdisciplinary key and trying to understand better the human being - not only *homo oeconomicus*, we shall now get closer by approximations to the more specific issue that fits European Union in an strategically important area.

2. BLACK SEA AREA: GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-ECONOMICS OF A LAND IN CONTINUOUS CHANGING

The Black Sea area can be defined as a land of a thousand vicissitudes. Although they have opened their doors to a policy of communication only for twenty years, since the dawn of Western civilization to this area the neighboring areas were affected by a strong commercial and economic activities because of their strategic position. Great interest was already historically demonstrated by the Greek and Latin culture. During the period of intense colonial expansion the Greeks did of the Black Sea area a fertile area for their businesses and founded cities such as Histria, Tomis and Callatis. In addition to the famous descriptions revealed to us by the songs of the famous poet Ovid (who spent the last part of his life in Tomis, now Constanta), it is understood the great importance for Latinos of the Danube River Delta for commercial purposes.

In fact, thanks to the Danube, the Black Sea area has enjoyed a great commercial axis connecting it to the territories of the Latin West. But not only this, during the Middle Ages were the great economic relationships which bound the Black Sea to the Venetians, the Pisans and the Genoese. These were the first to see the strategic importance of the Black Sea area, which was configured as link between West and East.

The middle ground, as identified by the Genoese, had in fact been turned into a sort of basis for inventory and warehouse stores. From simple storage center quickly turned into the flourishing Kaffa city (Feodosia, if you prefer) built by the Greeks in the sixth century under the name of Theodosia and valued by the Genoese in 1266.

It has to be considered that the grandeur of this city took unimaginable levels thanks to the prosperity of the trade, especially for being in competition with Byzantium for the same demographic level.

Well, then, the historical importance of the Black Sea area for the commercial traffic in the Classic and Middle Ages is well-documented.

The value of its connection between East and West, however, suffered with the arrival of Ottoman domination.

From the fifteenth century the Black Sea was slowly eclipsed within the international economic scenario, a decline persisted over the centuries and which emerged with the advent of the new world economic structure imposed by the Cold War.

The strategic value of the territory of the Black Sea was indeed overshadowed by the Soviet Union by one side and by Turkey as a counterbalance.

With the end of the Cold War, the created stability was completely altered. It has been developing a new structure as well as geopolitical order that the economic interests - rather than socio-cultural – inevitably entail.

Let us consider what new challenges - or old, but not yet dormant – are still on the scene regarding the Black Sea territories.

The process of European integration has affected heavily the borders and the new geopolitical and geo-economic features of the Balkans, of the northern Black Sea and Eastern Europe more properly. In particular, Romania's accession to the European Union marked a profound change of the strategies not only in terms of security, but also for what is concerning with the economic interest.

Romania is seen by the most geopolitics scientists as a true interpreter for a potential dialogue between European Union and the Eastern Countries, non European Union for vocation or still non being part of European Union.

A dialogue a little bit forced – we may say – considering that also Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union had to deal with a new geopolitical reality, enough to be very interested in territories of the Black Sea.

The dreams of the Russians of a “sovereign democracy” are never gone. (8)

Speaking here about theories as “Eurasia” or Russian revenge is amiss.

However, there are many people who sustain – as for example under Putin government - that we assist at a revival of the Russian giant, dormant during the *vacuum* post Cold War.

Maybe because Europe's expansion became more audacious, or perhaps because the energy resources are becoming in time a burning question for the community interest.

The implemented policy for the Black Sea areas seems to coincide with issues related to projects about “energy business”.

The middle position of the Black Sea - geographically speaking – lets it become a hub for the Russian energy market through Southern Europe.




Fig. 1. Map. Development project for the Russian energy market.
Source: Limes, climate energy. L'Espresso Publishing Group, 2007

This would have as a possible consequence, therefore, the diversion of oil and Liquefied Natural Gas pipeline routes from Ukraine's territory to those laid out on the trajectory of Black Sea. (9)

A clear policy will close the two old pipelines, "Brotherhood" and "Northern Lights" and pipe them into the Baltic gas pipeline (North Stream), which facilitate the transit through the Black Sea's pipelines (South Stream). We are spectators of a burning issue, but made with a cold logic, well known and considered by the United States lately. The American attempt – *under Bush government* - to centralizing with the aim to counterbalance the Russian, certainly get a decisive role in this matter.

The bases to a slow American insertion in the sensitive Caucasian, mainly in Georgian, area, were already clear since 2002 when the program "GTEP" (Georgia Train and Equip Program) was launched; then in 2005 the SSOP (Sustainment and Stability Operations Program) was initiated and in the same year the , Millennium Challenge Account" was promoted, which forecasted the allocation of 295.3 million dollars over five years for reinstatement of the regional infrastructure and business development.

The relationship between Georgia and USA became a wide cooperation that guided the Caucasian Country to new agreements with NATO.

The U.S. and NATO presence was insured besides the Ministries, so the air space, the sea and the land now is under continuous monitoring of the Alliance.

Georgia is not the only region appealing to American external support.

From the map below we can see the spread level of the Alliance in the world and more particularly in the areas surrounding the Black Sea.

Romania and Bulgaria have recently joined NATO (2004), while Georgia and Ukraine are not despises to a dialogue - and-not only - with the alliance.

Especially Ukraine, has already shown a real interest to a future European Union integration. Nevertheless, it is conscious of not performing the various requirements – difficult enough to achieve also by most of elders Western countries.

To be agreed to pool their resources for NATO together with very confining countries and those most Westerners, thus giving signals of high availability, can definitely be a good card to play for future agreements.

Among the players of this delicate geo-political-economic match, mentioned above, should be mentioned more in the final analysis, Turkey.

If Americans have clearly demonstrated big interest for the Black Sea area, there will the possibility that other factors related to military and policy (such as the illusion of Europe integration) induced Turkey to get closer to Russia.

Anyway, it should be pointed out that about 60% of the oil and gas from Russia are Turkish and that many manufactured products made in Turkey exported in Russia, with significant savings for the latter. (10)

Scientists of geopolitics studying the position also in the geo-economics key, however, exclude an impairment of Turkey towards Western countries.

Turkey became part of NATO already in 1952 and, although deluded many times, seems to have still European aspirations.



Fig. 2. Map. The NATO in the world.
Source: Limes, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso, 2010.

Making a brief and general frame of the interests involved and the new borne international challenges, before considering how the European Union responded to the territories in question, or how it could deal with the geopolitical issues, it seems also opportune to make a purely economic screening of the Black Sea Neighboring Countries.

This analysis can actually help us to consider the advantages or the disadvantages of the Black See and Middle Asian countries.

Considering the values expressed by individual analyzes elaborated by the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) countries, we will see how between 2000-2008 these countries were developed.

This strong development can be identified as an immediate consequence of their opening to the free international market

Considering the different values obtained by different BSEC states, according to a statistical estimate provided by the International Monetary Fund, the average of the development until 2007 was maintained of 7.2 percentage points.

Since 2009, the BSEC countries would follow the disastrous way as the European markets with a net decrease of values in terms of GDP.

In fact there is a reduction from +6 to -6 percentage points, the growth of GDP is then increased to 2.5% in 2010. (11)




Fig. 3. Growth in Real GDP (%).

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, on OECD, Black Sea and Central Asia: Transition, Globalization and Labour in the BS & CA Region, 2010.

Other statistical data that may give an idea about the progressively increasing trend until 2008 and the related economic downturn following the European Union crisis are provided by the EU balance of trade.

EXPORTS	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
I. Total exports of BSEC	172914	412524	500262	610836	820073	530309	664506
II. BSEC exports to other BSEC	24736	65947	85478	109799	146784	74447	99376
III. (II/I)x100	14,3	16,0	17,1	18,0	17,9	14,0	15,0
IV. GDP of all BSEC (billion)	758763	1763247	2122408	1419383	1655395	1394228	1501939
V. (II/IV)x100	3,3	3,7	4,0	7,7	8,9	5,3	6,6
IMPORTS	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
I. Total imports of BSEC	153981	376658	477843	644982	813456	526925	648971
II. BSEC imports from other BSEC	26624	71143	92972	120298	153470	94515	123997
III. (II/I)x100	17,3	18,9	19,5	18,7	18,9	17,9	19,1
IV. GDP of all BSEC (billion)	758763	1763247	2122408	1419383	1655395	1394228	1501939
V. (II/IV)x100	3,5	4,0	4,4	8,5	9,3	6,8	8,3
TRADE VOLUME	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
I. Total trade of BSEC	326896	789182	978106	1255818	1633529	1057234	1313477
II. BSEC trade with BSEC	51361	137090	178450	230098	300254	168962	223372
III. (II/I)x100	15,7	17,4	18,2	18,3	18,4	16,0	17,0
IV. GDP of BSEC	758763	1763247	2122408	1419383	1655395	1394228	1501939
V. (II/IV)x100	6,8	7,8	8,4	16,2	18,1	12,1	14,9

Fig. 4. Trade values in the BSEC. Fonte: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2012.

As it can be noticed from the commercial values, in 2009, the BSEC countries suffered an export decline from 820.073 billion in 2008 to 530309 billion; in the same time the import decreased from 813.456 billion in 2008 to 526925 billion recorded in 2009.

All this shows that in terms of GDP related to the total trend volume is reported from 2000 to 2010 a summary established situation of total trading volume, ranging from 16 percentage points in 2007 to 12 in 2009.

It is interesting to notice the gradually increasing of the trade values between the BSEC countries.

These values can easily help to understand the implemented regionalization level after the opening to the foreigner markets.

However, we must consider the other side of the coin, that means the transitory economic situation.

The collaborative relationships between the Black Sea territories seem to be still too uncertain and timid.

The integration process that opened the way to a significant trade flow has to be controlled and guided step by step in order to avoid an unstable and uneven developing of the economic growth.

Every state still requires a very personal agenda even for the safety of the domestic, economic and financial policy.

The sudden entry into an economic market made the prices very sensitive.

To prove for the above, the statistics have shown a correlation between a full European crisis and an economic downturn in the Black Sea Countries

The 2009, a year of full European economic crisis, showed us the falling equity values even in the Black Sea countries.

So how can do the European Union – the first trading partner of BSEC countries – during the process of integration of countries with different needs and being target of many, perhaps too many political and economic interests?

Let's take a quick step back.

The real policy of rapprochement between the European Union and the Black Sea countries began in 2007 through the so-called “Black Sea Synergy”.

As issued by the Commission's report to the European Council and Parliament, the cooperation which would be developed with of the Black Sea countries would have not constitute an independent strategy, but rather a complementary initiative to the already implemented policies for the adjacent States.

As stated by the Commission itself, actually, the European Union puts as priority in the own agenda the integration of Turkey, the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) and the strategic partnership with Russia.

With the Black Sea Synergy, the European Union aims also to be involved politically in the resolution of conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) (12) and suggests ways to enhance its participation in monitoring.

In terms of safety, there are proposal to control the immigration and to fight against it by using a plan of communication and a mutual exchange of information that can also monitor and fight against organized crime.

All this is done not only to promote the international cooperation, but also to support and “*safeguard human rights by providing training and exchange programs and stimulating a regional dialogue with civil class*”.

Another fundamental issue is related to the energy.

The energy passage “South stream” is, in fact, the way that brings gas and oil to South Europe, so it is a crucial interest point for Russia, EU and U.S.

The various multilateral agreements, as well as the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria as EU members in 2007 – already approved on 16/12/2004 – meant a lot for the consolidation of a policy in this matter.

These policies are also supported warmly by the external insertion of the U.S. being present in the warring nations with a good civil and bureaucratic structure.

The coordination proposed by “Black Sea Synergy” would touch also issues related to trade.

The European Union has clarified in fact its full availability that the Black Sea countries could reach as soon as possible a free market system, as long as they are not in conflict with the rules adopted by the EC agreements.

So regional trades and economic cooperation are well accepted. We should not forget the intentions for aerial and road transport and for the safeguard and the exploitation of resources.

These intentions, the Commission says, would be supported by a CBC program which supervises the activities of cooperation among the Black Sea area countries.

Without creating any additional bureaucracy, they would have send reinforcement for the regional organizations.

These new institutional realities provided by the European Union favored the latter to a delicate integration in these territories.

It's not a surprise that the EU strategy has often been defined as "soft power".

New realities and new lines "were drawn", bringing with them new relationships and new geopolitical orientations.

But the question is if the EU will really be able to please all the proposals promoted by multilateral treaties, and in primis, if it will be strong and awareness enough to maintain the cooperation in a so delicate moment as we are living.

To win the challenge with the giant Russian means many sacrifices and a very clear diplomacy. The stakes are very high.

Conflicts in the Black Sea area would have double consequences: the loss of stability of the Eastern European security and the impending necessity to find other energy sources.

CONCLUSIONS

These brief notes, as we said at the first beginning, represent thinking of those people who are involved in economic studies, with a interdisciplinary study methodology and approach.

In the light of this premise we have to remind an awareness, the fact that under the pressures of a global finance (the real economy, even if become global, brings devastating consequences), unprecedented communication systems and increasingly rapid innovative processes, the conceptual structure of analysis of the matter of facts, as well as the paradigms already characteristic for the economics approaches and for policy and for traditional sociology, requiring a whole reconsideration highlighting the systematic interconnections between the different methods of analysis.

As always - the past, marked by the heterogeneity, characteristic for different cultures of BSEC, the present characterized by soft territorial "*lines*" and the future surely by economic interests - will melt into a single logic of power.

Maybe these are the real spectrum to face for the European Union – now hit by a serious financial sickness, born elsewhere but rooted in the European reality.

If it will want to remain strong, reinforcing the proposition of integration, maintaining the current availability, will have to deal first with its own desire to aggregate.

This willingness was several times questioned by individualist logic of power of the Member States, by the current crisis difficulties and discussed even by the non EU member.

But they are precisely the difficulties that teach us, not only to coexist but at the same to time live together.

If we continue in Europe with national interests, submitting to others dreams, people with different experiences and maybe different objectives – for example to give total coverage to the wildest speculation and to submit to a completely financed economy instead to a real one –we will be not able to give this Entity a stable and lasting structure. The European Union, in some ways was and still it is the realization of an ancient dream. We do not allow that this dream shall be abandoned or swallowed up by drawings strangers to us.

We return to promote the foundation to build major new and important common infrastructures to feel more and more united and neighbors, and certainly we will have an assured future.

Also the BSEC countries will certainly have important experiences and a very important opportunity to offer for the common European prosperity and development.

With the economic and financial issues, it was given to Europe the chance to understand and to exist - or better, to live together – so we need a cohesive structure not only for trades but also in terms of policy and culture.

This cohesion - leveraging those common cultural aspects, as policy or economy, trades and finance - really shows how we can overlook the disagreements, the ancient resentment individual aspirations, encouraging the emergence of a true “*European Res Publica*”.

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UNACCOMPLISHED SECURITY AND DEFENCE PROJECTS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION DURING THE TWO WORLD WARS THE BRITISH CASE

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Abstract

During the two World Wars, the political, diplomatic, economic and military phenomena in Europe developed period a complex evolution, with specific elements for each region. During the two World Wars the Black Sea region was the contact area between the European and the Asian civilizations, between Christianity and Islam, between the liberal democracy and the left-wing totalitarianism, the space were the multiple interests of the great powers and local states collided, facts that conceded a special geopolitical importance to this zone. The essential events that occurred in this region were dominated by the “Straits issue”, by the Russian - Turks naval rivalry, by Russia’s desire of gaining access to a warm sea , by the tensions between Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania, the USSR and Romania, etc. The regional shift of powers was also strongly influenced by the actions of the great European powers such as Great Britain, France and Italy, which promoted their geopolitical interests in the Black Sea area under various forms: support for the creation of regional political and military organizations, the strengthening of bilateral alliances with the local states, gaining military facilities, etc. Great Britain showed a special interest regarding the issue of the Black Sea naval fleets and the Straits’ status because all these were strongly connected with the Channel of Suez security. The region’s small countries, including Romania, initiated several projects of bilateral or regional alliances but they were never accomplished due to the Great Powers’ opposition or rivalries.

Keywords: *geopolitics, naval policy, security, power, Black Sea, Soviet threat.*

INTRODUCTION

During the two World Wars period, the Black Sea represented a region with specific geopolitical features, being equally a space of cooperation and confrontation between the states in the area, between the Great Powers themselves, and between the local states and the Great Powers. It was the contact point between Islam and Christianity, between Europe and Asia, between the Western and the Oriental cultural model, between the Communist ideology and political regime vs the ideology of the Democratic world, between modernism and traditions, which provided a very complicated content for both human and interstate relationships. The Black Sea region was characterized by a governmental structure divided by a lot of territorial rivalries, with modest regional exchanges influenced by territorial tensions, by a low grade of industrialization and by the existence of some hostile political regimes. The tensions were amplified by the competition between the European Great Powers which were interested in controlling the countries in the Black Sea region. Having to face multiple threats, the local states reacted by either establishing regional structures of alliances characterized by anti-revisionism – such as the Balkan Entente – or by signing treaties of bilateral alliances with some of the Great Powers. The Black Sea region’s main feature, during almost the entire period between the two World Wars, was that of being regarded as an area of uncertainty, insecurity and international instability. Depending on their military capacity and the scale of the external threats, the small and middle states located in the Back Sea region chose different military and political solutions that were meant to insure the national security. During the entire period between the two World Wars, Romania faced the revisionist policy of the neighbouring states such as the Soviet Union, Hungary and

Bulgaria. The existing geopolitical situation forced the Romanian governments to seek political and military alliances which would confer real guarantees against the external threats.

Based upon the results obtained from archives, collections of documents and papers related to the Romanian state's defence policy during the two World Wars period, this paper analyzes the efforts done by the Bucharest decisional factors in order to attract and maintain the geopolitical interest of the democratic Western Great Powers to Romania. In this strategy, Great Britain played an important role, evidence being the various forms of bilateral cooperation initiated by Bucharest, including the construction of a Black Sea naval base. Our research hypothesis aims to evaluate and answer the following questions: what place did the Black Sea region occupy in the geopolitical plans of the European Great Powers? Which was the degree of the actual commitment that the Western democratic Great Powers were prepared to take towards the region's states, particularly Romania? Could one identify elements of continuity in the of the Great Powers' geopolitical behaviour towards the states neighbouring the Black Sea, starting with the period between the two World Wars and up to present days?

DEBATES

The Black Sea region – as an area of interferences and confrontations, where interests of the great European and extra-European powers collided – experienced many conflicts because of the division and reordering of the territories and areas of influence. The dominant problems of the Black Sea region during the two World Wars were connected with: the territorial battles generated by the process of creating a new architecture for the states established by World War I; “the Straits issue” and the geopolitical competition between Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, Italy and Germany regarding the configuration of the areas of influence. The configuration process of the post war states' architecture and the outlining of frontiers settled in the southern and eastern part of the Continent by the Peace Conference of Paris were accompanied by a prolongation of military conflicts and tensions until 1924-1925. The civil war in Russia also included in its area of conflict the territory in the northern and eastern shore of the Black Sea – from Caucasus to the Romanian border. On this huge territory the British and French forces landed in Caucasus, Crimea and Odessa supported the “Whiteguards” forces during the fights against the Bolshevik [1]. The Greek, Italian and French intervention in Turkey during 1920-1922 was a failure. The victories gained by the Turkish commanded by Kemal Ataturk led to the signing of the Mudanya Truce between Turkey and the Entente. Italy, which promoted an expansionist policy towards the Balkans, the Oriental Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea, caused a strong crisis in the Black Sea region during the summer-fall of 1923, especially after it had occupied the Corfu Island. The multiethnic composition of the Macedonian population was an issue that preoccupied both the neighbouring states as well as the Great Powers. Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece and Albania conducted an intense propaganda targeting the theme of nationalities, in order to justify their territorial claims over some regions in Macedonia [2]. The military incidents at the Greek-Bulgarian, Serbian-Bulgarian and Greek-Turkish borders, the military conflicts between Greece and Italy, the conflicts inside the Caucasian area between Turkey and Soviet Union, the military tension at the Romanian-Soviet border and at the Bulgarian-Serbian border determined the appearance of a state of insecurity, of “international political liability” [3].

The Lausanne and Montreaux conferences on the topic of the Straits regime highlighted the important divergences between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as the tensions between Great Britain and France regarding the Straits' regime. By controlling the Straits, one could also be sure of the dominance over the Black Sea region. The Tsarist Russia made huge efforts in order to obtain the main control over this “gateway” to Mediterranean and the warm seas. The efforts were resumed and continued by the Communist regime, which was also equally interested in having free access to the planetary ocean. The Straits' topic was one of the most important and complicated subjects negotiated during the conferences regarding the Black Sea. For Great Britain and France, the control over the Straits meant “efficiency and influence” over the Oriental Mediterranean as well as over the states bordering the Black Sea [4]. The Lausanne Conference (20th of November 1922 – 24th of July 1923) finished with the signing of the peace treaty with Turkey and the Convention regarding

the Straits' regime. The Turkish government lost the complete sovereignty over the Straits' use and was forced to accept the imposed terms regarding the delimitation of the nearby area, the destruction of the coastal fortifications and the acceptance of the Straits' International Commission's prerogatives. The Montreaux Conference in the summer of 1936 discussed Turkey's application for a revision of the Lausanne Conference's results regarding the Straits' regime and focused on the issues dealing with the Straits' re-militarization, the passing of battle ships through the Straits and the entering in the Black Sea of the military fleets belonging to other states than the neighbouring ones. The Convention on the Straits' regime [5] signed on July 20th, 1936 recognized Turkey's full sovereignty over the Straits, declared the free passing and navigation through the Straits and transferred the attributes of the Straits' International Commission over to the Turkish government [6]. Against the Great Powers' actions that sought to dominate this strategic gateway, Romania supported Turkey, a position that followed its economic interests. As a result, during the conference, Romania had "fruitfully" [7] collaborated with Great Britain and the states that formed the Balkan Entente, supporting Turkey's request of regaining the Straits' sovereignty. Romania was directly interested that no great power could gain control over the Straits, because, due to their geographical situation, they ensured the free navigation of the Romania fleet to the planetary ocean, being regarded as "the lungs" of the Romanian foreign commerce[8]. The geopolitical complications between Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, Italy and Germany over the redistribution of the areas of influence in the Black Sea region explained the existence of different or even completely opposite strategies promoted by the Great Powers during the two World Wars.

The Soviet Union, the only great naval power bordering the Black Sea, promoted a revisionist policy, hostile to the Versailles Treaties and their provisions, fact that determined the other neighbouring states to ensure their safety against the Soviet threat by forming regional alliances or by concluding bilateral treaties with the Great Western Powers that were interested in defending the status-quo.

The permanent Soviet hostility towards Romania together with the Bulgarian and Hungarian revisionism, were seen by the Romanian governments as possible anti-Romanian alliances. Romania had been seriously preoccupied by "the gravity of those tendencies", which "should be reported to all the internal and external factors, to the bilateral and regional relationships, to the international context found in one stage or another, to the states' geopolitical interests" [9]. As a result, the Romanian state had first developed its defence strategy based on its own forces and followed it by a most efficient capitalization of the common interests in the Black Sea region of the allied countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the great democratic western powers, especially France and Great Britain.

The winners, Great Britain and France, had different visions regarding the Black Sea region: on one side they initiated actions meant to prevent conflicts, to conciliate former opponents, to solve the region's litigations and disputes using dialogue, and, on the other side, each sought to hold the dominant position in the region. The British-French rivalries on the Straits' status and on the geopolitical control over the Black Sea led to the failure of the objectives that sought to defend the Interbellum's status-quo.

After the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920, France became the most influential power in the Central and South-eastern Europe. The French government announced to the Romanian authorities its wish to support the Romanian state in its efforts to accomplish the naval program. The Romanian and foreign specialists drew a series of studies during the first years after the war, in which they analyzed several ways of building a Romanian fleet at the Black Sea, the types of ships that needed to be adapted, their features and number. In two successive statements addressed to the Romanian authorities by the French commander O'Neill, dated 19th and 20th of March 1920, a series of proposals regarding the program of rebuilding Romania's war fleet were submitted. According to the French officer's opinion, Romania could be facing the Bulgarian and Soviet military fleets in the Black Sea region; between these two, a larger danger was represented by the Soviet fleet. During a future conflict, in order to defend the national maritime area, Romania had to develop a long-term naval program, to allocate adequate financial resources, to organize its entire infrastructure designed to

prepare ships and personnel and to build military ports necessary for the protection and maintenance of the warships. In the opinion of the French officer, the existence of a modern Romanian fleet composed of line ships, submarines and seaplanes was able to compensate the offensive superiority of the Soviet Black Sea fleet [10]. The lack of trained personnel, of naval military technique, of specialists as well as the lack of a large maritime port did not allow the “young Romanian naval forces” to train in the new naval combat techniques [11]. The French government offered a gratis cruiser training ship to Romania, volunteered to send a naval mission formed of specialist officers and to sell two or three Laubeuf-type submarines. The French side was also ready to help establishing a seaplanes’ naval training base at the Danube’s branches [12]. We do not possess information regarding the reasons why the Romanian authorities did not accept the French propositions.

The “classic” British fear of a French state that would be too strong from the military and economic point of view on the Continent, especially in the Central and Eastern part of it, as well as the disputes on the Ottoman legacy in the Middle East resulted in a strong opposition of the British circles towards the French strategy in the Black Sea. France reacted to the British actions that sought to reduce its influence in the Central Europe and the Black Sea region by encouraging regional alliances (the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente) and by signing bilateral treaties with the region’s states. Those agreements that France signed with the local states were more like “formal commitments”, with a morale value, which did not limit Paris’ liberty of action in relation with the other great powers [13]. A friendship treaty was signed with Romania only in 1926. Referring to the real commitment’s value of the bilateral engagements included in the Romanian-French treaty, Nicolae Titulescu stated that the document itself was “nothing but a repetition of the obligations included in the League of Nations’ Covenant”. In the opinion of the French diplomacy, the French engagements to Romania included in the treaty represented “a little more than nothing” [14]. Romania did not succeed in signing a military alliance with France because Paris was not interested in accomplishing such a project. A French-Romanian military treaty would have created supplementary complications in the Soviet-French relations, Paris considered. The French government’s point of view “excluded any sending of troops” in Romania. This position of the French diplomacy did not change during the entire Interbellum period. Regarding the content of the Romanian requests to France on the bilateral military collaboration, it must be specified that the Romanian side did not ask for “the impossible”, but just a guarantee that, “in case of un-provoked aggression from any power”, the French government would support Romania “by sending war supplies and, if necessary, a military mission” [15]. The British and French refusals of signing such military agreements with the middle and small states in the Black Sea region obliged the latter to seek other alternatives for the consolidation of their own security besides the traditional collaboration with the democratic Western powers. The failure of a collective security policy also contributed to a reduction of the Great Powers’ geopolitical influence and to the raise of role of the revisionist powers in the Black Sea region.

In Italy, the frustrations and dissatisfaction towards the decisions of the Paris’ Peace Conference in 1919-1920 allowed the ascension of the right-wings parties. The Fascist political regime in Rome promoted an aggressive foreign policy that questioned the status-quo and asked for a review of the boundaries. The Italian foreign policy was a stimulating factor for the defeated states in Central Europe and the Black Sea region, which constantly promoted a policy of cancelling the peace treaties and of reviewing the boundaries. The Italian expansion policy in the Balkan Peninsula caused new tensions and weakened the stability process in the Black Sea region. The hostility towards the regional organizations such as The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, the attempt of attracting Yugoslavia in its area of influence [16], the encouragement of the Bulgarian requests towards the neighbouring states, the opposition to the British and French influence in the area and the open anti-soviet and anti-Comintern attitudes were all the coordinates of the Italian strategy in the Black Sea region. The Italian strategy on the Black Sea region was in disagreement with the Romanian objectives and interests, the diplomatic, military and political Italian actions could be read as the Romanian minister in Rome, D. Zamfirescu stated, as stages of “a process” directed by the Italian fascist government [17] against the Romanian state and its foreign policy.

The British policy towards the Black Sea experienced changes related to the evolution of the Europe's balance of powers. In general, the British policy maintained a reduced presence in Central and Eastern Europe, regions considered by George Lloyd as full of tensions generated by "national hatred, greed and the worst form of national pride" [18]. In a document drew by the Foreign Office in 1925, called "Regarding the Balkan issue and the British Policy in Balkans", were formulated the main ideas of British policy in this region. These ideas were: maintaining the post-war status-quo, an impartial policy with the region's states, encouraging all peace initiatives and developing bilateral connections on various topics [19]. The traditional British policy was to prevent any attempt of the Great Powers to become the Continent's dominant. Consequently, Great Britain did not like too much French influence on the Continent and therefore supported the return of Germany as a European Great Power. The British interest towards the Continent's various regions was different: the Western Europe and Oriental Mediterranean represented vital area, whereas the Central and South-eastern Europe is considered an area of secondary importance. The German revisionism firstly targeted the territories in Central and South-eastern Europe, which were very important to the French interests. It is in this light that one must explain the British actions taken to reduce a much too powerful French domination in the centre and eastern part of the continent and also to stop the German and Italian advances in the Black Sea region. The Locarno Treaty showed the priorities of the British foreign policy [20]. After Locarno, the Romanian diplomacy understood that Great Britain was not "vitally interested" in the problems of south-eastern Europe [21]. As far as Romania was concerned, Great Britain did not had a "well-shaped" military and economic strategy. Between the two World Wars Romania represented a geopolitical interest for the British policy in relation to three aspects: the naval issues at the Black Sea – which could influence the communication's security between Oriental Mediterranean and the Suez; the oil – Romania being the second largest exporter of oil products in Europe; the defence of Poland – the Polish-Romanian alliance against the Soviet Union was taken into account. After the Anschluss' establishment, Great Britain drew a more coherent economic and political strategy towards Romania, taken into account the fact that a German domination in Romania and the Balkans severely endangered the British geopolitical interests in the Black Sea region and the Oriental Mediterranean [22].

From the Romanian point of view, the bilateral British-Romanian relationships in the Interbellum reveal another perspective. The Romanian diplomacy carefully observed the British policy in the Black Sea region and paid a great attention to the development of bilateral relationships on several levels. Great Britain played a very important role in the Romanian economy. In the Romanian foreign commerce, Great Britain was the second partner after Germany. The Bucharest governments were preoccupied to maintain the economic exchanges at a high level in order to compensate the German domination of the Romanian foreign commerce. Romania's efforts of industrialization found the technology, the necessary equipments as well as the adequate financial resources in Great Britain. It is one's duty to acknowledge the fact that between the two World Wars, Great Britain was Romania's most important supplier of war materials. During 1921-1939, Romania ordered numerous war supplies to Great Britain [23]. In spite of all these efforts, Romania played a peripheral role in the British military strategy regarding the Black Sea.

The geographic configuration of the Romanian territory after the First World War led to the doubling of the maritime border and to the gaining of control over the Danube's Branches, situation that clearly outlined the need of developing a Romanian military fleet, able to ensure the strategic defence of the Romanian shore and the Danube's boundaries. At the beginning of 1920, the Romania military authorities decided that the program of the fleet's development should be held in cooperation with British support. At the proposition of the Inspectorate of the Military Naval Forces, in March 1920, the Romanian War Minister approved that four superior officers should execute a one-year training program aboard British warships [24]. In the same time, the Romanian and British governments started to discuss the organization and development of the Romanian military naval forces. Based on the arrangements agreed between the Romanian and British military and political authorities, on February 19, 1920 Commander Bowring was appointed technical counsellor with the Romanian Inspectorate of the Military Naval Forces [25]. Commander Bowring, assisted by another

British officer, arrived in Romania on April 5, 1920, and since his arrival in the country until July 26, 1920 “drew complete and well-documented studies on the subjects submitted to him” [26]. At the end of July 1920, the British specialist left for London and worked closely together with captain-commander Bălănescu Ioan on the subjects regarding the buying conditions of British warships by the Romanian Navy and the Convention regarding the arrival of a British military mission in Romania. According to the Transcripts of the Council of Ministers no 888/1920 and 1526/1920, the Romanian government approved a 600, 000£ war credit for the buying of British military ships. The War Minister was authorized to buy from the British government a heavy monitor and seven destroyers. 450, 000 £ out of this credit were used for the payment of warships, spare parts, navigation instruments, artillery and other weaponry, engines, transmission equipments and also for the endowment of the Constanța Arsenal with installations and new machineries. The rest of the credit, evaluated at 150, 000 £, was assigned as improvement of a naval base in Constanța [27]. A Navy commission led by captain-commander Ioan Bălănescu and the director of the Military Navy Forces negotiated the buying of the eight warships from Great Britain in the summer of 1920. The negotiations took place at Foreign Office, between the Romanian plenipotentiary Minister in London, V. Boerescu and captain-commander I. Bălănescu on the Romanian side and A. Leeper and commandor Bowring on the British side. The main topics of the negotiations targeted the buying conditions of the British warships and the signing of a convention regarding the arrival and establishment in Constanța of the British Naval Mission in Romania. It had been agreed the buying of the heavy monitor called GORGON [28] (a modern ship, built in 1917, used for one year only in the British Navy combat service and which could have been rapidly put into function on sea) and seven torpedo boats (four “P” Class and three “M” or “N” Class) [29]. The warships selected by the Romanian Naval Commission were to be armed and brought to Romania in perfect condition for sea navigation. The total cost was estimated at 450, 000£, the payment conditions being negotiated afterwards [30]. The warships bought from Great Britain increased the combat force of the Romanian military navy. The negotiations regarding the British Naval Mission took place between August 1920 – September 1921 and targeted aspects regarding the composition, the time, the British officers’ statute and the payment of their salaries. The Convention was signed in London in September 1921 and stated that two British officers were “made available to the Romanian government and to the Inspectorate of the Romanian Navy” for two years, starting with April 1st, 1922 [31]. In the first years of the post war period, Romania developed a war fleet using two methods: by buying warships and by receiving war compensations. According to the statements of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the allies have distributed the warships belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to the winners as payment in the account of the war compensations that the Austrian state should have paid. This is how Romania received seven destroyers and three monitors from the Austrian navy as war compensation payment. Those ships belonged to the Romanian Navy Forces during December 1920 – January 1921 [32].

The demographic and territorial dimensions, the geographic situation and the neighbourhoods formed after the end of World War I, determined important corrections to Romania’s geopolitical position [33]. From the six states that neighbored Romania (The Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria), the country’s borders were threatened from three directions: east, west and south, more exactly, the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria. Besides the dangerous neighbourhoods, the geopolitical position of Romania was made more difficult by its situation on the “sanitary belt” that separated the democratic western world and its system of values from the Communist regime established at Moscow. Therefore the geopolitical situation of the Romanian state in Interbellum was characterized by: the probability of being attacked from three convergent directions either successively or simultaneously; the situation on the “sanitary belt” in the eastern periphery of the western world; the impossibility of a direct neighbourhood with the allied western states; the dependence on the value and speed of the western support [34]. In conclusion, Romania had to conceive a defence strategy based first on its own forces and on the most efficient capitalization of its entire national potential, to which it was added a possible military support from the allied countries including France and Great Britain [35].

The Romanian government was preoccupied to maintain the British interest towards Romania by stimulating the bilateral economic exchanges, by encouraging the British investments in the Romanian economy, by buying war supplies from Great Britain, etc. In 1923 the Romanian government allowed the General Staff to register large orders of war supplies to Great Britain [36]. In the next years, the military and political relationships between Romania and Great Britain recorded a favourable turn. Important orders for the buying of airplanes, airplane engines, guns and anti-aircraft machines guns, other types of weaponry and war equipments were signed. The conditions of a better collaboration between the two armies' intelligence services were created. Regular visits between the representatives of the two armies' General Staffs took place as well as mutual visits of military ships. The British political and military authorities carefully observed Romania's relationships with its neighbours, especially the Soviet-Romanian dispute over Bessarabia, the military rapports between Romania and France or Italy, Romania's role inside the Little Entente, Romania's position in the League of Nations and Bucharest's concern regarding the maintaining of the European status-quo. In 1927, with the help of Vickers Company, the foundations of the Romanian arms industry were laid by building two important factories of military productions in Cugir and Copșa Mică. In spite of the efforts done, the Romanian army's level of endowment was under the request of the modern war. In a meeting of the Superior Council for the Country's Defence, in July 2, 1929, while analyzing "*The Plan for the Army's Endowment*", General Nicolae Samsovici, Chief of the Romanian General Staff, presented a rapport which main conclusion was that the combat force of the Romanian army "was much lower than is was supposed to be" [37]. The analysis of the Romanian military navy's endowment presented in the same meeting proved that it was poorly endowed with warships and weaponry and did not "own a naval base as well as the material strictly necessary for defending the seacoasts" [38].

A series of measures were taken in order to strengthen the Romania's defence capability at the Black Sea, among which was the building of a modern naval base for the military fleet. Having taken into account the experience of the British military navy in achieving such military objectives, the collaboration relationships between the Romanian and British fleets, the support granted by the British specialists to the development program of the Romanian military navy, the Romanian authorities decided to ask to the British government the support of building a military port at the Black Sea. The Romanian War Minister asked the Romanian Delegation in London to "intervene with the British Admiralty in order to designate a technical Counter-Admiral [...] to study the execution plans and the location where the future naval base would be installed" [39]. Three days later, the British plenipotentiary Minister, Constantin M. Laptew, informed the Romanian Foreign Minister, Gh. Mironescu, that he made the requested intervention at the Foreign Office, but "the subject" was "delicate" and the British authorities asked that the "strict secrecy" should be maintained over the Romanian government's request [40]. On November 30, 1929, the Foreign Office communicated to the Romanian Delegation in London that the British government had approved the Romanian government's request; the British military attaché in Romania would subsequently transmit to Bucharest the composition of the mission and the draft of contract. During the discussions with the Romanian minister in London, the Foreign Office communicated to him London's interest towards the Romanian project together with the "the hope" that the Romanian government would decide that the construction works for the naval base would be executed by British companies [41]. The British authorities granted the necessary attention to preparing the mission that would later execute the project of the naval base and, on December 21, 1929, the British foreign minister communicated the name of the specialists selected for this mission to the Romanian Delegation: they were Counter-admiral R. M. Colvin and eng. G.P. Hayes as technical expert. The two specialists were to be accompanied by a secretary and a stenographer. In February 1930, the British military attaché in Romania had a conversation with Vice-admiral Scodrea regarding the project of the naval base and the selected British specialists [42]. Due to the fact that Counter-admiral Colvin had been deployed in another mission, the British government appointed Counter-admiral R.G. Henderson as replacement, this one being one of the most efficient British officers in port constructions [43]. On March 25, 1930 the Romanian government accepted the British officers and requested that studies on the naval base should begin as soon as possible. The British mission arrived in Romania on April 3, 1930. During

April-June 1930, the British mission made the requested investigations in the area and drew the necessary plans in order to build a port on Taşaul Lake, useable also as a naval base for the war fleet. The project was submitted for authorization to the Romanian military authorities. They appreciated that the documents were done with “special competence” and that “the solutions are given in correspondence with the state’s superior interests at the Black Sea” [44]. In the opinion of the military and political decision factors in Bucharest, the naval base on Taşaul Lake gained a special military value when one took into account “Russia’s war preparation”, attitude that made possible “a water and land aggression” against Romania anytime [45]. A forces analysis of the Romanian and Soviet fleets done in 1930 showed the clear advantage of Soviet fleet, a situation when the only thing one could ask to the Romanian naval forces was to execute missions of defending the Constanţa port and the Danube branches. The defending missions could have been accomplished only if “the existent war material would be supplemented by purchasing from the allies: a 240mm or 280mm battery for Constanţa; a 201mm battery for Sulina, a 152mm battery for Constanţa and a 152mm battery for Bugaz/Cetatea Albă” [46]. Building a credible defence for the Romanian naval border requested buying the following war ships from abroad: 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines, 2 anti-submarine warships and other war equipments specific for the naval fleet [47]. The British-Romanian discussions regarding the building of the naval base continued also in 1931, but in the context of the general economic crisis of 1929-1933, the military project could not receive finance. Without the British financial support, Romania did not own the necessary resources to begin the construction of the naval base on Taşaul Lake. The project regarding the construction of the military port on Taşaul Lake had also failed because the British foreign policy experienced a very important change at the beginning of the Interbellum’s second decade, when Great Britain showed a “reserved attitude both financial and political towards the European states” [48]. The discussions regarding the construction of the naval base on Taşaul Lake held an important place during the Romanian-British relationship during 1929-1934. Accomplishing such a project would have led to a strong involvement of the British policy in Romania and it would have created the supplementary conditions of convergence in the politics of the two states regarding the Black Sea, with important impact on the Romanian security.

The changes in the balance of forces between the great powers, Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, Italy’s increasingly aggressive policy towards the Balkan states, the growth of Soviet Union’s military offensive potential, King Carol II pro-British attitude were part of the factors that determined the Romanian authorities to restart the project of the naval base’s construction on Taşaul Lake with British help. Deputy Commander Gheorghe Niculescu was sent to London with the mission of getting the support of the British Admiralty in “developing” the Romanian naval forces [49], having been taken into account the fact that Admiral Henderson, author of the project, held a high position in this institution. The efforts of the Romanian diplomacy received the support of the British Admiralty but failed to obtain the financial resources necessary for the building of the naval base on Taşaul Lake because the British government had established a strict embargo on crediting other states, especially for military purposes. King Carol II had requested that an analysis should be done regarding the actions undertook in London by Commander Gheorghe Nicolescu in gaining the British support for the building of the naval base. The investigation conducted in 1937 by Costinescu Ghika showed that the Admiralty and some financial circles in the City were indeed interested in accomplishing the Henderson project, but no British company “would ever engage in such operation without the confidential approval of the British government” [50]. The project itself did not respond to Great Britain’s major geopolitical interests and the Foreign Office’s opposition led to the failure of the most important British- Romanian security project regarding the Black Sea between the two World Wars.

CONCLUSIONS

The Black Sea region – as an area of geopolitical confrontation – played different roles in the European great powers’ strategy during the Interbellum. To Great Britain, it represented an area of secondary importance, whereas for the other European great powers it represented a geopolitical priority. Great Britain and France signed alliance treaties with the region’s small states but refused any real commitment to them, not to limit their freedom of diplomatic action towards the Soviet Union, Italy or Germany. Romania developed a constant policy of attracting and maintaining the British

geopolitical interest towards the Romanian space and the Black Sea region implicitly. In order to keep its influence on the Black Sea region, Great Britain chose political and diplomatic methods for strategic reasons: it did not wish to unnecessarily provoke the Soviet Union and the security of the marine routes from the Oriental Mediterranean needed a stable area. Romania was able to elaborate its own strategy in order to counteract a possible Soviet naval aggression on its territory. The project of building a naval base on Taşaul Lake was one of the most important security initiatives of the Romanian authorities regarding the Black Sea, which opened new convergences in the British-Romanian relations. The Foreign Office opposed to the project's accomplishment because it did not respond to the British major geopolitical interests. The evolution of the British-Romanian relations during the analyzed period of time allows some considerations, always present in the international relations. In some cases of geopolitical disputes, the small and middle states can become partners in the security strategies' of great powers. Promoting their national interests in such situations depends on the realism with which they elaborate their own security strategies.

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CULTURE AND MORALITY IN GLOBALISATION

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Abstract

Whether we are for or against globalization, we must be aware that globalization is the process that marks, definitively, the contemporaneity. Above national interests, moreover weighing heavily on the moral position of the states, beyond cultural differences among the states, under the congestion of heavy clouds on the sky under which the whole world lives, an universal ethic is needed, which contains a number of consensual values, accepted by the entire mankind, respectively by the community of states. The idea that we are supporting is that a global culture is undesirable, yet a global ethic could build the foundation of the much needed “society of the states” so that we could face the threats that hovers upon the world. Dealing with the possibility of such dangers puts, in stringent terms, problems regarding ethics, moral consciousness and moral responsibility. Even if the values varies from state to state, from culture to culture, there is a set of universal rules acknowledged under the title of the Human Rights, at which adds the UN Charter principles, international relations laws, respectively traditions and practices shared among states, composing “the morality of the states”.

Keywords: *culture, value, ethic, morality, society of the states.*

Globalization is the defining process of contemporaneity. During the last decades, through the unprecedented development of information and communication, the amplitude of the globalization process has spurred deep theoretical debates, which constitute a large and controversial ideology of globalization. Aside from the divergences among the points of view belonging to different authors – promoters or opponents of globalization – the real fact of recognizing the process and its increasing comprehensiveness remains.

Globalization presupposes deep economic, social, political, cultural and moral transformations. In this sense, culture and the values of the contemporary world are going through a phase of acute agitation, contradictions and metamorphoses. Globalism and postmodernism reject and throw into oblivion classical and traditional values, together with their idealism and humanism, acknowledging the efficiency, the fragmentary and the exacerbated idealism.

The fervent supporters of globalization are only surpassed by the no less fervent critics of the process. Having a complex power of action in the financial, communicational, market or social domains, globalization is defined either as an essentially cultural process or as having an important cultural dimension. Theoreticians have dealt with the rapport between globalization and culture, between globalization and major problems such as the values that belong to human rights, social justice, environmental protection, the increasing polarization of the world in rich and poor, in rich countries and poor countries – all of these being values with a real moral connotation.

Our aim is to analyse the relation between culture and morality within globalization, starting from the premise that this is the major dilemma of this process from which both the positive and the negative effects that we all feel - regardless of whether we are supporters or opponents of globalization - emerge.

“Globalization” is a term that has been used very frequently lately, at the same time being understood very differently by those who use it: some see it as a total levelling, while others understand it as a

major diversification based on some common principles. The sure thing is that in the current development stage it is unthinkable that some parts of the world would act without considering the others. I do not believe that it is necessary for me to go into details in this respect, since this is already a commonly-accepted fact: today, any event that occurs in the world, even its remotest corner, affects the life of each of us.

Taking into account this reality, it becomes obvious that globalization is an ongoing process, an unavoidable and irreversible one.

Wishing to give a working definition to this concept, Malcom Waters considers that ‘ probably the best approach of such a definition should try to specify where the globalization process could end, how a completely globalized world would look like’ [1]. And the imagination of the author, a supporter of globalization, is not long in coming: “In a globalized world there will be a single society and a single culture that inhabits the planet. This society and this culture will probably not be harmoniously integrated, although it would be convenient that they should be. Rather they will probably tend towards high levels of differentiation, multi-centricity and chaos” [2]. In the global state there will be neither a central organizing government nor a narrow set of preferences and cultural prescriptions. “Should this culture be unified, it would be extremely abstract, expressing tolerance of diversity and individual option. The important thing is that territoriality will disappear as an organizing principle for the social and cultural life, there will be a society with no limits and no spatial borders.

After the description of this rather utopian vision, some questions await for answers: if the tendency towards globalization of society and culture could lead to chaos, among others, how would this be stopped? How can the extremely abstract character of culture be made compatible with tolerance towards diversity and the individual option? Facing chaos, why would globalization be desirable?

From a theoretical point of view, globalization offers the key to progress, it means transparency, standards of quality, environment protection – everything that contributes to the improvement of living conditions at a global level. However, it is obvious that in reality things are different. Globalization does not bring all these benefits and it does not bring equal benefits to all the states. Although the term of “globalization” suggests an inclusive process, the analyses of some authors reveal the existence and the persistence of some areas that are not included, that are underdeveloped, poor, far from the globalization conquests. However, because it assumes common standards and values, globalization generates a global balance, a privileged state that we all aim at. Globalization is not perfect but it is surely perfectible.

Globalization cannot be defined as a negative element of the modern society, but it is important that the national cultural background not be altered by the ignorance towards the educational aspect, which is the fundamental source of evolution for the young generation to feel and consolidate its roots into history, not only in the national one as a self reference, but also in the international one, where the deep roots can offer the force of the past, which will support the future development of some personalities who will know their place in the world and who will relate to other nations from correct and firm positions.

The deletion of the national culture, literature, art, religion, folkloric or musical traditions of a people will never be possible. The world would be poorer without the diversity of the national cultures. But the contemporary connections between the cultural and the political life must find their natural and working forms through which nations in general, including the Romanian one, should consolidate their qualities and spiritual and material achievements. Otherwise, what will we leave behind us? As a teacher of philosophy, I do believe that the Romanians will know this time too, as they have always known throughout their history, to find a middle way between accepting globalization and preserving their identity.

The concept of culture presupposes the cultures that particularize the values, which express the meaning of life and the identity of a people. In globalization, the most serious assault is the one against

small cultures, most of them being incapable of defending themselves and thus becoming endangered. To save them means to save some ways of expressing humanity, of expressing those values that constitute the dignity of the human soul in its various forms of manifestation. The widest met perspective among theoreticians is that the domain of culture does not and should not become global.

“Globalization and national culture” is not only a phrase, but represents a real dilemma. On the one hand, we have the globalization process, regarded both as a natural process and as a controlled process, while on the other hand we have the response reaction of the cultural universe, or, better said, of the cultural heritage of each nation.

Globalization includes the export and the imposing of Western cultural and socio-economic models, being defined as a new situation, a situation in which a planetary system is being built. This system is characterized by a huge communication capacity as well as by information changes on a planetary level. Beyond the formal definitions of globalization, we should insist on the attitude that we must adopt towards a phenomenon that is said to affect the Romanian national culture. Some claim that the globalization phenomenon has as a consequence the diversification of national cultures, while others, especially the French, claim the opposite.

We should not fall into the trap of the French model in our relation to the globalization phenomenon, because one cannot talk about a French model, about an attitude specific to the French people towards globalization. As a matter of fact, due to their national ego, the French replaced the term of “globalization” with the one of “mondialisation (worldization)”. This is not only the problem of the French people and of the French language or of the Romanian people and of the Romanian language, but it is the problem of more nations. The objective reality is that the English language, the Western culture and civilization in general and especially the American ones gain ground more and more. And nobody is to blame for this reality. The solution is to preserve as much as possible from the national cultural identity, to adopt certain limits of the acceptance of Americanization.

The reality is that the term globalization was created by the Americans. The French preferred the term “mondialisation (worldization)”, because in the French perspective mondialisation would define the respect towards the cultures of the countries participating at the phenomenon of economic globalization. Globalization has a decisive impact on national cultures and identities. Globalization does not always imply a high level of communication or of exchange between various cultures. Rather we witness the tendency underlined above that a dominant culture would impose over others, the result being a process of cultural homogenization. The degree of intensity of this homogenization is not given by the value of the national cultures but rather by the economic power of each country. The contact between the various national cultures, the exchanges between cultures bring into discussion the so-called “regional globalization”. Regionalization represents another aspect of globalization, being a globalization at a reduced scale. The world today goes through various forms of regionalization which are more or less consistent, especially in the fields of the market place, and capital. Thus, South-East Asia, North America, Latin America and the EU are especially visible. Among these, the European Union with its 450 million inhabitants and 27 member states is particularly visible mainly due to its history, results and project. The problem is if and when the free European market, communication and travelling – also free within the European space – will create the European citizen, with a European conscience and mentality.

Within social, economic, political and cultural frameworks defined by transition, globalization, postmodernism and regionalization, culture is transformed into an industry – “the industry of culture” - (a phrase that coincides with one of Th. Adorno’s works of the 20s) which, by revealing the banality of mass culture transforms the products of culture and art into a merchandise, suffocates individuality and destroys the critical spirit.

Analyzing culture and the moral values, we will not give up the hope that the great values of the universal culture, which have defined the human and the moral progress, will continue to exist and

even to be revitalized, reconsidered and placed once again on the position where history has raised them.

Autonomous spiritual domains, culture and morality have met in history and have influenced each other mutually. We understand the relation between them as having a unitary deep nature, justified by their role in society, which is to serve it by resorting to their specific means.

Having its roots in the human and social ontics the dialectic unity of the two areas of the human spirit lies, first of all, in reasoning and in work. The inter-conditionality of the two areas does not identify them and does not annihilate the differences between them. The characterization of culture, in its creative and value transforming dynamic, is understood as being the stimulus that determines the evolution of ethics itself, through the new meanings of its values, which transforms the human being into a value creating moral agent. Morality, including moral values, is a component of culture which, through its characteristic perspective, contributed to the social solidarity and cohesion, even if to a minimum extent at the beginning, instituting a social set of elementary moral norms without which the existence and the development of society would be difficult to conceive.

The moral norms and rules have a correspondent in reasoning and in the order that characterizes it. Analyzing the essence of the ethical norm in Logos architekton, Athanase Joja shows that it “is part of the human nature, because the ethic norm is the emanation, the transposition of the logical norms. Thus, the ethic norm is not an unexplainable attachment, but a manifestation of the human essence. Quoting E. Goblot, he goes on by underlying the fact that «The work of reason consists of two related logical systems: the system of Truth, science, and the system of the Just, morality»”. Belonging to the intellect, an expression of the harmony of the universe, and as works of reason, truth, just, science and morality explain, according to the author, why “the moral norm appears as related to the very essence of man, therefore as ineradicable” [3].

The osmosis between culture and the moral values is explained by the characteristic of morality of not being an independent “in itself”, but of interacting with all the facets of the human existence, of being present in the intricate weaving of the individual and of the social life.

The cultural creation, with its well-known manifestations – science, technology, art, literature, philosophy, religion etc. has permanently served the human, has emphasized the values that represented the height reached by the ideals of each era, has built attitudes in front of the world and of life, where the moral values constituted the bond between the forms of expression. In other words, morality, through its values, has never been absent and cannot be absent from any of the forms of culture. It works from the inside, in a more or less transparent way, instituting the convergence towards welfare, beauty and truth, convergence that will contribute to the human construction of man, to the expansion of his limits and to the improvement of his powers. The universe of culture is deeply impregnated by moral meanings that are co-substantial. Present in the culture, the moral dimension contributes to defining culture, participates to its permanent enrichment, just as the culture brings arguments for a highly moral structuring of the human personality. The Kantian inspiration – it is known that with Kant the supreme value was the human personality, man being an aim not a means – is taken a step forward. The Romanian axiologist Petre Andrei proposes the “culture-creating personality” as a moral ideal and an absolute value. Petre Andrei asks himself if morality creates culture or presupposes it; he further continues: “Culture is at the same time a condition and an effect of morality. It is a sine qua non condition, because it is a state in which the moral conviction influence, in which the moral law can be accomplished...Culture is a continuous creation and transformation of values whose general synthesis is the superior spiritual culture of humanity”. [4]

Beyond the relativity of the values, accounted for in the consideration of cultural diversity, morality as theory, as ethics and as practice – understood as human attitudes, feelings, behaviour and characteristics – has built around some common values that offered an inner unity to social constructs. Thus, it is hard to conceive a society without the existence of a minimum of the values of mutual help and respect, of respect for life and property etc. The presence and the manifestation of these values-

norms cannot be dissociated from a certain level of knowledge, which is an essential element of culture and which might have led, spontaneously, to the need of their appearance. Together with the development of society and of the human relations, as well as with the proliferation of culture beyond morality, in the well-known artistic, scientific and religious forms, the “code” of the human relations extended over certain norms in the sense of tolerance, loyalty, loving one’s neighbour, self restraint, discipline etc.

Culture associated with morality, both coming together with their values, gives consistency and significance to the human existence, motivates and focuses it, preventing its alienation and straying. With their power of influencing and even of determining human behaviors, the cultural and moral values order and harmonizes the life of the individual, open it to society and the his fellow individuals, to the sharing with them of some states such as hope, pain, guilt, remorse or insecurity. Especially in the face of great catastrophes that threaten them, people discover their humanity, which is common to all of them and gives profound value to the human life and being.

Thus, if a global culture is undesirable, a global ethics gathers more and more consensus. The confrontation with such possible dangers stringently raises ethical, civic or moral conscience problems and especially the problems of moral responsibility. In this debate of ideas, of searching for solutions at the theoretical level of ethics, of ways of making them functional within the space of morality, that is in the practice of human relations inside a group and in what is called “the society of states”, ethic theories that allow for or reject the possibility of a global ethics were elaborated. The battlefield between the supporters and the opponents of the global ethics is not strictly delineated, both parties accepting the existence of some weak points in their own field.

Various adepts of the global ethics consider the existence of the class of norms universally known as the human rights. To these they add the principles of the UN Charta, norms of international relations, and the existence of certain traditions and practices shared by the states and which constitute “the morality of the states”. The opponents of world ethics are essentially postmodernists or relativists of various orientations, who assert that different societies have different values and that the values differ from state to state and from culture to culture. Above the national interests, thus weighing heavily in the moral position of the states, above the cultural differences between the states, in the state of heavy threatening clouds gathering on the sky under which the world lives, one needs a universal ethics that should contain a number of consensual values agreed upon by the whole of humanity, by the community of the states, respectively.

The creation of a human community that is more sympathetic, with a diverse culture and yet essentially unified, starts from the premise that humanity is, in spite of the differences and of the variations between people, a unit; that people have the same physical and psychological constitution, the same basic needs and that they live on the same planet. Their way of life, seen from the point of view of the universal or general treats, leads more and more towards unity in diversity, the richness of which will be expressed in the alternatives specific to each group.

The need for unity and human solidarity will have to impose itself more and more in the future. International gatherings and meetings regarding environmental protection through the reduction of pollution, the limitation of arming in order to ensure peace and stability in the world, the reduction of poverty in the world in general and in Africa in particular through a more equitable distribution of the existing richness are nothing but attempts of solving the option to continue life on the small blue planet, but their results are more and more disappointing and less and less promising. Why? Because it is not reasoning nor culture and civilization that have a word to say, but the economic, military and financial power, hence the decision power over the fate of the whole planet of a small number of countries and people.

Righteously, it is said that the globalization process can be a good thing if the various cultures and national societies take part in this process equally. But if globalization is treated only as a redirected process which is decided on exclusively by the societies and the cultures that currently have the

economic power, then the homogenization of the national cultures can also have the negative effects of agglutination of the differences that are actually defining for the national and cultural identity.

The current culture reflects the interdependencies system that is created between peoples' cultures and it expresses the unity in diversity of the cultural phenomenon, but also the originality and the uniqueness of communities, groups and individuals. It claims the respect and the tolerance for the cultures of all peoples as an expression of their creation and existence, which is a reason to promote principles of peace and mutual trust, a system of values based on humanism, given the fact that the opposition between human groups is ultimately an opposition of systems of values. As a matter of fact, a culture and a civilization should use the whole human potential that has not been used by history yet, and new horizons should be open through the stimulation of changes in the human nature.

Following the same line of ideas, we underline that the dimensions of globalism and the universality of culture are not a fancy or the result of the will of a few individuals, but that it is an objective and necessary process, due to the fact that the current human species (*homo sapiens*) being the only one is also the great constant element of the universal history. Science and culture nowadays are and at the same time become more and more an universal message, the progress of the technical and scientific revolution imposing deep restructuring not only in the world of technology but also in the position that man has in the work process and in society in general, with wide consequences on the ideas about self, identity, man's position and role in the universe.

The richness in the cultural and in the behavioral-civilization areas is fundamentally different from richness in the economic area. From a cultural point of view, he who gives does not become poor, but, on the contrary, becomes rich, as cultural goods have a totally different alchemy than the material ones, where the accumulation of goods, money and other richness isolates the individual, often making him rapacious, even willing to resort to illegal and immoral means. In culture, on the other hand, by giving, man becomes spiritually and intellectually richer, sympathetic and sensitive to the others' problems, more open to the life, language and customs of the other. In culture, stronger, more sincere and more beautiful human relations are built and they develop the humane characteristic in the human being, as well as a flux of mutual values. The question to be asked, however, is the following: How many individuals nowadays live in the spirit of this morality, obeying the norms of authentic culture and civilization?

The moral crisis destroys the well-known pillars of the unity culture-moral values, in order to create, although not in the aggressive forms of elsewhere, that postmodern fragmentation that dilutes the concepts, mixes, multiplies and relativizes the criteria.

Thus, the dialectic unity between culture and the moral values is not tension-free and does not lack fighting and contradictions. The principle to question is whether the cultural and intellectual development, that is whether intelligence or feelings determine the progress, especially the moral progress. It is obvious that morality and culture are not synchronic; this disproportion between the intellectual and moral development of mankind, this non-parallelism between sensitivity and intelligence is the basis of the current crisis that the contemporary world is living.

Regarding this opposition, the opinions of the various authors are more clear-cut, especially in the case when the "unit" of the intellectual development is the level reached by the contemporary technology. One of the authors states that, while in technology we are giants, in morality we are no more than dwarfs. And the arguments do not stop here.

The globalization march, having a reason on the never returning road of science and technology, changes human existence where it can reach it, directs it primarily towards consumption so that civilization, society, arts and culture gain a consumption characteristic. This characteristic is not as serious as the increasingly emphasized one-dimension of their evolution process. Consumption and accumulation of material goods, spending free time with low quality or even anti-quality entertainment, the rapid consumption of friendship or love relations, doubled by the increase of individualism and of loneliness – all these and others as well are signs that we are passing into a new

stage or, according to others, into a new society. Optimists and pessimists, supporters and opponents of the coming structure called it in different ways: post-industrial society, informational society, knowledge (learning) society or postmodern society.

To the postmodern de-constructivism of the classic values, to the chaos and the current value confusion one can pair a “postmodern” culture – fluid, relativistic, with no benchmarks, hostile to the ideas associated with the classic and modern past. The collapse of the old system of values, the inclusion of anything into culture, the “carnival” of associations and highly strange value symbioses, reason and universal disparagement dilutes and relativizes the concept of culture. Postmodernism in culture and art becomes the expression of a crisis of values.

The postmodern man continues to be the slave of the accumulation of goods, of some false needs and wishes brought about by a more and more aggressive publicity. Subdued to the empire of television and of the virtual world, he leaves his solitude and the atomization of society, to which he opposes only what has been called “the neo-tribes”, sporadic and ephemeral urban agglomerations with immediate goals and no perspectives.

Identified at some point with westernization, globalization is understood nowadays more and more as Americanization and its rejection, in both forms, takes very diverse forms. The rejection of globalization, because of the risks to which society is exposed, meets the “panic” of globalization. The threats that are hovering over the world refer to economic, social, politic or moral risks, as well as to the risks of the globalization of poverty, diseases, drugs, pollution, crime and rebellion, terrorism, pain and evil. A movement opposing globalization is alter-globalization, meant to value the results of technology, science, communication, inter-state relations and human relations, in favor of all the countries and especially of underdeveloped and poor countries. In other words, it is meant to humanize globalization.

Becoming conscious of global threats led to the organization, in 1992, at Rio de Janeiro, of a world gathering – Earth Summit – where the challenges which mankind and the future generations would face were to be discussed. According to Maurice F. Strong, participant at a debate on values, environment and durable development held at the World Bank in 1995, the solution asked for a durable development as “a new vision of a sure and sustainable future for the human community”. Going on, he says that “the transition towards a sustainable development is not easy, but imperative for our survival. Our current model of production and consumption are not durable and we must change their course. Facing a new millennium, we also face an unprecedented challenge in the human experience, one that will determine our future as a species. There is no more time for gentle measures, as our survival and welfare ask for a transition towards a durable development. The course of the development and of consumption must be changed.” [5]

The problem was taken up again at the above-mentioned event which was organized by the World Bank. However, the organizing institution did not endorse the points of view of the participants, who somehow guessed that the global crisis was to break out during the first decade of the new millennium. What is surprising, since there had been no relevant antecedents for that, is the interest given to cultural values such as ethical, religious or aesthetic values that are involved in the promotion of durable development from the point of view of the environment in the United States, which is the country with one of the highest pollution coefficients in the world.

One condition for the society’s moving forward has proved to be the combination of the practical aspects of the human life with the moral and spiritual values. Thus, the inadequacy between the current values of the capitalist world and the world development requirements has been underlined. As a matter of fact, the critique of the current capitalist society is a constant of the globalization analysts’ analyses.

One aspect worth noticing is what the World Bank’s President at that time, James d. Wolfensohn, became aware of, namely that the fifty year-old institution must “combine the economic assistance mission with the spiritual, ethical and moral development. In this context, it is necessary that we

measure our progress and relate it to the groups that we are working on”, the result being given by the impact and by the efficiency of the programs over the development of a society. Remembering a transition process at the World Bank from this perspective, he wishes for a “balancing of the economic objectives with our moral and ethic standards”. [6]

We consider it very important in this context that we underline the fact that the activity of the American sociologist of Romanian origin Mihail Cernea, which brings the new perspective of the sociological research into the activity of the institution, is linked to the social, cultural and moral aspects of the economic assistance of the World Bank. The basic principle in the research of the development problems that he tackled was” Putting people first”. “The idea of the priority and the primordiality of people in any development project, regardless of whether it is of societal, communitarian or group size, are co-substantial in Mihail Cernea’s perspective. Thus, the Romanian sociologist shows in the Preface to “Putting people first. Sociological variables in rural development”: “The fundamental thesis of the book is that people are and should be the starting point, the center and the goal of any intervention regarding development. In sociological terms, “Putting people first” is more than an ideological appeal. It means making the social organization an explicit preoccupation of the policies, programs, needs and potential of the populations in the project area”. [7]

This point of view expresses not only the importance of social intervention, but is also a criticism of the way of working of some international institutions. According to the new vision, credits and assistance have as their aim a friendly environment as well as social development, taking into account the values of the assisted as well.

Between the environmental protection measures and the human values there is an important rapport, revealed by the English scholar R.J. Berry at the debate at the World Bank in 1995. His regret is that the ethic attitude was very dimly represented in a first version of the World Strategy for environmental conservation (in 1981). “As you all know, he shows, ethics determine attitudes and attitudes determine choices. Your choice depends on your values”. The economists however have mixed things up by not distinguishing between economic values and intrinsic values or symbolic values. The revised World Strategy of conservation (1991) has the merit, he continues, “to have included a very strong ethic component and to require a global ethic for a sustainable existence...People first operate based on beliefs and only afterwards on facts...The world’s future depends on responsible administration”. [8]

The solutions for fixing this situation come especially from the representatives of the consumption society. Some of them are even radical ones, which questions the possibility of their being actually applied. That is because they attack the very essence of capitalism. We refer, for instance, to the idea of the radical change of the way of living or, as the representative of Seattle, Norman Rice, states, to “the change of the whole consumption culture” which, should it be doable, “could be the strongest force on earth. Imagine, he continued, teaching ourselves and our people to look beyond our own interest and to see the wider interests of the community and of the future generations.” Since the top-bottom change does not work and since he trusts the people’s wisdom, he proposes that “a crusade for change and innovation should start from the grass level” [9], that is from the ordinary people.

Correcting the consumption culture presupposes a redefinition of the concept of success which, in current terms, is given for the Americans and not only, by the volume of the resources that they consume. The same correction brings into discussion the concept of needs, with the distinction between real needs and artificial needs which are generated by the consumption society.

Another participant at the debate, Ashok Khosla, considers that the dominant system of values is in the way of durable development, a system that privileges the individual over the community, the private over the public and the modern over the traditional. Among the fundamental principles that must guide the people’s future behavior the most important ones are reciprocity, which he considers to be “the golden rule” – what I expect from the other I expect from myself – and the fundamental human values which would be hard to deny by any rational being”. The stringency of the problem asks for action in this direction. “We must somehow create a movement and a new conscience at mass scale. The place

where we must act is represented by the schools, by our system of education” [10]. The redefinition of the concept of learning means, for example, that a constructor of a dam should also know the consequences that it has over the environment, over people, over forests and over wildlife.

The change that is required now is that the human attention should not center on mobilizing the resources of the Earth to sustain the human cause, but on mobilizing the human resources to sustain the cause of the Earth, thus satisfying the needs of the people. Such a perception and understanding are considered to be “one of the biggest moral challenges since we came out of caves”, “a moral challenge that is itself very challenging”. [11]

The ethic approach investigates new dimensions of the international justice, such as the relation between poverty, inequality and global distributive justice, the political exclusion of the refugees and the quasi-absence of these approaches from the ethics of the international relations, the relations between the human rights, human needs, human development and human security, the justice problems relating to the environment. In their national and international dimensions, the topic of the multinational corporations and of their global responsibilities and the problems correlated with nationalism, national self-determination and Secession.

Globalization made world states face global problems of various natures, some of them having a local “epicenter” and urging to action governments, state institutions and not only, mass media, national civil societies, the world civil society that is emerging through networking, national and transnational NGOs and even individuals.

We consider that without a universal ethics globalization will not solve the problems of the contemporary world but, on the contrary, it will intensify them. It is worth remembering of a short tractate written by Kant in 1795, entitled: “Toward Perpetual Peace”, where he considers the philosophical principles of international law. Kant believes that the vocation of humanity is to form a singular State. [12] The Kantian thought is not a pledge for a global state or for a world government, the solution being not a world state, but a federation of free states. Governments are organizations that are necessary from a moral point of view to accomplish the individual rights in the framework of concrete systems of justice. We consider the Kantian project as being abreast with the time. As a matter of fact, all the principles that he proposes in “Toward Perpetual Peace” are nowadays universally approved of. That shows us that such doctrines are not only dialectic exercises but even historical factors that accompany and regulate real progress. [13]

Today the concept of governance has become a reality indebted to the Kantian cosmopolitanism tradition. James Rosenau [14] conceptualized governing as governance - that is a regulation of the world interdependency relations in the absence of a political power such as the national one. There are discussions about international public policies, given that globalization imposes the management of a reality in the absence of a world government.

Authors such as David Held [15] or Jurgen Habermas [16] describe a theoretical project of the cosmopolite democracy, which implies multiple strata of local, regional, state and global governing, corresponding to the deficit of democracy at each level and especially at the global level. Democracy must “contaminate” global governance operating inside states, in the relations between states and at the global level.

In this sense the global society ethics is of interest. The specialists discuss about the ethics of the global governing in relation to the global governing of ethics, the understanding and the analysis of the social movements and alternative globalization, the dialogue between religion, cultural diversity and universalism in the international ethics, as well as about the transformations that the international political community are going through and the ideas about the global citizenship.

The contemporary world is characterized not only by a global economy but also by the emergence of a global civil society, of certain political liberalisms with global aspirations based, in various degrees, on cosmopolitanism and on inclusive and humanistic understandings of the human rights of the

individual as a global citizen, it is also characterized by an increasing importance given to the environment as well as to the accentuation of the detailed debates on world justice as “mutual advantage” but also as “impartiality”.

“The critical theory, the feminist theory, hermeneutics, the postcolonial theory and post-structuralism have been insufficiently appreciated in international relations, but each of them represent a challenge for the orthodox examination of the events of the contemporary world, deconstructing the binary oppositions that have framed so far the ethical problems and topics” [17]. All these demarches indicate a climate that is favorable to a more accentuated pluralism in the ethical theory and in the policies of international relations” [18]. The good practices, which are central to the ethical dimension of a good governing, will be necessarily indebted to this increasingly accentuated pluralism.

The critical theory continues Kant’s cosmopolitanism through the anti-hegemonic ethic ideas developed by Gramsci and Habermas, as well as by the Neo-Gramscians such as: Robert Cox, Stephen Gill or Mark Rupert. Through this demarche the possibilities of political transformation and the concrete practices of the authority structures at the international level are aimed at, said possibilities and practices being pleated on a pluralist approach in the theory of international relations, aiming at the understanding of the transformative possibilities of the global society and of globalization.

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES

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Abstract

International cooperation is a premise for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, is a principle that refers to all countries, regardless of the political, economic, development level and size. The principle of cooperation does not allow the exclusion of some countries from participating in international cooperation and discrimination. Any misunderstanding or dispute arisen between two or more countries should be settled by mutual agreement, cooperation being a necessary condition that must stay in the good faith of states, peaceful settlement representing a fundamental component of international security and peace.

Keywords: *international cooperation, peaceful settlement of international disputes, peace, international security.*

1. GENERAL BRIEF CONSIDERATION

International cooperation between states consists, in general, in collaboration of a state or some states with another state or group of states to address issues of general interest.

At the international level, states are central element, being only able, by virtue of their sovereignty, to establish principles based in cooperation and peaceful coexistence between them.

Despite social differences, advanced level of development, political regime, borders that divides them, the world's countries compile the international community as a whole forms a single whole.

Nicolae Titulescu highlighted the need to develop interstate relations, noting that “There is still an area where feeling can be valuable ally of reason: this area is that of mutual understanding of peoples, the only source of lasting peace and fruitful. Ills came from the fact that nations do not realize that, despite differences, they form after all, an indivisible whole. Man cannot be foreigner to man merely because it arises a border between them. And peace means nothing more than the case of universality of human consciousness” [1].

World peace is at their choice and to maintain it requires that all states to cooperate and fight only by peaceful means in solving international disputes or prevent the emergence of conflict situations in order to eliminate a looming world war.

Peoples of the world, as shown in the literature, support cooperation, even wish for it; is the benefit of progress and development. They do not accept, however, political subordination, military, economic “... All the unification and integration attempts - by subordination - have failed before and will fail in the future ...” [2].

Equality in rights of states is a prerequisite for cooperation between them, requires the elimination of discrimination and inequalities between countries, but also freedom of peoples to decide their own destinies.

Every state shall refrain from any action which would seek partial or total rupture of national unity and territorial integrity of another state [3].

Equality means the right of states, equal to each nation to decide its own destiny in accordance with its own interests and aspirations [4].

Moreover, the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to dispose of themselves or the principle of self-determination is a principle enshrined in the UN Charter and other international documents [5], under which “all peoples have the right to decide their political status, freely and without outside interference and to pursue their economic, social and cultural and any state has the obligation to comply right under the Charter “ [6].

International law, created by the will of the World States, is designed to facilitate collaboration between them, the means and legal guarantees for the development of cooperation and compliance with international norms and principles.

2. UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

United Nations was created in the aftermath of World War II, from the desire of people to build a global forum to ensure world peace and promote international cooperation and security, but also “to save succeeding generations from the scourge war, which twice in our lifetime man has caused untold human suffering” [7], by joining forces its members to maintain international peace and security by ensuring that the military “will be used only in the common interest” [8] and practice tolerance and good neighborliness.

UN General Reunion, following the principles established by the Charter was constantly concerned with states collaboration in peaceful settlement of any disagreement between them. In this regard, over the years, The US Reunion adopted a series of documents, bringing to the negotiation table all world countries.

One of the goals of the United Nations under the Charter, is “to achieve international cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems, in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion “, and all organization members” pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization “to achieve its goals and on the” higher standards of living, full employment conditions progress and economic and social development”.

International cooperation is enshrined not only in numerous provisions of the Charter [9] “which can be regarded as a genuine international code of cooperation” [10], but also in several international documents [11].

States, whatever the differences between their political, economic and social system (as outlined in the Declaration regarding principles of international law in the field of friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations), are obliged to cooperate with each other in various areas of international relations to maintain international peace and security and promote international economic stability and progress and general welfare of nations and international cooperation to be free of discrimination based on these differences.

For this purpose, as shown in the Declaration, states should: cooperate with each other to maintain international peace and security and ensure universal respect for and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and eliminate racial discrimination and religious intolerance in all their forms and lead, in their international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and commercial, in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention. And also, United Nations Member States are required to act both together, as well as individually in cooperation with the United Nations, according to relevant provisions of the Charter. States should cooperate in economic, social and cultural, as in that of science and to promote cultural and educational progress in

the world. They need to join efforts to promote economic development worldwide, especially in developing countries (...).

Declaration emphasizes that any state is obliged to promote, together with other states or separate, universal and effective respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms under the Charter of the United Nations (...).

In an international community composed largely of states under the rule of law, conflict resolution is inextricably linked to fundamental human rights.

United Nations, as noted, was created by world states stroked by war and the horrors marked, their organization's purpose being to defend peace and promote economic and social advancement of all peoples and to achieve international cooperation in all fields.

United Nations don't have the powers of a world government [12], but is an organization composed of sovereign states of the world, one of the purposes stated under art. 1 al.1 point 4 of the Charter is to be "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations" to achieve the common goals of the organization, the most important being the maintenance of international peace and security and the fight for human rights.

2.1. The principle of international cooperation

Duty of states to cooperate with each other is a principle provided by the UN Charter, and refers to all countries, regardless of political, developmental level and size and not allows the exclusion of countries from participating in international cooperation, or discrimination.

States should cooperate with each other to maintain international peace and security and to ensure universal respect for and implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and eliminate racial discrimination and religious intolerance in all their forms; states must lead in relationships their international economic, social, cultural, technical and commercial, in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, UN Member States have an obligation to act both jointly and individually in cooperation with the United Nations, in accordance with relevant Charter [13].

States have both the right and obligation to participate in international cooperation, but each state is free to choose partners for cooperation in any areas of international relations.

Necessity for global values exchange requires the states participation, in accordance with the principle of cooperation, whereas the present stage, they can not ignore and can not think to separate destinies.

No state can circumvent international cooperation to solve major problems facing mankind.

International cooperation is conditioned by the goals to be pursued, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, promoting economic progress and stability, the general welfare of nations, to promote economic development worldwide, and can not be achieved under the other principles fundamental international law, first of sovereign equality, the equality of partners in cooperation [14].

The principle of cooperation has a broad application and covers all areas of activity - technical, legal, scientific, etc., not only those mentioned in the Charter, states accounting for the obligation to cooperate with each other.

An expression of the principle of cooperation is unprecedented increase in the number of international organizations with a universal vocation, to which most members' states of the world, the statutes of these organizations, as well as through their decisions in the Member States have undertaken specific obligations to cooperate in this field. Large number of organizations, covering various fields, creates a network of obligations of cooperation between most countries [15].

2.2. International cooperation - a prerequisite for peaceful settlement of international disputes

International cooperation between states is a prerequisite for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, based on good faith that must stand the states in international relations.

The UN Declaration of 1970 was endorsed this principle stipulating that "... every state is obliged to fulfill in good faith the obligations incumbent on them under international agreements, in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law ..." and "... the principle that states must fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the Charter is intended that, along with other fundamental principles of international law contribute to the normal international life to promoting peace and cooperation between all countries.

Any misunderstanding or dispute arises between two or more countries should be settled amicably through peaceful means.

Nicolae Titulescu said that there are no problems in relations between states that can not be resolved by mutual agreement, mutually beneficial, as necessary "to realize the truth that despite the frontiers, despite differences, mankind form one body. It belongs to the government, as to us to realize this truth. Consciousness that binds man to man is more important than what you can separate the field of national interests ..." [16] and also stated that "... there is no difficulty arising from relations between people who can resist at the union and international cooperative" [17].

Peaceful settlement of international disputes is a mission that is the United Nations, which recognizes the important role in this matter, as also through its only able to take appropriate action.

In its role of maintaining international peace and security, the United Nations since its creation, was often required to prevent disputes on a war or to help restore peace when conflict broke out already. Experience in recent years has strengthened leadership of the United Nations, the builder of peace and strong peacekeeping organization.

In recent years, due to international events, the UN General Assembly expressed its determination to promote international cooperation in political and encouraging the progressive development and codification of international law in particular the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Adoption of a universal treaty on peaceful settlement of international disputes would be particularly important in this respect; an important step was made at the 52nd session of UN General Meeting by initiating the development of guiding principles for international negotiations [18].

Treaty "should devote duty of all states to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter [19] in order to avoid disputes between them affecting the friendly relations between countries, thus contributing to peace and international security and their duty to live in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to endeavor to adopt effective measures to strengthen international peace and security.

Treaty is expected to stipulate the obligation of all states to settle their international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so that international peace and security and justice are not endangered [20].

The United Nations is the most important tool you have available to achieve member ideals of international peace and security, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to achieve international cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

Administration of cooperation between states is necessary in all fields to contribute to healing the international political climate. Must be real cooperation, mutually beneficial, and development of relations between states must be based on principles of international law, especially the principle of equality of all States, in their inalienable right to have their fate.

An important area of international cooperation is the economic relations between states, governed by economic agreements, commercial, banking, etc. to facilitate economic growth between them, and to reduce tension and political animosities.

Nicolae Titulescu ideas are very actually, he stated in 1934 that “economic agreements can greatly reduce the political difficulties. Applied on a large scale, they can make devaluation frontiers and practiced in good faith, they can bring their full spirituality” [21].

As a factor in world peace and stability, economic, commercial and technical-scientific relations represent the most important weight in relations between states; international cooperation gives them a complex content and has an active role in influencing positive political relations.

Unfortunately, underdevelopment, economic backwardness, hunger, does not bring peace among men thus, one of the goals of international cooperation being the liquidation of these shortcomings. States with high or very high economic potential, should support the less developed, so that through the exchange of material and spiritual, people would come to be more respectful.

Development of multilateral international cooperation, peace and security in the world having as a premise the possibility that each nation can claim their liberty and national personality, to enjoy free of all conditions to its economic and social progress based on principles and rules generally recognized international law [22].

Currently, states must place special emphasis on cooperation between regional and international organizations to fight for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, for only by their disappearance can build a world of peace.

Kofi Annan underlined the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and the need to build global-regional strategic partnerships appropriate current international context, but also institutional cooperation structures between the UN and regional organizations [23].

The international community has reached a stage of its evolution, in which peace and security can not be dealt with unilaterally. Member development is undoubtedly related to peace and security and human rights, which requires the need for cooperation of all countries of the world and coordinate their efforts, which aim primarily to achieve and maintain international peace and security.

Only in a world of peace [24], a world without violence, can achieve compliance, and protection principles and universal values.

United Nations was established in peace and security around the world, trying to institutionalize these concepts, based on prohibiting the use of force by states to settle their international disputes and collective defense.

However, the conclusion based on myriad events, is that perpetual peace was never installed in the world.

Such a goal can be achieved by signing international documents of any number of states, but the development of international law to abolish war and as a natural consequence, all the arsenal used in such cases, will disappear.

Peace will indeed be fully established, with one condition that the big states to abandon the “superpower” by arms, and become superpowers by their economic and cultural value.

References

[1] N. Titulescu, 1967, Speech at Ceremony title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Athens on October 21, 1933, in Diplomatic Documents, Policy Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 531.

[2] D. Mazilu, 1998, Peace Law - Treaty, All Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 171.

[3] The territory is the material development and affirmation of all states and nations. State and nation are inextricably linked to the territory, which is a sine qua non of their existence.

[4] E. Glaser, Right of People to Decide Their Own Destiny, the Romanian Journal of Law, nr. 5/1971, p. 110.

[5] The principle was reaffirmed and developed, for example, the Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention (1949) for the protection of victims in international armed conflicts, adopted in 1977 in Geneva, which recognizes the legality of the fight “against colonial domination and foreign occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves enshrined in the UN Charter ... “ (Article 1 paragraph 4); human rights Covenants adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force ten years later, established that “All peoples have the right to dispose of themselves. By virtue of that right they freely determine their economic, social and cultural. States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of people to have themselves and to respect that right, in accordance with United Nations Charter “ (Article 1), the Helsinki Final Act states that “... in the name of equality of peoples and their right to dispose of themselves, all peoples always have the right in its sole discretion, to determine as they wish when they wish, their internal and external political status, without any outside interference and to achieve their development according to their political will, economic, social and cultural” others This principle was emphasized in the International Court of Justice practice.

[6] Declaration on principles of international law in relations of friendship and cooperation among States in accordance with United Nations Charter, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution nr.2625 - XXV - from October 24, 1970 (UN Declaration of 1970).

[7] UN Charter Preamble.

[8] Ibid.

[9] In article 1 section 3 of the Charter, international cooperation is seen as one of the main purposes of UN Charter. Article 13 of the Charter states that promotion of international cooperation is one of the important functions of the General Assembly; Cap.IX of the Charter entitled “Economic cooperation and international social” still refers to this principle.

[10] N. Ecobescu , V. Duculescu, 1976, Fundamental Rights and Obligations of States, Policy Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 171.

[11] Covenant of the League of Arab Charter of the OAS, Organization of African Unity Charter, Helsinki Final Act, UN Declaration of 1970, Charter Member and economic obligations adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 (XXIX).

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[13] UN Declaration of 1970.

[14] I. Diaconu, 2005, Treaty of International Law, vol III, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 282.

[15] I. Diaconu, 2002, Treaty of Public International Law, vol I, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 316-317.

[16] N. Titulescu, Idea of Peace Progress, in Diplomatic Documents, p.354.

[17] Ditto, p. 342.

[18] D. Mazilu, 2006, the Treaty on the Law of Peace, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, pag. 177.

[19] As shown by UN Secretary General, “to reaffirm and develop the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes between states, the legal rule that depends to a large extent the fate of mankind”, is of great importance. According to his dedication to this principle and its transformation into a fundamental norm of international relations “will result in Member States to reflect on their conduct in international relations and to fulfill obligations to settle international disputes by peaceful means” - Javier Perez de Cuellar, on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, doc.PR.7/15 November 1982 - quote D. Mazilu, Law Peace - Treaty, p. 202.

[20] D. Mazilu, the Treaty on the Law of Peace, p. 177.

[21] N. Titulescu, 1934, Romania and the Treaty Review, the National Printing House, Bucharest, p. 75.

[22] D. Mazilu, Law Peace - Treaty, p. 153.

[23] From the speech of UN Secretary General the opening meeting “Cooperation UNO - Regional organizations in stabilization processes “, organized by Romania on July 20, 2004. The debate was attended by representatives of the other 14 Member States of the Security Council and UN Member States and of organizations with security tasks - OSCE, CIS, Organization of African Union, League of Arab States, aso, site: <http://old.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=25032&idlnk=&cat>

[24] Without thinking it is a misnomer, since peace has to be a normal state, the natural arrangement of things and accompany us everywhere. People must be born in peace, to live in peace and leave inheritance of future generations, peace, most precious asset of humanity.

MANAGEMENT POSSIBILITIES OF THE RETAIL ASSORTMENT

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Abstract

The choice of assortment in retailing refers to the key strategic decisions. In principle, importance of all the goods offered to consumers. The task of managing the development of the retail assortment is better satisfying consumer demand. The main objective of this paper is to examine and interpret basic theoretical and methodological stands for assortment management in retail and on this basis to distinguish effective approaches in all its impact on development.

Keywords: retail assortment, category management, retailer.

INTRODUCTION

Assortment policy is one of the main elements of the competitive strategy of the firm. The question of expansion or contraction of the range of products manufactured or sold may have different solutions depending on a single set of specific conditions: an industry trade group, the scale of the enterprise and other circumstantial details. Nevertheless, the general rules and relationships can and should be identified and formulated on the basis of analysis of the status and development of existing market segments (external factors) and financial changes within the firm (internal factors).

The main purpose of this report is to examine and interpret basic theoretical and methodological stands for assortment management in retail and on this basis to distinguish effective approaches in all its impact on development.

According to the rule in the range of merchandising for each type of enterprise retail sales figures for the provider establishes a minimum set of product. The formation and implementation of assortment policy are needed to determine the break-even condition of the company, control the amount of income tax in order to optimize and predict their own investments in business development.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ASSORTMENT

The formation of assortment policy and its implementation are of particular importance if the scope of freedom of choice and the line of the enterprise. Assortment policy involves gathering information about the characteristics of market segments, products, consumer preferences, prices, macroeconomic trends, conditions of foreign economic relations with countries abroad.

There are the following fundamental factors affecting the formation of an optimal set of product assortment in the store: Fig. 1.

Demand is one of the major factors in determining the optimal range of point of sale. It is classified as follows:

- special - the demand for a particular product, a product, can not be replaced by another, even a homogeneous product;
- an alternative - the demand is finally emerging in the choice of products, meet with their proposal;
- impulsive - demand, emerging under the influence of the supply of goods in retail establishments.

- the objectives of assortment policy merchandising producer;
- the representation in the market of as many kinds of product assortment;
- an active innovation policy;
- provision of sufficient inventory at retail, to which is constant monitoring both quantitatively and by product versions;
- to ensure quality of our products;
- the presence of “shock” in the range of goods that are already in the retail network will need to focus with advertising and calculations.




Fig. 1. Fundamental factors affecting the formation of an optimal set of product assortment.

The basis of selection of a product line strategy must be the assessment of changes in cash flows, changes in the range of activated and the forecast of the cash flows in the future. Any expansion of the range necessarily entail increased costs. In this case the positive financial results from changes in the range can only be in the future.

It happens that the purpose of expanding the range (for example, the production of related products under existing brand) may be advertising. Under these conditions, diversification should be considered as any transaction costs, in terms of their impact on cash flows and financial benefits. Despite this, the main parameter in evaluating decisions about the production of new goods (whether it is a new and independent type of products or fashion goods) or the reduction of existing product lines to be cash flow analysis and financial results in connection with such changes.

Policy changes may be based on the range of three theories:

- Horizontal change - one of the elements of horizontal diversification policy, which is a change within the range of existing activities, or in similar areas, access to new markets without passing on the adjacent levels in the range of cooperation.
- Vertical change - a component of vertical diversification of the company, focused on the expansion or contraction in output associated with the independent production of those components, which are primarily purchased from outside suppliers, as well as the formation of its sales network to promote their products.
- Integrated change - is a vertical and horizontal diversification.

The struggle ranges often occurs within the boundaries of education and confrontation of major economic clusters - complex business organizations, members of the profitable and emerging sectors of the economy. In Russia, this process is also associated with opposition to oligarchic structures, industrial and financial organizations (groups) that can be used as methods of lobbying the legislative process and the decisions of local authorities, as well as the unfair restriction of competition through the establishment of artificial barriers to entry.

In addition to unfair methods of struggle in the market place and have the economy-wide (opportunistic) conditions, Michael Porter refers to barriers to entry. They are:

- the economies of the increase in production;
- differentiation of the goods;
- the need for capital;
- higher costs;
- access to channels of consumption;
- the policy of the government.

This type of management implies that the range of commodity categories, taking into account user requirements, responsibilities of the cycle of movement of categories and a review of each commodity category, such as mini-business within the commercial organization with a budget, pricing, purchasing policy etc. [2].

In chronological aspect of range management has evolved, observing a particular sequence. A review of the literature in this field allows you to identify different evolutionary stages.

In the traditional approach, which survived until the 80s of the twentieth century, manufacturers updated range of reasons such as:

- putting into circulation a new item of goods, enabling lower cost, which generally does not modify user attributes. Thus ensuring participation in price competition with other producers of similar goods.
- developing an improved and updated stock position in order to preserve the share of sales.

With the transition to a postindustrial society has lost the usual mechanisms for efficiency. Stocks are increasing - both brands and in properties. Direct competitors grow and found that the new conditions the old approaches do not provide the necessary positive balance. Before manufacturers have a need to examine the range, assuming the position of buyers.

The situation forced the retailers to restructure their approach to the management of the range is similar to that in which they are producers. So in the middle of the 80 years of the twentieth century show the prerequisites for the emergence of the concept of the categorical management. This concept is based on the relationship between the increase in sales volume on the approach to the assortment, not as collected in one individual commodities, but as a set of specific categories or product groups.

Thus categorical management, as a kind of management, becomes independent research field, suggesting the presence of certain approaches and methods of study. The decisions of the retailer into one of the categorical areas of management, may limit the effect of management decisions in other areas integrated. As emphasized J. Chiang and T. Wilcox, "... the larger range puts more demands on the shelves space in case of permanent shelf space necessitates rearrangement of items" [1]. Since this reduces the amount of stock to be stored for each item - as in warehouse stores and on shelves, then a large number of sets can not only lead to reduced visibility on the shelf, but may pose an increased risk of deficiency, namely, does not have a range of goods.

In this sense, the entire shelf space allocation by category, may place restrictions on the number of stored stock units which can effectively provide a shelf in an assortment size/composition, and affect the process of reducing commodity deficits. Retailers should have answered the question of how consumers respond to specific management decisions categorical and thus what effect it has on the amount of sales and revenue for individual commodity categories. This must be considered how these specific categorical management decisions related to its component areas of management. As a rule, consumer response to the missing items depends on the available amount of items from their stock and the opportunity for mutual substitutability. What matters is whether the deficit is seen commodity, and the way be interpreted - as a permanent or temporary.

Consumer reactions to changes in the set are controlled by changes in shelf space and its arrangement in accordance with existing sets. In this way users are expected to be more responsive to increasing assortments arranged on shelves, provided that the diversity is large enough and does not hinder visibility. In this connection, to obtain a clear idea of all processes in the system range, it is appropriate to present a retail assortment in the types of several subsystems, formed by a certain dominant sign, ie system to classify the range. The classification of commercial orientation in the range allows different categories and groups of goods that are inherent in the common signs that, first, greatly simplifies the tasks of management and, secondly, create optimal conditions for research and demand forecasting [3].

Simple signs of classification, determining the compliance of goods to the classification group is the unity of origin or manufacturing consumer use. These signs are used in traditional classification of goods. Depending on the purpose of managing the range of possible build any other structure in which the defining characteristics can be user preferences, trade mark, the level of profitability and more. In its entirety the structure of the retail assortment is a set of interdependent and independent classification groups at different levels in the hierarchy. The classification of commercial range allows to group multiple objects realization consolidated commodity categories. By this logic, the range of commercial enterprise can be represented as a list of commodity groups. In essence, every product group in the range consists of several sub-commodity. Thus, the classification of the range allows the formation of a structure within which to maintain control.

One of the basic objectives of the category management consists in dividing the commodity categories in the structure of the set and then manage each of them. The range of goods are not divisible commodity groups and categories formed on the ground of consumer habits and preferences.

In broad terms, the stock category is a combination of elements, changing their position when changing the status of individual elements of this set. The management of commodity category is part of overall management, which is the most complete, logical or productive in terms of achieving management objectives.

A new approach to the management of range - category management - is limited by the investigator C. Kandalintsev to control range to Category principle; own professionally active in the management of the range, aimed at developing a range according to size and structure of demand in most more complete and effective use of financial, material, information and labor resources. The basis of the adapted approach puts the separation of interconnected groups of goods from a consumer perspective. Any such goods category shall be managed and treated as a separate business unit.

Management to differentiate and specify in the form of activities whose performance helps optimize the structure of the range and ensure rational organization of the entire commercial process:

- managing the development of commercial range;
- establishment of commodity categories in the structure of the range;
- optimizing the structure of commodity categories;

- establishment of business management models appropriate to the category management strategy;
- maintenance of an automated system for managing the commercial range.

The retail assortment in the system of category management is a peculiar combination of species or varieties of goods grouped under certain categories of signs in stock while preserving the essential features of the range (width, depth, balance, rationality, stability, novelty). In itself the distinction of each commodity category allow the maximum number of factors affecting the sale of goods and allows to reach better results.

Besides, unlike the traditional management of the business in which the functions of buying, selling and moving goods is divided between different departments, the management category in all the work associated with a commodity category, starting from the purchase and ending with the sale is performed by so called. browse categories manager. For commercial enterprise benefits from the implementation of category management is summed up in the stock portfolio optimization, increasing the effectiveness of the measures to stimulate sales, competitive pricing, proper consideration of the goods. Business processes of retailers and suppliers improve, which implies reducing operating costs and increase revenue. Achieving this is impossible without close cooperation between operators, suppliers and manufacturers, but also without the exchange of data necessary to manage the range.

In terms of general problems in the organization of management of the business category management is a suitable option for decentralization. The large number of stores in a chain composition of the huge range of models need to separate the network business of efficient units. Commodity categories - is one of the best among them as they are formed in order to increase sales and therefore the final performance. In this respect, the fundamental idea of category management is to distinguish goods categories in the structure of the set and then manage each of them. The range of goods in this case is not divisible commodity groups and categories formed by signs consumer habits or preferences.

In broad terms, the category is a set of elements, changing their position when changing the status of individual elements of this set. In the retail sub category means all elements whose constitution allows groups in offering a positive effect in the conversion process, increases efficiency and productivity of the managed system. Stock category is represented as a set of goods, the unification of groups which co-management with the objectives and tasks of category management. In a commodity category may be combined goods belonging to different commodity groups, subgroups or species. For example, a single commodity category may include cheese (the group of dairy), wine (from the group of alcoholic drinks) and chocolate (the group of confectionery).

By extending the range manager responsible for this commodity category may attract additional customers. In this case its delivery costs, storage and deployment of additional positions are compensated less by increasing the volume of wine sold, but at the expense of increased sales of ancillary products which customers use with wine. Thus, in bringing the goods into categories managers provide the maximum possible beneficial effects for their own management systems. According to a large group of researchers. It itself the process of implementation of category management and system development management product range consists of the following five stages: forming (separation) of commodity categories in the set, determine the structure of commodity categories (components of these categories), defining the role of commodity categories, the assessment component and specify the potential of commodity categories, the contribution of components of product categories to achieve the objectives of the store.

Indeed, the identified stages allow tracking of market goods in separate categories, and analysis of sales by commodity categories within the commercial enterprise. This in turn requires a thorough analysis of the structure of product categories in terms of their need to expand or narrow, new sub-amendments to the magnitude of trade margins applicable to certain commodity groups, etc. In its entirety distinctive stages facing the process of category management at commercial enterprise.

The composition and the timely updating of assortment of goods in the shops rely heavily on the degree of satisfaction of demand, costs, consumption, associated with the purchase of goods, quantitative and qualitative indicators of economic activity in the retail stores. Individual products, their narrow, unstable or inappropriate customer demands creates pent-up demand, which increases the amount of time people searching for the right products, adversely affect the economic efficiency of enterprises.

Therefore, the formation range of goods at retail key requirement is the maximum satisfaction of customer demand at the lowest cost of time on making a purchase, and to ensure efficient operation of commercial enterprises.

The services sector of retail trade has a significant place in the economy. Direction of this field is the maximum satisfaction of human needs, not only in high-quality products and services. Retailers is that they are produced and consumed mainly at the same time and shall not be stored. Because of this, these services are usually based on direct contacts between producers and costumers. In trade is the separation of certain services from the goods embodied the realization of which is usually associated with commercial brokerage and storage capacities.

Retail trade - is the production of use values that are in the process of retailers do not get materialized form and satisfy the material needs of everyday society. In the main competition for retailers is to get the best profit by providing the required quality of service trade and reduce the costs of providing. Part of retailers in an effort to increase profits by reducing costs, degrade the quality of trade services.

Relations arising at this stage of commercial activity between the seller and the buyer, are based on the contract of retail purchase and trade. Accordance with the contract of retail purchase and sale of a seller engaged in business of selling goods at retail, shall transfer the goods to be used for purposes not associated with a business that is for personal, family, home and other such uses.

A contract of retail purchase and sale of a public contract because it establishes the obligation of the retail trade enterprises selling goods and services trade to everyone who has applied to it. In this case the seller has no right to prefer one customer over another, and the price of goods and services, as well as other conditions of the contract, shall be the same for all consumers, except in cases where the law or other legal acts permitted to provide benefits for specified categories.

The conclusion of the contract is preceded by a public offer, which recognizes the supply of goods in the form of advertising, catalogs, specifications, containing all the essential terms of the contract. If the place of sale of goods (on the shelves, windows, etc.) exposed to the goods themselves, their designs, or provides information about the goods (in the form of catalogs, descriptions, photos, etc.), it is considered a public offer, regardless of whether, are the price and other material terms of the contract of retail purchase and trade. The case where the seller is clearly established that the goods are not intended for sale. A contract of retail sale is concluded with the issuance of the seller to the buyer or cash sales receipt or other document confirming the payment of goods.

At the heart of the commercial retail is the study of various types of consumer demand for subsequent analysis and use of the results. For example, one form of demand is a measure of retail trade. Analysis its structure helps to reveal the preferences of consumers in respect of certain goods.

However, it should be remembered that trade as an expression of demand can be judged only on the needs of buyers. No realized and unrealized, there are still needs, and so - and pent-up demand. The causes of such demand may be on sale as a lack of necessary consumer goods, as well as too high, do not meet income population, the prices for them. Changes in demand may be associated with a reduction in both the needs of customers in one and an increase in demand for new substitutes, goods, and with the expansion of demand for goods, demand for which has already been formed. In these cases we speak of the emerging demand.

Thus, the formation range of goods - is a complex and continuous process, the main purpose of which is the most complete satisfaction of human needs for goods, while ensuring the profitability of commercial enterprises.

Significant impact on demand fashion and have scientific and technological progress, so they too can not be ignored, forming a range of products. In stores the formation range of products starts with the determination of the latitude range of goods sold in it, that is, the number of commodity group. Determined by the depth of assortment, that is, the number of species and varieties of products within each group.

As a rule, the department stores over a wide range of products compared with a range of specialized shops. Specialized stores presented a larger number of varieties of goods, so they are characterized by large depth range. In accordance with the rules of the sale of certain goods assortment of goods offered for sale is determined independently by retailers in accordance with the profile and specialization of their activities.

CONCLUSION

Attempt to examine and interpret the nature of the complexity of the process management product range in retail trade and certain approaches related to its development, a basis for formulating the following major conclusions:

- Analysis theoretical and methodological formulations help to explain the process of development management product range in retail and on this basis to derive its practical importance for both sides - business and consumers.

- The implementation of category management as a new approach to managing the development of the assortment is methodologically based on the formation of commodity categories according to size and structure of consumer demand and targets the most complete and efficient use of material, financial, labor and information resources .

- categorical managers should develop and implement complex solutions associated with the formation and development of the range, the promotion of sales of goods of a given category, and the securing of beneficial effects for their own management system.

Using category management, retailers aim to achieve successful sales by commodity categories, increased profitability at the expense of lower quantities of illiquid and low commodity items be turned, optimization of stock, increase customer satisfaction, as far as structure and performance in commodity categories performed taking into account consumer needs.

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ROMANIA AND THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA AREA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR

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I would like to bring to the attention of the participants two distinct dimensions of international cooperation in the Black Sea area, which can complement the views expressed at this conference.

The first dimension is related to the fact that a first initiative with a view to organizing an institutionalized cooperation between the Black Sea riparian states emerged soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. That initiative is presently known as the *Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation*.

It is important to note that before the end of the Cold War there was no form of institutional cooperation among the Black Sea riparian states. If the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits did not stipulate anything in this direction [1], the inter-state cooperation was not possible even after the end of World War II. The specific post-war bipolar division line passed through the Black Sea, as long as Turkey joined NATO in 1952, whilst the USSR and the other two riparian states, Bulgaria and Romania, became in 1955 founding members of the Warsaw Pact.

The ending of the Cold War created the appropriate conditions for the emergence of a format of cooperation among the Black Sea riparian states, and the first project in this respect was a Turkish-driven initiative. Being launched within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as early as the beginning of 1990, and taken on board rapidly enough by the Turkish state authorities [2], this project aimed at developing economic cooperation between the countries in the region and at ensuring the sustainable development of their economies so that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity.

It was in this purpose that a meeting was held in Ankara, on 19-20 December 1990, with the participation of deputy Foreign Ministers from the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Beyond the specific aspirations of the host country – at that time the only booming market economy in that particular region – to build a „common market of the Black Sea” [3], it was pretty noticeable the general political will to establish lines of cooperation in the fields of energy, environment, transport and communications, as well as the very symbolic fact that within the Soviet delegation there was an Armenian representative who went to Ankara to promote cooperation with Turkey and thus to overcome the differences of the past [4].

The negotiation of the political document in order to launch that form of cooperation was practically achieved during the first semester of 1991. The experts dealt with the details in Bucharest (March 1991) and Sofia (April 1991), and the deputy Foreign Ministers agreed the main lines of cooperation during their meeting in Moscow, in mid-July 1991. However, the high-level approval of the political document could not take place immediately, due to a dramatic shift in the geopolitical conditions of the Black Sea area: at the end of 1991 the Soviet state passed to the history books, so that a plurality of new regional actors emerged in the Black Sea cooperation scheme.

In that particular context, the Foreign Ministers of the riparian states met in Istanbul, on 3 February 1992, and initialed the political document, opening the way for the signature in the historic city of Istanbul, on 25 June 1992, of the *Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation* [5] by the Heads of State and Government from 11 countries [6]. Laying the ground for that kind of cooperation, the participating states reaffirmed their political will to develop constructive and peaceful

relations, based on the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, currently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe = OSCE), to facilitate the development of market economy and partnership relations and to strengthen the respect for human rights in the region [7]. It was just the beginning of a cooperation structure [8] that has been severely affected since its inception by the crisis situations in its neighborhood: on the one hand by the post-Yugoslav succession crisis; and on the other hand by the security problems emerged north of the Black Sea after the fall of the USSR, where the so-called „frozen conflicts” began to make their presence felt [9].

As for the attitude of the Romanian government with reference to this initiative, it was clearly expressed by the then Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase on 3 February 1992, at the Istanbul ministerial meeting. The Romanian dignitary made in that occasion a large number of proposals with the aim to ensure a more structured posture for the Black Sea cooperation. Among the Romanian proposals there were those advocating for: the establishment of a „Foreign Trade and Investment Bank of the Black Sea”; the development of a „Feasibility study for the creation of an EFTA type free trade area between participating states”; or „the setting up of an institutional framework for economic cooperation in the Black Sea area”, to be seen as „a kind of joint body to ensure consistency of the whole project” [10]. On the other hand – and again before the official launching of this cooperation initiative in Istanbul –, it was the head of the Romanian diplomacy that promoted the idea that the Black Sea „could become in the near future an attractive area for Western investment, especially if one takes into account its connection with Rhine-Main-Danube Channel, which allows for faster access to resources and important markets outside Europe” [11].

At the time of its launching, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation was received with particular interest by the Romanian independent foreign policy analysis, but that interest was expressed in a contradictory manner, ranging from the optimistic approach that this form of cooperation „has revived the interest of the European organizations for Romania” [12], to the rather pessimistic one that perceives this initiative as „going far beyond its region and becoming for the countries of Eastern Europe a secondary framework for their own security” [13]. However, as seen from the Western world, this initiative was in no time perceived as a form of cooperation relevant for the former Communist states’ aspiration to come closer to the European Union and NATO [14], but rather as a mechanism for those countries relations with the former Soviet area [15].

The *second dimension* I want to address brings to light the fact that the importance Romania attached to its participation in the sub-regional organizations, and in this context to the Black Sea initiative, was based on a concept that the authorities in Bucharest publicly defined in 1991. Thus, on 6 March 1991 the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document with the title „*Romania’s Security Policy*” [16], which emphasized that „the radical transformations taking place in Europe, particularly the changes in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, have brought to the forefront of the concerns shared by many European countries the search for new ways and means to ensure their security protection”. The document stated as well that this search had „a more acute character in Eastern Europe, largely in the context of the right decision that led to the abolition of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact”.

Against that background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategy document advocated for a security policy of Romania that should have been designed in a number of principal lines of action, and further developed on several levels, as follows:

- a „General European level”, which had in view to „further develop and strengthen the security component of the CSCE process”;

- a „Sub-regional level”, which had the goal to actively promote the cooperation programs with countries in the region to which Romania belonged, particularly the Balkan Forum, the setting up of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the definition and the implementation of some complex cooperation projects among the Danube countries, respectively;

- a „Bilateral level”, which, by means of concluding new friendship and cooperation treaties „with all neighboring states and other European countries and from other continents”, aimed, *inter alia*, „to prevent any situation in their mutual relations that was likely to affect their national security”;

- a „National level”, which was „to stimulate the development of a modern and efficient economy, to achieve the unity of action of all Romanians inside the country and abroad in promoting the national interests, and to ensure a modern and efficient defense capability, respectively”;

- Finally, a „Global level”, which emphasized the role of the UN in promoting the international law and justice.

As regards the „Sub-regional level”, it is worth highlighting the explicit mentioning of the Black Sea cooperation along with the Balkan Project and the Danube Project, as well as the specification that „the connection with security of these cooperation programs consists in that they are designed to help maintaining and strengthening stability in those areas”. The document stated that the defining feature of all three sub-regional projects consisted in their open character, as long as „all of them were conceived as parts of the CSCE process and were designed to help speeding it up”. However, the document was also keen to mark their differences as compared with other sub-regional projects in the Central-European area, and in this respect it made specific references to the „Pentagonal Initiative” and the „Trilateral Group” (i.e. the structures that afterwards transformed themselves into the Central European Initiative and the Visegrad Group, respectively).

The basic ideas of this internal document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were translated into the actions Romania promoted at least during the first half of 1991. Above all, its conceptual lines were further developed by way of a document Romania distributed to the CSCE participating States on the occasion of the first Meeting, held in Berlin, on 19-20 June 1991, of the Council of Ministers of the pan-European forum [17]. Entitled „The European Architecture and the Strengthening of Security in Europe”, this document was oriented by the belief that the „building-up of an efficient all-European security and co-operation system will take a considerable time”. Based on that assumption, the document made clear the Romanian approach to the way forward: „throughout the transition period, until reaching this objective, the European architecture will consist of the institutions which exercise, each one in its own sphere of activity, essential functions in the fields of security, co-operation and human rights. The main such institutions are those of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the EEC, the NATO and the WEU”. It is very much interesting to note that the way the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceived in June 1991 the re-making of the European security system was closely linked to the developments in the European debate on this issue [18], and found itself reflected in what the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome defined as a system of „interlocking institutions” [19].

As far as the Sub-regional co-operation was concerned, the Romanian document called for the „Promotion of sub-regional co-operation programmes, based on the CSCE principles, as means of accelerating the development of the States in the respective areas, of hastening their integration into the main European structures, and of consolidating sub-regional and all-European stability and security”, for then making clear that „The Romanian Government is particularly interested in the implementation of such sub-regional co-operation programmes in the Balkans, in the Black Sea zone and in the Danube’s area”.

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- [5] For the text of this document, see the website of the organization: <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul1992.pdf>.
- [6] The 11 Participation States – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russian Federation, Romania, Ukraine and Turkey – adopted as well the *Bosphorus Declaration* (see <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Bosphorus%201992.pdf>).
- [7] Para 13 of the 1992 *Summit Declaration* stipulated that the fields of cooperation considered by the participants were: „transport and communications, including their infrastructure; informatics; exchange of economic and commercial information, including statistics; standardization and certification of products; energy; mining and processing of mineral raw materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries; veterinary and sanitary protection; health care and pharmaceuticals; science and technology”.
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[16] An internal document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that was published by former Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase (*op.cit.*, p. 262-264), and reprinted in Mihail Dobre, *România la sfârșitul Războiului Rece. Statut geopolitic și opțiuni de securitate*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2011, p. 346-349.

[17] This Romanian concept paper was distributed, as an official document, on 17 June 1991, few days before the Berlin session of the CSCE Council of Ministers. The text of this document, in Mihail Dobre, *op.cit.*, p. 359-362.

[18] For instance, during the preparation of the „Conference on the Future of European Security” (Prague, 25-26 April 1991), the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of 9 April 1991 expressed the view that „the best means of ensuring stability and development in tomorrow’s Europe would be by means of a harmonious interaction between the key institutions of the European security architecture, all fully respecting their own missions - the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, Western European Union and the Council of Europe”. Cf. Jiri Dienstbier, *The Future of European Security. Prague Conference Confirms Agreement on Basic Ideas*, in „NATO Review”, vol. 39, no. 3, June 1991, p. 22-27.

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COMECON Revival: Comradely Mutual Assistance or Mutual Exploratory

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Abstract: *The Cold War, the last great hegemonic war, brings a reinvention of the conventional method in order to settle such disputes. The emergence of the nuclear weapon led to almost total removal of military confrontation between the major powers. Therefore, hegemonic war was directed toward economics. The appearance on the interacting scene of two economic organizations with supranational valences: EEC and COMECON enabled the two superpowers to solve on this path the struggle for global supremacy. Each of the two organizations promoted their own form of economic interaction, but the goal was mutual. This aim, transposed into the most current terms, is known as Globalization.*

Keywords: *COMECON, economic, economic integration, plans coordinates.*

The fall of “Iron Curtain” was meant to bring the long-dreamt postwar order, the one that East European states had waited for nearly 50 years. Although historiography gave a secondary importance to the struggle waged in the economic sphere, it is more than positive that the stake of this confrontation was exactly that one. Each of the two competitors banked everything on such an economic organization that was designed from the outset in order to impose its own economic system to the other Party. COMECON [1] is the organization created at the strategic initiative of Stalin, who was close to become the winning card in the hands of Khrushchev and who today represents to many of us a great unknown.

Since its founding in January 1949, was designed as a subordination instrument to the Kremlin satellite states. Nevertheless, through the voice of Gheorghiu Dej, Romania assumed the initiative of setting up this structure: „The initiative of discussing this issue belongs to our party’s leadership [2].” By creating this organization, the soviets initially targeted only the rejection of the Marshall Plan for East European states, exercising directly their economic control through mixed societies. Alexandru Barladeanu, one of the most important representatives of Romania in COMECON, explains in his memories that the Soviets began to grant such a great importance to the organization, placing it on the same level with the Cominform [3]. Starting with 1954, on the background of the attempts of de-Stalinization along with the leisure of politics towards European satellites, the Soviet leadership reconsidered the role this organization should have had.

On the occasion of the fourth session of COMECON held in March 26-27th in Moscow, is initiated the substitution of the order which the organization was functioning, with clearly avowed intention to increase economic cooperation between Member States and also to achieve a better coordination of economic development plans of the Member States [4]. COMECON reorganization started by creating the permanent Secretariat with headquarters in Moscow and other 13 standing committees specialized in manufacturing branches. In this manner, it was intended to transfer the responsibility from political sphere to technocratic zone. This reassignment foreshadowed the intentions of the Soviet authorities to convert the organization into a supranational organism through which would have been achieved the economic control of Member States. The most important of COMECON reforming proposals, forward by the Soviets at that time, aimed at tightening relations between Member States and achieving national plans coordination. This initiative sought avoiding overlapping of production, situation that would have led to recording economically unjustified losses for all Member States.

The main task of the new secretary of COMECON, A. Pavlov, elected during this session, was to organize a regular session of the Council, in which the representatives of the Member States should establish a common way regarding the coordination of plans in the development of large industrial units, and also a common strategy regarding the attitude to be adopted in trading with Western states. Besides these stipulations, it was brought into question the concept of “comradely mutual assistance”, by which states from the Eastern bloc would have mobilized under the common banner of mutual aid and would have provide economic aid to GDR, especially agro-food products. Rates and material types to be sent to East Germany were established, Romania assuming the obligation to deliver 6,800 tons of meat. The other states were to deliver both food supplies and raw materials: Hungary delivered 13,800 tons of meat, Bulgaria 1,100 tons, Poland 780,000 tons of hard coal and Czechoslovakia a quantity of metallurgical coke according to consumption needs of Germany [5].

The session, which was to enshrine the new development line of the Communist states, brought also the first disagreements between economically developed states and least developed ones within the bloc. Romania was part of the second category, and the role incumbent upon it was not approved by the Communist leaders in Bucharest. According to this viewpoint, our country systematically refused to export unprocessed raw materials. Czechoslovakia was the first of the importing countries that protested against the Romanian government’s decision to stop exporting raw oil. The Czechoslovak view received support from the Bulgarian, German and Polish representatives, who argued the need for oil processing in refineries that are on the territory of other countries [6].

Regarding the new announced principle of national plans coordination, in order to avoid a possible overlap in production between Member States, during the same session it was decided that each one of them should establish a number of priority areas. Their choice should have been based on specific characteristics of each country, as well as on the existence on their territory of the raw materials required by the development of that industrial branch[7]. Romania was recommended specializing in the domain of iron and steel metallurgy, coke-chemical and chemical agents industries[8], its strengths consisted on its rich resources of oil, methane gas, salt, reed and wood. As for the car industry, Romanian authorities established as priorities the development of the field regarding construction of oil equipment, crawler and wheel tractors, agricultural machinery, construction of ships, freight wagons, diesel locomotives, electrical plants and machines for the food industry as well as a wide range of consumption goods [9]. This Romanian initiative of continuing the development of its own economy was severely sanctioned the developed states within the Communist bloc, which considered this as an autarkic tendency, within it’s not found a unitary vision of developing the entire socialist camp [10].

During May 21-22nd 1954, the representatives of COMECON member states gathered in Prague to decide the conditions necessary to restart at large-scale the trade with capitalist countries. It was foreseen an intensification of the commercial trades, especially with less economically developed states, with which it was desired the conclusion of the long-term commercial agreements, endeavoring to establish outlets for products spread all over the Communist bloc states. During the meeting in Prague, it was confirmed the position that the Soviets imposed to the Communist states with regard to their relations with Yugoslavia. This Communist country was going to be treated like a capitalist state without being made any commercial facilities [11]. The Soviets would still take several precautions, prohibiting export to a series of products with strategic importance for the economy of the Communist states. There were restricted mainly the exports of copper, lead, zinc, aluminum and metallurgical coke[12]. Realizing the great importance of the Western currency within commercial trade, Soviets would approve Member States to export the products required by trading partners, without claiming the importation of similar products [13], thus achieving not only a trade surplus in the relations with those, but also establishing a foreign exchange reserves that would have allowed the purchase of far more important products to their economy.

The issue of national plans coordination was also resumed at the Fifth Session held in March 1955, when representatives of Member States resumed the negotiations with regard to industrial sectors that were to be developed by each state. It was decided unanimously that this matter was to be

discussed at expert level during September – October, the same year, in Moscow. Debates on this topic became increasingly intensive, while the negotiations concerning the project regarding machine construction failed to be approved. Decision on adoption of a common point of view regarding this issue was postponed for the next session of COMECON [14].

As part of the Sixth Session of COMECON that took place in Budapest, during December 7-11th 1955, participating countries decided the necessity of concluding the long-term commercial agreements for the period of 1956-1960, along with the achievement of economic specialization in the field of machine construction. Requests for additional exports of laminates from Czechoslovakia to the other socialist states received negative opinion justified by the lack of production capacity. The participating states recommended that each of them should produce only certain car models. Four tons truck were planned to be produced in Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and GDR. Czechoslovakia, due to its strong industrial tradition, was also entrusted with the production of twelve tons trucks. As for road passenger transport, Member States were divided into two categories: manufactures of personal vehicles and of bus. For the first category, highly industrialized states qualified: Czechoslovakia, GDR and Poland, and for the second one: only Hungary. Romania was due to produce along with Poland and Czechoslovakia 37-40 hp wheeled tractors and 27-40 crawler tractors, while high output power 55-60 hp tractors was set for GDR. Taking into account the predominant agricultural orientation of Romania, especially at corn crops, our country was assigned for manufacturing corn harvesting combines, specialization shared with Hungary. Production of rolling stock designed for railways was another item on the agenda. The Commission recommends continuing the production of steam locomotives in Romania and Poland, our country being assumed also the production of Diesel locomotives with 301-1000 CP engines and exclusively the four-axle tanks. As for the production of passenger wagons, most of the Member States, except Albania, were drawn as their expertise their manufacturing [15].

According to the principles mutually agreed upon between Member States of COMECON, each one of them was to take a complex specialization of all branches of production, allowing an equalization of national economies. Romania was one of the states that wanted, in an altogether particular way, to implement this type of specialization, allowing the achievement of a complex interconnection, on how each state should carry out certain components that were to be assembled in plants outside the national territory. This would have led to the removal of the possibility that only some Member States should focus on all branched of production, thus eliminating the competition of the other members:

“Cooperation in production is a form of specialization, in which two or more countries specialize in production of subassemblies which they deliver to one of them for assembling in order to satisfy the needs of such finished products of all the states that cooperate including the export to different countries[16].”

In 1956 it was decided that each Member State should specialize in production of certain types of equipment and machinery. GDR and Czechoslovakia requested the right to manufacture most of the products considered for specialization, because of their long industrial tradition as well as their specialists and equipment far much better than the others'[17]. The project failed mainly because in order to cover the increase demand for such products, the two countries were compromising the quality and their products were rejected by the partners.

During COMECON Sessions held in Bucharest in June 1958 and in Prague in December the same year, proposals were made in order to strengthen to cooperation in the field of metallurgical and chemical industries that affected the development of these sectors in all member countries. Along with the formulation of these ideas, A. Stepanyan, one of the greatest Soviet theorists, developed his famous thesis on the evolution more or less equal towards Communism [18]. The author emphasizes the need for cooperation between COMECON Eastern European states, even if it involves an economic evolution, slightly different according to the development level, a cooperation aiming at the achievement of a single common objective: “simultaneous transition towards Communism [19]”.

In this economic project, Romania had an awkward posture, passing successively through a series of steps from the position of Stalin's puppet to that of dissident in the period of Nikita Khrushchev's government. Since November 1956, the Communist – nationalist policy of Gheorghiu Dej outlined the main elements that would have led to a separation of policy dictated from Moscow. The Romanian initiative targeted in principle a distancing in order to allow a normal economical development without affecting the Communist values in which they found themselves entirely. The solution chosen by Dej implied a massive involvement of all staff in leadership positions within the state, invoking the principle of collective leadership [20], by which were traced major responsibilities to each of them. In this way, he would have been able to hide eventual errors behind less important characters in the state leadership and he also tried to deceive the vigilance of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on the matter of the adoption of decisions in the Romanian state.

In witness of such a policy is also the statement of Silviu Brucan who asserted that in a November evening of 1956, Dej would have summoned him to his office making a confession: "*his intention to cause a distancing from Moscow*[21]". To achieve this plan, he initiated a strategy to cover the real intentions which sought to be made in three directions: national economy's growth and consolidation, political stability of the system and extinction of potential outbreaks of conflict, as well as the establishment of a external relations system that would ensure international stability in the event of a sudden rupture from the USSR.

The intention to disconnect from Moscow had to be based mainly on an improvement of the results achieved by the Romanian economy, which according to official assessments from the years 1951-1955 presented serious failures. Contrary to the Soviets will of suspending the development of heavy industry projects, Gheorghiu Dej insisted on maintaining its sustained pace of development in the detriment of other branches: "*The progress of our country is in direct and unmediated connection with the progress of our country's industrialization*[22]." Among the most important economic deficiencies it stands a disproportionate development of certain economic branches, especially in heavy industry category, in industrial building without economic justification and in financing excessive military investments programs compared with the real threat against the national security[23]. Also referring to the targets set for the second five-years plan (1956-1960), Gheorghiu Dej emphasizes the urgent need of taking decisions designed to prevent the resumption of such errors. On the basis of certain stipulations mutually agreed upon within the Eighth Session of COMECON held on June 18-22nd, 1957, Warsaw [24] and of the discussions held between members of the Central Committee within the CC plenary session of the RWP, November 1st 1958, he pledged to draft the economic planning for a longer period of time [25]. In this regard it was nominated a commission consisting of the most important leading economists of the country under the leadership of Alexandru Barladeanu, that were to establish a development program for a period of 10-15 years (1960-1975).

The main directions taken into account pursued to continue the pace of industrial development, particularly in heavy industry and machine building domains. Romania was going to get into a new phase, where development should be focused mainly on the valorization of local raw material resources, while as for technology acquisitions they were to be purchased from the states that provided cutting-edge technology, even if it should have been acquired from the West. In the agriculture field, our country was to increase the amount of grain produced per hectare, by the industrialization of agriculture and by the implementation of modern plan cultivation systems [26]. They aimed also for the incensement of technical plants cultivation and the number of animals in the new agricultural state units. The economic development model of Romania remains, at least for now, the Soviet one, the one which made it possible for USSR to move from being a backward agricultural country to being the world's economic superpower. Moreover, Romanian specialists that were to create the new concept of economic development were mostly graduates of universities in USSR.

The strategy of building the economic and political Romanian identity was built on the foundation according to which this could have been achieved only as a result of a moderate approach to diplomatic relations, both with the Soviet side, from which it was expected the providing of cheap raw materials, and with the Western states, from where it was intended the acquisition of industrial

technology and high performance equipment. Relations with other Communist countries, particularly with China, were regarded with great interest, especially to ensure the strategic balance in relation to the giant from the East. Acute exacerbation of the relations between the two giants of the Communist world: China and USSR, gave Romania the chance to deal with sensitive issues from a different position than the previous one, representing a strict subordination to Moscow [27]. From this moment, Romania led by Gheorghiu Dej and later by Nicolae Ceausescu, will initiate the largest national emancipation movement of the Eastern Bloc states, primarily based on the economic leverages.

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Interstate Production Centers: Reality and Desideratum in the Enlarged Area of the Black Sea

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Abstract: *The study of economic development regions represented a major concern for the Soviet authorities placed in a race against time in order to impose economic supremacy in relation to ideological opponent U.S. For a short time, it was stated that such a form of organization can represent the key to success. After more than 50 years since the astounding failure of this attempt of economic development, this sort of approach seems to offer the solution to this prolonged economic crisis that the European continent is crossing. The industry's approach to raw materials, the most important of thesis supported by the Soviets, could revive into the global race the frailties of European economy. Such a thesis adapted to current conditions seems more present than ever, and the idea of territorial production complexes makes space slow but steady for European economic development regions. Coming years will certainly prove whether the current EU components are able to continue or not to go together.*

Keywords: *Economic development complex, region, industry, resources.*

The concept of economic regionalization was a major concern of both ideological blocs throughout the Cold War, each seeking their own solutions for implementing these goals. The Soviets were identifying a functional administrative-economic model at the level of USSR, which later they sought to implement to the satellite states. This concept had nothing to do with the old territorial entities existing in that area and did not plan to meet the national borders drawn on the basis of international standards existing at that time. One of the fiercest supporters of the concept of unitary economic development of the entire socialist bloc, G. Sorokin, corresponding member of USSR Academy of Science, noted in one of his articles that effective development of all branches of production at the level of entire camp was restricted by "national boundaries"[1]. The idea of creating interstate economic development centers took by surprise the international public opinion and especially the two satellite states in the Danube – Black Sea region, Romania and Bulgaria, nominated "guinea pigs" in the draft of intergovernmental economic development. Both popular democracies, the states were to cede the prerogatives of the economic sovereignty to an interstate economic-administrative region set up along the lower course of the Danube.

This delicate issue was the headline of numerous publications both in the Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and especially in the Western part of Europe and in the U.S. The idea of Soviet economists E.B. Valev to create economic developments zones in several countries without taking too much into account the national boundaries aroused wide debates at that time. The central concept of his thesis was the establishment of a pilot region for economic development within the Danubian districts in Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR, which was intended to highlight the common feature of that region: similar condition regarding relief, climate and soil, predominantly agricultural specialization, agricultural raw material industrial processing capacity and geographical transport conditions community [2]. His article was based on a series of economic research on the economic recovery of the Lower Danube region, which was to specialize in particular on the exploitation of local raw materials or imported from USSR raw materials having as main transport route the Danube, which became the central axis of the region. Originally published in the Soviet magazine "Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitet"[3] and republished in the Romanian magazine "The Economic Life", the article was the subject of endless debates between the Romanian and the Soviet part, each trying to justify the weaknesses or the strengths of the project in accordance with their national interests.

Valev's ideas can be found in several studies from research institutes in fields of geography and economy from the Soviet Union. In the framework of the CC Twentieth Congress of CPSU from

December 1956 and February 1957 [4], there were established the elements that were to be proved scientifically in order to create economic development regions. Concrete tasks were outlined to researchers from the USSR Academy of Science and to those who were part of scientific academies from union republics. The tasks regarded the development of complex materials needed to enhance the natural resources within the Soviet Union. The results of this research were to be valued in order to raise labor productivity, in a first phase only within the Soviet regions and lately throughout the Communist world. It seems that Valev developed this plan in order to test the efficacy of this idea at international level.

Scientific organizations mandated to develop the functionality of future economic development regions established particular standards according to which large economic centers were to be designed. For most of these industrial objectives (coal mines, metallurgical plants, machine building plants, power plants, electric power transportation system, railways or irrigation channels) perspective projection of economic development for the entire center was needed. They could not be found isolated, but only as part of a large industrial gear, which sought in that way to fully utilize the resources of the region. N.N. Kolosovsky, professor in the Department of Economic and Social Geography of Russia, developed this concept trying to impose it into the attention of the Soviet politicians as a viable alternative to production branches planning, to which it was given a special attention throughout the 1930. His concepts could be taken into account because they had been also verified practically through economic planning for Angara, a region located in the far eastern Siberia[5].

The territorial distribution of these economic mastodons should have considered primarily the electricity production capacity, using multiple sources. This very detailed planning, which could cover, according to official recommendations, periods between 10 and 15 years, allowed the national decision-makers to incorporate in the national economic development planning the secure items that could be extracted from each region planning [6]. Locating the industrial objectives had to take into account a number of statistical indicators regarding consumption per capita of that type of product, the density of inhabitants' number, the national peculiarities of that type of traditionally work done in that region and a series of data concerning other social and climatic conditions found in that region [7].

The Soviets tried to argue the need to create an economic development region through a series of theses emphasizing the fact that the transitions of these countries from a popular democracy to communism should be based mainly on structural economic changes that will cease to value the individual benefit at the expense of collective welfare. This type of theories received a contribution of value by the involvement of political key factors while the speech of the Soviet president, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered during the Twentieth Congress of CPSU represented the climax of the desideratum:

"... when there is about the strong community of socialist countries and when their defense and security capacity are based on the industrial strength of the entire socialist camp, each popular democracy European country may specialize in the development of those industries, in the production of those types of products that have the most favorable natural and economic conditions. It also creates the prerequisites needed to release significant means for agricultural and light industrial development and on this basis, also to more fully satisfy the material and cultural needs of peoples."[8]

Through the arguments raised in the thesis developed by Valev, he tries to emphasize the serious dependence of the Danubian countries on raw materials from USSR, especially in heavy industry regions within Soviet Ukraine, Donbas and Dnieper area. He argued his ideas by using studies that had treated the possibility of joint use, in order to increase the value of raw materials sources within certain geographical areas, particularly in the South of Romania. He brought into attention the theses of T. Zhivkov[9], H. Ovciarov, J. Jabimski [10], G. Sorokin [11], G. Karhin [12] and Groza Octavian [13] by which he argued the need for joint exploitation of existing resources in that area of development. He particularly emphasized a series of works promoted during the Fourth Congress of the USSR Society of Geography, held in May 25-30th 1964, Moscow.

The idea of maximizing the benefits from processing resources at mine sites in the giant industrial centers was raised for the first time in the early 1920s in the former USSR. The term of “territorial production center”, established to justify the new “to-be” promoted concept, highlights the form of organizing economic activities in an area where the current various economic entities find themselves in an interdependent relationship, strong enough to create the image of a single administrative-territorial entity. Soviet geographers agreed that any area where activities overlap strong enough to cause mutual dependency may become a territorial production center. The examples used to illustrate the viability of this concept were Kuznetsk and Novosibirsk.

The concept of center development comes to improve the content of the old national syntagm of “economic development region” by bringing centralized planning system that proposed the location of new industrial sites in the targeted areas developed to complement the existing production flow at that time [14]. The development of the idea of center and labor social and territorial division is conceived as a combination of the elements drawn from the national economy with the elements planned for development by each region:

“The complex region development is based on the rationalization of economic links between regions and on the approaching of the enterprises to the sources of raw materials and to the consuming regions what contributes to wasteful transportation reduction and to social work economizing.”[15]

The need for practical evaluation of this concept determined the Gosplan to propose a new concept to be implemented “GOLERO”[16]. According to the specifications made by Lenin (“*Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the entire country*”[17]), the Soviet leadership foresaw a new territory reorganization plan. USSR was to be divided into eight regions with their own development system: South, Central, North, Ural, Volga, Turkmenistan, Caucasus and Western Siberia. The plan aimed at the construction of new units for energy production, especially hydropower units that would have generate an increase of the existing capacity from 1.9 million kWh to 8.8 million kWh. There were proposed to be made 10 hydro-energetic projects, which totalized would have generated over 640 MW. They would have been located throughout the USSR: Valkhov, Nizhni-Svir and Vrkhne-Svir in the Nordic region, Chusov in the Urals, Dnepr in the South, Tersk, Kuban and Krasnodar in the Caucasus, Altai in Siberia and Turkmen in Turkmenistan. Golero proved to be a great success: in only 10 years the energy capacity had increased to 1719 MW, and in another 5 years, it reached no less than 4345 MW, exceeding the original plan by 248% [18]. This ambitious development plan involves, among others, the creation of new area of economic development and the establishment of a lasting cooperation between them. The new centers would specialize in production of a certain type of finite elements, all of which provide a common energy basis.

According to Soviet specialists, the planned distribution of production within the country is based on an extension of electricity networks:

“Even since the Golero Plan, it was foreseen the territorial distribution of the industry on a new technical basis, on electrification.”[19]

“We cannot foresee that the rationalization of our industry will be accompanied by a significant geographic resettlement within the country for the purpose of a possible approach of the manufacturing industry with the main sources of raw materials and fuel or with the general economic considerations. The huge role wholly-electrification has in this process is undoubtedly because the existence of a cheap and convenient energy forms a basis for a rapidly creation of the various industrial branches within these regions.”[20]

I.G. Feighin draws a parallel between the proposed system and the existing one in Russia during the Tsarist period when the Russian Empire acquired 40% of its electrical energy from coal brought from great distances, even from England, while the remaining 60% of oil being brought as coal, from even larger distances. Precisely for not repeating this kind of mistakes that would have produced great damage to the national economy, Feighin proposed a large energy system based mainly on the hydropower potential of the country.

Developing the energy basis, considered to be vital to relocating large industrial centers, was focused on multiple directions. It was intended to be used mainly for local reserves of coal and bituminous shale in addition to the electricity produced by large hydropower to be built centers. The second great problem sought to be solved was to build a gigantic system of high voltage lines to connect the main industrial centers of energy tanks, thus ensuring judicious use of electricity and also the development of agriculture and electrified rail networks. Achieving such a strategy would have made possible even greater production flexibility depending on consumption. [21]

Director of the committee to create the framework to implementing this concept, I.G. Aleksandrov established a set of criteria from which the territorial division of these regions to be made. The conditions absolutely required for the implementation of this idea expected a very good transportation network within the regions and a industrial specialization of the region taking into account the peculiarities of the area, the previous experience of the inhabitants and the implications linked to the social and environmental costs.[22]

The image model agreed upon in order to represent the new regions to be made, consisted on a production aggregate with a specialty clearly defined at a national level, in which the other elements to be interconnected with it, not only as the result of geographical location, but also as the result of jointly implementing the outcomes of the most advanced scientific researches. [23]

The plan concerning the development of future economic regions must be in accordance with both the local interest but especially to improve the efficiency of the national interest. It should be scientifically correct and it should meet the expectation regarding the development of each region proposed to specialization. The political factor that triggered this research aimed in theoretical terms at strengthening and broadening the role of local authorities in leading and developing the national economy. It also aimed to create the optimal conditions in abolishing the “departmental barriers”, which from their point of view restricted the developing ability of the economic centers that were not benefitting from judicious use of huge reserves of raw materials. [24]

The Soviet academician, V. Nemcirov, also deals with the fundamental issues related to regional economic development study and proposes as a solution the reorganization of the almost 70 economic and administrative regions that were found within the SFSR Ruse and their merging in only 7 major development regions. He argues this by the fact that local governance structures are more able to perform economic organizing functions than the structure defined as “*amorphous*” – Planning State Committee of RSFSR:

“Only if the large regions will take the social-juridical form of the national economy organization, in other words, if they will become regional links of the economic union; only then, regions will become an objective economic reality and not only an economic – geographical experimental category.”[25]

Perhaps the greatest upholder of this new form of organization was the president of USSR, Nikita Khrushchev. In September 1962, by publishing the article “Current issues in the development of the socialist world system”, he launches a series of older theses that were envisaging the establishment of a single plan production: the joint carrying out of enterprises, whose production would be directed by common agreement between the participating states, and the achieving of technical-productive branches unions [26]. In the view of Khrushchev, economic splitting had to be confused with the administration one [27]. In this material he used for the first time the term “economic administrative region”, which highlighted the full proposal of the division, not only in an economic way, but also in an administrative one.

Supporting the necessity to achieve the unity between economic and administrative division weighted very much when Khrushchev through the voice of Valev tried to impose the implementation plan of the Danubian economic center. The possible intentions of the Soviet leader were to create economic zones directly subordinate to supranational structures, in this case COMECON, through which the Soviets could control directly the economy of the satellite states. This initiative, if it were to be materialized, it would be able to constitute a powerful counterweight to world economy globalization initiated by the Americans around the same period.

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